

# Migration and migration policies in The Netherlands 2004

Dutch SOPEMI -Report 2004

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# Preface

This is the fourth Dutch SOPEMI report compiled by a group of Rotterdam researchers associated with Ercomer-Rotterdam and the Rotterdam Institute for Social Policy Research (RISBO). This report was commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Justice and the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. In The Netherlands the Ministry of Justice is responsible for both migration policies and immigrant integration.

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# The changing Dutch immigration regime

## 1.1 The end of multiculturalism in The Netherlands

The official Dutch policies in the fields of immigration and immigrant integration went through various 'paradigm changes' in recent decades. Until the early 1980's the Dutch government considered immigration as a temporary phenomenon. From this perspective immigrant integration was not considered as important or even as an impediment to the (expected and desired) return of immigrants to their home countries. The alienation of immigrants (mainly so-called 'guest workers') alienated from their home countries and home culture was to be prevented. In the early 1980's the Dutch government formally acknowledged that immigration was rather a permanent phenomenon. The immigrants were here to stay. To verbalize this new approach immigrant groups were reframed as 'ethnic minorities' – that is minorities within Dutch society. However, official policies related to these immigrant or minority groups changed only partly. On the one hand immigrant groups were to integrate in Dutch society, but on the other hand they were to preserve their own culture and cultural identity. "Integration with preservation of cultural identity" was the slogan of immigrant integration policies in those days.

During the early 1990's the Dutch immigrant integration policies changed again because of the serious economic crisis that hit immigrant groups even harder than the native Dutch population. Dutch integration policies became more focused on the integration of immigrants in Dutch society, particularly on labour market integration. The 'identity approach' of the 1980's was traded in for a new 'integration approach' of the 1990's (Hoppe 1993; Entzinger 2004). Subsequently, 'ethnic minority policies' were now reframed as 'integration policies', a phrase that is still in use. However, although some observers interpreted this new policy focus as a real paradigm shift, others established that actual practices did not change very much. The only real change was the introduction of compulsory language and introduction courses

for newcomers in 1998. However, this also shows how long it can take for new policy perspectives to be translated into actual policy programs. Meanwhile, after the Millennium Change and especially after 9/11 there was a remarkable hardening of the Dutch public and political debates about immigration and immigrant integration in The Netherlands. In these harsher debates about immigration and integration again a new perspective came up, focusing less on socio-economic issues and social deprivation of non-Western immigrants and more on the (assumed) 'cultural clash' between the native Dutch population and immigrants, especially those coming from Muslim countries.

The Dutch political debate about immigration and immigrant integration became even more heated by the sudden rise and the subsequent assassination of the populist political leader, Pim Fortuyn. Fortuyn strongly argued against the notion of The Netherlands as a multicultural society. In his book 'Against the Islamification of Culture' he expressed his worries about the threatened Dutch identity (Fortuyn 2001a). In a later political pamphlet Fortuyn simply stated that Islam and its culture could be dominant in their part of the world, but that 'we' are dominant in Europe. Those coming from non-Western countries have to adjust to a Western way of life and to Western values (Fortuyn 2001b: 154). Despite his assassination, early 2002, Fortuyn caused a landslide in Dutch politics. The government of social democrats and liberals were replaced by a more conservative government.

After Fortuyn's violent death, a young member of parliament with a Somalian background, Ms. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, became a prominent spokesperson for the critics of multiculturalism. She heavily criticized the suppression of and violence against women in Muslim communities and sometimes she extended her criticism to Islam in general. Together with the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh she made a controversial film 'Submission' in which texts of the Quran were projected on nude female bodies. In November 2004, an Islamic extremist of Moroccan origin killed Van Gogh because he considered the film an insult to Islam. All these violent incidents and public debates contributed to a public climate in which skepticism or plain criticism of multiculturalism – in short, the idea one has to accept different cultures within society – became rather common in The Netherlands.

What did these events mean for public policies in the field of immigration and immigrant integration? The current Centre/Rightist government, formed by Christian Democrats and liberals, publicly advocates more "selective and

restrictive immigration policies"<sup>1</sup> and a strong effort to 'integrate' non-Western immigrants and ethnic minorities already living in The Netherlands into Dutch society. Ms. Verdonk, the current minister of Immigration and Integration (I&I), verbalized this new perspective on immigration and immigrant integration in her letter to the Dutch parliament *Integration Policy New Style* (2003). This policy document can be characterised as a farewell to multiculturalism as the cornerstone of Dutch integration policy: "In this integration policy, a great deal of emphasis has been traditionally put on accepting differences between minorities and the native Dutch population. In itself, there is nothing wrong with that, but it is often interpreted to mean the presence of new ethnic groups is a good thing and automatically enriches our society. One loses sight of the fact that not everything that is different is consequently also good. Having newcomers cultivate their own cultural identities does not necessarily bridge any gaps. The unity of society should be sought in what the people who take part in it have in common with each other, in what they share."<sup>2</sup>

In the perception of the current Dutch Cabinet, integration policies should not stress the cultural differences between various population categories; it should focus on what they have in common. The main objective of Dutch integration policy is described as "shared citizenship". According to the government, this means immigrants should speak Dutch, respect the laws and regulations and abide by "basic Dutch norms". These norms pertain to earning a living, taking care of one's surroundings, respecting other people's physical integrity and sexual preferences, and accepting the notion of equality between men and women. The aim of all this is to enable everyone "to live in freedom, autonomously design an independent life and take part in society."<sup>3</sup>

This new tougher approach of immigration and integration policies is reflected in various recent policy initiatives that are described in this introduction chapter to the 2004 Dutch SOPEMI Report. We will describe recent Dutch policy initiatives on immigration and citizenship (Section 1.2), compulsory introduction programmes for immigrants (Section 1.3), the policies on labour immigration (Section 1.4) and the asylum policy (Section 1.5) and return migration policies (Section 1.6).

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<sup>1</sup> *Hoofdlijnenakkoord* (Agreement on the Main Lines 2003).

<sup>2</sup> *Integratiebeleid nieuwe stijl*. (Integration Policy New Style). Letter from the Minister of Immigration and Integration to the Lower Chamber of the Dutch States General dated 16 September 2004.

<sup>3</sup> *Idem*.

## 1.2 Immigration and citizenship

The current Dutch government has opted for more restrictive immigration policies. The integration of non-Western immigrants and ethnic minorities that are already living in the country is considered insufficient. Ongoing immigration is therefore viewed as problematic. As is stated in recent policy documents, "Due to the continual arrival of considerable groups of non-integrated newcomers, it is impossible to see the progress immigrants and their children are making in integrating into Dutch society."<sup>4</sup>

As noted in the 2002 Dutch SOPEMI Report, marital migration and family reunification are in particular seen as problematic. As a result of ongoing marital migration, new and often poorly educated immigrants enter The Netherlands, where their chances in the labour market are limited. More generally, marital migration is often taken as evidence of the poor integration of immigrants into Dutch society. As long as young immigrants look for spouses in their countries of origin rather than in The Netherlands, they are not well integrated in Dutch society. Already in the 2000 Aliens Act various measures to limit marital migration and family reunification were taken. In 2003, the following new measures were added:

- the minimum age for marital migration was set on to 21 years (also to prevent forced marriages) (it was 18 years);
- the minimum income requirement for marital migration was increased from 100% to 120% of the official minimum existence level;
- marital migrants have to have a joint household;
- marital migrants need to pass a test of knowledge of a body of 500 common Dutch words before coming to The Netherlands.

The Dutch State has also made several proposals in the field of citizenship. The Dutch government has proposed that dual citizenship is no longer possible for third-generation immigrants. The rationale behind the new proposal is that third-generation immigrants should decide which nationality they want. Dual citizenship allows too much leeway according to the Dutch cabinet.<sup>5</sup> Another recent proposal is to give the document granting Dutch citizenship a more ceremonial aspect. The aim of both proposed measures is to strengthen the immigrants' link and loyalty to Dutch society rather than stress their own history and background.

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<sup>4</sup> Cabinet response, p. 13.

<sup>5</sup> Cabinet response, p. 13.

### **1.3 Immigrant introduction programmes**

Since 1998, The Netherlands has a system of compulsory introduction programmes for newcomers. Immigrants coming to The Netherlands are obliged to follow a one-year language and introduction course. The assumption is that by learning the Dutch language and Dutch society, immigrants are better prepared to participate in Dutch society in general and the labour market in particular. However, the ultimate objectives of the immigrant introduction programmes are more comprehensive: "The introduction programmes focus on the skills immigrants need if they are to be able to take part in Dutch society and build an independent life for themselves here, i.e. mastery of the language and knowledge of the society, particularly of the values and norms in our country. The introduction programmes are the start of an integration process that ultimately leads to the full-fledged citizenship they share with the rest of the Dutch population."<sup>6</sup> Since 2000 the immigrant introduction programmes extend to those immigrants that already lived in The Netherlands before the compulsory introduction courses for 'newcomers' were introduced. In the official jargon these immigrants already living in The Netherlands before 1998 are referred to as 'old-comers' as opposed to the newcomers that arrived in The Netherlands after 1998. Up to now, these introduction courses for 'old-comers' were on a voluntary basis. Starting 2006, the introduction courses for 'old-comers' will be compulsory as well.

An immigrant introduction programme starts with an *individual assessment*. Newly arrived immigrants are called up for an interview within four months after their arrival. The interview is to ascertain whether the immigrant needs to attend the programme and what the individual goal is to be. Immigrants coming from EU-countries and immigrants that already have sufficient command of Dutch language are exempted from the obligation to follow an introduction course. For all others an introduction contract is established. The main element of the programme is an educational course, consisting of a language course (500 hours) and an introduction to Dutch society (100 hours). After finishing the course, participants are tested on their command of the Dutch language. Immigrants living on social benefits are expected to learn enough Dutch to either attend further training courses or get a job. The level of language they are expected to be in command of is referred to as the "professional self-reliance level". Immigrants that will not become

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<sup>6</sup> Ministry of Justice, 2005 Budget.

economically active (e.g. female marital migrants) are expected to learn enough Dutch to cope with daily encounters. This level of language proficiency is referred to as the “social self-reliance level”.

In 2004, 46,500 immigrants that had arrived in The Netherlands after 1998 followed an introduction course for newcomers. On top of that, 25.500 people participated in an introduction course for ‘old-comers’ (that already lived in The Netherlands when the compulsory introduction courses for newcomers were introduced in 1998).<sup>7</sup> There is some information about the results of the immigrant introduction courses for those immigrants participating in 2003. One problem of the immigrant introduction courses, as we already reported in previous Dutch Sopedmi reports, is the premature dropout of participants. Premature dropout was high in the first years of the immigrant introduction programmes. In the 2002 Dutch SOPEMI Report we mentioned a premature dropout of 15 to 20% of all participants in newcomer courses. In more recent years (2003 and 2004) premature dropout in newcomer courses fell to 7% and 8%, mainly due to a better support of participants. In the ‘old-comer’ courses, the premature dropout is much higher. Of all participants in ‘old-comer’ courses in the period 2000-2003, one in five prematurely dropped out. The main grounds for premature dropout were gaining employment, pregnancy and moving to a different municipality. Another ground for premature dropout is insufficient childcare facilities.<sup>8</sup>

Another problem of the existing immigrant introduction programmes are the disappointing results in terms of language command at the end of the course. The aim of the immigrant introduction programmes was, as already mentioned, to provide immigrants with sufficient command of Dutch language to become economically active or follow further education (‘professional self-reliance’) or to be able to cope with daily encounters in Dutch society (‘social self-reliance’). However, the majority of all participants of the newcomers’ courses do not achieve any of these objectives. Around 60% of all participants that finished a newcomers’ introduction course in 2003 did *not* reach the level of ‘social self-reliance’ (level 2). Only 10 to 15% of all participants of newcomer introduction courses in 2003 reached the level of ‘professional self-reliance’ (level 3). Consequently, the command of Dutch language that a great part of all participants of the newcomers’ introduction courses have is insufficient to follow further education or to participate in the labour market.<sup>9</sup> When the participants start the course they have a very

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<sup>7</sup> Information: SCP, WODC, CBS, Jaarrapport integratie, pp. 29-30

<sup>8</sup> Information: SCP, WODC, CBS, Jaarrapport integratie, pp. 35; Significant 2004a; Brink et al., 2004b

<sup>9</sup> Information: SCP, WODC, CBS, Jaarrapport integratie, pp. 35; Significant 2004a;

limited knowledge of the Dutch language, which is concerned the main reason for these disappointing results. As almost 80% of all participants start at language level 0 and most of them gain only 1 language level during the course, it is obvious that most of them do not achieve the minimum required, which is level 2 or 3. Learning adequate Dutch may very well take more than 500 hours of language courses, particularly when the participants have very little education and are sometimes even illiterate.

However, the results of the 'old-comer' courses are even more disappointing. Almost 60% of all participants of 'old-comer' courses in 2003 did not achieve any progress at all, 30% of all participants only gained one language level and only 10% of all participants gained two levels or more.<sup>10</sup> These limited results of 'old-comer' courses may be the result of the voluntary nature of these courses and of characteristics of the participants. Most participants are non-Western immigrants (men and women) that have lived in The Netherlands for years, are not working or stay at home to take care of the children. Many of them have little or no prior education and are illiterate in their own language as well. Learning a foreign language appears to be extremely difficult for this target group and one should not expect significant results from them.

In response to the shortcomings of the existing immigrant introduction programmes, the Dutch Minister of Immigration and Integration announced a completely new system of these programmes. The main components of the new system, to be implemented in 2006, can be summarised as follows:

- Prior to their arrival in The Netherlands, newcomers should command some basic knowledge of the Dutch language. This is tested before immigrants arrive in The Netherlands. The test will be taken at the Dutch embassy in their country of origin.
- Compulsory participation of immigrant introduction courses is replaced by the obligation to pass a so-called immigrant introduction exam (at the latest five years after arrival in The Netherlands).
- Passing the immigrant introduction exam will be one of the preconditions to obtain an unrestricted residence permit.
- Asylum seekers have to comply with the same conditions as far as command of the Dutch language is concerned as other newcomers

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<sup>10</sup> Information: SCP, WODC, CBS, Jaarrapport integratie, pp. 35; Significant 2004b

- Immigrants themselves are responsible to learn the language, taking a course is not obliged anymore. Immigrants that do take a course have to bear the cost of the course themselves (estimated costs of the current immigrant introduction courses are around 6000 euro). These costs are partly reimbursed after passing the immigrant introduction exam successfully.
- The obligation to pass an immigrant introduction exam goes for some categories of 'old-comers' as well (particularly for immigrants living from social benefits and for women that are responsible for raising children).
- The market for immigrant introduction courses will be privatised. Up to now, immigrant introduction courses were organised by schools for vocational training. From 2006 on, anybody can organise immigrant introduction courses. Immigrants are free to take the course that suits them best.
- Municipal authorities will lose their leading role in the immigrant introduction process. Currently, municipalities more or less direct the immigrant introduction courses and control whether immigrants comply with their obligations. In the new situation the immigrant himself is responsible to learn the Dutch language and prepare to pass the immigrant introduction exam.

All in all, the proposed new system of immigrant introduction programmes will be much stricter and less subject to alteration than the existing policies because of the obligations and sanctions. The new immigrant introduction programme proposals also follow the liberal philosophy of the current Dutch Cabinet, stressing that immigrants themselves are responsible for learning Dutch and getting to know Dutch society. The requirement that immigrants themselves bear the costs of language courses also fits into the idea of personal responsibility of citizens. The partial reimbursement of these costs once the immigrant introduction exam is passed can be interpreted as another incentive to learn the Dutch language.

#### **1.4 Policy on labour migration**

The Dutch policy on labour migration is formulated in the Aliens Employment Act (Wet Arbeid Vreemdelingen, Dutch acronym: WAV). The purpose of this Act is to "selectively allow the entry of labour migrants within the framework of labour market policy and control the employment of illegal persons" (WRR



2001: 80). The Dutch government prefers to reduce the economic inactivity of the existing Dutch labour force, especially among ethnic minorities, rather than invite foreign workers to The Netherlands. However, the recruitment of temporary non-EU foreign personnel is possible under certain conditions. A Dutch employer who is unable to find an employee in the so-called priority workforce can apply for a temporary work permit (TWV) for a foreign employee. The priority workforce consists of Dutch job seekers and other job seekers from the European Economic Area (EEA). Workers from the EEA do not need a temporary work permit to work in The Netherlands. An exception is made in The Netherlands to the free mobility of EU workers concerning people from the new EU member states in Middle and Eastern Europe. Although as a EU-member they do not need a residence permit, until at least May 2006 they still need a TWV. A consequence of these regulations is that the discrepancy between the number of TWV's and the number of persons allowed in to join the labour force is increasing (see tables 3.1 and A3.1)<sup>11</sup>. Applications for a temporary work permit are assessed by the Central Organisation for Work and Income (CWI), which, among other things conducts a labour market check to assess whether job seekers from the priority workforce are available<sup>12</sup>. If so, or if the employer has made insufficient efforts to hire a Dutch or European job seeker the application will be refused. It is also possible for a temporary work permit to become permanent. After three years, the foreign worker becomes eligible for a residence permit stating 'no restrictions on work'. Around ten percent of all work permits are issued for three years and could lead to a permanent residence. In practice however most of the highly qualified workers working on a TWV granted for the maximum period of three years, leave the country after this period (Veld 2004).

Recently the Dutch cabinet has introduced new and simplified procedures for so-called knowledge migrants coming to The Netherlands. In order to stimulate highly qualified labour migration to The Netherlands, there will be a special counter for foreign workers and new admission rules for highly qualified labour migrants. Labour migrants who are able to earn more than 45.000 Euro for wage labour in the Dutch labour market are eligible for a residence permit for a maximum of five years. For labour migrants who are

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<sup>11</sup> Another reason for the difference between the number of temporary work permits at the one hand and the number of immigrants getting a permit for the motive of work is that persons working on a temporary work permit for a maximum of three months can enter the country on a visa/green card. They do not have to apply for a residence permit.

<sup>12</sup> In specific cases a labour market check is not prescribed. The cases are mainly employees of international corporate business and their partners, trainees and workers from countries with which there is a bilateral agreement like Turkey.

less than 30 years of age the income criterion is 32.600 Euro. For scientific researchers at universities, a wage criterion does not apply at all. These highly qualified labour migrants are allowed to work in The Netherlands without the obligation to hold a work permit. Within two weeks the INS (Dutch acronym: IND) can decide on an application for a (provisional) residence permit. After five years these labour migrants are authorised to receive a permanent residence permit. Surprisingly, no educational criterion is used, only a simple income criterion in order to select and attract highly qualified migrants. This new legislation, coming into force 1st October 2004, shows that different categories of labour migrants will be treated in different ways. The result is that The Netherlands is developing a selective labour migration system in which a more liberal entry policy is pursued for certain (highly qualified) categories of workers because of their positive (financial) contribution to the Dutch economy and society, while at the same time the job and residence opportunities for low or medium skilled labour migrants are allowed only for a short period (Engbersen 2003).

As noted in the 2001 and 2002 Dutch SOPEMI Reports, the number of temporary foreign workers coming to The Netherlands via the Foreign National Employment Act has increased considerably over the past few years. The total number of temporary work permits issued for foreign workers almost doubled between 1999 and 2002 from 20,000 to 35,000. In 2003, the number of temporary work permits for foreign workers increased further to 38.000 (see Chapter 4). Given this growing number of temporary foreign workers in The Netherlands, one can hardly refer to them as exceptional cases. In addition, many of the current temporary foreign workers are not knowledge migrants. In 2003, more than one third of the temporary work permits were issued for unskilled or semi-skilled work in Dutch agriculture and horticulture. Many of the temporary work permits were given to foreign workers from Central and Eastern Europe, especially Poland.

As is noted in the 2002 Dutch SOPEMI Report, the arrival of temporary workers from Central and Eastern Europe to do agricultural or horticultural work is partly the result of earlier state policy. In the past, undocumented migrants were often employed in horticultural work (Burgers and Engbersen 1999). In the Westland, a well-known Dutch horticultural region, anti-fraud checks showed that one in four businesses employed undocumented migrants (WRR 2001: 81). The employer organisations in the agricultural and horticultural sector were in favour of more lenient regulations to make it possible to legally employ Polish workers for seasonal work. In response, in

2001 the Dutch State came to an agreement with the sector organisations that made it possible to formally recruit Polish workers easily. However, since most Polish workers now demand normal wages, which some businesses are not prepared to pay, undocumented migrants, now mainly Bulgarians, are once again being recruited (Leerkes et al. 2004). We come to the conclusion that in general the government policy goal with respect to labour migration is to eliminate labour market bottlenecks by means of temporary labour migration. To this end, the Aliens Employment Act is available as a regulating instrument. The government plays a role in arriving at agreements in sectors where there is a temporary or permanent shortage of workers, such as health care, horticulture and Chinese restaurants. The recent proposal to amend the Aliens Employment Act should provide a legal basis for these agreements.

## **1.5 Dutch asylum policy<sup>13</sup>**

As in other Western countries, asylum policy continues to be a thorny political issue in The Netherlands. Following the large influx of asylum-seekers in The Netherlands in the 1990s, the Dutch State adopted a new Aliens Act in 2000. Its primary purpose is to formulate a more restrictive and efficient asylum policy, e.g. by following previous European agreements on asylum policy. Two points in this draft of European asylum policy are particularly relevant to Dutch asylum policy (see WRR 2001: 63):

- The principle of *safe countries of origin*, according to which an asylum request is declared unfounded if the asylum-seeker comes from a country considered safe by the country handling the request. "Safe" means the political, civil and human rights in the country are sufficiently guaranteed.
- The principle of *safe third countries*, designed to stop "asylum shopping", refers to the situation where an asylum-seeker has entered a country via another EU or a non-EU country that is considered safe. Since that country is safe, the asylum-seeker should have requested asylum there and the receiving country is entitled to send the asylum-seeker back there. In Europe, these instances are referred to as *Dublin cases*.

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<sup>13</sup> Our description of the current asylum policy in The Netherlands is largely based on: WRR, *Nederland als immigratiesamenleving* (The Netherlands as Immigration Society). The Hague: 2001 (in particular pp. 62-74) ([www.wrr.nl](http://www.wrr.nl)).

A crucial problem of the Dutch pre-2000 asylum policy was the lengthy procedure. It was often years before a final decision on an asylum request was made, especially if asylum-seekers appealed negative decisions of the immigration authorities (INS) or continued the procedure in an effort to obtain a better status. The 2000 Aliens Act aimed to shorten the asylum procedures in the following three ways:

*a) Asylum decision within six months*

In principle, the immigration authorities issue a decision on an asylum request within six months. This is not a strict requirement, but one that an effort is made to meet. A desire for faster asylum-related decision-making is nothing new, but in practice it has not been doable due to the mass influx of asylum-seekers to The Netherlands. The Dutch have taken numerous measures in recent years to limit the number of asylum-seekers and to simplify and accelerate the asylum procedure. The first measure was to set up so-called Application Centres (AC) where a first assessment of an asylum request is to be made within 48 'process hours' (which takes a maximum of about five days). Asylum-seekers rejected at the Application Center have to leave The Netherlands immediately. Secondly, criteria were formulated on which countries could be considered safe. A country is considered safe if it has signed the relevant human rights agreements and abides by them. The Minister of Immigration and Integration decides whether this is the case on the advice of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Asylum-seekers from countries considered safe according to the formal criteria are not immediately rejected. There is always an assessment of each individual case. A pre-condition is that asylum-seekers can make a plausible case that their personal safety is at risk in their home country.

*b) Appeals system*

The Aliens Act 2000 eliminated the option of an administrative review of a decision by the immigration authorities. Asylum seekers have the opportunity to lodge an appeal to a court, followed by an appeal to the Council of State, the highest Dutch administrative appeal board, which is required to make a decision within six months. In principle the asylum seeker can remain in The Netherlands pending an appeal decision, though not in the case of a decision on a further appeal. If the asylum appeal is rejected, the alien no longer has a right to make use of a reception centre or of the other facilities and is to leave The Netherlands. No separate appeal is possible against the termination

of the reception facilities, as this is a part of the negative decision on the asylum application itself.

*c) Introduction of a single asylum status*

However, the most important change in the 2000 Aliens Act pertains to the different asylum statuses. Prior to the Act, The Netherlands had various asylum statuses with different rights and privileges depending on the grounds for asylum. As of 1 April 2001, every asylum-seeker whose asylum request is approved receives the same temporary residence permit, regardless of the grounds for the asylum. Each asylum-seeker who is admitted first receives a temporary residence permit for a maximum of three years, after which it can be converted into a permanent residence permit (in 2004 this was changed to five years). Uniform rights and facilities are attached to this single status. All asylum migrants who have been admitted to The Netherlands (status holders) have the same rights in regards to employment, national assistance, family reunification, study and study grants, refugee passports and so forth. During the asylum procedure, asylum-seekers have a right to be housed at a reception centre or elsewhere. However, the basic principle is that asylum-seekers remain outside society. Asylum-seekers only have a limited right to engage in paid employment and have no access to the Dutch national assistance system. Instead, there are pocket money arrangements at the Reception Centres. The idea is that asylum seekers have to be kept outside Dutch society as long as their asylum request has not been approved. If they are integrated into Dutch society, it would only make it harder for them to leave again.

In chapter 4 and 7 of this 2004 Dutch Sopemi Report the results of these new procedures of the Dutch Asylum policies will be discussed.

## **1.6 Return migration policies**

An important focal point of the current restrictive migration policies is the return of rejected asylum seekers and illegal aliens to their countries of origin, or, rather, their departure from The Netherlands (Commissie Evaluatie Vreemdelingenwet 2000 2004).

Efforts to promote return migration are not new. Already in the early 1990's an official advisory committee (Committee Zeevalking) gave the advice to discourage illegal residence by introducing an (partial) identification

obligation, punishing illegal work (by booking the employers) and excluding illegal residents from all public services. During the 1990's various acts were introduced to make illegal residence more difficult in The Netherlands. The most important change was the introduction of the so-called 1998 *Linkage Act (Koppelingswet)*. This Linkage Act restricts almost all public services to Dutch nationals or non-Dutch residents with a valid residence permit. Explicit policies to stimulate return migration of rejected asylum seekers and other undocumented immigrants also started in the 1990's. In 1996, a first so-called *Departure Centre (Vertrekcentrum)* was opened in a small village called Vlagtwedde. This Departure Centre housed rejected asylum seekers that no longer had any legal opportunities to obtain a residence permit. Awaiting their departure from The Netherlands they received minimal care (bath, bed, bread, some pocket money and legal advice). However, of the first 368 residents of the Departure Centre only 41 were actually sent out of the country. The same happened in 1997: only 64 of all 898 residents of the Departure Centre were actually sent out of The Netherlands. Most others had left *With Unknown Destination (Met Onbekende Bestemming, Dutch acronym: MOB)*, as it is called. Someone is considered 'departured with unknown destination' if he is not encountered at the address and it is assumed that he has left. Whether he or she has actually left the country or is still present without a valid residence permit (that is to say 'illegal'), cannot be established. This Departure Centre was closed down in June 2000.

The current immigration and integration policy is based on the following principle: "A person whose residence permit is granted must integrate in the Dutch society. A person, who has finalised his legal proceedings, becomes illegal and must leave The Netherlands. Starting point is that it is prohibited to stay here illegally, also in the interest of the immigrant." (Ministry of Justice 2004)

The return policy is based on the premise that the asylum seeker who has finalised his legal proceedings is responsible for his return to his country of origin. The idea behind this is that the asylum seeker managed to get to The Netherlands on his own initiative and must therefore return on his own initiative as well. After every negative decision in the procedure the asylum seeker will be reminded of his responsibility and encouraged to make preparations for his return. He can receive support from the Dutch Government. The Government may, for instance, assist the asylum seeker in obtaining replacement travel documents.

The current minister for Immigration and Integration has declared an effective return migration policy to be one of four “spearheads” of her policies. Late 2003 she published her *Memorandum on Return Migration* (Ministry of Immigration and Integration 2003). A large part of her policy is a continuation of measures taken by former governments, though there is now a greater emphasis on effective implementation of the measures and on the final stage of the migration policy cycle, namely the expulsion policy. From the perspective of the Dutch government, the main problems of return migration are that immigrants refuse to cooperate in leaving the country and that there is too little surveillance of illegal immigrants (both rejected asylum-seekers and other undocumented migrants). The *Memorandum on Return Migration* (2003) contains various measures to assure a more effective implementation of return migration.

In the implementation of return migration policies a distinction is made between a) asylum seekers who submitted their initial request for asylum prior to 1 April 2001 and were treated under the former Aliens Act and b) those that submitted their request after 1 April 2001 and are treated under the new Aliens Act 2000.

*Policy for asylum seekers who submitted their initial asylum request before 1 April 2001*

For asylum seekers who submitted their initial request for asylum prior to 1 April 2001 the Project Return was set up. The asylum seekers who have finalised their legal proceedings and must leave The Netherlands receive intensive support in their return to their country of origin. If the asylum seeker objectively demonstrates that he is unable to return for reasons beyond his control, a residence permit will be granted on the grounds of the so-called ‘no blame’ criterion. In cases in which distressing circumstances prevent the return, the Minister can still grant a residence permit by utilising the discretionary powers inherent in the legislation.

The intensive support for asylum seekers who have finalised their legal proceedings will, in the first instance, take place in the current reception centre. To this effect the asylum seeker can use the ‘Return Reintegration Project’, offered to them by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). In addition to assistance in obtaining travel documents, these asylum seekers may receive plane tickets for their return journey, home contents may be shipped and they may receive a sum of money to assist them in the initial period after their return. They get eight weeks time to arrange their own return migration.

If the asylum seeker who has finalised his legal proceedings does not manage (or is unwilling) to arrange this departure, the procedure is as follows. First the reception facilities will be terminated and the asylum seeker is moved to one of the *Departure Centres* (in Vlagtwedde (Ter Apel) or in Vught). In this Centre the asylum seeker who has finalised his legal proceedings must report on a daily basis and remain available for intensive examination of his identity and nationality in order to enable his return migration. This procedure takes a maximum of eight weeks.

If the asylum seeker still refuses to return he becomes illegal alien and may end up on the streets without any public support or can decide to leave the country after all.

When the expectation is that it is possible for the migrant to be forcibly repatriated on short notice, he will be moved to a *Removal Centre*. This, for example, is the case when all necessary travel documents are available and he only has to wait for a flight. When a rejected asylum seeker can, in principle, be expelled from the country, but not on short notice, he can be detained in a *Detention Centre* (alien custody). When there is no chance of expelling the person, the alien custody is ended on behalf of a judge. In that case, aliens also end up on the street or decide to leave the country themselves. These Departure and Removal Centres are specifically set up for the Project Return

Prior to the implementation of this more restrictive policy, in 2003, the Dutch government decided to a specific amnesty for rejected asylum seekers. Based on the discretionary power of the Dutch Minister for Immigration and Integration residence permits could be granted to the following people:

- aliens who submitted their initial asylum request in The Netherlands before May 1998 and were still awaiting a final decision on their first asylum request in May 2003, including aliens awaiting a final decision on the prolongation, withdrawal or non-prolongation of a conditional residence permit in the framework of this initial asylum request; and
- who have continuously resided in The Netherlands from the date of their first asylum request to 27 May 2003.
- a residence permit is not granted if there are negative indications such as delinquency or false documents.

Ten thousands of people handed in a request. However, it was decided that only 2,097 persons were granted a residence permit on grounds of the



amnesty, and 220 persons on grounds of distressing circumstances (and another 17 persons from Srebrenica). This decision of Mrs. Verdonk, the Dutch minister of Immigration and Integration, caused quite a protest from private organisations and municipal authorities, which claimed that more immigrants should have received a residence permit (Weltevrede 2005).

The project Return is aimed at those asylum seekers that lodged their first claims under the Former Aliens Act. Beginning 2004 it became clear that 26,000 asylum seekers were eligible for this Project. Up until January 1, 2005 7500 of the target group left the project, in 40 per cent of the cases by getting a residence permit anyway on grounds of distressing circumstances, the no-blame criterion or other reasons.

*Policy for asylum seekers who submitted their initial asylum request after 1 April 2001*

For immigrants that applied for asylum after 1 April 2001 the regulations, as far as return migration is concerned, are even stricter. This group is treated under the new Aliens Act 2000 that is pointed at shorter and quicker procedures. From the start of the asylum procedure asylum seekers are informed that if the asylum request is rejected they have to leave the country. The Aliens Act 2000 establishes that asylum seekers have only four weeks (28 days) to arrange their return to their home country after the final refusal of their asylum request. After these four weeks all public support is ended. If necessary, they are taken by force from their homes or asylum reception centres. The initial assumption is that rejected asylum seekers themselves are responsible for leaving the country on time. Twenty-eight days after the alien has been informed that he must leave the country, a check is performed to establish whether this has actually happened. The Aliens Department then carries out an *address check* at the last known address of the alien. The alien is considered to be 'administratively removed' if he is not encountered at the address and it is assumed that he has departed. In the majority of cases this implies 'departure with unknown destination'. If the alien is found at the last known address after 28 days and forced return is possible then the person is taken into custody before being *deported* or forced to *departure under supervision*. In the case of deportation the alien is taken across the border under supervision and if necessary transported to the country of origin. In case of departure under supervision an alien can leave the country by oneself, but his travel documents are taken in and only given back at the place where the alien leaves the country.

If forced return is not possible, the alien can be forcibly removed from their homes or from reception centres for asylum seekers. In practice this means however that many rejected asylum-seekers end up on the street. There are clear indications that a significant proportion will continue to remain in The Netherlands on an illegal basis (Engbersen et al. 2002; Leerkes et al. 2004). Without any formal support they have to survive by themselves, sometimes with help from so-called informal social safety nets (organized by municipal administrations, often in conjunction with churches or other private organisations) (Rusinovic et al. 2002). However, the Dutch State does not view these informal safety nets as justified and insists that rejected asylum-seekers should leave the country.

The most recent measures for a more effective implementation of the return migration policy, as described in the *Memorandum on Return Migration* (2003), are as follows (Ministry of Immigration and Integration 2003). First, more measures to improve border control with the aim of preventing illegal residence, e.g. by enlarging the responsibility of carriers in removing aliens who have been refused at the border.

Second, more measures to promote the return of failed and rejected asylum seekers e.g. by expanding the capacity for alien detention and by new reception modes for asylum-seekers. Reception centres will be divided into two categories for two kinds of asylum seekers. *Orientation and Integration Centres* will house asylum seekers who are waiting for a decision on their applications. Asylum-seekers at the orientation centres and the existing reception centres who receive an initial rejection from the immigration authorities are then to be transferred to a *Repatriation Centre*. These Repatriation Centres are not to house any asylum-seekers who are still awaiting the initial decision on their asylum request. Another measure to encourage return is to ensure that aliens remain available for investigations into identity and nationality as well as explaining the possible outcome of the asylum procedure more explicitly and emphatically to asylum seekers.

Third, there are measures to promote the return of illegal migrants by intensifying supervision and conducting further research into the use of biometrics. Other measures involve, generating more general support for return as well as integrating departure and return into Dutch foreign Policy. The Return Migration Memorandum stipulates numerous measures for a stricter approach to the problems related to illegal aliens within the policy on aliens. In addition to this memorandum, in April 2004 the Minister of Immigration and Integration presented the Memorandum on Illegal Aliens

(Ministry of Immigration and Integration 2004). The memorandum announces a wide range of measures to deal with issues such as the employment of illegal aliens, trafficking in people, and premises rented to illegal aliens. The implementation of these measures was launched in 2004. These efforts are to be continued in 2005.



# Migration to and from The Netherlands

## 2.1 Migration to and from The Netherlands

Main trends in migration to and from The Netherlands

- In 2004, the number of immigrants entering The Netherlands dropped to 94,019. This declining trend was also evident in 2003. In 2000 and 2001, the total number of immigrants entering The Netherlands reached a record number of about 130,000 a year.
- Since the number of emigrants leaving The Netherlands, Dutch and foreign nationals alike, rose in recent years, the immigration surplus (immigration minus emigration) in 2004 was only about 19,000. Four years earlier, in 2000, the immigration surplus was almost four times this figure (72,000).
- An important explanation for the declining immigration is the sharp fall in the number of immigrants from typical refugee countries such as Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sierra Leone, Iran, Angola, former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. In 2004, there were 16,500 fewer immigrants from these nine countries than in 2001. This explains half of the total decline in immigration from 2001 to 2004. The declining immigration from these countries is the intended result of the stricter Dutch asylum policies in recent years.
- In public opinion, the media, and the political debate, immigration is often associated with immigrants from Third World countries with a non-Western cultural background who find it hard to integrate into Dutch society. However this popular picture is only true of a minority of the immigrants entering The Netherlands. More than half (55%) of the 94,000 immigrants in 2004 are either Dutch nationals (including Antilleans) or immigrants from other Western countries such as other EU countries, the United States, Indonesia or Japan. Even if we exclude the immigrants from The Netherlands Antilles, 49% of the immigrants were still either Dutch nationals or

from other Western countries. The other half of the immigrant population in 2004 either came from the new EU countries (8%) other (mainly Central and Eastern) European countries (5%) or from non-Western countries (30%).

- The largest single immigrant groups in 2004 from Western countries were Dutch nationals from The Netherlands Antilles and non-Dutch nationals from Germany (5300), Poland (5000), the United Kingdom (3,600) and immigrants from the former Soviet Union (2100). The largest single non-Western immigrant groups in 2004 were Turks (4200), Moroccans (3200), Chinese (3600), and Surinamese (2000). These non-Western immigrant groups consist of traditional guest workers or post-colonial migrants as well as immigrants from new countries. The fastest growing, larger immigrant groups since 1995 have been immigrants from Poland and China.
- Almost half (47%) of the immigrants in 2003 came to The Netherlands for family reasons (marriage, family reunion). In some groups, the percentage of immigrants to The Netherlands for family reasons is significantly higher. This is the case for Moroccans, Thais and Surinamese (around 90%), Turks (80%) and Brazilians (77%).
- About one in three immigrants to The Netherlands leave again within six years. The percentage of return migrants is larger among Western than non-Western immigrants. The percentage of return immigrants seems to be the lowest among immigrants coming to The Netherlands to seek asylum or for family reasons.

## 2.2 Immigration to The Netherlands

This chapter describes the migration flows to and from The Netherlands. What are the central trends? Who are the immigrants and why do they come to The Netherlands? After the Second World War, The Netherlands was a country of emigration. Officially encouraged by the Dutch government, many Dutch citizens emigrated to the United States, Canada or Australia. This situation only changed in the early 1960s with the arrival of guest workers from the Mediterranean. As the term *guest worker* implies, they were only expected to stay temporarily in The Netherlands and return to their home countries once they had done their job. This myth of migrants returning home dominated

official Dutch thinking about immigration and immigrant integration for many years. Only when the guest workers brought their whole families to The Netherlands did it become clear that they were here to stay. The Netherlands was turning into a country of immigration. This became even clearer in the early 1980s when major flows of post-colonial immigrants from the Caribbean (Suriname, Netherlands Antilles) started to come to The Netherlands as well.

Figure 2.1 shows the numbers of immigrants to The Netherlands in recent decades. The figure clearly shows that immigration in the 1990s, although it differed from one year to the next, tended to be higher than in the 1980s. In most years in the 1980s, less than 100,000 immigrants, Dutch nationals and non-nationals alike, entered The Netherlands. In the 1990s the number of immigrants entering The Netherlands was above 100,000 in most years, with a post-war peak in 2000-2001 with more than 130,000. However, in the last few years the number of immigrants has been declining again. We noted the drop in the number of immigrants in last year's SOPEMI report. In 2004 the number of immigrants fell again to 94,000, about 10% less than in 2003 and roughly 30% less than three years earlier (Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1). If this continues in the coming years, immigration to The Netherlands will be back at the lower level of the early 1980s.

In the same period as the fall in the number of immigrants, more emigrants left The Netherlands. The total number of emigrants increased from 59,000 in 1999 to 75,000 in 2004. Table 2.1 makes it clear that this increase in emigration is mainly due to the number of Dutch nationals who left the country. With declining immigration and rising emigration, of course the immigration surplus (immigration minus emigration) is declining as well. In 2003 the immigration surplus still was about 36,000, but in 2004 it was only half that much (19,000).

Figure 2.1 Immigration of Dutch and Foreign Nationals to The Netherlands (1980-2004) (in absolute numbers)


Source: Statistics Netherlands (Staltine)<sup>14</sup>

Table 2.1: Immigration and Emigration of Dutch and Foreign Nationals in The Netherlands (1980-2004)

Year	Immigration			Emigration			Surplus		
	Dutch nationals	Foreign nationals	Total	Dutch nationals	Foreign nationals	Total	Dutch nationals	Foreign nationals	Total
1980	32,684	79,820	112,504	35,837	23,633	59,470	-3153	56,187	53,034
1981	29,767	50,416	80,183	38,216	24,979	63,195	-8449	25,437	16,988
1982	29,810	40,930	70,740	39,413	28,094	67,507	-9603	12,836	3233
1983	30,321	36,441	66,762	32,810	27,974	60,784	-2489	8467	5978
1984	29,616	37,291	66,907	31,824	27,030	58,854	-2208	10,261	8053
1985	33,196	46,166	79,362	31,009	24,206	55,215	2187	21,960	24,147
1986	34,585	52,802	87,387	31,155	23,563	54,718	3430	29,239	32,669
1987	35,080	60,855	95,935	31,139	20,872	52,011	3941	39,983	43,924
1988	32,976	58,262	91,238	34,403	21,388	55,791	-1427	36,874	35,447
1989	33,529	65,385	98,914	38,218	21,489	59,707	-4689	43,896	39,207
1990	36,086	81,264	117,350	36,749	20,595	57,344	-663	60,669	60,006
1991	35,912	84,337	120,249	35,998	21,330	57,328	-86	63,007	62,921
1992	33,904	83,022	116,926	36,101	22,733	58,834	-2197	60,289	58,092
1993	31,581	87,573	119,154	37,019	22,203	59,222	-5438	65,370	59,932
1994	30,887	68,424	99,311	39,409	22,746	62,155	-8522	45,678	37,156
1995	29,127	66,972	96,099	41,648	21,673	63,321	-12,521	45,299	32,778
1996	31,572	77,177	108,749	42,921	22,404	65,325	-11,349	54,773	43,424
1997	33,124	76,736	109,860	40,278	21,940	62,218	-7154	54,796	47,642
1998	40,706	81,701	122,407	39,175	21,266	60,441	1531	60,435	61,966
1999	40,786	78,365	119,151	38,358	20,665	59,023	2428	57,700	60,128
2000	41,467	91,383	132,850	40,474	20,727	61,201	993	70,656	71,649
2001	38,897	94,507	133,404	42,921	20,397	63,318	-4024	74,110	70,086
2002	34,631	86,619	121,250	45,571	21,157	66,728	-10,940	65,462	54,522
2003	30,948	73,566	104,514	47,015	21,870	68,885	-16,067	51,696	35,629
2004	28,898	65,121	94,019	51,500	23,549	75,049	-22,602	41,572	18,970

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline<sup>14</sup>


Who are the 94,000 immigrants who entered The Netherlands in 2004? Where did they come from and why? About 30% of the immigrants are Dutch nationals coming or returning to The Netherlands (about 29,000

<sup>14</sup> The figures are based on information of Statistics Netherlands as reported to Statistics Netherlands by the municipal population registrations.



people in 2004, Table 2.1). The table also shows that the number of Dutch nationals coming or returning to The Netherlands was much higher at the end of the 1990s (about 40,000). Figure 2.2 gives a more precise picture of where these Dutch nationals entering The Netherlands come from.

Figure 2.2: Immigration of Dutch Nationals (selected categories) 1995-2004<sup>15</sup>



Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline (figures are based on the municipal population registrations)

A relatively large percentage of immigrants with Dutch citizenship have come from the Dutch Caribbean islands, The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. People from these islands have Dutch citizenship and more or less free access to The Netherlands. In the late 1990s more than an annual 10,000 Antilleans came to The Netherlands due to the poor economic situation there. In 2004 the number of Antillean immigrants declined to about 5,000 (17% of the Dutch nationals entering The Netherlands and 5% of the total immigration). Of the remaining 24,000 immigrants with Dutch citizenship, half came from other EU countries and the other half from other countries that remain unspecified.

<sup>15</sup> For 2004 EU includes 10 new countries

Table 2.2: Immigration of Dutch and Foreign Nationals by Country of Origin and Gender 2004

	Male		Female		Total	
		in %		in %		in %
<b>Total</b>	<b>46,200</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>47,819</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>94,019</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Dutch nationals</b>	<b>15,688</b>	<b>34.0</b>	<b>13,210</b>	<b>27.6</b>	<b>28,898</b>	<b>30.7</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
Dutch Antilles and Aruba	2597	5.6	2441	5.1	5038	5.4
25 EU countries	7321	15.8	5917	12.4	13,238	14.1
<b>Non-Dutch nationals</b>	<b>30,512</b>	<b>66.0</b>	<b>34,609</b>	<b>72.4</b>	<b>65,121</b>	<b>69.3</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
<b>Western Countries</b>	<b>17,347</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>19,356</b>	<b>40.5</b>	<b>36,703</b>	<b>39.0</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
<b>EU-countries (25)</b>	<b>12,764</b>	<b>27.6</b>	<b>13,196</b>	<b>27.6</b>	<b>25,960</b>	<b>27.6</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
<b>old EU-countries (15)</b>	<b>9718</b>	<b>21.0</b>	<b>8863</b>	<b>18.5</b>	<b>18,581</b>	<b>19.8</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
Germany	2476	5.4	2784	5.8	5260	5.6
United Kingdom	2077	4.5	1510	3.2	3587	3.8
France	1016	2.2	806	1.7	1822	1.9
Belgium	822	1.8	862	1.8	1684	1.8
<b>new EU-countries (10)</b>	<b>2983</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>4333</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>7316</b>	<b>7.8</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
Poland	2113	4.6	2836	5.9	4949	5.3
Hungary	232	0.5	335	0.7	567	0.6
<b>other Europe</b>	<b>1700</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>2943</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>4643</b>	<b>4.9</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
Soviet Union (former)	712	1.5	1396	2.9	2108	2.2
Yugoslavia (former)	306	0.7	443	0.9	749	0.8
Romania	234	0.5	424	0.9	658	0.7
<b>other Western</b>	<b>2883</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>3217</b>	<b>6.7</b>	<b>6100</b>	<b>6.5</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
United States	1194	2.6	1206	2.5	2400	2.6
Canada	228	0.5	299	0.6	527	0.6
Indonesia	430	0.9	755	1.6	1185	1.3
Japan	595	1.3	569	1.2	1164	1.2
Australia	340	0.7	330	0.7	670	0.7
<b>Non-Western countries</b>	<b>13,013</b>	<b>28.2</b>	<b>15,126</b>	<b>31.6</b>	<b>28,139</b>	<b>29.9</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
Turkey	2270	4.9	1975	4.1	4245	4.5
Morocco	1469	3.2	1748	3.7	3217	3.4
South Africa	205	0.4	344	0.7	549	0.6
Egypt	300	0.6	166	0.3	466	0.5
Nigeria	195	0.4	165	0.3	360	0.4
Ghana	173	0.4	174	0.4	347	0.4
Suriname	841	1.8	1144	2.4	1985	2.1
Brazil	216	0.5	481	1.0	697	0.7
Colombia	144	0.3	224	0.5	368	0.4
China	1402	3.0	2247	4.7	3649	3.9
Thailand	312	0.7	810	1.7	1122	1.2
Iraq	577	1.2	356	0.7	933	1.0
Afghanistan	270	0.6	350	0.7	620	0.7
Iran	267	0.6	320	0.7	587	0.6
India	385	0.8	246	0.5	631	0.7
Philippines	146	0.3	415	0.9	561	0.6
Centre for asylum seekers	152	0.3	127	0.3	279	0.3

Source: Statistics Netherlands (figures are based on the municipal population registrations)

Table 2.2 gives a more precise picture of who came to The Netherlands in 2004. The data in the table refer to their nationality and country of origin. First a distinction is drawn between Dutch nationals including immigrants from The Netherlands Antilles and foreign nationals, whose country of origin is mentioned. Their country of origin is not necessarily their country of birth, but the country they said they came from when they arrived in The Netherlands. The various countries of origin are subdivided in Western countries (such as the EU, countries in Central and Eastern Europe and other Western countries) and non-Western countries. With this subdivision, we are following the example set by Netherlands Statistics.<sup>16</sup>

In our opinion, these figures put the current concern about immigration in Dutch society into the proper perspective. The Dutch public opinion, the media and the political debates often associate immigration with people from the Third World countries with a non-Western cultural background who find it hard to integrate into Dutch society. However, as Table 2.3 makes very clear, this popular picture of immigration is only true for a minority of the immigrants entering The Netherlands. Of the 94,000 immigrants in 2004, almost 29,000 were Dutch nationals (including Antilleans), 19,000 came from other EU15 countries and 6000 came from other Western countries such as the United States, Indonesia (a former Dutch colony) or Japan. Together, these Western immigrants account for 55% of the total immigrant population of 2004. Even if we exclude the immigrants from The Netherlands Antilles, about half (49%) of the immigrants were still either Dutch nationals or from other Western countries.

The other half of the 2004 immigrants can roughly be divided into three subcategories: those from the 10 new EU-countries, those from other European countries (mainly other Central and Eastern Europe) and those from non-Western countries. In recent decades, one dominant trend within Europe has been the growing migration from east to west. In 2004 more than 11,000 non-Dutch immigrants (12% of the total immigrant population) arrived from Central and Eastern Europe. In 2004 the second largest non-Dutch immigrant group was

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
<sup>16</sup> Statistics Netherlands distinguishes between Western and non-Western countries. Western countries are all European countries including Central and Eastern Europe except Turkey, North American countries, some Asian countries (Japan and Indonesia) and the countries in Oceania (Australia, New Zealand). Turkey and all the countries in Latin and South America, Africa and Asia are considered non-Western.

from one of the new EU-countries. Almost 5000 non-Dutch immigrants, 5% of the total, came from Poland. In the 1990s the largest immigrant group from Central and Eastern Europe was from the former Yugoslavia, fleeing the war. The peak in immigration from former Yugoslavia to The Netherlands was in 1993 when 8,912 people from various post-Yugoslav republics entered The Netherlands. In 2004, however, only 750 non-Dutch immigrants from former Yugoslavia arrived in The Netherlands. About 2100 non-Dutch immigrants came from the former Soviet Union, 2% of the total immigrant population of 2004. As is the case with other Eastern European countries, more female than male immigrants came to The Netherlands from the former Soviet Union.

Lastly, 28,000 immigrants (less than a third of the total immigrant population of 2004) came from non-Western countries. The five largest single immigrant groups among them in 2004 were Turks (4245), Chinese (3649), Moroccans (3217), Surinamese (1985) and immigrants from Thailand (1122). It is interesting to note that the more or less traditional immigrant groups in The Netherlands (Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese) still constitute a large percentage of the non-Western immigrants, although relatively new immigrant groups in The Netherlands such as the Chinese is relatively large as well. The same is true for the 2100 immigrants from the former Soviet Union who came to The Netherlands in 2004. Many people in the new immigrant groups came to The Netherlands as asylum-seekers. The arrival of new immigrant groups to The Netherlands, in addition to the more or less traditional immigrant groups, can be interpreted as a sign of the growing differentiation in the flow of immigrants to The Netherlands.

Figure 2.3 shows this trend in a historical perspective.

Figure 2.3: Migration Surplus of Non-Dutch Immigrants by Country of Origin, 1980-2004



Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline (figures are based on the municipal population registrations)

In the early 1980s, more than two thirds of the non-Dutch immigrants to The Netherlands came from just three countries, Turkey, Morocco and Suriname. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the percentage of these three immigrant groups steadily declined to around 30% of the total immigrant population in 1993. After that the percentage of these more or less traditional immigrant groups in The Netherlands remained at a much lower level (from 15 to 20%). The percentage of non-Dutch immigrants from the EU countries in the total immigrant population in The Netherlands increased from 20% in 2003 to 28% in 2004 as a result of a large group of immigrants from the new EU-countries (especially Poland). The percentage of immigrants from the other countries increased from less than 30% in the early 1980s to 70% or more in the late 1990s. All the figures show an increasing heterogeneity of the immigrant population in The Netherlands.

**Table 2.3: Immigration of foreign-born immigrants to The Netherlands by Country of Origin (1995-2004)**

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
<b>Total</b>	<b>74,703</b>	<b>86,183</b>	<b>87,145</b>	<b>96,423</b>	<b>94,177</b>	<b>109,033</b>	<b>110,254</b>	<b>99,808</b>	<b>84,686</b>	<b>74,572</b>
<i>of whom from</i>										
<b>Western countries</b>	<b>36,517</b>	<b>38,042</b>	<b>37,467</b>	<b>40,311</b>	<b>42,609</b>	<b>49,478</b>	<b>48,340</b>	<b>43,434</b>	<b>38,956</b>	<b>40,195</b>
<i>of whom from</i>										
<b>EU-countries (25)</b>	<b>20,088</b>	<b>23,956</b>	<b>25,160</b>	<b>26,649</b>	<b>25,899</b>	<b>28,395</b>	<b>28,637</b>	<b>26,926</b>	<b>25,064</b>	<b>28,466</b>
<i>of whom from</i>										
<b>old EU-countries (15)</b>	<b>18,261</b>	<b>21,476</b>	<b>22,600</b>	<b>23,660</b>	<b>23,642</b>	<b>25,087</b>	<b>24,844</b>	<b>23,354</b>	<b>21,757</b>	<b>21,075</b>
<i>of whom from</i>										
Germany	6470	6362	6374	6261	5892	5939	5826	5625	5487	5905
United Kingdom	3629	4643	4669	4791	5276	6226	6226	5357	4539	4125
Belgium	2087	2461	2809	3036	2882	2718	2609	2459	2364	2200
France	1467	1961	2298	2544	2368	2513	2297	2233	2056	2018
<b>new EU-countries (10)</b>	<b>1827</b>	<b>2480</b>	<b>2560</b>	<b>2989</b>	<b>2257</b>	<b>3308</b>	<b>3793</b>	<b>3572</b>	<b>3307</b>	<b>7391</b>
<i>of whom from</i>										
Poland	1158	1410	1430	1562	1090	1762	2067	2155	2022	4972
Hungary	231	401	444	509	461	527	588	469	444	590
<b>Other Europe</b>	<b>10,504</b>	<b>6795</b>	<b>5072</b>	<b>5425</b>	<b>8317</b>	<b>12,250</b>	<b>10,767</b>	<b>7868</b>	<b>6289</b>	<b>4860</b>
<i>of whom from</i>										
Soviet Union (former)	1986	2095	1872	2334	2743	5730	5706	4267	3098	2138
Yugoslavia (former)	7323	3345	1551	1421	3884	4589	3035	1652	1189	792
Romania	285	312	389	421	425	607	660	596	679	675
<b>other Western</b>	<b>5925</b>	<b>7291</b>	<b>7235</b>	<b>8237</b>	<b>8393</b>	<b>8833</b>	<b>8936</b>	<b>8640</b>	<b>7603</b>	<b>6869</b>
<i>of whom from</i>										
United States	2781	3571	3558	3920	3991	4051	3777	3811	3267	2850
Canada	489	679	649	681	731	770	862	702	629	614
Indonesia	757	941	949	1477	1313	1533	1674	1641	1467	1252
Japan	1212	1275	1221	1129	1209	1211	1240	1208	1194	1180
Australia	495	605	591	766	849	911	1048	1003	829	768
<b>Non-Western countries</b>	<b>38,160</b>	<b>48,048</b>	<b>49,671</b>	<b>56,112</b>	<b>51,568</b>	<b>59,555</b>	<b>61,914</b>	<b>56,374</b>	<b>45,730</b>	<b>34,377</b>
<i>of whom from</i>										
Turkey	4803	6274	6488	5765	4917	5363	5904	6103	6579	4441
Morocco	3017	4219	4510	5079	4398	4170	4927	4849	4561	3367
Somalia	2691	3105	1397	1087	1360	1820	1397	742	307	236
South Africa	561	881	1047	1687	1307	1256	1334	1030	830	736
Angola	673	493	281	269	609	1161	1819	3428	1085	280
Sudan	211	287	571	928	785	1469	1337	783	393	168
Egypt	531	736	856	820	676	557	611	676	721	589
Sierra Leone	95	185	174	214	410	768	1518	1863	578	165
Ghana	344	619	627	607	406	421	374	320	468	377
Congo (Democaric	1015	500	397	299	309	458	497	512	324	167
Nigeria	258	481	508	530	433	402	459	468	512	379
Ethiopia	497	442	340	353	368	461	524	483	330	314
Netherlands Antilles	3600	4168	5186	8261	9546	11025	9131	6737	4811	3570
Suriname	2419	3338	3229	4231	2777	3113	3134	3098	3163	2614
Brazil	515	688	734	766	687	745	765	819	847	812
Colombia	361	541	565	609	518	619	586	606	636	494
Iraq	2412	4135	5544	6742	2925	4024	2807	1273	1051	907
Afghanistan	1367	2637	3279	3449	4913	4244	4061	2410	1406	609
China	1340	1324	1668	1900	1845	2636	3643	3901	3998	3450
Iran	2526	2713	1581	1051	1072	1596	2068	1344	876	576
Thailand	404	549	523	660	636	862	1045	1069	1004	950
Pakistan	627	757	802	943	1005	815	689	688	588	419
India	540	607	730	874	742	666	693	607	599	560
Philippines	554	637	595	560	499	570	590	640	609	512
Syria	323	392	369	351	713	1.054	1.132	673	429	304
Sri Lanka	579	395	513	532	632	666	597	495	354	195
Israel	291	384	389	444	422	436	515	650	579	425

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline (figures are based on the municipal population registrations)

What have been the fastest growing immigrant groups in The Netherlands over the past decade? Table 2.3 shows the pattern in the number of immigrants from selected countries from 1995 to 2004. Here immigrants are defined as foreign-born if they were born outside The Netherlands, regardless of their nationality. The countries of origin are again divided into Western and non-Western countries.

A comparison of data from 2003 and 2004 shows that the total number of foreign-born immigrants entering The Netherlands decreased by 10,000 from around 85,000 in 2003 to 75,000 in 2004 which is about the same as in 1995. The number of immigrants was much higher in 2000-2001. In the same period (1995-2004), the number of immigrants from the original 15 EU countries, and other Western countries increased by 15%. Immigration from the 10 countries that now belong to the EU increased sharply from 3300 in 2003 to almost 7500 in 2004.

A striking feature is the declining immigration from other European countries (mainly Eastern European countries) to The Netherlands. This is contrary to the expectation of growing Eastern European immigration due to the changed political situation in Europe in the 1990s. However, this declining Eastern European immigration can be explained by the sharp fall in immigration from the former Yugoslavia. In 1995, at the height of the war there, the number of immigrants from the former Yugoslavia (mainly refugees) reached its peak. The number of immigrants from former Yugoslavia fell, but the number of immigrants from the other Eastern European countries increased rapidly after 1995. The number of immigrants from non-Western countries decreased in the same period by almost 4000, a decrease of 10% compared to 1995.

Table 2.3 also makes it possible to examine more carefully the declining number of immigrants since 2001. From 2001 to 2004 the total number of immigrants entering The Netherlands fell by almost 36,000. This declining total number of immigrants can be largely explained by the declining number of immigrants from what are considered typical refugee countries, i.e. Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sierra Leone, Iran, Angola, former Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet Union. In 2004, the total number of immigrants from these ten countries was 16,500 less than in 2001. This explains half of the total decline in immigration from 2001 to 2004. This leads to the assumption

that the drop in immigration in the past three years is largely due to the declining number of refugees and asylum-seekers coming to The Netherlands, which in turn can be explained by the stricter asylum policies of recent years.

Table 2.4 summarizes Table 2.3 and shows the countries whose emigrants at least doubled since 1995 and that contribute a significant percentage of the foreign-born immigrants coming to The Netherlands (at least 2% of the total immigrant population). Eight countries meet both criteria. China generates by far the fastest growing number of immigrants to The Netherlands. This is striking since China has neither historical colonial ties nor important contemporary economic relations with The Netherlands. The number of Chinese immigrants nonetheless almost tripled in the past decade and Chinese immigrants now account for almost 5% of the immigrants entering The Netherlands in 2003. Other countries with large and growing numbers of emigrants to The Netherlands are the former Soviet Union, Morocco, Turkey, Netherlands Antilles and the United Kingdom.

**Table 2.4: Countries with the fastest growing number of immigrants (1995-2004)**


	Number of immigrants in 1995	Number of immigrants in 2004	% of all immigrants in 2004	Increase since 1995 (1995=100)
Poland	1158	4972	6.7	429
China	1340	3450	4.6	257
Spain	945	1686	2.3	178
France	1467	2018	2.7	138
United Kingdom	3629	4125	5.5	114
Morocco	3017	3367	4.5	112
Surinam	2419	2614	3.5	108
Soviet Union (former)	1986	2138	2.9	108

Source: Statistics Netherlands (processed by RISBO)

Another important aspect of immigration statistics pertains to why immigrants come to The Netherlands. When immigrants enter the country they are asked why they want to live in The Netherlands. This information is registered at the Central Register of Aliens of the Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service. Statistics Netherlands publishes these data every year. Figure 2.4 gives an initial overview of the immigration motives of Non-Dutch immigrants since the mid 1990s.



Figure 2.4: Migration Motives of Foreign Nationals, 1995-2004



Migration motives of Foreign Nationals 1995-2004

Subjects	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
employment	10,211	12,656	13,193	15,369	16,299	19,025	19,937	18,535	16,621	15,637
asylum <sup>a</sup>	22,182	19,901	16,820	16,936	19,102	27,347	25,967	18,789	9272	2966
family	29,073	36,494	35,676	38,329	32,144	33,846	35,519	35,225	34,351	28,350
study	1855	4074	5998	6081	6178	6361	7778	9136	8773	10,194
unspecified	3438	4037	5053	4910	4638	4803	5309	4935	4549	7961

Source: Statistics Netherlands (figures are based on data of the Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service)

<sup>a</sup> not all asylum seekers in a particular year are counted as immigrants in that year because entry in a municipal population register which is only realised after some time or not at all (if the request is turned down), is required.

Figure 2.4 confirms our assumption that the decreasing number of asylum-seekers can largely explain the declining number of immigrants since 2001. In 2000 and 2001 around 25,000 immigrants said they had come to The Netherlands to receive asylum, but in 2004 the number of asylum-seekers dropped to only about 3000. Chapter 4 of this report examines developments in the field of asylum migration in greater detail. It is also evident that the number of immigrants coming to The Netherlands to find employment is declining again. In the second half of the 1990s, when The Netherlands was experiencing a period of economic growth and increasing shortages on the labour market, the number of immigrants coming to The Netherlands to find jobs increased from 10,000 in 1995 to almost 20,000 in 2001. In 2003, however, the number of immigrants coming to The Netherlands to find jobs fell again to almost 17,000. Chapter 3 of this report examines

labour migration to The Netherlands in greater detail. By far the most immigrants come to The Netherlands for family reasons such as marriage or family reunification. The number of immigrants coming to The Netherlands for family reasons decreased sharply in in 2004 to the level of 1995. This is probably due to various measures taken in 2003 to limit marital migration and family reunification (see chapter 1).

**Table 2.5: Immigration of Foreign Nationals for Family Reasons by Country of Birth, 2004**

	Family reunification	Family members	Marital migration	Total	Percentage male	Percentage female
<b>Total</b>	<b>10,623</b>	<b>2350</b>	<b>15,377</b>	<b>28,350</b>	<b>36,1</b>	<b>63,9</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
<b>Western Countries</b>	<b>6129</b>	<b>1794</b>	<b>7098</b>	<b>15,021</b>	<b>35,8</b>	<b>64,2</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
<b>EU-countries (25)</b>	<b>3698</b>	<b>1040</b>	<b>1689</b>	<b>6427</b>	<b>35,2</b>	<b>64,8</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
<b>old EU-countries (15)</b>	<b>2748</b>	<b>875</b>	<b>587</b>	<b>4210</b>	<b>40,0</b>	<b>60,0</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
Germany	566	152	212	930	36,8	63,2
United Kingdom	635	280	74	989	38,8	61,2
Belgium	200	39	53	292	41,8	58,2
France	180	85	51	316	33,9	66,1
<b>new EU-countries<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>950</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>1102</b>	<b>2217</b>	<b>26,1</b>	<b>73,9</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
Poland	783	138	825	1746	28,2	71,8
Hungary	65	14	86	165	18,2	81,8
<b>other Europe</b>	<b>1785</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>4159</b>	<b>6142</b>	<b>38,5</b>	<b>61,5</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
Yugoslavia (former) <sup>b</sup>	129	13	295	437	31,1	68,9
Soviet Union (former) <sup>c</sup>	531	67	900	1498	21,0	79,0
Romania	63	7	257	327	19,6	80,4
<b>other Western</b>	<b>646</b>	<b>556</b>	<b>1250</b>	<b>2452</b>	<b>30,6</b>	<b>69,4</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
United States	281	260	446	987	37,9	62,1
Canada	37	30	81	148	31,1	68,9
Indonesia	128	10	361	499	19,0	81,0
Japan	120	207	253	580	24,1	75,9
Australia	56	38	86	180	38,3	61,7
<b>Non-Western countries</b>	<b>4494</b>	<b>556</b>	<b>8279</b>	<b>13,329</b>	<b>36,4</b>	<b>63,6</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
Turkey	905	62	2539	3506	49,3	50,7
Morocco	891	19	1967	2877	43,7	56,3
Somalia	91	3	23	117	53,0	47,0
South Africa	49	42	100	191	30,9	69,1
Ghana	66	1	211	278	44,2	55,8
Netherlands Antilles	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suriname	557	12	754	1323	42,3	57,7
Brazil	135	21	367	523	20,5	79,5
Colombia	113	17	127	257	31,5	68,5
Iraq	321	20	242	583	41,5	58,5
Afghanistan	361	22	300	683	31,3	68,7
China	212	23	357	592	38,9	61,1
Iran	143	22	143	308	37,3	62,7
Thailand	154	12	476	642	13,6	86,4
Pakistan	66	3	87	156	48,7	51,3
India	45	25	164	234	38,0	62,0
Phillipines	58	2	211	271	15,5	84,5

Source: Statistics Netherlands (figures are based on data of the Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service)

<sup>a</sup>figures do not include data of Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia and Baltic States,

<sup>b</sup>including Slovenia,

<sup>c</sup>including Baltic States

Table 2.5 distinguishes various family-related migration motives. Marital or family formation migration means an immigrant comes to The Netherlands to marry or live with someone already living in The Netherlands. Family reunification means a family already existed before the migration and one or more family members (spouse, children) are joining the immigrant who came to The Netherlands earlier. In 2004, 28,000 migrants came to The Netherlands for family reasons. The majority of this group (15,000 or 54% of the family-related immigration) can be categorized as marital migrants, in other words unwed individuals who came to The Netherlands to form a family or a couple with someone already residing in the country. Among immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe and non-Western countries, the percentage of marital migrants is even larger.

Unfortunately, the table gives no information about the partners of marital migrants who already live in The Netherlands. This means we do not know whether they are native Dutch with a foreign bride or groom coming to The Netherlands or first or second-generation immigrants themselves. However, we do know from other research that marital migrants from the largest immigrant groups (Turks, Moroccan, and Surinamese) almost exclusively come to The Netherlands to form a family with earlier immigrants from these countries. The marital immigrants from the three countries jointly account for one third of the marital immigrants of 2004 (more than 5000). Lastly, Table 2.5 shows the percentages of men and women among the migrants for family reasons. In general, family-related migration is a more female than male phenomenon. Almost two thirds of the immigrants for family reasons in 2004 were women. However, the two largest family-related immigrant groups (Turks and Moroccans) exhibit a difference. In the two groups, the percentage of male migrants to The Netherlands for family reasons is larger.

We conclude this section with a breakdown of the data on immigration motives by country of birth (Table 2.6). Obviously, there are significant differences in the migration motives of different categories of the immigrant population. For immigrants from other EU countries, jobs are clearly the dominant reason for coming to The Netherlands. Family reasons are the dominant immigration motive for immigrants from other Western countries, especially from the US (half the US immigrants to The Netherlands come here for family reasons). Family reasons are also the dominant migration motive for immigrants from

Eastern Europe, although other reasons are also important for them. Almost half the immigrants from former Yugoslavia or the former Soviet Union (as is noted above, the most important upcoming country of immigration) come here for family reasons. A considerable number of immigrants from Poland come for employment reasons.

Table 2.6: Immigration of Foreign Nationals by Country of Birth and Motive, 2004

	Employment	Asylum	Family	Study	other
<b>Absolute numbers</b>	<b>15,637</b>	<b>2966</b>	<b>28,350</b>	<b>10,194</b>	<b>7961</b>
<i>in %</i>					
<b>Western Countries</b>	<b>35,0</b>	<b>1,6</b>	<b>39,3</b>	<b>15,2</b>	<b>8,9</b>
<i>of whom from</i>					
<b>EU-countries (25)</b>	<b>48,8</b>	<b>0,2</b>	<b>29,4</b>	<b>15,1</b>	<b>6,6</b>
<i>of whom from</i>					
<b>old EU-countries (15)</b>	<b>50,7</b>	<b>0,0</b>	<b>25,6</b>	<b>15,5</b>	<b>8,1</b>
<i>of whom from</i>					
Germany	46,9	0,0	23,7	28,8	0,5
United Kingdom	62,9	0,0	32,8	2,1	2,1
Belgium	27,5	0,0	12,9	6,3	53,3
France	44,8	0,0	18,8	18,6	17,8
<b>new EU-countries<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>43,1</b>	<b>0,7</b>	<b>40,6</b>	<b>13,6</b>	<b>2,0</b>
<i>of whom from</i>					
Poland	45,5	0,4	41,9	11,1	1,1
Hungary	31,6	0,7	29,8	28,7	9,2
<b>other Europe</b>	<b>12,5</b>	<b>6,0</b>	<b>64,1</b>	<b>13,0</b>	<b>4,5</b>
<i>of whom from</i>					
Yugoslavia (former) <sup>b</sup>	7,7	22,0	55,0	12,7	2,6
Soviet Union (former) <sup>c</sup>	15,6	10,8	54,4	18,1	1,1
Romania	19,8	0,0	42,8	18,6	18,8
<b>other Western</b>	<b>22,1</b>	<b>0,0</b>	<b>36,5</b>	<b>18,7</b>	<b>22,7</b>
<i>of whom from</i>					
United States	31,2	0,0	47,3	21,2	0,3
Canada	31,9	0,0	39,4	25,3	3,5
Indonesia	3,1	0,1	25,7	25,0	46,1
Japan	36,6	0,0	48,2	14,2	1,0
Australia	37,8	0,0	42,3	10,6	9,4
<b>Non-Western countries</b>	<b>8,5</b>	<b>8,7</b>	<b>49,5</b>	<b>16,3</b>	<b>17,0</b>
<i>of whom from</i>					
Turkey	6,5	2,3	86,5	4,2	0,4
Morocco	4,0	1,7	90,1	3,9	0,3
Somalia	1,0	54,5	38,6	0,0	5,9
South Africa	38,5	0,2	40,4	11,6	9,3
Angola	6,9	32,7	8,3	1,1	51,0
Sudan	0,6	44,4	43,2	3,0	8,9
Sierra Leone	0,9	30,7	19,9	5,3	43,2
Ghana	10,9	2,1	65,9	9,5	11,6
Congo (democratic republic)	4,8	42,4	41,0	2,9	9,0
Ethiopia	1,0	11,6	13,2	21,6	52,7
Suriname	2,1	2,5	88,4	5,4	1,6
Brazil	4,4	0,0	22,2	2,8	70,6
Colombia	8,3	1,5	62,8	24,4	2,9
Iraq	0,5	38,8	56,2	2,3	2,2
Afghanistan	0,1	5,1	26,3	0,1	68,4
China	9,0	2,3	23,8	64,9	0,0
Iran	7,0	23,2	49,2	9,7	10,9
Thailand	2,5	0,3	84,4	12,0	0,9
Pakistan	4,5	1,8	16,0	6,0	71,6
India	17,3	0,3	20,2	10,6	51,6
Phillipines	7,7	0,2	44,1	7,0	41,0
Syria	6,7	33,3	51,1	3,3	5,6
Sri Lanka	2,4	12,1	58,7	18,4	8,3

Source: Statistics Netherlands (figures are based on data of the Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service)

<sup>a</sup>figures do not include data of Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia and Baltic States,

<sup>b</sup>including Slovenia,

<sup>c</sup>including Baltic States

For immigrants from non-Western countries, family reasons are clearly the main migration motive. Of the non-Western immigrants 50% came for family reasons, 9% came to seek asylum, 16% to study and 9% to find jobs. In some immigrant groups, the percentage of immigrants to The Netherlands for family reasons is significantly higher: around 90% of the immigrants from Morocco, Turkey and Suriname and 85% of the immigrants from Thailand.

### **2.3 Emigration from The Netherlands**

The counterpart of immigration is emigration. Earlier in this chapter, Table 2.1 gives an overview of the emigration of Dutch nationals and foreign nationals since 1980. The total emigration from The Netherlands remained quite stable from the mid-1980s to the end of the 1990s and fluctuated between 55,000 in 1985 and 61,000 in 2000. But as we already noted in the 2002 Dutch SOPEMI report, the number of emigrants has been growing in recent years. In 2003, almost 69,000 emigrants left the country and in 2004 the total number rose to almost 75,000. The latter figure is the largest number of emigrants in one year since the early fifties. Rising numbers of emigrants are visible among Dutch as well as foreign nationals, but more marked among Dutch nationals. Table 2.7 shows the countries of destination for Dutch and foreign nationals leaving The Netherlands in 2004. Dutch nationals constitute a little more than two thirds of the emigrants in 2004 and foreign nationals one third. For Dutch nationals, the percentage of male emigrants is slightly higher than of female emigrants. For foreign nationals, the percentage of male emigrants more or less equals the percentage of female emigrants. Dutch as well as foreign nationals predominantly emigrate to other Western countries. More than half (57%) the Dutch nationals went to other EU countries, another 14% went to other Western countries including Central and Eastern Europe. Only 29% of the emigrating Dutch nationals went to non-Western countries, almost a third of them to The Netherlands Antilles (presumably native Antilleans themselves). For emigrating foreign nationals, the figures are not very different. Half (52%) the emigrating foreign nationals went to other EU countries, and a quarter (24%) went to other Western countries. Another quarter (24%) of them went to non-Western countries, even less than among Dutch nationals. This

leads to the conclusion that although immigrants from non-Western countries form a considerable percentage of the immigrants to The Netherlands, only relatively few people leave for these countries.

**Table 2.7: Emigration of Dutch and Non-Dutch Nationals by Country of Destination and Gender, 2004**

	dutch			non-dutch			male	total	
	male	female	total	male	female	total		female	total
<b>2004</b>	<b>27,541</b>	<b>23,959</b>	<b>51,500</b>	<b>11,963</b>	<b>11,586</b>	<b>23,549</b>	<b>39,504</b>	<b>35,545</b>	<b>75,049</b>
in %	36.7	31.9	68.6	15.9	15.4	31.4	52.6	47.4	100.0
<b>Western countries</b>	<b>19,789</b>	<b>16,887</b>	<b>36,676</b>	<b>8,917</b>	<b>9,035</b>	<b>17,952</b>	<b>28,665</b>	<b>25,876</b>	<b>54,575</b>
<i>of whom to</i>									
<b>25 EU-countries</b>	<b>15,891</b>	<b>13,685</b>	<b>29,576</b>	<b>6,143</b>	<b>6,144</b>	<b>12,287</b>	<b>22,034</b>	<b>19,829</b>	<b>41,863</b>
<i>of whom to</i>									
Germany	3732	2801	6533	1453	1566	3019	5185	4367	9552
Belgium	4288	3768	8056	620	791	1411	4908	4559	9467
United Kingdom	3273	3126	6399	1327	1162	2489	4600	4288	8888
Spain	1398	1177	2575	519	505	1024	1917	1682	3599
France	1256	1194	2450	503	489	992	1759	1683	3442
Italy	265	291	556	293	228	521	558	519	1077
Sweden	267	231	498	142	169	311	409	400	809
Portugal	164	132	296	209	181	390	373	313	686
Ireland	207	175	382	101	108	209	308	283	591
Austria	201	152	353	82	116	198	283	268	551
Denmark	175	139	314	85	108	193	260	247	507
Greece	106	130	236	170	97	267	276	227	503
Poland	130	80	210	301	246	547	431	326	757
Hungary	95	63	158	126	93	219	221	156	377
<b>other Europe</b>	<b>1001</b>	<b>786</b>	<b>1787</b>	<b>781</b>	<b>816</b>	<b>1597</b>	<b>1758</b>	<b>1572</b>	<b>3364</b>
<i>of whom to</i>									
Switzerland	374	307	681	108	118	226	482	425	907
Norway	257	196	453	69	107	176	326	303	629
Yugoslavia (former)	136	145	281	299	265	564	435	410	845
Soviet Union (former)	131	69	200	191	215	406	322	284	606
<b>other Western countries</b>	<b>2897</b>	<b>2416</b>	<b>5313</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>2075</b>	<b>4068</b>	<b>4873</b>	<b>4475</b>	<b>9348</b>
<i>of whom to</i>									
United States	1345	1085	2430	870	918	1788	2215	2003	4218
Canada	508	425	933	148	179	327	656	604	1260
Australia	571	514	1085	246	276	522	817	790	1607
New Zealand	237	238	475	46	39	85	283	277	560
Japan	70	43	113	488	406	894	558	449	1007
Indonesia	149	95	244	195	257	452	344	352	696
<b>Non-Western countries</b>	<b>7752</b>	<b>7072</b>	<b>14824</b>	<b>3046</b>	<b>2551</b>	<b>5597</b>	<b>10,668</b>	<b>9501</b>	<b>20,258</b>
<i>of whom to</i>									
Turkey	357	353	710	856	426	1282	1213	779	1992
Morocco	213	175	388	255	149	404	468	324	792
South Africa	242	229	471	96	221	317	338	450	788
Egypt	116	160	276	52	35	87	168	195	363
Netherlands Antilles	2457	2799	5256	10	24	34	2467	2823	5290
Aruba	768	683	1451	2	9	11	770	692	1462
Suriname	530	415	945	63	92	155	593	507	1100
Brazil	179	92	271	74	117	191	253	209	462
China	255	170	425	270	276	546	525	446	971
Thailand	244	91	335	36	110	146	280	201	481
Iraq	187	127	314	33	25	58	220	152	372

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline (figures are based on the municipal population registrations)

Lastly, combining the Dutch and foreign nationals leaving The Netherlands in 2004 makes it clear that just ten countries attracted almost two thirds (64%) of the emigrants in 2004. With the exception of The Netherlands Antilles, they are all Western countries: Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Spain, Australia, Italy and Canada. Germany, Belgium and the United Kingdom are by far the most important destination for emigrants from The Netherlands: 37% of the Dutch and non-Dutch emigrants went to these three countries. Almost 75% of the Dutch and non-Dutch emigrants went to other Western countries including Central and Eastern Europe, and only 27% of the emigrants leaving The Netherlands in 2004 went to a non-Western country.

The findings thus far raise a question about the significance of return migration. To what extent do immigrants to The Netherlands eventually return to their country of origin, and to what extent do they stay in The Netherlands? This has been examined by Statistics Netherlands in a cohort analysis (Alders and Nicolaas 2003 and Nicolaas et al. 2004).<sup>17</sup> The study covers the period from 1995 to 2002. The data are taken from the municipal population registers [Gemeentelijk Basisadministratie (GBA)] where all the legal residents of The Netherlands are registered. In addition to characteristics such as age, sex and so forth, the length of stay (the period they have spent in The Netherlands since their last arrival) is also recorded for everyone who is of foreign descent. This information makes it possible to distinguish between migrants who are here temporarily and those who are residents of The Netherlands on a more or less permanent basis. The most important result of the analysis is that most of the immigrants remain in The Netherlands but a significant percentage also depart again within a fairly short period of time.

Table 2.8 shows the percentage of immigrants to The Netherlands in a certain year (a cohort) who depart again in subsequent years. The main conclusion of the analysis is that a little more than one-third of the immigrants who came to The Netherlands from 1995 to 1997 left again in the subsequent four to six years. In the following years, the return migration figures gradually fell. This does

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<sup>17</sup> The following is based on: M. Alders & H. Nicolaas (2003) 'One in three immigrants leaves within six years'. In: *Bevolkingstrends* nr. 1, blz. 45-48. ([www.cbs.nl](http://www.cbs.nl)) and H. Nicolaas, A. Sprangers, A. Zorlu and J. Hartog (2004), 'Een derde van de immigranten binnen zes jaar weer vertrokken' (Migranten: wie komen, wie gaan terug en wie laten hun gezin overkomen?) In: *Bevolkingstrends* 52(2), pp. 36-42 ([www.cbs.nl](http://www.cbs.nl)).

not mean that immigrants who came to The Netherlands later have less of a tendency to depart again. It only means they were less apt to leave in the period examined. It can be assumed that some of these immigrants will leave The Netherlands as well in the future. In the whole period from 1995 to 2002, a total of more than 760,000 migrants came to The Netherlands. Of this group almost 25% had departed again before 2003.

**Table 2.8: Emigration of Foreign-born Immigrants by Years of Residence in The Netherlands (data of 2004 not available)**

Settled down:	Total	Of which % left in :								Total
		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	
	x 1000	%								
1995	74.8	3.1	9.5	7.4	5.4	3.5	2.8	2.4	2.6	36.8
1996	86.2		3.6	10.2	7.9	4.7	3.5	2.9	2.8	35.6
1997	87.0			4.0	10.5	7.5	5.0	3.5	3.5	34.0
1998	96.5				3.8	10.1	7.1	5.0	5.0	30.9
1999	94.3					3.7	8.5	7.1	6.2	26.4
2000	109.1						3.4	8.5	8.2	20.0
2001	110.3							3.4	10.3	13.7
2002	99.9								3.8	3.8

Source: Nicolaas et al., *Bevolkingstrends 2004* (2)


Although the pattern for Western and non-Western migrants is similar, there are considerable differences in the level of the departure percentages. For example, almost half the 35,000 Western immigrants who came to The Netherlands in 1995 left again within seven years. Of the 40,000 non-Western immigrants who came in that year, about a quarter left The Netherlands within seven years. Of the 1997 immigration cohort, almost half the Western immigrants left within only four years. This means Western immigrants to The Netherlands in 1997 left even more quickly than their predecessors. For the non-Western immigrants this percentage is 20%, which is comparable to the immigration cohort of 1995.

Figure 2.5 shows the differences in return migration between immigrants from Western and non-Western countries for the period of 1995-2001. The figure shows that return migration is more common among Western than non-Western immigrants: whereas about 45% of the Western immigrants left The Netherlands in the years examined, this is only true of slightly more than 25% of the non-Western immigrants. However, there are significant differences between the two categories. The percentage of return migrants from Western countries is considerably lower than the overall average for immigrants from former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. Yet, the percentage of return migrants is significant higher than the overall average for immigrants from the United Kingdom, the United States and especially



Japan. There are similar differences in the category of non-Western immigrants. Immigrants from Afghanistan, Morocco, Iraq, Iran and Turkey are less apt to leave The Netherlands than other non-Western immigrants. Immigrants from India, South Africa and The Netherlands Antilles are more apt to leave The Netherlands than the average non-Western immigrants.

**Figure 2.5: Percentage of Immigrants who Arrived in 1995 and Emigrated within 6 Years (data of 2004 not available)**



Source: Alders and Nicolaas, Statistics Netherlands, 2003

The percentage of return migrants in each immigrant group seems to be related to the dominant group immigration motives (*cf.* Table 2.5). Immigrants who primarily come to The Netherlands for employment reasons tend to be much more apt to return home than immigrants who predominantly come to The Netherlands to seek asylum or for family reasons. This distinction can be observed among Western as well as non-Western immigrants. Of the immigrants from Western countries, immigrants from former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union predominantly came to The Netherlands to seek asylum or in recent years for family reasons. They have the lowest percentage of return migration of all the Western immigrants. Immigrants from countries like the United Kingdom and Japan who mainly come to The Netherlands for employment reasons exhibit the highest percentages of

return migration. (US immigrants seem to be an exception. Although half the US immigrants came to The Netherlands for family reasons, more than 70% of them leave in the next few years). There are similar differences among non-Western immigrants. Immigrants who mainly come to The Netherlands to seek asylum or for family reasons such as Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians, Turks and Moroccans exhibit the smallest percentages of return migration. Typical non-Western labour immigrants such as Indians and South Africans tend to be relatively quick to leave again.

# Appendices for Chapter 2

## Definitions and data sources<sup>18</sup>

### Migration

External migration statistics refer to all persons who enter the Netherlands with the intention of staying in the country for a certain period of time, or who leave the Netherlands to live in another country for a certain period of time. For people arriving in the Netherlands, registration is obligatory if they stay in the country for at least four months during the first six months following registration. People leaving the country are obliged to notify the authorities if they intend to live outside the Netherlands for at least eight months in the first year following this notification.

### Western countries

All countries in Europe (excluding Turkey), North America, Oceania, Indonesia and Japan.

### Non-western countries

Non-western countries include Turkey and countries in Africa, South America and Asia except Indonesia and Japan. The latter two countries are included with the western countries on the basis of their socio-economic and socio-cultural position.

### Population

All data mentioned concern the registered population of the Netherlands. The figures shown in this publication relate to the resident ('de jure') population: persons who reside habitually in the Netherlands and who are recorded in the municipal population registers. In principle all those residing in the Netherlands for an indefinite period are entered into the population register of the municipality where they usually live.

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<sup>18</sup> source Statistics Netherlands

### **Used external sources**

The figures are based on information as reported to Statistics Netherlands by the municipal population registrations.

### **Immigration**

Immigration relates to all individuals arriving in the Netherlands whose arrival results in an entry in a municipal population register.

### **Emigration**

Emigration relates to all individuals departing from the Netherlands whose departure results in a removal from a municipal population register.

### **Emigration (incl. net adm. corrections)**

Emigration including net administrative corrections.

Administrative corrections consist of inclusions in and withdrawals from the municipal population registers for other reasons than birth, death, migration or redefinition of municipal borders. Most of these administrative corrections refer to people for whom it has been demonstrated that they have left the municipality, often to live abroad. Entries often concern people who reappear in the same or in a different municipality and are then included in the population register. This explains why the net administrative corrections are included in emigration (and net migration) but not in immigration.

This means that in some cases (like specific ages) the value of emigration including net administrative corrections may be negative.

### **Net migration**

Immigration minus emigration.

### **Net administrative corrections**

Migration figures in The Netherlands need to be corrected by the number of net administrative corrections, a figure that is largely influenced by the unreported emigration of foreigners. If the net administrative corrections are deducted from the registered migration surplus, the result is a lower corrected migration surplus. Statistics Netherlands [Dutch acronym: CBS] presents the registered migration statistics as well as the net administrative corrections. The corrected migration surplus (1980-2004) as stated in this appendix should be regarded as an unofficial figure.

Migration to and from The Netherlands

Table A2.1: Development of External Migration of Dutch Nationals and Foreigners, 1980-2004

Year	Dutch nationals			Foreigners			Total			Net. Admin. Correct.	Corrected Surplus
	Immigration	Emigration	Surplus	Immigration	Emigration	Surplus	Immigration	Emigration	Surplus		
1980	32,684	35,837	-3,153	79,820	23,633	56,187	112,504	59,470	53,034	-	53,034
1981	29,767	38,216	-8,449	50,416	24,979	25,437	80,183	63,195	16,988	-	16,988
1982	29,810	39,413	-9,603	40,930	28,094	12,836	70,740	67,507	3,233	-	3,233
1983	30,321	32,810	-2,489	36,441	27,974	8,467	66,762	60,784	5,978	-3,647	2,331
1984	29,616	31,824	-2,208	37,291	27,030	10,261	66,907	58,854	8,053	-2,920	5,133
1985	33,196	31,009	2,187	46,166	24,206	21,960	79,362	55,215	24,147	-4,260	19,887
1986	34,585	31,155	3,430	52,802	23,563	29,239	87,387	54,718	32,669	-5,889	26,780
1987	35,080	31,139	3,941	60,855	20,872	39,983	95,935	52,011	43,924	-8,833	35,091
1988	32,976	34,403	-1,427	58,262	21,388	36,874	91,238	55,791	35,447	-8,205	27,242
1989	33,529	38,218	-4,689	65,385	21,489	43,896	98,914	59,707	39,207	-12,356	26,851
1990	36,086	36,749	-663	81,264	20,595	60,669	117,350	57,344	60,006	-11,595	48,411
1991	35,912	35,998	-86	84,337	21,330	63,007	120,249	57,328	62,921	-13,311	49,610
1992	33,904	36,101	-2,197	83,022	22,733	60,289	116,926	58,834	58,092	-14,974	43,118
1993	31,581	37,019	-5,438	87,573	22,203	65,370	119,154	59,222	59,932	-15,566	44,366
1994	30,887	39,409	-8,522	68,424	22,746	45,678	99,311	62,155	37,156	-17,073	20,083
1995	29,127	41,648	-12,521	66,972	21,673	45,299	96,099	63,321	32,778	-18,874	13,904
1996	31,572	42,921	-11,349	77,177	22,404	54,773	108,749	65,325	43,424	-26,620	16,804
1997	33,124	40,278	-7,154	76,736	21,940	54,796	109,860	62,218	47,642	-19,755	27,887
1998	40,706	39,175	1,531	81,701	21,266	60,435	122,407	60,441	61,966	-18,848	43,118
1999	40,786	38,358	2,428	78,365	20,665	57,700	119,151	59,023	60,128	-19,756	40,372
2000	41,467	40,474	993	91,383	20,727	70,656	132,850	61,201	71,649	-17,776	53,873
2001	38,897	42,921	-4,024	94,507	20,397	74,110	133,404	63,318	70,086	-19,248	50,838
2002	34,631	45,571	-10,940	86,619	21,157	65,462	121,250	66,728	54,522	-30,190	24,332
2003	30,948	47,015	-16,067	73,566	21,870	51,696	104,514	68,885	35,629	-35,946	-317
2004	28,898	51,500	-22,602	65,121	23,549	41,572	94,019	75,049	18,970	-35,186	-16,216

Source: Statistics Netherlands, statline

Administrative corrections: Administrative corrections consist of inclusions in and withdrawals from the municipal population registers for other reasons than birth, death, migration or redefinition of municipal borders. Most of these administrative corrections pertain to people who have left the municipality, often to live abroad. Entries often pertain to people who reappear in the same or in a different municipality and are then included in the population register.



In cooperation with Dr. Theo Veld (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

## 3.1 Introduction

The desirability of labour migration is a much-discussed topic in member countries of the EU. Recently both the European Commission and some European governments have argued that labour migration in EU countries is indispensable to alleviate existing and future tensions on the European labour markets. Proponents of further labour migration argue that the influx of labour migrants is necessary to compensate for the decreasing birth rates in most European countries and to restore the balance between the number of economically active and inactive citizens in the ageing European populations.

In response to these discussions the Dutch government has always stated that labour migration is only desirable for vacancies for which there are no Dutch or European job seekers available. Even during the period of job growth in The Netherlands during the second half of the 1990's the Dutch cabinet accepted labour migration only when there was insufficient labour supply available on the Dutch/EU labour market. The Dutch government argued there were still unacceptable large numbers of job seekers in the Netherlands. Furthermore, it wants to stimulate labour market participation of women and older workers. As a consequence, workpermits are only issued in specific economic sectors that have a high need and short supply of manpower (for instance in the ICT-sector). This position has been confirmed by the Dutch labour unions and is even more relevant now that the economic situation in The Netherlands has worsened and unemployment is rising.

Yet this general line of reasoning ignores the specific need for certain workers in the Dutch labour market. On the one hand there is a need for highly qualified workers (nurses, doctors, teachers, ICT specialists, etcetera) in specific economic sectors (health, education, personal and commercial services, ICT). There is a shortage of these workers in the Dutch labour market. On the other hand there is at the same time also a need for low-

qualified workers in specific economic sectors in which Dutch job seekers are often not willing to work and employers are looking for cheap labour (especially in horticulture and to a lesser extent in the hotel and catering industry). Illegal foreign immigrants often find employment in these sectors. For both kind of jobs – highly skilled and low skilled - Dutch employers are increasingly looking for qualified employees from outside the EU. A well-known example of this was the arrival of nurses from the Philippines and South Africa. At present Dutch hospitals are contracting South African doctors on quite a large-scale. Since 1995 the recruitment of non-EU foreigners for work has been regulated under the Aliens Employment Act (*Wet Arbeid Vreemdelingen* or *WAV*).

In reaction to national and international trends and practises in labour migration, the Dutch Cabinet has recently developed a programme to stimulate highly qualified labour migration to The Netherlands. Labour migrants who are able to earn a gross wage of more than 45.000 Euro on the Dutch labour market are eligible for a residence permit for a maximum of five years. For labour migrants who are less than 30 years of age the income criterion is 32.600 Euro. For scientific researchers at universities, a wage criterion does not apply at all. All these highly qualified labour migrants are allowed to work in The Netherlands without the labour market check made in cases in which a work permit is necessary. Within two weeks the INS can decide on an application for a (provisional) residence permit. After five years these labour migrants are authorised to receive a permanent residence permit. Surprisingly, no educational criterion is used, only a simple income criterion in order to select and attract highly qualified migrants. This new legislation, entered into force 1st October 2004 shows that different categories of labour migrants will be treated in different ways. The Netherlands is developing a selective labour migration system in which a more liberal entry policy is pursued for certain (highly qualified) labour groups who will get straightforward access to permanent residence because of their positive (financial) contribution to the Dutch economy and society, while at the same time the job and residence opportunities for low or medium skilled labour migrants are given on a strictly temporal basis (Engbersen 2003). The intention behind this differential policy is to safeguard the Dutch welfare state and to prevent groups of labour migrants from gaining easy access to public provisions.




### 3.2 Increase in temporary work permits

The WAV was described in detail in the SOPEMI-Netherlands report of 1995. A Dutch employer who is unable to find an employee in the so-called priority workforce can apply for a temporary work permit (TWV) for a foreign employee. The priority workforce consists of Dutch job seekers and other job seekers from the European Economic Area (EEA). Workers from within the EEA are not obliged to obtain a temporary work permit to work in The Netherlands. They are free to move in the labour market. Applications made by employers for employees on a temporary work permit are assessed by the Central Organisation for Work and Income (Public Employment Service), a local employment agency (CWI), which, among other things conducts a labour market check to assess whether job seekers from the priority workforce are available. If so, or if the employer has made insufficient efforts to hire a Dutch or European job seeker the application will be refused. Employees for whom a temporary work permit has been granted must apply for a residence permit for The Netherlands. In order to enter The Netherlands, they first require a temporary residence permit. This work permit is granted for a maximum of five years.

Figure 3.1 shows that the number of temporary work permits granted in recent years increased significantly.

**Figure 3.1: The number of temporary work permits and 'declarations' issued on the ground of the Dutch Foreign Nationals Labour Act (WAV) in the period 1990-2004**



Source: CWI

In the rest of this paragraph a more detailed picture is given of the number of foreign temporary workers coming to The Netherlands. It is important to note that these figures only provide insight into the labour migration of employees from outside the European Economic Area

From 1990 to 1997 the number of temporary work permits was fairly stable. In 1997 the number of temporary work permits exceeded 10,000 per year for the first time. In the following four years the number of temporary work permits tripled to reach 30,000 in 2001. In 2003 this increase in the number of temporary work permits continued, despite of the current economic recession. In 2003, a total of 38,000 temporary work permits were issued.

Table 3.1 shows the countries of origin for labour migrants who came to The Netherlands with a temporary work permit. More than two-thirds of the temporary labour migrants came from Western countries (including Eastern European countries) and one-third came from non-Western countries. In particular, the number of temporary labour migrants from Eastern European countries has increased sharply over the last few years. In 1999 about 6400 temporary workers from several Eastern European countries came to The Netherlands. Four years later, in 2003, their number had nearly tripled to more than 17.000. This means that 45 percent of all temporary labour migrants who came to The Netherlands in 2003, came from Eastern European countries, whereas in 1999 this was only 31 percent. Moreover, the number of temporary workers from Poland has increased sharply due to a project of the Dutch Organisation for Agriculture and Horticulture (LTO) and the Centre for Work and income, which was supported by the Dutch government, that made formal recruitment of Polish seasonal workers possible. In 2001, the highest number of labour migrants still came from the United States. In 2003 the five countries with the highest number of temporary labour migrants in The Netherlands were: Poland, the former Soviet Union, the United States, the former Czechoslovakian Republic and the People's Republic of China. Remarkable is the strong increase in the number of work permits, issued for people from Sierra Leone (mostly (former) asylum seekers, who are allowed to work for at most 12 weeks a year with a work permit during the application for asylum).

Labour migration

Table 3.1: Number of temporary work permits (WAV) by nationality (1996-2004) (data of 2004 not available)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
<b>Total</b>	<b>9173</b>	<b>11,062</b>	<b>15,181</b>	<b>20,816</b>	<b>27,678</b>	<b>30,153</b>	<b>34,558</b>	<b>38,036</b>	<b>44,113</b>
<b>Western countries</b>				<b>11,994</b>	<b>16,234</b>	<b>17,633</b>	<b>20,175</b>	<b>22,663</b>	<b>32,538</b>
<i>of which</i>									
<b>European</b>							<b>14,893</b>	<b>17,222</b>	<b>28,303</b>
<b>New EU-Countries*</b>							<b>9,400</b>	<b>12,542</b>	<b>24,424</b>
<i>of which</i>									
Poland	735	928	1184	1501	2497	2831	6572	9511	20,190
Czechoslovakia (former)	174	256	282	606	1058	1673	1494	1653	2690
<i>of whom from</i>									
Czech Republic							879	967	1454
Slovak Republic							615	686	1236
Hungary	275	349	502	662	718	1063	1000	953	1080
Lithuania							157	213	302
Latvia							60	48	72
Slovenia							68	104	49
Estonia							27	50	37
Malta							19	9	3
<b>other Europe</b>							<b>5492</b>	<b>4680</b>	<b>3877</b>
<i>of which</i>									
Soviet Union (former)(1)				2121	3572	3784	3309	2547	1741
Yugoslavia (former)(2)				746	1146	1098	944	627	414
Romenia	287	193	299	458	643	741	860	1095	1300
Bulgaria				317	387	427	324	381	400
<b>other Western countries</b>	-	-	-	<b>5556</b>	<b>6186</b>	<b>5980</b>	<b>5295</b>	<b>5443</b>	<b>4235</b>
<i>of whom from</i>									
United States	1945	2275	2603	2822	3133	2918	2594	2564	2024
Canada	286	412	439	604	628	504	407	405	446
Japan	949	893	871	890	945	909	1008	1204	823
Indonesia	146	148	211	482	547	799	795	872	578
Australia	240	263	312	444	505	515	376	324	300
<b>Non-Western countries</b>	-	-	-	<b>8695</b>	<b>11,229</b>	<b>12,245</b>	<b>14,015</b>	<b>14,977</b>	<b>11,312</b>
<i>of whom from</i>									
Turkey	467	442	661	710	1007	931	1108	1276	478
Sierra Leone				31	81	222	1047	1252	560
Angola				31	110	268	583	754	428
South Africa	197	223	588	479	566	646	377	402	358
Cameroon				45	92	144	222	322	251
Guinea				11	60	110	320	370	203
Sudan	7	6	70	322	488	524	571	463	196
Suriname				261	364	445	387	313	240
Brasil							166	176	204
China	578	489	512	701	980	1161	1741	2253	2402
India	390	519	830	901	1006	974	776	845	1050
Iraq	12	30	964	1520	1627	1176	782	786	663
Afghanistan	8	15	238	651	580	699	974	1008	555
Iran				160	300	448	533	470	250
Vietnam							191	225	207
unknown							368	396	263

Source: CWI

The increase in the number of issued work permits does not necessarily mean that more labour migrants come to The Netherlands. One should distinguish between 'real' labour migrants and foreigners already living in The

Netherlands (asylum seekers, admitted asylum seekers, foreign students, trainees, artists and musicians etc.) that want to work and need a temporary work permit. Although figures are not available the latter category is partly responsible for the increase in the number work permits issued in recent years.

Table 3.2 shows the types of jobs for which temporary work permits were issued. Contrary to the popular idea that temporary work permits are primarily issued for highly qualified professions, the data reveal that the highest number of work permits is issued for work in the agricultural and horticultural sectors. In 2001 more than one-quarter of all temporary work permits were issued for agricultural and horticultural work and in 2004 this was almost half. The increase in the number of Polish temporary labour migrants from the year 2002 seems to be related to the growing need for agricultural and horticultural workers in The Netherlands. The increasing number of foreign agricultural and horticultural workers is striking, since the idea of employing Dutch unemployed in this sector is frequently discussed. Other lower-qualified professions that attract a relatively large number of labour migrants are various industrial production jobs, chauffeurs and personnel for the hotel and catering industry.

**Table 3.2: Number of temporary work permits(WAV) by type of profession (2000-2004)**

	Absolute					in percentages				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
agriculture / horticulture	7694	8046	11,141	12,792	21,161	27.8	26.7	32.2	33.6	48.0
artistic professions	4324	4408	3971	3569	2992	15.6	14.6	11.5	9.4	6.8
production work	1996	2828	4735	5749	6258	7.2	9.4	13.7	15.1	14.2
science	2851	2715	2576	3246	3360	10.3	9.0	7.5	8.5	7.6
computer specialists	2209	2291	1193	900	984	8.0	7.6	3.5	2.4	2.2
executive professions	1889	1972	1712	1677	1762	6.8	6.5	5.0	4.4	4.0
advisors	1919	1749	1443	1510	1114	6.9	5.8	4.2	4.0	2.5
drivers	1088	1358	1396	1285	1681	3.9	4.5	4.0	3.4	3.8
hotel and catering industry	672	1019	1543	1557	1142	2.4	3.4	4.5	4.1	2.6
other services	2032	2192	3240	3485	2269	7.3	7.3	9.4	9.2	5.1
construction	278	615	294	810	393	1.0	2.0	0.9	2.1	0.9
health care	291	429	605	722	495	1.1	1.4	1.8	1.9	1.1
sports	256	210	199	203	219	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.5
unskilled work	43	111	310	295	127	0.2	0.4	0.9	0.8	0.3
mechanics	59	91	125	99	89	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.2
other professions	76	119	75	137	67	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.2
unknown	1	0				0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<b>All professions</b>	<b>27,678</b>	<b>30,153</b>	<b>34,558</b>	<b>38,036</b>	<b>44,113</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: CWI

In addition to these low-skilled professions, labour migrants are also attracted to certain more highly-skilled jobs. A relatively large proportion of temporary work permits are issued for the artistic professions and scientists. Table 3.3 shows the types of jobs in which temporary workers from different countries are employed. It is no surprise there are clear differences between

the sectors temporary workers from the more developed Western countries and temporary workers from Eastern Europe and developing countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia, work in.

**Table 3.3: Temporary work permits (TWV) by type of profession and region 2004 (percentage)**

	Total (N)	Western					Non-western			
		New EU-Countries	Other Europe	Northern-America	Japan/Indonesia	Oceania	Turkey	Africa	Other America	Other Asia
agriculture / horticulture	21,010	69.6	36.2	0.3	2.2	0.0	10.3	35.1	1.3	19.9
artistic professions	2992	2.7	19.3	35.4	6.4	9.9	5.2	4.9	17.5	3.5
production work	6214	15.2	9.7	8.4	4.6	3.6	6.5	24.5	9.1	13.4
science	3357	1.9	15.9	9.5	19.1	15.9	12.3	6.5	24.3	18.8
computer specialists	983	0.2	2.0	3.4	2.3	9.9	5.2	1.7	2.8	9.3
executive professions	1761	0.3	1.5	20.2	27.0	26.6	9.8	2.5	7.4	7.0
advisors	1114	0.5	2.8	8.9	7.4	19.0	9.4	2.4	8.4	4.5
drivers	1681	6.2	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	13.6	0.3	0.1	0.3
hotel and catering industry	1134	0.8	1.4	0.3	16.9	0.5	3.3	1.6	3.8	8.4
other services	2229	0.9	6.0	6.1	8.8	5.2	20.5	12.9	18.4	11.8
construction	390	1.2	0.8	0.0	0.1	0.5	1.9	0.7	0.2	0.3
health care	488	0.3	1.3	1.1	4.4	2.7	0.6	4.4	2.2	1.4
sports	219	0.1	0.4	4.8	0.5	4.4	0.2	0.4	2.1	0.1
unskilled work	124	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.2	1.3	1.8	0.5
mechanics	87	0.0	0.2	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.4
other professions	67	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.3	1.4	0.6	0.1	0.4	0.1
total		100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
(n)	43,850	24,426	3877	2470	1401	364	478	3529	906	6399

Source: CWI

Temporary workers from the developed Western countries (USA, Canada, Japan, Oceania, including Australia and New Zealand) predominantly work in high-skilled jobs such as executive professions and advisors. American temporary workers are also frequently employed in artistic professions. Temporary workers from Eastern European countries, in particular Poland, and from African countries predominantly work in the agricultural and horticultural sectors. Eastern European and Latin American temporary workers also frequently work in artistic professions. African and Asian temporary workers frequently work in production jobs. African, Latin American and Asian temporary workers are also frequently employed in the so-called 'other services' such as cleaning jobs.

### 3.3 Labour migration policies for low and high skilled workers

The recent Dutch labour migration policy proposals make clear that with respect to highly skilled workers, the adage of temporariness is increasingly less adhered to. The reason for this is the increased competition between OECD countries attracting the necessary human capital to be internationally competitive. The worldwide shortage in highly educated, technical and

medical personnel stimulates migration to countries where the conditions for taking up residence are the most favourable. An important condition is guaranteeing a quick route towards permanent residence (and consequently access to comprehensive social rights). Such a policy is without risk for the welfare state because these immigrants perform better on European labour markets than average residents. An inflow of such immigrants would positively affect the public budget (Roodenburg et al. 2003). It is also acknowledged that highly educated employees are geographically very mobile. Recent Dutch studies estimates that highly skilled immigrants from western countries and countries such as Japan and India will leave again within six years (Statistics Netherlands 2003; Veld 2004)

As far as immigrants with a low or intermediate level of education are concerned, temporariness of permits remains the basic principle in The Netherlands. This principle should enable a flexible labour market policy and prevent temporary immigrants from gaining access to public provisions. It also prevents extensive forms of chain migration from following in the wake of initial migration. In most West European countries employers have to hire available labour supply (i.e. within the national borders or within the European Economic Area (EEA)), before they may hire (temporary) labour migrants. This labour market test is applied in a flexible way due to the fact that even in countries with substantial numbers of inactives and unemployed, shortages in workforce still exist in specific sectors. Examples are the vacancies in nursing and other forms of care (requiring an intermediate level of education) and those in domestic services, agriculture, and horticulture (requiring low and unskilled workers). These sectors already give an indication of the diversity of temporary labour migration, ranging from short-term labour migration in the case of seasonal labour (for three months) to long-term labour migration in the health care sector (for more than two years).

Two relevant points need to be made with respect to labour migration (cf. ACVZ 2004). The first involves the *problematic maintenance* of temporary labour migration. There are several systems for encouraging migrants to return to their country of origin, but none of these systems actually guarantees their return. That is why in practice, labour migrants find ways to stay longer or even permanently. Thus, temporary work and residence may result in permanent residence. Labour migrants can also lengthen their stay through marriage or may choose to remain illegally in a country once their permit has expired. Another point is that regulated temporary labour

migration only partially limits *illegal employment*, in the the underside of the labour market. This applies particularly to advanced Scandinavian and continental welfare states, and to a lesser extent to countries such as Spain and Italy. The idea that illegal labour in the underside of the labour market will be pushed back by regulating the recruitment of (temporary) labour migrants is dubious. Illegal immigrants are economically appealing to many employers because they are illegal and can be paid wages below the statutory minimum wage levels (cf. Engbersen 1999 en 2003).

## Appendix chapter 3

**Table A3.1: Immigration of foreign nationals by reasons of labour by country of birth 1995-2004**

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
<b>Absolute numbers</b>	10,211	12,656	13,193	15,369	16,299	19,025	19,937	18,535	16,621	15,637
<i>in %</i>										
<i>including</i>										
<b>Western Countries</b>	<b>86,7</b>	<b>86,9</b>	<b>86,4</b>	<b>85,1</b>	<b>85,6</b>	<b>86,5</b>	<b>84,9</b>	<b>84,3</b>	<b>84,5</b>	<b>85,4</b>
<i>of whom from</i>										
<b>EU-countries (25)</b>	<b>67,0</b>	<b>66,7</b>	<b>66,3</b>	<b>65,6</b>	<b>66,3</b>	<b>68,7</b>	<b>67,3</b>	<b>66,8</b>	<b>64,7</b>	<b>68,3</b>
<i>of whom from</i>										
<b>old EU-countries (15)</b>	<b>65,7</b>	<b>64,5</b>	<b>64,2</b>	<b>62,2</b>	<b>64,0</b>	<b>64,4</b>	<b>61,3</b>	<b>61,6</b>	<b>58,9</b>	<b>53,3</b>
<i>of whom from</i>										
Germany	11,8	10,8	10,9	10,8	10,7	11,3	11,0	12,6	11,6	11,7
United Kingdom	18,6	20,3	19,6	17,1	18,0	18,7	18,3	15,6	14,5	12,1
Belgium	5,7	5,3	6,0	5,4	5,3	5,0	4,3	4,5	4,6	4,0
France	4,6	5,4	5,5	6,2	6,2	5,7	5,3	5,4	4,9	4,8
<b>new EU-countries<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>1,3</b>	<b>2,2</b>	<b>2,2</b>	<b>3,4</b>	<b>2,3</b>	<b>4,3</b>	<b>6,0</b>	<b>5,2</b>	<b>5,8</b>	<b>15,1</b>
<i>of whom from</i>										
Poland	0,9	1,6	1,4	2,0	1,5	3,0	4,0	3,9	4,6	12,1
Hungary	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,6	0,4	0,6	1,0	0,6	0,6	1,1
<b>other Europe</b>	<b>5,8</b>	<b>5,5</b>	<b>5,6</b>	<b>6,2</b>	<b>6,0</b>	<b>5,8</b>	<b>7,0</b>	<b>7,5</b>	<b>9,8</b>	<b>7,6</b>
<i>of whom from</i>										
Yugoslavia (former) <sup>b</sup>	0,4	0,2	0,4	0,5	0,6	0,7	0,7	0,4	0,4	0,4
Soviet Union (former) <sup>c</sup>	1,3	1,2	1,1	2,0	1,9	1,9	2,2	2,0	2,0	2,7
Romania	0,3	0,3	0,4	0,7	0,6	0,8	1,1	1,0	0,9	1,0
<b>other Western</b>	<b>13,8</b>	<b>14,7</b>	<b>14,4</b>	<b>13,4</b>	<b>13,3</b>	<b>12,0</b>	<b>10,7</b>	<b>10,0</b>	<b>10,0</b>	<b>9,5</b>
<i>of whom from</i>										
United States	6,2	7,6	7,7	7,0	6,8	6,0	4,9	4,4	4,7	4,2
Canada	1,0	1,3	1,3	1,2	1,0	1,2	1,0	0,9	0,9	0,8
Indonesia	0,2	0,2	0,4	0,4	0,5	0,3	0,5	0,3	0,3	0,4
Japan	5,0	4,3	3,6	3,0	2,9	2,6	2,4	2,8	2,8	2,8
Australia	1,1	1,1	1,0	1,3	1,6	1,3	1,4	1,3	1,0	1,0
<b>Non-Western countries</b>	<b>13,3</b>	<b>13,1</b>	<b>13,6</b>	<b>14,9</b>	<b>14,4</b>	<b>13,5</b>	<b>15,1</b>	<b>15,7</b>	<b>15,5</b>	<b>14,6</b>
<i>of whom from</i>										
Turkey	2,1	2,2	2,0	1,4	1,0	1,2	1,5	2,3	5,2	1,7
Morocco	1,2	1,2	1,3	1,1	0,8	0,9	0,7	0,8	1,0	0,8
Somalia	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,0	0,0
South Africa	0,7	1,2	1,0	2,2	1,4	1,5	1,7	1,0	1,1	1,2
Angola	0,2	0,3	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,3	0,4	0,6	0,4	0,3
Sudan	0,0	-	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Ghana	0,2	0,3	0,3	0,2	0,3	0,4	0,6	0,9	0,6	0,3
Congo (democratic republic)	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,0	0,1
Suriname	0,4	0,3	0,1	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,2	0,2
Brazil	0,3	0,3	0,4	0,4	0,5	0,4	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,7
Colombia	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,2
Iraq	-	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,0
Afghanistan	-	0,0	0,0	-	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
China	1,5	1,3	1,0	1,0	1,1	0,9	1,4	1,2	1,3	1,4
Iran	0,3	0,2	0,3	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,3	0,3
Thailand	0,1	0,2	0,1	0,2	0,1	0,2	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1
Pakistan	0,7	0,5	0,4	0,3	0,3	0,4	0,3	0,4	0,4	0,3
India	1,5	1,4	1,6	2,2	2,1	1,4	1,4	1,3	1,4	1,3
Phillipines	0,3	0,3	0,4	0,3	0,1	0,2	0,5	0,3	0,3	0,3
Syria	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,1
Sri Lanka	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,0	0,1	0,0

Source: Statistics Netherlands (figures are based on data of the Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service)

<sup>a</sup>figures do not include data of Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia and Baltic States,

<sup>b</sup>including Slovenia,

<sup>c</sup>including Baltic States



## Chapter 4 **Developments in asylum migration**

### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter briefly describes recent developments with respect to the influx of asylum seekers and asylum policy. The most striking aspect is the sharp decrease in the number of asylum seekers over the past five years. The new Dutch Aliens Act, which came into effect in 2000, is held responsible for this decrease. In this chapter we will mainly focus on the influx of asylum seekers to the Netherlands and changes in the composition of this category. Finally, we will examine the concluding part of the asylum policy, the return policy.

### **4.2 Asylum requests**


The Dutch government's restrictive asylum policy is probably the most important reason for the decrease in the number of asylum applications (especially the high percentage of rejections in the accelerated procedure and the strict policy for solitary underage asylum seekers). The number of asylum requests decreased from more than 32,000 in 2001 to some 9,800 in 2004 (see table 4.1). In table 4.1 we can see the sizeable monthly differences between the years 2001 and 2004 and in figure 4.1 we can see the trends over a period of 14 years. The number of asylum requests in 2004 was more than twice as low than in the beginning of the 1990s.

**Table 4.1: Total number of individual asylum seekers who arrived, with monthly breakdown and percentage variation between years 2003-2004:**

Month	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Variation +/- 2003-2004	
						absolute	percentage
January	4125	3697	2377	1234	976	-258	-21%
February	3840	2805	1972	1042	836	-206	-20%
March	3571	3086	1950	1398	940	-458	-33%
April	3104	2781	1767	1570	681	-889	-57%
May	3053	2549	1590	1391	627	-764	-55%
June	3473	2219	1479	831	772	-59	-7%
July	3702	2475	1419	1127	672	-455	-40%
August	3997	2462	1350	989	787	-202	-20%
September	3451	2551	1432	1103	849	-254	-23%
October	3981	3401	1374	1015	904	-111	-11%
November	3927	2399	1037	931	956	25	3%
December	3668	2154	920	771	782	11	1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>43,892</b>	<b>32,579</b>	<b>18,667</b>	<b>13,402</b>	<b>9,782</b>	<b>-3620</b>	<b>-27%</b>

Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service

**Figure 4.1: Asylum requests by country of nationality, 1991-2004**



Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service

In 2004, many countries of origin especially Iraq exhibited an absolute decrease in asylum influx in comparison to previous years (see table 4.2). The asylum requests of people from Somalia, Afghanistan and Burundi increased in 2004.

**Table 4.2: Asylum requests by country of nationality, 1997-2004 (top ten countries 2004)**

Country of nationality	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Iraq	9640	8300	3710	2780	1329	1022	3472	1043
Soviet Union (former)	1960	3230	5520	4200	3235	1891	1100	916
Somalia	1280	2780	2740	2110	1098	538	451	792
Afghanistan	5920	7120	4400	5050	3614	1077	492	688
Yugoslavia (former)	3790	8330	8520	5700	2184	847	539	497
Iran	1250	1680	1530	2550	1519	665	555	450
Burundi	60	150	200	330	427	452	402	405
Turkey	1140	1220	1500	2270	1400	638	414	338
China	1160	920	1240	1400	703	541	295	265
Sudan	680	1880	1700	1420	869	513	293	255
Other nationalities	7560	9610	11,670	16,080	16,201	10,483	5389	4133
<b>Total</b>	<b>34,440</b>	<b>45,220</b>	<b>42,730</b>	<b>43,890</b>	<b>32,579</b>	<b>18,667</b>	<b>13,402</b>	<b>9782</b>

Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service

A closer examination of the figures from the former Soviet Union countries reveals that most of the asylum applications come from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia (see table 4.3).

**Table 4.3: Asylum applications from former Soviet Union en Yugoslavia in The Netherlands**

Country of origin	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
<b>Soviet Union (former)</b>	<b>1960</b>	<b>3230</b>	<b>5520</b>	<b>4200</b>	<b>3235</b>	<b>1891</b>	<b>1100</b>	<b>916</b>
<i>of which from</i>								
Armenia	430	710	1249	812	529	427	204	247
Azerbaijan	320	1270	2449	1163	634	335	265	253
Belarus	*	*	40	113	115	131	55	25
Estonia	*	*	0	2	3	3	*	*
Georgia	290	290	321	291	298	219	116	73
Kazakhstan	*	*	102	180	133	43	8	23
Kyrgyzstan	*	*	6	119	71	55	21	7
Latvia	*	*	10	9	9	10		
Lithuania	*	*	12	11	12	9	10	7
Moldova	*	*	31	28	20	31	36	30
Russia	460	520	960	1016	911	420	245	206
Tajikistan	*	*	21	42	56	12	8	9
Turkmenistan	*	*	0	1	1	0	*	*
Ukraine	230	230	306	218	191	156	85	17
Uzbekistan	*	*	13	197	252	40	47	19
<b>Total applications former S.U.</b>	<b>1960</b>	<b>3230</b>	<b>5520</b>	<b>4200</b>	<b>3235</b>	<b>1891</b>	<b>1100</b>	<b>916</b>
<b>Total applications</b>	<b>34,440</b>	<b>45,220</b>	<b>39,299</b>	<b>43,895</b>	<b>32,579</b>	<b>18,667</b>	<b>13,402</b>	<b>9782</b>
<b>Percentage former S.U.</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>14%</b>	<b>10%</b>	<b>10%</b>	<b>10%</b>	<b>8%</b>	<b>9%</b>
<b>Yugoslavia (former)</b>	<b>3790</b>	<b>8330</b>	<b>8520</b>	<b>5700</b>	<b>2184</b>	<b>847</b>	<b>539</b>	<b>497</b>
<i>of which from</i>								
Bosnia-Herz.	1970	3770	1170	1650	1026	221	103	57
Croatia	70	150	140	140	63	31	13	15
Macedonia	0	0	80	60	187	79	30	30
Serbia & Montenegro	1650	4290	7130	3850	908	516	393	395
<b>Total applications Yugoslavia</b>	<b>3790</b>	<b>8330</b>	<b>8520</b>	<b>5700</b>	<b>2184</b>	<b>847</b>	<b>539</b>	<b>497</b>
<b>Total applications</b>	<b>34,440</b>	<b>45,220</b>	<b>39,299</b>	<b>43,895</b>	<b>32,579</b>	<b>18,667</b>	<b>13,402</b>	<b>9782</b>
<b>Percentage former Yugoslavia</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>22%</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>4%</b>	<b>5%</b>

Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service

\*unknown

The influx of indicated solitary underage asylum seekers [Dutch acronym: AMA's] in the Netherlands decreased from 5009 in 1999 to 594 in 2004. The figure of solitary underage asylum seekers as a percentage of the total influx of asylum seekers was rather high and stable in the 2000-2002 period (17 percent). This has changed since

2003. The figure is now 6 percent. In 2004, the main countries of origin were China, India and Somalia.

**Table 4.5: Influx of indicated Solitary underage asylum seekers in The Netherlands**

Country of origin	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
China	477	793	942	344	177	116	99
India	*	*	409	248	28	40	57
Somalia	534	496	410	248	87	75	46
Burundi	*	*	54	55	51	30	32
Angola	192	756	1.058	1.991	854	146	28
Iraq	*	*	261	117	56	108	27
Afghanistan	223	215	303	228	141	41	23
Guinea	218	380	818	668	104	70	22
Nigeria	62	24	31	43	70	40	21
Sierra Leone	225	529	757	728	392	61	16
D.R. Congo	105	77	123	116	101	37	11
Ivory Coast	*	2	48	37	46	56	11
Mongolia	4	20	47	56	59	22	8
Togo	58	119	166	147	147	21	7
unknown	*	*	48	54	31	33	21
others	1406	1598	1230	871	888	320	165
Total applications UMA	3504	5009	6705	5951	3232	1216	594
Total applications	44,393	37,921	43,895	32,579	18,667	13,402	9782
Percentage UMA	7,9	13,2	15,3	18,3	17,3	9,1	6,1

Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service

\*unknown

### 4.3 Asylum requests in Europe

The decrease in the number of asylum seekers in the Netherlands is also clear if we compare the Dutch data with data from 13 other European countries with respect to the influx of asylum requests under consideration. Table 4.6 presents the influx in asylum requests under consideration from 2003-2004. It is estimated that in 2004 more than 254,000 asylum applications were submitted in the countries stated, a decline of 22 percent with respect to the same period in 2003.

There were particularly strong decreases in Norway, Ireland, the United Kingdom and Switzerland. Finland and France were the only countries in which the number of asylum applicants increased in 2004.

**Table 4.6: Asylum requests in Europe compared; 2004 with 2003**

	2001	2002	2003	2004*	mutation	mutation in %
France	88,287	51,004	61,993	65,237	3244	5%
United Kingdom	47,260	103,080	61,051	40,243	-20,808	-34%
Germany	90,244	71,127	50,563	35,855	-14,708	-29%
Austria	30,135	39,354	32,364	24,886	-7478	-23%
Sweden	23,499	32,995	31,355	23,198	-8157	-26%
Switzerland	20,633	26,125	20,806	14,653	-6153	-30%
Norway	24,527	17,480	15,613	8221	-7392	-47%
Belgium**	14,782	18,768	16,940	15,024	-1916	-11%
The Netherlands	32,579	18,667	13,402	9818	-3584	-27%
Ireland	10,325	11,634	7900	4730	-3170	-40%
Spain	9219	6179	5918	5521	-397	-7%
Denmark	12,512	5947	4593	3260	-1333	-29%
Finland	1650	3443	3221	3462	241	7%
Total	405,652	405,803	325,719	254,109	-71,610	-22%

\*2004, number of applications for november/december aren't available, figures are estimates

\*\* Data do not include accompanied underage asylum seekers

Source: Inter-Governmental Consultations (IGC)

#### 4.4 Granted asylum requests

The submission of an asylum request is the first step in a process where only some of the asylum requests are actually approved. Table 4.7 shows the number of asylum requests approved per year for ten different groups. The number of asylum requests approved has shown a marked decrease. In 1997 almost 17,000 requests were approved, whereas in 2004 less than 60 percent of this number was approved.

**Table 4.7: Asylum requests granted by country of nationality, 1997-2004**

Country of nationality	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Iraq	4340	5990	550	510	-	-	-	-
Afghanistan	4240	3990	4380	3410	-	-	-	-
Soviet Union (former)	650	530	510	480	-	-	-	-
Somalia	1180	880	1030	920	-	-	-	-
Burundi	30	70	50	170	-	-	-	-
Iran	1100	600	530	350	-	-	-	-
Angola	200	140	200	580	-	-	-	-
Yugoslavia (former)	2260	350	420	730	-	-	-	-
Sierra Leone	50	130	160	280	-	-	-	-
Sudan	530	820	300	420	-	-	-	-
Other nationalities	2410	1600	1360	1880	-	-	-	-
Total	16,990	15,100	9490	9730	10,580	8820	9760	10,170

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline, numbers rounded in units of five, 1997-2004

Table 4.8 provides additional information about the type of status awarded. From the data presented it is clear that there has been a strong decrease in the number of 'A statuses' awarded during the period 1997-2000, whereas the granting of residence permits with a humanitarian status has decreased much less. The figures for 2003

concern statuses awarded under the new Aliens Act and they therefore cannot be simply compared with the situation in 2000.

**Table 4.8: Refugees admitted and the humanitarian or refugee status granted 1997-2004 (1)**

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
<i>Before new Aliens Act 2000</i>								
<b>Refugees</b>								
Individual requests 'A status' granted	6630	2356	1507	1808	444			
<b>Humanitarian status</b>								
Granted (VtV)	5176	3591	3471	4791	1567			
Provisional status temporary protection (VVtV)	5182	9152	8512	3127	806			
<i>After new Aliens Law 2000 (April 2001)</i>								
<b>VV fixed term (total)</b>					<b>7231</b>	<b>8008</b>	<b>8335</b>	<b>6120</b>
<i>of which</i>								
VV asylum fixed term					4906	4008	5620	-
VV regular fixed term (2)					2325	4000	2715	-
<b>VV asylum indefinite term</b>					<b>532</b>	<b>746</b>	<b>1408</b>	<b>4050</b>
<i>of which</i>								
VV asylum indefinite term					508	721	1402	-
VV regular indefinite term (2)					24	25	6	-
<b>Refused (old and new Aliens Law)</b>	<b>28,318</b>	<b>28,173</b>	<b>41,367</b>	<b>57,418</b>	<b>51,317</b>	<b>52,889</b>	<b>21,935</b>	<b>12,955</b>

1) refers to outcomes after a first decision as well as revised decisions.

2) regular residence permits granted in asylum affairs concern e.g. solitary underage asylum seekers and residence permits on account of the so-called three years policies.

Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistics Netherlands, Statline (2004)

The figures presented in the previous tables concern the decision taken during the year in question (approved or rejected), irrespective of the year in which the asylum request was submitted. Therefore the figures presented about approvals cannot be directly compared with the figures presented in table 4.2 about the asylum requests submitted and thus do not provide any insight into the percentage approved. In order to delineate the percentage approved cohort studies are needed. In the 2001-Sopemi Study we have presented the results of a cohort study conducted by Van der Erf (2002). On the basis of material made available by the INS concerning the completion of asylum procedures according to the year of submission (1994-2000), Van der Erf concluded that the percentage of asylum requests approved in the Netherlands has significantly decreased. The results of a more recent cohort study performed by the INS (Cohortanalyse asielprocedure 1994-2003, 2005) show that the approval percentage decreased from almost 49 percent for asylum seekers who submitted their request in 1997 to no more than 11 percent for asylum seekers who submitted their request in 2002 (see table 4.9a and 4.9b). For those who submitted their request in 2003 the figure is however a little higher. At the end of the first quarter of 2004 around 12 percent was approved. If we take a closer look at the asylum seekers who submitted their

request in 2003 we see that asylum seekers from Iraq (24%) and Somalia (18%) have a high approval percentage while asylum seekers from Bosnia (0,9%), Turkey (2,3%) and Sri Lanka (3,2%) have relative low approval percentages (INS, Cohortanalyse asielprocedure 1994-2003, 2005).

**Table 4.9a: Influx of asylum seekers 1994-2003 (top ten countries 1994-2003)**

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Iraq	2.850	2.419	4.328	9.605	8.266	3.720	2.730	1.281	988	3.373
Afghanistan	2.473	1.894	3.003	5.926	7.026	4.321	4.886	3.395	1.044	464
Yugoslavia (former)	4.238	1.489	771	1.563	4.015	7.093	3.694	864	490	386
Bosnia- Herz.	8.501	4.158	949	2.000	3.915	1.154	1.557	938	199	113
Somalia	5.332	3.923	1.437	1.259	2.715	2.684	2.070	1.046	519	445
Iran	5.995	2.664	1.491	1.219	1.660	1.481	2.477	1.450	624	529
Angola	1.365	727	410	364	589	1.547	2.132	3.955	1.795	354
Turkey	615	686	677	1.104	1.176	1.455	2.179	1.314	608	391
Sri Lanka	1.802	1.298	1.463	1.484	1.040	846	941	646	282	95
Sierra Leone	82	388	247	386	479	1.278	1.992	2.349	1.578	306
<b>Total</b>	<b>52.033</b>	<b>28.891</b>	<b>22.531</b>	<b>34.103</b>	<b>44.684</b>	<b>42.053</b>	<b>42.504</b>	<b>30.768</b>	<b>17.786</b>	<b>12.884</b>

Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service

**Table 4.9b: Percentage of asylum requests granted cohort 1994-2003 (top ten countries 1994-2003)**

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Iraq	82,8	86,9	77,6	70,9	36,1	26,6	20,0	15,9	30,9	24,0
Afghanistan	78,0	71,9	84,0	82,6	71,9	55,0	54,6	26,5	12,0	13,4
Yugoslavia (former)	28,0	22,0	15,2	8,6	21,0	55,4	10,4	5,7	5,1	5,7
Bosnia- Herz.	80,3	77,0	64,7	21,3	12,5	8,6	9,3	5,7	0,5	0,9
Somalia	56,7	50,0	57,9	52,3	42,1	28,4	19,0	11,7	12,7	18,0
Iran	39,9	33,0	31,5	31,3	29,9	17,8	12,9	12,1	9,5	9,8
Angola	37,4	27,2	19,8	23,4	36,8	34,5	29,2	10,1	13,1	7,9
Turkey	32,2	26,8	18,3	10,2	12,5	7,9	4,0	4,1	8,2	2,3
Sri Lanka	14,9	8,4	8,0	9,2	13,3	12,1	6,0	9,0	8,9	3,2
Sierra Leone	54,9	34,8	27,9	39,1	45,3	50,5	48,4	43,8	17,4	5,6
<b>Total</b>	<b>43,0</b>	<b>42,2</b>	<b>44,5</b>	<b>48,4</b>	<b>34,1</b>	<b>29,8</b>	<b>19,9</b>	<b>14,6</b>	<b>10,9</b>	<b>12,3</b>
Deviation Margin +10%	47,3	46,5	48,9	53,2	37,5	32,8	21,8	16,1	12,0	13,6
Deviation Margin -10%	38,7	38,0	40,0	43,5	30,7	26,8	17,9	13,1	9,8	11,1

Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service

## 4.5 Return and expulsion of asylum seekers

The majority of aliens who request asylum in the Netherlands do not receive a residence permit and therefore there is a constant stream of aliens leaving the Netherlands. Most of these aliens depart of their own volition and a small number need to be forcibly expelled. If the asylum seeker does not leave of his own accord then enforced departure can be effected. There are different types of expulsion: Check of addresses, Expulsion, Controlled departure, Departure by IOM and others (see Figure 4.2). Departure by IOM entails voluntarily departure with

assistance from the International Organisation for Migration. In 2004, the number of people who were assisted by the IOM in their return to the country of origin or to migrate further increased with more than one-fourth compared to 2003. In 2004, 3828 persons departed voluntarily with help from the IOM. Another type of support are the country specific projects in which the Dutch government cooperates with the countries of origin and a range of organisations who are active in the field of migration.

The number of people that voluntarily departed with help from the IOM is relatively small compared to the total number of 'expelled asylum seekers' in 2004, namely nearly 15,000. From the table below it can be seen that the number of expelled asylum seekers rose considerably in 2002 and 2003. However, in 2004 it strongly decreased with 32 percent compared to 2003. Most asylum seekers that are expelled are from Angola, the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia and Iraq (see table 4.10). However, we do not know the degree in which these groups actually left the Netherlands. In figure 4.2 the removals for the period 1992-2004 are detailed according to the type of removal.


**Table 4.10: Expelled asylum seekers by country of nationality, 1997-2004 (top ten countries 2004)**

Country of nationality	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Angola	430	180	110	170	250	760	1618	1528
Soviet Union (former)	1360	960	950	1420	1350	1880	2138	1218
Yugoslavia (former)	2910	3280	6210	4140	2180	2300	2183	1180
Iraq	1040	1190	1940	1310	1780	2421	1158	956
Afghanistan	480	670	980	650	1090	882	750	673
Sierra Leone	160	150	190	290	490	801	826	663
Sudan	160	150	280	350	420	700	944	644
Turkey	790	820	660	880	1250	1047	864	623
Iran	1070	440	460	730	770	1012	1336	606
Somalia	1120	680	850	890	940	1526	1354	590
China	690	490	480	490	420	700	799	529
Other nationalities	8660	5330	5230	5300	5080	7226	7926	5719
<b>Total</b>	<b>18,870</b>	<b>14,340</b>	<b>18,340</b>	<b>16,620</b>	<b>16,020</b>	<b>21,255</b>	<b>21,896</b>	<b>14,929</b>

Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service



Figure 4.2: Expelled asylum seekers by type of expulsion, 1992-2004



Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service

The chart shows that the proportion of compulsory removals (Controlled departure and Expulsion) has strongly decreased during the period 1999-2003. In 1999, more than one-third of all removals occurred in this manner, whereas in 2003 less than 20 percent of the rejected asylum seekers were forcibly expelled from the country. Last year this percentage has increased some. However, in absolute terms the number of compulsory removals decreased last year (from 3900 in 2003 to 3350 in 2004). By far the greatest numbers of rejected asylum seekers are still removed by means of checking the address. Although this is in accordance with the policy's objectives, the asylum seeker bearing responsibility for his return, it is not clear whether these persons actually leave the country or continue to remain in the Netherlands as illegal immigrants. There are clear indications that a significant proportion will continue to remain in the Netherlands on an illegal basis (Engbersen et al. 2002; Leerkes et al. 2004). Figures about detained illegal aliens in the period 1997-2002 reveal, for example, that substantial numbers of illegal aliens from 'asylum countries' such as Iraq, (former) Yugoslavia, (former) Soviet Union and Somalia were detained (Leerkes et al. 2004).

Due to the problems in returning, two tendencies are visible. Firstly, more use has been made of enforced return by means of building special centres. The capacity for alien detention is being expanded. The capacity to detain illegal aliens will increase in the period 2003-2007. In 2007 there will be a structural capacity of 2000 places for detained aliens. Furthermore, two detention centres for illegal immigrants and rejected asylum seekers are established in Rotterdam and Amsterdam-Schiphol.<sup>19</sup> Secondly, use has also been made of the expertise of local organisations that offer help to rejected asylum seekers. We end this chapter by presenting some results of a local voluntary return programme in the city of Rotterdam.

#### 4.6 Voluntary return

In the last Dutch Sopemi report a voluntary return project of Pauluskerk (Paul's Church) and IOM was described. This project was successful in that it promoted the return (or consideration to return) of a substantial amount of asylum seekers and illegal migrants from the target countries, namely the states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus. In 2003 a new cooperative project was set up: the Randstad Return Initiative. The aim of this project is to continue and fortify the cooperation in Rotterdam, and to expand the cooperation to the other big cities (Amsterdam, The Hague and Utrecht), other NGO's and other target groups. The project is financed by the European Refugee Fund, within the framework of the 'Return and Emigration of Aliens from the Netherlands (REAN)' programme.

The general aim is to contribute to the voluntary return of (often homeless) (refused) asylum seekers by offering approachable and confidential counselling for the preparation and enforcement of voluntary return in Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Utrecht and The Hague. More specifically, it consists of counselling by native counsellors and intensive cooperation between IOM and several NGO's that are specialised in the support of homeless people in big cities.

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<sup>19</sup> On October 27 2005 a fire broke out in the Detention Centre at Schiphol Airport, killing 11 illegal immigrants awaiting expulsion.

The native counsellors are social workers who are themselves from the target-areas, so are able to speak the language and are acquainted with the culture of the area of origin. The target areas are chosen on the basis of an analysis of IOM-data on the nationalities of their departed clients. From this analysis and the experience of IOM-employees it became clear that many of the (rejected) asylum seekers in the large cities come from the West and Central African countries, Afghanistan and Iran, and the former Soviet-Union. The counsellors hired for the project therefore come from, or are acquainted with these areas. The counsellor in Rotterdam can counsel in Russian, English, Dutch, Ukrainian, Polish, Bulgarian and some Yugoslavian languages. The native counsellor in Utrecht comes from Sudan and speaks English, Dutch and Arabic. He is able to counsel people from the English-speaking African countries, from the Middle East and the Maghreb. The native counsellor who works in The Hague and Amsterdam comes from Burundi and speaks, apart from Swahili, the language that is spoken in West African countries, Kirundi, French and Russian. The native counsellors can contact each other when a client comes from an area where one of the other counsellors is from.

In Rotterdam IOM has already been in cooperation with the Pauluskerk since 2002. In Amsterdam, Utrecht and The Hague new partner organisations had to be found. It was sometimes difficult to find NGO's willing to cooperate in a project on return migration. However, by the end of the project period partners were found in all cities.<sup>20</sup> Due to the different backgrounds and capabilities of the NGO's, the character of the cooperation with IOM differed. For some organisations the cooperation was limited to IOM having consulting hours at the location of the NGO, in the case of Pauluskerk the cooperation was extensive. The extensive cooperation between Pauluskerk and IOM can be explained by their earlier cooperation during the former project. However, the specific character of Pauluskerk also contributes to the successful and extensive cooperation. Pauluskerk already has a lot of experience with asylum seekers, is positive about voluntary return and offers its clients a broad package of aid. Apart from help with return, it offers shelter, financial aid and practical help such as food-aid, clothes

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<sup>20</sup> In Rotterdam: Pauluskerk, in Utrecht: Vluchtelingenwerk Utrecht, in The Hague: Vluchtelingenwerk Den Haag, and in Amsterdam: Leger de Heils, het Afikahuis and Werkgroep Ondersteuning Uitgerpocedeerden.

and medical aid. This allows Pauluskerk and IOM in Rotterdam to help the client more quickly and directly, as well as offering the client more custom-made aid. Pauluskerk's success factors with regard to return are also connected with its approachability and the trust the institution emanates.

The aim of the project is operationalised with indicators. With regard to return the indicators were:

- For Rotterdam to have 60 (rejected) asylum seekers return to their country of origin and to assist these people to the end.
- For Utrecht, The Hague and Amsterdam: to have 20 (rejected) asylum seekers per city return to their country of origin and to assist these people to the end.

The project has been evaluated (Rodenburg et al. 2005). The evaluation covers the formal term of the project; September 2003 until December 2004.

In Rotterdam 130 (rejected) asylum seekers returned within the project, so the project indicator pertaining to return has been achieved. Apart from these returnees 311 illegal migrants returned with the help of IOM and the native counsellor. In Utrecht 41 asylum seekers and 18 illegal aliens returned within the project. In The Hague and Amsterdam the project indicators have not been achieved. In The Hague only 8 (rejected) asylum seekers returned, in Amsterdam only 3. The numbers were higher for illegal migrants. In The Hague and Amsterdam, respectively 21 and 9 illegal migrants returned. Part of the reason the project indicators have not been achieved is that the project could not flourish from the beginning in these cities, because of the delayed start of the project, as well as the limited working hours of the native counsellors in these cities.

## Foreign nationals and immigrants in The Netherlands

### Main findings

- Non-native residents of The Netherlands are defined in Dutch statistics by their own and their parents' country of birth. The term *non-native* refers to people who were born outside The Netherlands of at least one foreign-born parent (first-generation immigrants) or in The Netherlands of two foreign-born parents (second generation).
- At the end of 2004, there were 3.1 million non-native residents of The Netherlands, accounting for 19% of the Dutch population, about half from Western countries including those in Central and Eastern Europe, and the other half from non-Western countries. The largest immigrant groups in The Netherlands are Indonesians (396 thousand), Germans (386 thousand), Turks (358 thousand), Surinamese (329 thousand) and Moroccans (315 thousand).
- In 1996 there were 2.5 million non-native residents. This means the non-native population in The Netherlands increased by 22% in eight years time. The number of non-native residents from non-Western countries increased even more rapidly from 1.2 million in 1996 to 1.7 million in 2004 an increase of 40% in eight years. In 2004, non-Western immigrants accounted for exactly 10% of the total Dutch population. The percentage of non-Western immigrants in The Netherlands is expected to grow to 11% in 2010 and almost 17% in 2050.
- On the average, non-Western immigrants are much younger than the native Dutch population. Almost one in five of the native Dutch population is above the age of 65, which is only true of 3% of the residents of non-Western descent. The relatively young non-Western immigrants are a welcome counterweight to the aging Dutch population.
- Non-Western immigrants in The Netherlands are heavily concentrated in the main urban centres. Whereas only one in eight of all Dutch residents live in the four main Dutch cities, this is true for 40% of the non-Western immigrant population. It is expected

that in the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam non-Western immigrant groups will be the majority of the population in the foreseeable future (around 2020).

- Unfortunately, we have not received new information of the number of naturalized immigrants. In the Dutch 2003 SOPEMI report we reported a sharp fall in the number of non-Dutch residents who obtained Dutch citizenship. We do not know yet whether the situation was the same in 2004.
- A sizeable number of undocumented immigrants live in The Netherlands (125 thousand to 225 thousand), most of them in cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Due to stricter regulations, the possibilities for undocumented immigrants to be engaged in formal work have diminished. Although they still often work, they are now more engaged in informal work (including domestic labour). On the other hand we see growth in the criminal activities of undocumented immigrants. Although most of them do not engage in criminal activities, there is a significant trend towards more forms of survival crime.

## 5.1 Introduction

In chapter 2 we described the immigration flows to and from The Netherlands. Here we address the stock of foreign nationals and immigrants living in The Netherlands. Before providing any specific data, we need to clear up the problem of definitions. How are foreign nationals and immigrants defined and counted in the Dutch statistics? International migration statistics usually provide information on either foreign nationals or on foreign-born residents who - regardless of their nationality - were born outside the country. In The Netherlands, a third, more complicated definition is used for immigrants or the non-Dutch. We first explain the limitations of both approaches noted above and then explain the Dutch definition of immigrants (“allochtonous”). The most obvious way to describe immigrants in a country is to say they are residents with a different citizenship (foreign nationals). However, there are several reasons why this would present an incomplete picture of the immigrant population in The Netherlands. As a former colonial power, The Netherlands has a relatively high number of immigrants from its former colonies. Many people from Suriname or

The Netherlands Antilles have Dutch citizenship, so they would not be considered immigrants if we only examine non-Dutch nationals. The same is true of other immigrants who have acquired Dutch citizenship, which is relatively easy in The Netherlands and not uncommon.

According to the present regulations, children born in The Netherlands of at least one Dutch parent including naturalized immigrants automatically have Dutch citizenship, so this category of second-generation immigrants would not be considered non-Dutch.

Another approach to describe the immigrant population would be to include everyone born outside the country (foreign-born). Although this definition is often used in international statistics, it has its limitations. On the one hand it includes the foreign-born children of Dutch parents and on the other hand excludes children of immigrants born in The Netherlands (the so-called second generation). However, within the framework of their immigrant integration policies the Dutch authorities want to keep track of this second generation of immigrants. For all these reasons, in Dutch statistics immigrants - in Dutch official publications, immigrants also referred to as *allochtonous* - are defined by their parents' as well as their own country of birth and therefore include both first and second generation immigrants.

In Dutch statistics, a person is considered as an immigrant or non-native Dutch resident either if they and at least one of their parents were born outside The Netherlands or if they themselves were born in The Netherlands out of two foreign-born parents. This means that a child born outside The Netherlands of two Dutch parents is considered native Dutch, but a child born outside The Netherlands of one foreign parent is not. A child born in The Netherlands of one Dutch and one foreign parent is also considered native Dutch, but a child born in The Netherlands of two foreign parents is non-native. Lastly, the official Dutch statistics draw a distinction between non-native residents from Western and from non-Western countries. This distinction was already explained in Chapter 2. The Dutch immigrant integration policies in general refer to the non-Western immigrant population (including the so-called second generation).

In this chapter we refer to Dutch residents with non-Dutch citizenship as 'foreign nationals'. When we speak of 'immigrants' we not only mean foreign-born residents but also their offspring born in The Netherlands (according to the official Dutch definitions). It will become clear that these different definitions and approaches result in a variety

of figures (5.2). We describe the various demographic characteristics of the non-native population in The Netherlands (5.3), and the naturalization figures (5.4).

## **5.2 Numbers of non-Dutch residents and immigrants in The Netherlands**

Table 5.1 shows that it makes a difference which definition is used for the non-Dutch population. In 2004, 700,000 foreign nationals lived in The Netherlands. The number of foreign-born residents (including the foreign-born children of Dutch parents) in 2004 was 1.7 million. Following the official Dutch definitions, the total number of non-Dutch residents (first and second-generation immigrants) in 2004 was 3.1 million. If we only look at foreign nationals, 4.3% of all Dutch residents are non-Dutch. Using the official definitions, almost one in five (19%) of all Dutch residents are considered as non-Dutch. Almost half of all non-Dutch residents (according to their ethnic origin) come from Western countries (1.4 million or almost 9% of the Dutch population), a little more than half come from non-Western countries (1.6 million or 10% of the total Dutch population). The three largest non-Dutch population categories were from Indonesia (396 thousand), Germany (387 thousand) and Turkey (359 thousand).

We can conclude that definitions do make a difference in statistics. Using the official Dutch definitions, the number of non-Dutch or non-native residents living in The Netherlands is four times as high as if we only look at foreign nationals. The reason for this huge difference is that many immigrants obtained Dutch citizenship or were given Dutch citizenship by birth. An additional factor is 130 thousand people from The Netherlands Antilles have Dutch citizenship but are considered non-Dutch as far as their ethnic decent is concerned.



Table 5.1: Non-Dutch / Non-native Population in The Netherlands 2004 (= 1-1-2005)

	Foreign nationals		Foreign-born		Ethnic origin	
	number	percentage	number	percentage	number	percentage
<b>Total</b>	<b>16,305,526</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>16,305,506</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>16,305,526</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Dutch</b>	<b>15,606,175</b>	<b>95.7</b>	<b>14,569,399</b>	<b>89.4</b>	<b>13,182,809</b>	<b>80.8</b>
<b>Non-Dutch</b>	<b>699,351</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>1,736,107</b>	<b>10.6</b>	<b>3,122,717</b>	<b>19.2</b>
<i>from</i>						
<b>Western countries</b>	<b>298,842</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>662,470</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>1,423,675</b>	<b>8.7</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
<b>EU countries (25)</b>	<b>228,072</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>346,562</b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>821,716</b>	<b>5.0</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
<b>old EU countries (15)</b>	<b>210,072</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>309,066</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>755,507</b>	<b>4.6</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
Germany	57,141	0.4	117,697	0.7	386,716	2.4
United Kingdom	42,519	0.3	47,472	0.3	76,344	0.5
Belgium	26,105	0.2	47,075	0.3	112,731	0.7
<b>new EU countries (10)</b>	<b>18,000</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>37,496</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>66,209</b>	<b>0.4</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
Poland	10,968	0.1	24,992	0.2	39,815	0.2
Hungary	2029	0.0	5662	0.0	12,655	0.1
Czechoslovakia (former)	3015	0.0	6283	0.0	10,423	0.1
<b>other Europe</b>	<b>30,916</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>108,148</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>135,657</b>	<b>0.8</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
Yugoslavia (former) <sup>a</sup>	10,846	0.1	54,493	0.3	76,301	0.5
Soviet Union (former) <sup>b</sup>	10,173	0.1	34,454	0.2	44,419	0.3
Romania	3020	0.0	6320	0.0	8417	0.1
<b>other Western Countries</b>	<b>39,854</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>207,760</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>466,302</b>	<b>2.9</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
United States	14,837	0.1	22,635	0.1	30,482	0.2
Canada	3458	0.0	8849	0.1	12,907	0.1
Australia	3333	0.0	10,122	0.1	14,379	0.1
Indonesia	11,427	0.1	155,953	1.0	396,080	2.4
Japan	5811	0.0	6144	0.0	7286	0.0
<b>Non-Western countries</b>	<b>296,794</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>1,073,637</b>	<b>6.6</b>	<b>1,699,042</b>	<b>10.4</b>
<i>of whom from</i>						
Turkey	100,574	0.6	195,937	1.2	358,846	2.2
Morocco	91,558	0.6	168,528	1.0	315,821	1.9
Somalia	1496	0.0	15,093	0.1	21,733	0.1
South Africa	3247	0.0	12,274	0.1	15,370	0.1
Ghana	4018	0.0	12,179	0.1	19,108	0.1
Cape Verde	1456	0.0	11,542	0.1	19,966	0.1
Egypt	2840	0.0	11,091	0.1	18,528	0.1
Ethiopia	1218	0.0	8011	0.0	10,292	0.1
Angola	930	0.0	9310	0.1	11,601	0.1
Sudan	1019	0.0	5817	0.0	7285	0.0
Congo	450	0.0	1073	0.0	8337	0.1
Suriname	9644	0.1	190,104	1.2	329,430	2.0
Neth. Antilles and Aruba	0	0.0	89,657	0.5	130,538	0.8
Colombia	2065	0.0	11,698	0.1	9885	0.1
Brazil	3560	0.0	10,196	0.1	12,289	0.1
Dominican Republic	1175	0.0	7044	0.0	9843	0.1
Iraq	3852	0.0	35,913	0.2	43,708	0.3
Afghanistan	3848	0.0	32,409	0.2	37,021	0.2
China	14,662	0.1	33,459	0.2	43,880	0.3
Iran	2685	0.0	24,072	0.1	28,691	0.2
India	3745	0.0	12,011	0.1	13,807	0.1
Vietnam	2674	0.0	12,199	0.1	18,019	0.1
Pakistan	2514	0.0	10,827	0.1	17,894	0.1
Hongkong	0	0.0	10,432	0.1	18,096	0.1
Sri Lanka	1614	0.0	10,258	0.1	9827	0.1
Philippines	3041	0.0	8669	0.1	12,966	0.1
Thailand	4884	0.0	9772	0.1	12,365	0.1
Syria	697	0.0	6691	0.0	9044	0.1
South Korea	1578	0.0	5905	0.0	3621	0.0
unknown/stateless	103,715	0.6	-	-	-	-

Source: Statistics Netherlands, population register, a. Slovenia not included, b. Baltic states not included

Tables A5.1 and A5.2 (Appendix) show the trends in the number of residents of The Netherlands of non-Dutch descent. In Table A5.1, their background is based on nationality (foreign nationals) and in Table A5.2 on ethnic origin (first and second-generation immigrants). As the first table shows the number of foreign nationals in The Netherlands decreased from 725,000 in 1996 to almost 699,000 in 2004. This decrease in the number of foreign nationals in The Netherlands, despite the immigration surpluses in the second half of the 1990s (see Chapter 2), can be explained by the fact that so many immigrants have obtained Dutch citizenship (see par. 5.4).

The second table (A5.2) shows the trends in the number of native and non-native residents in The Netherlands according to the official Dutch definitions of ethnic origin from 1996 to 2004. The number of non-native residents in The Netherlands increased from 2.5 million in 1996 to 3.1 million in 2004 (an increase of 22% in eight years time). In the same period the native Dutch population was more or less stable. The increase in the number of non-native residents is mainly due to the growing influx from various Eastern European and from non-Western countries. The number of (first and second-generation) immigrants from Central and Eastern European countries increased by more than 50% (from 126 thousand in 1995 to 197 thousand in 2004). The number of immigrants from the former Soviet Union almost tripled in this period (15 thousand in 1996, 44 thousand in 2004). The number of non-native residents coming from various non-Western countries also grew rapidly from 1.2 million in 1996 to almost 1.7 million in 2004, an increase of almost 40% in a period of eight years.

Lastly, Table A5.2 also distinguishes between the first and second generation of non-native residents in 2004, i.e. between people born outside The Netherlands and people born in The Netherlands of two foreign-born parents. Both categories are about the same size. Generally speaking the percentage of the second generation is larger among immigrant groups from Western countries (59%) than among immigrant groups from non-Western countries (40%). The largest percentages of the second generation are to be found among immigrants from neighbouring countries such as Germany (74%) and Belgium (68%). Remarkable is that the percentage of the second generation among traditional immigrant groups such as the Turks and Moroccans is still relatively low (45% with the Turks, 47% with the Moroccans). This can be explained that many of the Turkish and

Moroccan youth that grew up in The Netherlands were actually born in their country of origin and came to The Netherlands during their youth (they are therefore often referred to as the 1,5 generation). On the other hand, there is still a large influx of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in The Netherlands (mainly marital immigrants; see chapter 2 of this report).

*Population forecast*

We conclude this section with a forecast of the non-native population in The Netherlands. Here again, the non-native population includes first and second-generation immigrants from Western and non-Western countries (Table 5.2). Whereas the total Dutch population is expected to remain rather stable between 2005 and 2050, the non-native population is expected to increase. The number of first and second-generation immigrants coming from Western countries will increase from 1.4 million in 2005 to 2.2 million in 2050 (an increase of 57%), the number of first and second-generation immigrants coming from non-Western countries is expected to increase even more quickly, from 1.7 million in 2005 to 2.8 million in 2050 (an increase of 67% in the coming decades). This means that the percentage of non-Western immigrant groups in the total Dutch population in The Netherlands will gradually rise from 10,4% in 2005 to 12,5% in 2020 and 16,6% in 2050.

**Table 5.2 Population Forecast: Western and Non-Western Non-native Population (1990-2050)**

	1990	2005*	2010	2020	2050
	X1000				
Total population	14,893	16,295	16,462	16,800	16,906
Western	-	1422	1463	1644	2226
Non-Western	831	1696	1831	2103	2800
Turkey	203	358	389	440	514
Morocco	164	314	352	406	460
Suriname	224	328	342	362	368
Neth. Antilles and Aruba	69	130	132	154	249
other Non-Western	171	565	615	741	1209
<b>Non-Western as % of the total population</b>	<b>8.3%</b>	<b>10.4%</b>	<b>11.1%</b>	<b>12.5%</b>	<b>16.6%</b>

\*2005= 1 January 2005

Source: CBS

Table 5.2 also shows that the traditional immigrant groups in The Netherlands (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans) will continue to grow in the future. However, the greatest increase will be among the other non-Western immigrant groups. In 1990, these so-called other non-Western immigrants were only a fifth of the total non-Western immigrant population in The Netherlands. In 2020 the


percentage of these other non-Western immigrants in the total non-Western immigrant population living in The Netherlands will have increased to 35%, and in 2050 to 43%. This is a clear indication of the growing diversification of the non-Western immigrant population living in The Netherlands. The time when immigrants came from a limited number of sending countries is increasingly something of the past. Table 5.2 does not distinguish between first and second-generation immigrants. If we do draw this distinction (see Table A5.3 in the Appendix,) it becomes clear that in the coming years specifically the second generation of non-Western immigrant groups is expected to grow. Between 2005 and 2010, the number the second generation of non-Western immigrants will increase from 844 to 980 (that is an increase of 16% in the coming five years). The increase of the number of second-generation immigrants from Latin America and Asian countries will even be a little higher. The number of non-Western first generation immigrants living in The Netherlands will also increase, but far more moderately. The growth of the non-Western immigrant population in The Netherlands is therefore mainly due to the growth of the second generation of immigrant youth that are born in the country.

### **5.3 Some demographic characteristics of the immigrant population**

In this section we discuss some demographic characteristics of the non-native population in The Netherlands. We examine the distribution according to age, sex, and region.

Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the distribution of the native and non-native Dutch population according to gender and age. Here as well, the non-native population includes the first and second-generation and is split into Western and non-Western immigrants. With respect to gender distribution, there are few if any differences between the population groups. In the native Dutch population as well as among non-Western immigrants, the percentage of men is more or less half (49 and 51.5% respectively). This is striking in so far as typical immigrant groups might be expected to have a higher percentage of men than women. Yet this is not the case.


Figure 5.1 Dutch and Non-native Population By gender in % (2004)



Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline (figures are based on the municipal population registrations)

However, as Figure 5.2 shows, there are large differences in the age structure of various population groups. Non-Western immigrants are predominantly young. Almost half of all Dutch residents with a non-Western background are younger than 20, as are only about one in four in the native Dutch population. On the other hand, the share of elderly is much higher in the native Dutch population than in non-Western immigrant groups. Whereas 16% of the native Dutch population is above 65, this is true for only 3% of all Dutch residents with a non-Western background. The presence of the non-Western immigrant population therefore is a strong counterbalance against the ageing Dutch society.

Figure 5.2: Age Distribution of Native Dutch and Non-native Populations (2004)



Another issue is the regional distribution of the immigrant population in The Netherlands (Table 5.3). Despite current public debates, The Netherlands can hardly be called a multicultural society as only one in ten of all Dutch residents have a non-Western immigrant background. But since non-Western immigrants are heavily concentrated in the four main cities of The Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht), the country does have a number of multicultural cities. In three of the four main Dutch cities the non-Western immigrant population is one third of the total population or more. According to Amsterdam and Rotterdam municipal population forecasts non-Western immigrant population will become a majority of the population in the foreseeable future (around 2020). Of the four main cities in The Netherlands, only in the smallest one, Utrecht, is there a smaller percentage of non-Western immigrants (21%). In other medium-sized Dutch cities, the percentage of non-Western immigrants is significantly lower.

The concentration of non-Western immigrants is also clear in the last row of Table 5.3, which shows the percentage of the total population in each of the four main cities. Living in a large city is not particularly popular among the native Dutch; only one in eight live in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague or Utrecht. Immigrants from Western countries are slightly more city-oriented than the overall average. About one in six of the immigrants from Western countries live in one of these four

large cities. Non-Western immigrants are much more oriented to the main cities. Almost 40% of the non-Western immigrants live in one of the four main cities and this percentage is even higher among Surinamese and Moroccans. About half the Surinamese and Moroccans live in one of the four main cities. Turks and Antilleans appear to be more dispersed in other municipalities.

**Table 5.3: Regional Distribution of Non-native Population (Western and Non-Western) (2004)**

	Total						
		Western	Non-Western	Turkey	Morocco	Suriname	Neth. Antilles
<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>16,305,526</b>	<b>1,423,675</b>	<b>1,699,042</b>	<b>358,846</b>	<b>315,821</b>	<b>329,430</b>	<b>130,538</b>
Amsterdam	742,783	104,452	254,176	37,957	64,385	70,380	11,500
The Hague	472,096	59,485	150,051	31,972	24,150	45,446	10,862
Rotterdam	596,407	59,267	209,410	45,024	36,127	52,504	20,012
Utrecht	275,258	27,095	56,917	12,418	24,055	7,099	2,271
<i>as % of the total</i>							
Netherlands	100	8.7	10.4	2.2	1.9	2.0	0.8
Amsterdam	100	14.1	34.2	5.1	8.7	9.5	1.5
The Hague	100	12.6	31.8	6.8	5.1	9.6	2.3
Rotterdam	100	9.9	35.1	7.5	6.1	8.8	3.4
Utrecht	100	9.8	20.7	4.5	8.7	2.6	0.8
% total population in all 4 cities	12.8	17.6	39.5	35.5	47.1	53.3	34.2

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline (figures are based on the municipal population registrations)


## 5.4 Naturalization

Most of the non-native residents of the Netherlands have the Dutch nationality, sometimes in addition to the nationality of their country of origin. Most of the Surinamese and Antilleans have always had Dutch citizenship. Two thirds of the older immigrant groups such as Turks and Moroccans also have Dutch citizenship. However, it is striking that most of the new immigrant groups such as Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians and Somalians now also have the Dutch nationality. From 1996 to 2004, about 460,000 non-Dutch residents of the Netherlands acquired Dutch citizenship. The peak in the number of naturalizations was in 1996, when almost 83,000 non-Dutch residents obtained Dutch citizenship. In the following years the number of naturalizations gradually decreased to about 45,000 in 2002. In 2003, however, the number of naturalizations declined again quite drastically to 29,000, a decline of

36% in one year (Figure 5.3). In 2004 the number of naturalizations decreased further to 26.000.

The trend in the number of naturalizations strongly correlates with Dutch policy changes. The peak in the number of naturalizations in 1996 was the result of the growing number of non-Dutch immigrants in the early 1990s and changes in the Dutch policy on aliens in 1992. From 1 January 1992 to 1 October 1997, non-Dutch residents who obtained the Dutch nationality were allowed to keep their original nationality. On 1 October 1997, this dual nationality option was replaced by a more restrictive policy. Dual nationality is now only possible in a number of exceptional cases, usually pertaining to nationals from countries that do not allow citizens to give up their nationality. Another exception is made for people for whom it would be unreasonable to give up their nationality (Muus, 2001). As a result of this policy change, the number of naturalizations fell sharply from 83,000 in 1996 to 60,000 in 1997. In particular, the number of naturalizations among Turks decreased sharply in 1997. The policy changes barely affected Moroccans, since Moroccan law does not allow them to give up their nationality. After this marked decrease, the number of naturalizations from 1997 to 1999 stabilized at about 60,000 and then fell to 45,000 in 2002 and 29,000 in 2003.

Figure 5.3: Non-Dutch Residents Obtaining Dutch Nationality by Year



Source: Statistics Netherlands (figures are based on data of the Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service)



Table A5.4 in the Appendix specifies the country of origin of new Dutch citizens. It shows the largest decline in the number of naturalizations among Moroccans. In 2004 the number of persons obtaining Dutch citizenship was about 2500 less than a year earlier; 50% of the difference can be explained by the declining number of Moroccan residents of the Netherlands who obtained or applied for Dutch citizenship.

## **5.5 Undocumented immigrants in The Netherlands**

### **Summary**

A sizeable number of undocumented immigrants live in the Netherlands (125 thousand to 230 thousand), most of them in cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Due to stricter regulations, the possibilities for undocumented immigrants to be engaged in formal work have diminished. Although they still often work, they are now more engaged in informal work (including domestic labour). On the other hand we are seeing a growth in criminal activity by undocumented immigrants. Although most do not engage in criminal activities, there is a significant trend towards more forms of survival crime.

### **The extent and spatial concentration of illegality**

Illegal immigrants have become an evident part of the Dutch population. Despite the development of restrictive immigration policy, there does not seem to be any decline in the number of illegal immigrants in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, more than ten thousand illegal immigrants are apprehended annually (Engbersen et al. 2002: 24). The total number of illegal immigrants is estimated to be between 125,000 and 230,000 on an annual basis<sup>21</sup> (Leerkes et al. 2004; Cruyff and Van der Heijden 2004). This estimate is somewhat higher than that of a number of years ago, but that is mainly due to the fact that a better method of estimation has been used (Engbersen et al. 2002).

For this purpose, the capture-recapture method was used (Cruyff and Van der Heijden 2004), which originates from biology. This technique is

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<sup>21</sup> Estimation based on data of apprehended illegal immigrants in the period 1997-2003 thus before the expansion of the EU with the 10 new countries.

used to estimate the number of a certain animal species in a particular area by means of two measurements. On the basis of the number of animals that is found only the first time, the number that is found only the second time, and the number found both times, researchers can estimate the number of animals *not* found both times. The sum of these figures gives an estimate of the total number of animals present in the selected area. If there are heterogeneous populations, the analyses can be performed separately for subgroups. There are also ways to adjust the figures for distorting influences. The capture-recapture technique is a systematic estimation methodology that can also be used in human population research. This may involve either observations by two or more independent bodies or continuously collected data such as investigation data in criminology. Police records satisfy the requirements of this method. Insofar as the data do not meet these requirements, a model should be constructed which obviates the violations of the general assumptions as much as possible (Cruyff and Van der Heijden 2004).

We assume that the number of illegal immigrants in the Netherlands is about 150,000. This is equivalent to one percent of the regular Dutch population and ten percent of the foreign-born population. The Netherlands has more than sixteen million inhabitants. In 2003, 1.7 million of these inhabitants were foreign-born, whereof 1 million born in a non-western country (Snel et al. 2004). The illegal immigrants found in the Netherlands originate from more than two hundred countries. The largest groups are the Turks, Moroccans, Algerians and Surinamese. In addition, there is a growing number from Eastern and Central Europe. The larger part of these illegal immigrants entered the Netherlands illegally or on a tourist visa. Recently, the number of immigrants that become illegal after they have been rejected as asylum seekers has gone up. Although, over the past ten years, the Netherlands has taken a number of measures to prevent unauthorized residence, there are no empirical indications for a decrease in the number of illegal immigrants (Engbersen et al. 2002; Leerkes et al. 2004).

A second observation is that illegal immigrants are unevenly spread across the Netherlands. A recent study revealed that the phenomenon is mainly present in the four large cities in the Netherlands and in a

number of border and rural areas (Leerkes et al. 2004). In some places illegal immigrants therefore make up a considerably larger part of the population than the national average of one percent (locally probably increasing up to about six to eight percent). The number of illegal residents in a neighbourhood is determined by the scale at which (1) legal non-western immigrants, (2) economic opportunities; (3) cheap housing opportunities and (4) single people are present in a neighbourhood – as well as by the extent to which these dimensions of the spatial opportunity structure for illegal immigrants are interrelated. Not only do the above-mentioned neighbourhood characteristics enable illegal residence, they also generate the demand for it. Many illegal immigrants satisfy the economic and affective needs of family members, friends, partners and employers. Illegal immigration can therefore not be simply qualified as 'unwanted'. It encompasses all types of migration whereof the illegal manifestations also have legal counterparts, such as chain migration, labour migration, family-forming migration and asylum migration.

### **Labour market position**

Illegal immigrants are working in the formal and informal economy of certain industries: construction, cleaning, agriculture and horticulture, fish processing, hotel and catering, sex, commercial services, domestic services, newspaper distribution, gardening, etc. Their labour market position demonstrates that there is a demand for cheap, illegal workers to do specific types of labour. However, this demand is not unlimited. This is made clear by the fact that we also registered sizeable numbers of 'undocumented unemployed' in two consecutive ethnographic studies. In the period 1992-1993, 170 illegal immigrants were interviewed in the city of Rotterdam. One third of them proved to be unemployed (Burgers and Engbersen 1999). In 2001, 156 illegal immigrants were interviewed. Again, one third proved to be unemployed, and a remarkable shift from the formal to the informal economy had taken place. Over this ten-year period, there indeed had been some significant shifts in the nature of the work they did. Whereas, in the early 1990s, 30 percent of the illegal immigrants had worked within the formal labour market, almost none of them still did so ten years later (Engbersen et al. 2002).

The shift into the informal labour market is strongly related to the new exclusionary migration policies. As a result of these policies, illegal immigrants became more dependent on the informal economy and on illegal labour subcontractors and fraudulent temporary employment agencies (especially agricultural agencies) (Engbersen et al. 2002). It is also striking that more illegal immigrants are working in catering and the personal service industry. These are sectors in which illegal labour is more difficult to control compared to traditional sectors such as cleaning, construction, manufacturing industry, and agriculture and horticulture. Incidentally, increased participation of illegal immigrants in the personal service industry (domestic care, nursing and care services) is a phenomenon that has existed in southern Europe and North America for many more years.

### **The importance of social capital**

A crucial support system is the support capacity of ethnic communities. This involves what sociologists call social capital. Social capital relates to the illegal immigrants' ability to mobilize resources (money, work, housing, information) from the ethnic and family networks (local and transnational) in which they are embedded. This social capital is essential for the illegal immigrants' incorporation opportunities in Dutch society. The social capital that illegal immigrants can obtain to come to and reside in the Netherlands is, however, limited. Not every compatriot receives aid to come over and stay. Lack of social capital is particularly a problem among asylum seekers from new immigration countries who have exhausted all legal remedies to get a residence permit. They often cannot fall back on established migrant communities (such as the long established and rather large groups of Turkish, Moroccan or Surinamese migrants in the Netherlands). If they do not find a job, they have to fend for themselves. This may be a reason for some to leave the Netherlands; others who do not want to or cannot leave, resort to 'survival crime' or 'subsistence crime'.

### **Subsistence crime**

Police data show a strong increase in crime as a reason for apprehension (Engbersen et al. 2002; Leerkes et al. 2004). Over a period of almost seven years (1997-2003), the apprehension data on illegal immigrants show a marked rise in the categories of minor offences and serious offences. In 1997 nearly 30 percent of the illegal

immigrants were apprehended for criminal offences. This number has now risen to about 45 percent (in 2003). This strong increase cannot be explained solely by a general trend in criminal law enforcement, in which, due to societal pressure and probably also due to changes in data recording, the police are generally more active in crime detection and in registering their findings.

This strong rise in crime among illegal immigrants indicates that the restrictive alien's policy is affecting the illegal immigrants' residence strategies. In the recent past (before 1990), illegal immigrants had relatively easy access to the formal labour market and some public services. This has now become much more difficult for them. As a result, illegal immigrants who want to or are forced to stay in the Netherlands develop forms of subsistence crime, as becomes clear from the offences committed. The increase in criminal offences for which they were apprehended mainly includes theft, aggravated theft and the use of false documents. These are crimes that are directly related to the precarious position of illegal immigrants who are excluded from public provisions and the labour market. The aim of these offences is to acquire money (theft) or access to the labour market (false documents).

## **5.6 Money transfers by immigrants**

Until 2002, the Dutch Central Bank provided statistical information about money transfers by immigrants to their country of origin. People have always moved to other countries to obtain better living conditions and financially support those who stay behind. According to the Dutch Central Bank, in 2002 non-Western immigrants living in The Netherlands sent a total sum of 560 million to their home countries. The Turkish immigrant group sent almost half of this sum. Further research indicates that the size of this financial support depends on features of the receiving as well as the sending households.<sup>22</sup> Households in Turkey or Morocco that are in a dependent position, for example because they are headed by women with children, receive more money than households headed by men. In

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<sup>22</sup> See T. Fokkema and G. Groenewold, *De migrant als suikerroom* (The migrant as rich uncle) in: *Demos* June/July 2003 ([www.nidi.nl/public/demos](http://www.nidi.nl/public/demos))

most cases this kind of transfer involves men who came to The Netherlands as guest workers while their wives and children remained back home. Research also shows that more affluent migrants transfer more money to their country of origin than less affluent migrants.

**Table 5.4: Private Transfers of Money to Selected Countries 1992-2002 (in millions of euros)**

<i>Millions of euros</i>	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
former labour recruitment countries											
Morocco	85	88	100	101	106	117	124	151	169	180	191
Turkey	124	132	141	146	151	168	175	216	227	250	249
Portugal	18	17	19	20	22	23	25	28	36	39	28
Spain	57	56	61	23	29	42	43	68	75	94	48
Former Yugoslavia	1	5	5	11	17	22	20	31	48	37	
Greece	4	3	7	7	7	7	7	8	11	12	11
Refugee countries											
Iraq	1	0	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Iran	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Afghanistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sri Lanka	6	5	5	8	5	7	5	5	7	9	9
Vietnam	0	1	1	5	9	9	9	9	11	13	12
China	0	0	2	4	9	7	9	10	12	11	12
Somalia	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zaire	3	1	3	4	4	3	1	0	0	0	0
Congo-Kinshasa	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0

Source: The Dutch Central Bank, Statistical Information Division

Migrants with a job send at least four times as much money to their country of origin as those on social assistance benefits. Lastly, there is the issue of whether the financial transfers encourage others to migrate. Generally speaking this is the case. People from households in Turkey and Morocco that received generous sums of money from abroad are significantly more apt to intend to migrate themselves than people from households that received little or no money.

## Appendix for Chapter 5

Table A5.1: Population by Nationality (1995-2004) on December 31

	1995	1997	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
<b>Total</b>	<b>15,493,889</b>	<b>15,654,192</b>	<b>15,863,950</b>	<b>15,987,075</b>	<b>16,105,285</b>	<b>16,192,572</b>	<b>16,258,032</b>	<b>16,305,526</b>
<b>Dutch Nationals</b>	<b>14,768,468</b>	<b>14,976,115</b>	<b>15,212,418</b>	<b>15,319,273</b>	<b>15,414,892</b>	<b>15,492,618</b>	<b>15,555,847</b>	<b>15,606,175</b>
<b>Non-Dutch nationals</b>	<b>725,421</b>	<b>678,077</b>	<b>651,532</b>	<b>667,802</b>	<b>690,393</b>	<b>699,954</b>	<b>702,185</b>	<b>699,351</b>
<i>from</i>								
<b>Western countries</b>	<b>275,372</b>	<b>271,112</b>	<b>268,345</b>	<b>275,265</b>	<b>285,645</b>	<b>291,423</b>	<b>294,376</b>	<b>298,842</b>
<i>of whom from</i>								
<b>25 EU countries</b>	<b>199,170</b>	<b>198,881</b>	<b>205,256</b>	<b>211,783</b>	<b>219,159</b>	<b>222,850</b>	<b>224,208</b>	<b>228,072</b>
<i>of whom from</i>								
<b>old EU countries (15)</b>	<b>191,074</b>	<b>190,192</b>	<b>195,886</b>	<b>201,574</b>	<b>207,858</b>	<b>210,549</b>	<b>211,009</b>	<b>210,072</b>
<i>of whom from</i>								
Germany	53922	53914	54272	54811	55572	56060	56466	57141
United Kingdom	41146	39153	39466	41404	43604	44052	43678	42519
Belgium	24111	24443	25382	25860	26148	26306	26223	26105
<b>new EU countries (10)</b>	<b>8096</b>	<b>8689</b>	<b>9370</b>	<b>10,209</b>	<b>11,301</b>	<b>12,301</b>	<b>13,199</b>	<b>18,000</b>
<i>of whom from</i>								
Poland	5910	5680	5645	5944	6312	6912	7431	10968
Hungary	1133	1272	1385	1538	1719	1832	1886	2029
Czechoslovakia (former)	891	1210	1593	1893	2297	2374	2508	3015
<b>Other Europe</b>	<b>44,818</b>	<b>40,665</b>	<b>28,731</b>	<b>27,022</b>	<b>27,822</b>	<b>28,853</b>	<b>30,292</b>	<b>30,916</b>
<i>of whom from</i>								
Yugoslavia (former)	33403	28306	15421	12739	11929	11529	11351	10846
Soviet Union (former)	4756	6063	6525	6935	7815	8637	9593	10173
Romania	1466	1144	1397	1694	2094	2360	2735	3020
<b>other Western Countries</b>	<b>31,384</b>	<b>31,566</b>	<b>34,358</b>	<b>36,460</b>	<b>38,664</b>	<b>39,720</b>	<b>39,876</b>	<b>39,854</b>
<i>of whom from</i>								
United States	12769	12980	14074	14751	15217	15412	15075	14837
Canada	2574	2702	2892	3130	3398	3435	3456	3458
Australia	2013	2031	2522	2802	3201	3352	3383	3333
Indonesia	8159	7970	8717	9338	10127	10786	11185	11427
Japan	5347	5369	5507	5626	5771	5747	5813	5811
<b>Non-Western countries</b>	<b>435,387</b>	<b>368,637</b>	<b>316,819</b>	<b>305,493</b>	<b>297,749</b>	<b>292,962</b>	<b>296,829</b>	<b>296,794</b>
<i>of whom from</i>								
Turkey	154310	114696	100688	100782	100309	100286	101845	100574
Morocco	149841	135721	119726	111396	104262	97843	94380	91558
Somalia	17223	13648	5296	3567	2654	2116	1792	1496
South Africa	1444	1769	2512	2864	3230	3330	3321	3247
Ghana	5150	4375	3887	3877	3756	3630	3807	4018
Cape Verde	2111	1786	1567	1404	1352	1289	1364	1456
Egypt	4084	3101	2771	2588	2425	2440	2649	2840
Ethiopia	3653	1870	1280	1203	1161	1166	1194	1218
Angola	1633	1679	1184	982	946	1009	993	930
Sudan	676	868	1113	1212	1114	1089	1054	1019
Congo	20	29	97	207	270	354	417	450
Suriname	15174	11760	8665	8469	8491	8573	9406	9644
Neth. Antilles and Aruba								
Colombia	1569	1718	1790	1636	1668	1743	1919	2065
Brazil	2145	2380	2597	2728	2841	2994	3298	3560
Dominican Republic	1453	1312	1204	1164	1158	1165	1141	1175
Iraq	9694	13008	10025	8639	6919	4771	4182	3852
Afghanistan	3913	5275	4395	4203	4259	3997	3923	3848
China	7912	7260	7473	7997	9395	11223	13330	14662
Iran	10150	7831	3892	2833	2520	2513	2589	2685
India	2748	2803	3234	3361	3417	3416	3592	3745
Vietnam	3765	2032	1546	1613	1885	2274	2496	2674
Pakistan	3724	3199	2882	2880	2737	2605	2541	2514
Hongkong								
Sri Lanka	3186	2395	1549	1531	1591	1604	1624	1614
Philippines	2363	2428	2351	2417	2427	2597	2841	3041
Thailand	1985	2162	2520	2920	3288	3783	4366	4884
Syria	2031	857	543	560	628	670	685	697
South Korea	722	910	1079	1193	1280	1421	1477	1578
<b>unknown/stateless</b>	<b>14662</b>	<b>38328</b>	<b>66368</b>	<b>87044</b>	<b>106999</b>	<b>115569</b>	<b>110980</b>	<b>103715</b>

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline (figures are based on the municipal population registrations)



Table A5.2: Population by Ethnic origin (1995-2004) on December 31

	1995	1997	1999	2001	2003	2004	In 2004 of which	
							First generation	Second generation
<b>Total</b>	<b>15.493.889</b>	<b>15.654.192</b>	<b>15.863.950</b>	<b>16.105.285</b>	<b>16.258.032</b>	<b>16.305.526</b>		
<b>Native Dutch</b>	<b>12.995.174</b>	<b>13.033.792</b>	<b>13.088.648</b>	<b>13.140.336</b>	<b>13.169.880</b>	<b>13.182.809</b>		
<b>Of foreign descent from</b>	<b>2.498.715</b>	<b>2.620.400</b>	<b>2.775.302</b>	<b>2.964.949</b>	<b>3.088.152</b>	<b>3.122.717</b>	<b>1.606.664</b>	<b>1.516.053</b>
<b>Western countries of whom from</b>	<b>1.327.602</b>	<b>1.341.947</b>	<b>1.366.535</b>	<b>1.406.596</b>	<b>1.419.855</b>	<b>1.423.675</b>	<b>582.278</b>	<b>841.397</b>
<b>25 EU countries of whom from</b>	-	<b>781.511</b>	<b>790.734</b>	<b>805.335</b>	<b>809.116</b>	<b>821.716</b>	<b>349.279</b>	<b>528.500</b>
<b>old EU countries (15) of whom from</b>	<b>731.930</b>	<b>733.059</b>	<b>739.309</b>	<b>748.930</b>	<b>748.417</b>	<b>755.507</b>	<b>254.647</b>	<b>444.797</b>
Germany	411.504	405.991	401.119	396.316	389.912	386.716	102.209	284.507
United Kingdom	65.663	66.781	69.263	74.869	76.457	76.344	44.392	31.952
Belgium	111.228	111.537	112.604	113.239	113.081	112.731	36.021	76.710
<b>new EU countries (10) of whom from</b>	-	<b>48.452</b>	<b>51.425</b>	<b>56.405</b>	<b>60.699</b>	<b>66.209</b>	<b>94.632</b>	<b>83.703</b>
Poland	25.125	27.315	29.180	32.210	35.542	39.815	24.566	15.249
Hungary	11.454	11.742	11.917	12.359	12.564	12.655	5.544	7.111
Czechoslovakia (former)	7.106	7.616	8.274	9.456	9.813	10.423	6.201	4.222
<b>Other Europe of whom from</b>	-	<b>96.231</b>	<b>109.388</b>	<b>131.817</b>	<b>142.898</b>	<b>135.657</b>	<b>65.526</b>	<b>14.068</b>
Yugoslavia (former)	56.220	60.959	66.947	74.640	76.346	76.301	54.386	21.915
Soviet Union (former)	13.485	17.334	22.625	34.903	42.033	44.419	34.392	10.027
Romania	4.226	4.722	5.451	6.667	7.895	8.417	6.115	2.302
<b>other Western Countries of whom from</b>	<b>476.376</b>	<b>464.205</b>	<b>466.413</b>	<b>469.444</b>	<b>467.841</b>	<b>466.302</b>	<b>167.473</b>	<b>298.829</b>
United States	22.730	24.479	26.808	29.093	30.161	30.482	18.688	11.794
Canada	9.519	10.370	11.217	12.199	12.660	12.907	4.503	8.404
Australia	10.355	11.076	12.230	13.493	14.221	14.379	4.989	9.390
Indonesia	411.622	407.885	405.155	402.663	398.502	396.080	131.203	264.877
Japan	6.355	6.475	6.674	7.078	7.215	7.286	5.955	1.331
<b>Non-Western countries of whom from</b>	<b>1.171.113</b>	<b>1.278.453</b>	<b>1.408.767</b>	<b>1.558.353</b>	<b>1.668.297</b>	<b>1.699.042</b>	<b>1.024.386</b>	<b>674.656</b>
Turkey	271.514	289.777	308.890	330.709	351.648	358.846	195.678	163.168
Morocco	225.088	241.982	262.221	284.124	306.219	315.821	168.400	147.421
Somalia	20.060	25.842	28.780	28.979	25.001	21.733	15.083	6.650
South Africa	9.629	10.737	12.524	14.378	15.164	15.370	8.091	7.279
Ghana	12.480	13.973	15.609	17.232	18.727	19.108	11.977	7.131
Cape Verde	16.662	17.478	18.242	19.012	19.666	19.966	11.537	8.429
Egypt	11.598	12.738	14.398	16.108	17.873	18.528	10.982	7.546
Ethiopia	7.978	8.460	8.997	9.783	10.236	10.292	7.147	3.145
Angola	2.594	3.352	4.477	7.962	12.281	11.601	9.285	2.316
Sudan	943	1.936	3.919	6.935	7.626	7.285	5.798	1.487
Congo	4.546	5.147	6.115	7.657	8.490	8.337	5.469	2.868
Suriname	280.615	290.467	302.514	315.177	325.281	329.430	188.367	141.063
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba	86.824	92.105	107.197	124.870	130.722	130.538	82.321	48.217
Colombia	4.937	6.002	7.025	8.122	9.366	9.885	6.646	3.239
Brazil	6.589	7.639	8.913	10.237	11.638	12.289	7.584	4.705
Dominican Republic	5.321	6.174	7.341	8.676	9.546	9.843	6.960	2.883
Iraq	11.278	22.295	33.449	41.323	42.931	43.708	35.856	7.852
Afghanistan	4.916	11.551	21.468	31.167	36.043	37.021	32.394	4.627
China	23.471	26.191	29.759	35.691	41.694	43.880	30.930	12.950
Iran	16.478	20.685	22.893	26.789	28.438	28.691	23.834	4.857
India	9.476	10.302	11.516	12.589	13.363	13.807	9.029	4.778
Vietnam	12.937	13.801	14.717	16.012	17.536	18.019	12.092	5.927
Pakistan	14.127	15.135	16.149	17.325	17.990	17.894	10.651	7.243
Hongkong	17.147	17.304	17.510	17.789	17.965	18.096	10.144	7.952
Sri Lanka	5.636	6.463	7.685	9.053	9.812	9.827	6.961	2.866
Philippines	7.738	8.868	9.857	11.100	12.401	12.966	8.308	4.658
Thailand	5.576	6.503	7.701	9.450	11.462	12.365	9.023	3.342
Syria	3.604	4.324	5.397	7.736	8.803	9.044	6.663	2.381
South Korea	1.492	1.819	2.245	2.764	3.328	3.621	2.224	1.397

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline (figures are based on the municipal population registrations)

Table A5.3: Non-native Population Forecasts by Country of Origin in the Netherlands (2005 – 2050)

		2005	2010	2030	2050
		x1000			
Western	1st generation	582	606	862	1.132
	2nd generation	841	857	950	1.094
	Total	1.422	1.463	1.812	2.226
Non-Western	1st generation	1.018	1.021	1.160	1.266
	2nd generation	677	809	1.194	1.534
	Total	1.696	1.831	2.354	2.800
Turkey	1st generation	195	200	220	205
	2nd generation	163	189	259	309
	Total	358	389	479	514
Morocco	1st generation	167	171	183	175
	2nd generation	147	181	253	284
	Total	314	352	436	460
Suriname	1st generation	188	186	185	158
	2nd generation	141	156	189	209
	Total	328	342	374	368
Neth. Antilles and Aruba	1st generation	81	78	95	120
	2nd generation	48	55	85	129
	Total	130	132	181	249
Africa	1st generation	125	108	103	133
	2nd generation	69	84	118	155
	Total	194	192	221	289
Asia	1st generation	219	229	303	381
	2nd generation	84	111	223	339
	Total	302	341	525	720
Latin America	1st generation	43	49	71	93
	2nd generation	25	33	67	108
	Total	68	82	138	201
Indonesia	1st generation	131	118	78	54
	2nd generation	265	263	245	175
	Total	395	380	323	229
EU (24)	1st generation	304	326	534	824
	2nd generation	518	522	561	710
	Total	822	847	1.095	1.534
Other European	1st generation	110	119	168	187
	2nd generation	25	38	87	134
	Total	135	157	255	321
Other non-European	1st generation	37	44	82	66
	2nd generation	32	35	57	76
	Total	69	79	139	142

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline (figures are based on the municipal population registrations)

Table A5.4: Naturalization of Foreign Nationals by Country of Origin 1996-2004

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
<b>Total</b>	<b>82,687</b>	<b>59,831</b>	<b>59,173</b>	<b>62,093</b>	<b>49,968</b>	<b>46,667</b>	<b>45,321</b>	<b>28,799</b>	<b>26,173</b>
<b>Western countries</b>	<b>9764</b>	<b>11,257</b>	<b>11,927</b>	<b>13,746</b>	<b>8569</b>	<b>6214</b>	<b>5501</b>	<b>3956</b>	<b>3277</b>
<i>of whom from</i>									
<b>25 EU countries</b>	<b>4975</b>	<b>3991</b>	<b>3337</b>	<b>3132</b>	<b>2683</b>	<b>2751</b>	<b>2803</b>	<b>2102</b>	<b>1470</b>
<i>of whom from</i>									
<b>15 EU countries</b>	<b>3520</b>	<b>2904</b>	<b>2419</b>	<b>2127</b>	<b>1848</b>	<b>1884</b>	<b>2049</b>	<b>1621</b>	<b>1122</b>
<i>of whom from</i>									
Germany	776	567	558	580	508	573	608	445	297
United Kingdom	1174	912	578	453	374	356	394	294	190
Belgium	287	183	200	189	164	189	223	250	122
<b>new EU countries</b>	<b>1455</b>	<b>1087</b>	<b>918</b>	<b>1005</b>	<b>835</b>	<b>867</b>	<b>754</b>	<b>481</b>	<b>348</b>
<i>of whom from</i>									
Poland	1129	827	677	688	587	597	530	318	212
Hungary	159	135	106	99	84	93	90	43	33
Czechoslovakia (former)	102	77	74	132	91	99	80	73	56
<b>Other Europe</b>	<b>3651</b>	<b>6382</b>	<b>7799</b>	<b>9824</b>	<b>5177</b>	<b>2766</b>	<b>1966</b>	<b>1235</b>	<b>1295</b>
<i>of whom from</i>									
Yugoslavia (former)	2283	5412	6668	7993	3809	1647	938	539	580
Soviet Union (former)	591	586	826	1510	1103	879	758	503	538
Romania	519	203	179	157	161	162	164	106	109
<b>other Western Countries</b>	<b>1138</b>	<b>884</b>	<b>791</b>	<b>790</b>	<b>709</b>	<b>697</b>	<b>732</b>	<b>619</b>	<b>512</b>
<i>of whom from</i>									
United States	489	410	261	161	160	168	225	181	181
Canada	121	109	108	74	51	65	66	54	56
Indonesia	436	314	368	514	456	416	380	291	203
Japan	8	5	7	6	8	12	5	8	6
<b>Non-Western countries</b>	<b>72,108</b>	<b>47,891</b>	<b>46,044</b>	<b>43,724</b>	<b>33,999</b>	<b>32,653</b>	<b>30,173</b>	<b>18,219</b>	<b>16,237</b>
<i>of whom from</i>									
Turkey	30704	21189	13484	5214	4708	5513	5391	3726	4026
Morocco	15,598	10,478	11,252	14,217	13,471	12,721	12,033	7126	5873
Egypt	1077	551	393	496	443	528	437	190	97
Somalia	3002	2141	4918	3487	1634	873	378	180	136
Ghana	1208	737	502	432	348	360	357	157	74
Nigeria	268	166	98	153	143	196	214	96	69
Suriname	4445	3019	2991	3194	2008	2025	1957	1242	1421
Colombia	409	354	288	341	382	259	274	112	94
Brazil	319	279	227	257	231	290	249	137	131
Dominican Republic	387	207	217	235	200	206	143	91	59
Iraq	854	798	2721	3834	2403	2315	2367	832	489
Afghanistan	360	217	905	1847	945	803	1118	982	801
China	1394	975	800	977	1002	1111	908	722	739
Iran	2299	1285	1806	2560	1375	754	336	180	122
Thailand	319	253	235	275	277	355	289	171	161
Phillipines	401	279	298	295	300	348	263	159	129
India	407	249	234	235	242	309	250	138	117
Pakistan	630	296	287	277	237	255	241	132	83
Stateless	815	683	1202	4623	7400	7800	9647	6624	6659

Source: Statistics Netherlands (figures are based on data of the Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service)

**Table A5.5: Dutch and Non-native Population by Gender and Age in % (2004)**

Age	Dutch			Non-native (Western)			Non-native (non-Western)		
	male	female	total	male	female	total	male	female	total
0 to 5	6.1	5.7	5.9	4.8	4.2	4.5	10.0	10.0	10.0
5 to 10	6.0	5.6	5.8	4.7	4.0	4.4	9.3	9.2	9.2
10 to 15	6.2	5.8	6.0	4.9	4.3	4.6	9.2	9.1	9.2
15 to 20	5.9	5.6	5.8	5.1	4.5	4.8	9.1	8.8	9.0
20 to 25	5.7	5.3	5.5	5.8	5.7	5.8	9.5	9.9	9.7
25 to 30	5.8	5.5	5.6	6.7	7.1	6.9	8.6	9.5	9.0
30 to 35	7.1	6.7	6.9	8.0	8.1	8.1	9.4	9.9	9.6
35 to 40	8.1	7.7	7.9	8.9	8.7	8.8	9.3	8.6	9.0
40 to 45	8.2	7.8	8.0	8.4	8.3	8.3	8.1	7.5	7.8
45 to 50	7.7	7.4	7.6	7.7	7.7	7.7	5.6	5.6	5.6
50 to 55	7.3	6.9	7.1	8.0	7.7	7.8	3.9	4.2	4.0
55 to 60	7.4	7.1	7.2	8.2	7.4	7.8	2.9	2.8	2.8
60 to 65	5.4	5.3	5.3	6.2	5.6	5.9	2.3	2.0	2.1
65 or older	13.1	17.7	15.4	12.6	16.5	14.6	2.7	2.9	2.8
Total (N)	6,518,800 (49.4%)	6,664,009 (50.5%)	13,182,809 (100%)	681,595 (47.8%)	742,080 (52.1%)	1,423,675 (100%)	865,584 (50.9%)	833,458 (49.0%)	1,699,042 (100%)

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline (figures are based on the municipal population registrations)

# Labour market integration of non-Western immigrants in The Netherlands

## 6.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the socio-economic position of first and second-generation non-Western immigrants in The Netherlands. Since the early 1980s, The Netherlands has had extensive policies in place to improve the labour market position of non-Western immigrant groups. Dutch integration policies focused in particular on the four largest immigrant groups living in The Netherlands: two former guest worker groups (Turks and Moroccans) and the two groups of post-colonial Caribbean immigrants (Surinamese and Antilleans). As a part of the policies concerning these immigrant groups their socio-economic position has been monitored extensively during the years. This chapter also describes the socio-economic position of other non-Western immigrant groups.

As we explained earlier, in Dutch literature foreign-born residents and their children are mostly referred to as 'allochtonous' or 'ethnic minorities'. In this chapter we use the phrase non-Western immigrants, but the reader should bear in mind that – following official definitions of 'allochtonous' residents (described in chapter 5 of this report) - this refers to both immigrants themselves and to their offspring. The data presented in this chapter therefore refer to both first and second-generation immigrants coming from various non-Western countries. In this chapter we do not describe the socio-economic position of first and second-generation coming from Western countries. In general we can say that the socio-economic position of Western immigrants is quite similar to that of the native Dutch.

The main issue in this chapter is the changing labour market position of non-Western immigrant groups. Since an adequate level of education is considered an important precondition for labour market participation, we first examine the level of educations of non-Western immigrants in The Netherlands (6.2). We then describe various aspects of their labour market

position such as labour market participation and unemployment (6.3), the extent to which non-Western immigrants depend on social assistance and other social benefits (6.4) and the labour position of non-Western immigrants (6.5). In all of these paragraphs the position of non-Western immigrant groups is systematically compared with that of the native Dutch population.

The appendix to this chapter contains some supplementary statistical information.


## 6.2 Level of education of non-Western immigrants

An adequate education is generally considered a precondition for a good labour market position. This is true for both the native Dutch population and for non-Western immigrants living in the country. A major problem for many non-Western immigrants is however their low level of education. This has different backgrounds. Former guest workers were at that time selected to do low-skilled work in The Netherlands. They were migrants with little or no educational background. Other immigrants from non-Western countries may have higher level of educations, but often their education is not sufficient for the current post-industrial labour markets. Educations achieved in Third world countries are often not acknowledged in The Netherlands. One might expect the level of education of younger members of immigrant groups, especially the second generation born in The Netherlands, to be significantly higher than that of their parents. This raises the question of how the minority level of education has developed in recent years.

Figure 6.1 shows the levels of education of the native Dutch population and various non-Western immigrant groups in 1996, 2000 and 2003. The figure makes two things clear. First, the level of education of non-Western immigrant groups – and especially of the Turkish and Moroccan groups – is still significantly lower than that of the native Dutch population. Almost 40 percent of all Turkish adults (from 15 to 64 years old) and 43 percent of all Moroccan adults have only finished primary education – and often not even that. Not less than 70 percent of all adults of both immigrant groups have finished lower vocational and general secondary school or less. In the Netherlands this level of education is considered less than the minimum required to qualify to enter the labour market. To put these figures in perspective: only 8,5 percent of all native Dutch adults have primary school and 33 percent of all native Dutch adults have finished lower vocational and

general secondary school at most. The level of education for all other non-western immigrant groups is somewhere between that of the native Dutch and that of the Turkish and Moroccan groups (figures from 2003). Second, although the levels of education for non-western immigrants are still rather low they have risen significantly in the last decade. This is especially true for the Turkish and Moroccan groups. The share of Moroccan adults with only primary school fell from 56 percent in 1996 to 44 percent in 2003. In the Turkish groups the percentage of adults with only primary school fell from 56 percent in 1996 to 44 percent in 2003. In the same time, the percentage of high-educated Turkish or Moroccan adults is slowly rising (in both groups from 4 percent to 7 percent). However, the native Dutch are improving their levels of education as well. The percentage of highly educated native Dutch adults rose from 20 percent in 1996 to 24 percent in 2003. Although non-Western immigrants are slowly improving their educational qualifications they are unable to catch up with the native Dutch population (see figure 6.1; more specific data in the appendix to this chapter).

Figure 6.1 level of education of native Dutch and non-Dutch population (15-64 year) (1996, 2000, 2003)



Source: Netherlands Statistics, Statline (our own computations)


The level of education varies not only between different immigrant groups, but also by gender and age groups. In general the level of education for men is higher than for women. This is true for both the native Dutch and for various immigrant populations. On the other hand, the difference between educational achievement of males and females in non-Western immigrant groups is not that large. For Turkish and Moroccan groups in particular

applies that both men and women are often very low educated. The same is true for various new immigrant groups, especially Afghans and Somalians. For most immigrant groups the level of education increases for both men and women. The only exceptions are women from the Dutch Antilles. Their levels of education actually fell between 2001 and 2003. This is most likely because in this period more women with little or no education came to The Netherlands from all groups (figures in the appendix to this chapter).

Levels of education also vary by age groups. In general younger people were in school longer and achieved a higher education than older groups. This is also true for the native Dutch population as well as for various immigrant groups. The second generation of immigrants that were born and educated in The Netherlands have attained a higher level of education than first generation immigrants (foreign-born). It is also remarkable that young first generation immigrants, especially marital migrants from Turkey and Morocco, are often not well educated. That the second-generation immigrant youth attain higher levels of education than their parents does not mean, however, that their situation is unproblematic. To the contrary, levels of education of young non-Western second-generation immigrants are still significantly lower compared to those of young native Dutch persons. There are various reasons for the low level of education of young non-Western second-generation immigrants. On the one hand one has to take into account that their parents were mostly low-skilled or unskilled. As the educational achievement of children is strongly influenced by the level of education of their parents one can hardly expect young non-Western immigrants to do so much better than their parents. On the other hand the educational achievement of young non-Western second-generation immigrants is strongly tempered by their high incidence of premature school dropout. Figure 6.2 shows the percentage of native Dutch and non-Dutch youths (15-34) that left school without a certificate. The figure shows that premature school dropout rates of Turkish and Moroccan youth fell in recent years, but they are still significantly higher than among native Dutch youth. Also in 2002, one in five or six Turkish or Moroccan youth left school without a certificate – three times more than native Dutch youth. Premature school dropout rates did not fall among Surinamese and Antillean youth, but are lower than among Turks and Moroccans. Premature school dropout occurs least among native Dutch youth (6% in 1998, no data available about 2002).



Figure 6.2. Premature School Dropout by Ethnic Origin, 15-34 Age Group (1998 and 2002)



Source: SVPA 1998 and 2002

A further examination of these figures showed that the Turkish and Moroccan premature school dropout rates declined more among young females than males. Observers see this as another sign that young Turkish and Moroccan women are catching up (SCP 2003). Observers also note that the school poor performance of non-Dutch youth already starts at primary schools and can largely be explained by their parents' poor level of education and their own insufficient command of Dutch when they start school. Pupils who are unable to meet the standards at secondary school tend to leave school altogether rather than switch to a lower-level school (SCP 2003).

### 6.3 Ethnic minority employment and unemployment


In the Dutch SOPEMI-report 2003 we already mentioned the turn in the economic tide in The Netherlands. Particularly the second half of the 1990's were the years of the "Dutch miracle" (cf. Visser and Hemerijck 1997), a period of continuous economic growth and job growth that also provided non-Western immigrant groups ample possibilities to improve their socio-economic position. As a result, the labour participation of non-Western immigrants increased and the unemployment levels among immigrants fell dramatically during the 1990's. However, their socio-economic position was still rather vulnerable as became clear when the current economic recession started in the years 2001 and 2002. Non-Western immigrants seem to be the main victim of the current economic recession. The labour market participation of non-Western immigrants declined again in recent years and

the unemployment of non-Western immigrants rose dramatically – particularly among the youth. In short, much of the gains of the 1990's were lost in the recent period. This section gives an overview of the employment and unemployment figures of native Dutch and non-Western immigrants living in The Netherlands since the mid-1990s.

*Non-Western immigrants in the Dutch labour market (1994-2004)*

In this section we describe the changing labour market position of non-Western immigrants by using two key indicators, the net labour market participation and the unemployment figures. The *net labour participation* (or actual workforce) shows the percentage of the total population of working age (from 15 to 65 years) that is actually employed for at least 12 hours a week. The *unemployment rate* shows the number of unemployed people as a percentage of all labour market participants. Only those people actively looking for work are counted as unemployed. Students, housewives and incapacitated are not counted as unemployed.

Figure 6.3: Net Labour Participation and Unemployment by Ethnic Descent (1994-2004)



Source: Netherlands Statistics, Statline (our own computations)

The upper part of figure 6.3 shows the development of the net labour market participation (or the actual workforce) of the native Dutch and non-Western immigrant population in the last decade. The picture is quite clear. The net labour market participation of both the native Dutch population and all non-Western immigrant groups increased significantly in the period 1994-2002, and especially in the second half of the 1990's (since 1996). For instance, the total number of non-Western immigrants participating in the labour force doubled in this period (from a quarter of a million in 1994 to half a million in 2002; figures in the appendix to this chapter). Although the labour market participation of non-Western immigrants in general was still significantly lower than with the native Dutch group (with the possible exception of the Surinamese group) the non-Western immigrants slowly seemed to catch up with the native Dutch. However, in recent years this trend of growing equality

came to an end. In 2003 and in particular in 2004 the net labour market participation of most non-Western immigrant groups fell again.

This turn in economic fortunes is most clear with the Moroccan and Antillean groups. Both immigrant groups were hit by the economic crisis relatively late. From 2001 to 2002 the labour market participation of both immigrant groups was still rising (which led observers to the assumption that non-Western immigrants were relatively less effected by the new economic recession, an assumption that turned out to be completely false; cf. the Dutch SOPEMI report 2002). However, the turning point came in 2002. The net labour market participation (or actual workforce) of the Moroccan groups fell from almost 46 percent in 2002 to 37 percent in 2004; a decrease of 19 percentpoints in three years time. During the same period, the net labour market participation of the Antillean groups fell from almost 56 percent in 2002 to 52 percent in 2004; a decrease of 9 percentpoints in three years time. However, not all population categories faced a falling net labour market participation. The net labour market participation of the native Dutch group decreased by two percentpoint (from 68 percent in 2002 to 67 percent in 2004). The net labour market participation of the Surinamese group even increased by two percentpoint (from 61 percent in 2002 to 62 percent in 2004). The declining labour market participation of most non-Western immigrant groups is counter to the explicit objective of the Dutch government to raise the labour market participation of non-Western immigrants with  $\frac{3}{4}$  percent on a annual basis.

Looking at the figures from 2004, we can establish that the net labour participation of all non-Western immigrant groups is still significantly lower than among the native Dutch population. The net labour market participation of the Moroccan group in 2004 is little more than half the level of the native Dutch groups (37 percent for the Moroccans versus 67 percent for the native Dutch). The gap in labour market participation between the native Dutch and the other non-Western immigrant groups is smaller, but still significant. Only the Surinamese seem to catch up with the native Dutch as far as the net labour market participation is concerned. The number of Surinamese women in the Dutch workforce even outnumbers the number of Dutch women in the Dutch workforce.

The net labour market participation of the so-called 'new immigrant groups' that mostly came to The Netherlands as asylum seekers during the 1990's in general is even more dramatic. The net labour market participation of these new immigrant groups is the highest with immigrants from former Yugoslavia (49 percent) and the lowest with Iraqis (28 percent), Afghans (27 percent)

and Somalians (26 percent). The lowest labour market participation is to be found with Somalian women: only 9 percent of all Somalian women of the working age actually participate in formal labour.

To conclude we can say that the net labour market participation of non-Western immigrants (with a notable exception of the Surinamese) is still significantly lower than of the native Dutch population. Moreover, the net labour market participation of most non-western immigrant groups is falling more rapidly than among the native Dutch. Particularly Moroccans and some (not all!) new immigrant groups participate relatively little in the formal labour force. In all groups women participate considerable less in formal labour than men.

These differences between the labour market participation of various ethnic groups can be explained by several factors: the number of women not participating in the labour market, the age structure of various groups and the number of low-skilled workers. All three factors influence the low labour market participation of large immigrant groups such as the Moroccans, and to a lesser extend the Turks, in The Netherlands. First, many Turkish and Moroccan women are not in the labour market because they work in the household. Second, the Turkish and Moroccan communities in The Netherlands are relatively young. This means that relatively large parts of these populations (over 15 years) are still on school. Third, labour market participation is strongly related with educational background. People with little education participate much less than high-skilled people. As we saw before, the Turkish and Moroccan groups have many adults with little or no educational background and this may partly explain their low labour market participation. The low labour market participation of newly arrived refugee groups may partly be explained by the fact that they have lived in The Netherlands only for a relatively short period and still have to find their place in Dutch society.

### *Unemployment*

The lower part of figure 6.3 shows the development of the official unemployment rates of the various population categories since 1994. The unemployment rate of non-Western immigrant groups fell dramatically during the second half of the 1990's. The unemployment among Moroccans for instance fell from 32 percent in 1995 to around 10 percent in 2001 and 2002. Thus, we concluded that non-Western immigrants in The Netherlands were indeed able to benefit from the favourable economy in the late 1990s and improve their labour market position (Dutch SOPEMI Report 2002 and 2003).

However, most recent years are again seeing a sharp increase in unemployment among non-Western immigrants. The unemployment among Moroccans for instance more than doubled between 2002 and 2004 (from 10 to 22 percent). Among immigrant youth the unemployment situation is even more dramatic than among the non-Western immigrant population in general (table 6.1).

**Table 6.1. Unemployment rate (in %) by Ethnic Descent (2001-2004)**

<b>All age groups</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2001 = 100</b>
Native Dutch	2.8	5,2	186
Turks	7.9	13,7	173
Moroccans	10.1	22,3	221
Surinamese	6.4	11,5	180
Antilleans/Arubans	8.6	15,6	181
Other Non-Western immigrants	11.1	18,4	166
<b>From 15 to 24 years</b>		<b>2004</b>	
Native Dutch		12	
Turks/ Moroccans		24	
Surinamese/ Antilleans		23	
Other Non-Western immigrants		20	

Source: Netherlands Statistics, Staline; SCP, WODC, CBS, Jaarrapport integratie (youth unemployment 2004)

Relatively spoken, the unemployment rates among most non-Western immigrant groups (with the exception of the Moroccans) did not rise more in recent years than the unemployment rate of the native Dutch population. However, as the starting position of the native Dutch group was much better in 2001 (with an unemployment rate of 2,8 percent, the lowest in many years) the unemployment level in 2004 is still quite moderate. Among the non-Western immigrants the unemployment varies from more than twice as high as among the native Dutch (the Surinamese) to more than four times as high as among the native Dutch (the Moroccans).

Youth unemployment is even higher than unemployment in general. Youth unemployment varies between 12 percent with the native Dutch group to 24 percent with young people from Turkish and Moroccan decent. Experts think the real youth unemployment may even be higher because many young people stopped looking for work, and are therefore not counted as unemployed. On the other hand, the differences in unemployment figures between the native Dutch population and the non-Western immigrant groups among the youth are much smaller than among the total population.

All in all, the current labour market position of non-Western immigrants in The Netherlands is far from positive. With declining labour market participation and rising unemployment rates non-Western immigrants (with the exception of the Surinamese) again lag behind the native Dutch population. Whereas the differences in the labour market position between

the native Dutch and non-Western immigrants were gradually diminishing during the 1990's it now seems that they are beginning to grow again. The unemployment rates for non-Western immigrant youth are particularly dramatic.

#### **6.4 Non-Western immigrants and social benefits**

Another way to describe the social position of non-Western immigrant groups is by the extent to which they are on social benefits. The picture presented in this analysis differs slightly from the earlier analyses of the labour market participation and unemployment of non-Western immigrants. Figures of labour market participation only give information on people who either work or are actively looking for a job. Figures about social assistance or disability benefit recipients also provide information on people who have left the labour market and are no longer actively seeking a job. This means they also include so-called labour market dropouts, that is people that are neither active in the labour process nor looking for a job. It has been argued, that unemployment was not the main socio-economic problem of The Netherlands in the late 1990's so much as the sizeable labour market drop out. People who do not participate in the labour market anymore may live on social assistance or from disability benefits. The Netherlands has particularly high disability rates. In this section we describe the distribution of social assistance or disability benefit recipients over various ethnic groups. As in the previous section, ethnic descent is defined by people's birth country or their parents' birth country. That is, the immigrant groups described here include both first and second-generation immigrants. In the analyses we examine three kinds of benefits, i.e. social assistance<sup>23</sup>, unemployment and disability benefits<sup>24</sup>. In the analyses we only include social assistance recipients younger than 65. Non-Western immigrant groups, particularly Turks and Moroccans, live on social benefits significantly more often than the native Dutch population. Whereas 15 percent of the native Dutch population (from 15 to 64 years) receives some social benefit this is true for around 30 percent of the Turkish and Moroccan population in the same age group. Of the other non-Western immigrant groups (Surinamese, Antilleans, other non-Western immigrants) between 22 and 24 percent of the total adult population receives some social


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<sup>23</sup> National assistance (ABW) and special benefits for the long-term unemployed (IOAW/IOAZ).

<sup>24</sup> They include disability benefits for working people (WAO), entrepreneurs (WAZ) and people who were never able to work due to physical or mental health problems.

benefit. The high number of Turkish people living from a disability benefit (almost 14 percent of the total adult population of Turkish descent) is quite remarkable.

Figure 6.4. Benefit Recipients by Ethnic Descent (1999 and 2002) (in %)




Source: Netherlands Statistics, Statline (our own computations)

Figure 6.4 shows that in all the minority groups, the percentage of benefit recipients was slightly higher in 2003 than in 1999. One should keep in mind however that the labour market position of non-Western immigrants improved significantly between 1999 and 2001/2002. In the period social benefit recipiency fell, also among non-Western immigrants. This means that the situation deteriorated rather quickly from 2002 to 2003. More recent data on social benefit recipiency is not available.



Figure 6.5. Benefit Recipients by Ethnic Descent and Generation (1999 and 2002)



Source: Netherlands Statistics, Statline (our own computations)

Figure 6.5 shows the percentages of benefit recipients among first and second-generation immigrants. First-generation immigrants are foreign-born and second-generation immigrants are born in The Netherlands of two foreign-born parents. The figure shows significant differences in the extent of benefit assistance dependency between first and second-generation immigrants. First-generation immigrants are far more often benefit recipients than their children of the second generation. The differences can be partly explained by differences in age. Since the second generation is often much younger than the first, although young immigrants are still coming to The Netherlands, they are less often unemployed or ill. The second generation is also more integrated into Dutch society. They are better educated, often in The Netherlands, and speak better Dutch than their parents and as a result are less often dependent on benefits. Both factors probably play a role. Figure 6.5 also shows that the differences between the first and second generation in the percentage of benefit recipients are not the same in all immigrant groups. Moroccans exhibit the largest difference between the first and second generation: the percentage of first-generation Moroccan benefit recipients is four times higher than of the second generation. The fact that the second generation does so much better than the first may be less the result of the successful integration of Moroccan youth into Dutch society than of their parents' lack of integration. The percentage of Surinamese benefit recipients is only 2.5 times higher in the first generation than the second.

This shows that the Surinamese youth are not doing much better than their parents, but that first-generation Surinamese immigrants are not fairing badly in The Netherlands.

## 6.5 Labour position of non-Western immigrants

So far our focus was on labour market participation as such and on the question to what extent members of non-Western immigrant groups participate on the labour market. In this section we describe the position of non-Western immigrant workers compared with native Dutch workers. We will address the occupational levels of native Dutch and immigrant workers, the type of employment contracts they have (steady or flexible jobs) and how many hours they work.

The best indicator of whether minority workers have been able to improve their labour position is to look at the levels of occupation they reach.

**Table 6.2. Native Dutch and Immigrant Workers by Occupational Level (2003) (in %)**

	Elementary occupations	Lower occupations	Intermediate occupations	higher/scientific occupations
Native Dutch	6	22	39	31
All non-Western immigrants	18	30	32	17
Turks	22	32	31	12
Moroccans	24	38	23	12
Surinamese	12	29	37	21
Antilleans	13	26	36	21
Other non-Western immigrants	20	28	31	19

Source: SCP, WODC, CBS, Jaarrapport integratie

Table 6.2 distinguishes four occupational levels: elementary, lower, intermediate and higher/scientific occupations. The table makes clear that non-Western immigrant workers predominantly are active at the bottom of the labour market. 22 to 24 percent of all Turkish and Moroccan workers are employed in elementary occupations, compared to only 6 percent of all native Dutch workers. The occupational level of Surinamese and Antillean workers, as always, is somewhere in between. However, we also find Surinamese and Antillean workers at the top end of the occupational structure. More than 20 percent of all Surinamese and Antillean workers has a higher or scientific occupation, compared to ample 30 percent of all native Dutch workers. Further analysis shows that differences in personal qualifications are the main explanation of the still rather low occupational levels of non-Western immigrant workers. When controlling for gender, age, household composition and level of education, non-Western immigrant workers are much less

concentrated at the bottom of the labour market. The influence of level of education and other personal qualifications differs somewhat between the various immigrant groups. Particularly for the Surinamese workers level of education seems to be the main explanation for their occupational level. For other groups such as Moroccans, Antilleans and other non-Western immigrants, level of education does not entirely explain the low level of occupation. This means that the low occupational level of these immigrant groups is partly the result of different factors that are still unknown (such as lower aspiration levels of immigrant workers or labour market discrimination).

**Table 6.3: Employees with Steady and Flexible Jobs\* by Ethnic Origin (in %) (2004)**

	With steady jobs	All flexible jobs	Self-employed
Native Dutch	82	6	12
All non-Western immigrants	77	16	7
Turks	77	16	8
Moroccans	82	15	3
Surinamese	81	14	5
Antilleans	80	14	5
Other non-Western immigrants	72	18	11

\*flexible jobs are defined here as workers with either limited labour contracts or unsure number of working hours (including employees of temporary employment agencies)

Source: Jaarrapport integratie, pp. 93 (table 6.5)

Table 6.3 describes what kind of employment contracts native Dutch and non-Western immigrant workers have. Despite of all the talk of flexibilisation of the labour market, the table makes very clear that the 'traditional' steady work is still the prevailing employment contract. This is true for all ethnic groups. The lowest percentage of steady work is 70 percent, found with the so-called other non-Western immigrant groups. This is not surprising because many of these immigrants arrived in The Netherlands relatively recently and they still have to find their place on the Dutch labour market. These other non-Western immigrant groups are also relatively often self-employed. Ethnic entrepreneurship is an issue that is often discussed in The Netherlands. However, as table 6.3 makes clear, the percentage of entrepreneurs in the total working population is much higher in the native Dutch population than in most immigrant groups (with the already mentioned exception of 'other non-Western immigrants'). In absolute terms the number of non-Western immigrant entrepreneurs rose in the recent year, but as a percentage of the total working population the number of non-Western immigrant entrepreneurs remained rather steady.

**Table 6.4: Employees by Working Hours and Ethnic Origin (2003)**

	Total	< 12 hours a week	12-19 hours a week x 1000	20-34 hours a week In %	> 35 hours a week
Native Dutch	6,659	10.6	8.3	24.0	57.1
All minority groups	565	9.9	7.3	21.1	61.6
Turks	110	10.0	5.5	17.3	66.4
Moroccans	81	8.6	9.9	14.8	66.7
Surinamese	150	7.3	8.0	22.0	62.7
Antilleans	51	7.8	5.9	25.5	58.8
Other non-Western groups	173	12.7	6.9	24.3	56.1

Source: Netherlands Statistics, Statline (our own computations)

Table 6.4 shows the 'working hour regimes' of native Dutch and minority workers. Unexpectedly, we see that minority workers, in particular Turks and Moroccans, have full-time jobs (at least 36 hours a week) more often than native Dutch workers. Native Dutch women in particular tend to work part-time at small part-time jobs (less than 20 hours a week) or larger part-time jobs (20 to 34 hours a week).

## Appendix for Chapter 6

### Supplementary tables

**A6.1** Level of education by Ethnic Descent and gender (15-64 year) (1996, 2000, 2003)

**A6.2** Gross Labour Participation by Ethnic Descent and gender 1994-2004

**A6.3** Net Labour Participation by Ethnic Descent and gender 1994-2004

**A6.4** Number of working people by ethnic decent 1994-2004

**A6.5** Unemployment Rate by Ethnic Descent and gender 1994-2004

**A6.6** Youth unemployment by Ethnic Descent and gender 1996-2004

**A6.7** Net Labour Participation and unemployment Rate of native Dutch and so-called new immigrant groups' (2003)

**A6.8** Net labour market participation table

**A6.9** Unemployment

### Supplementary figure

**A6.1** Unemployment rates of native Dutch population and non-Western immigrants (both total population and juveniles) (1996-2004)

**Table A6.1: Educational level of native Dutch and non-Dutch population (15-64 year) (1996, 2000, 2003)**

		only primary school	lower vocational and general secondary school	intermediate vocational and general secondary school	Higher education
native Dutch	1996	12	26	41	20
	2000	10	26	42	22
	2003	8	25	42	24
non-Western immigrants	1996	37	26	25	11
	2000	32	27	26	13
	2003	28	28	29	14
Turks	1996	55	24	15	4
	2000	47	28	19	4
	2003	39	30	22	7
Moroccans	1996	56	22	15	4
	2000	49	27	17	6
	2003	44	27	21	7
Surinamese	1996	26	27	33	13
	2000	19	29	35	15
	2003	19	29	37	15
Antilleans	1996	19	34	32	15
	2000	20	28	33	17
	2003	17	32	37	14
other non-Western immigrants	1996	24	25	30	20
	2000	24	25	29	20
	2003	22	26	30	22

Table A6.2 Gross Labour Participation by Ethnic Descent\* and gender 1994-2004

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
<b>Total population</b>											
Native Dutch	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	69	70	70	70
Of foreign descent	55	57	57	58	59	59	60	61	61	62	62
Western	61	62	62	64	64	65	66	66	66	68	68
non-Western	49	51	51	52	53	53	54	55	56	57	57
Turkish	42	43	45	45	45	46	49	52	51	54	54
Moroccan	40	43	43	45	48	46	39	47	51	50	48
Surinames	59	61	62	60	66	65	69	66	67	68	70
Antillean	55	57	58	58	59	62	60	59	63	64	61
other non-Western	50	49	51	53	49	50	52	53	53	53	53
<b>Total</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>69</b>
<b>Male</b>											
Native Dutch	77	78	78	79	80	80	80	81	81	81	80
Of foreign descent	68	69	69	69	70	70	71	70	71	72	71
Western	74	74	73	74	75	75	77	76	77	78	76
non-Western	61	63	63	63	64	64	65	65	66	67	66
Turkish	58	59	59	61	60	61	66	67	66	69	67
Moroccan	53	59	59	60	63	63	54	61	65	64	60
Surinames	67	70	71	65	72	71	77	71	72	75	75
Antillean	67	69	67	62	70	76	66	68	70	72	68
other non-Western	61	59	61	64	59	61	63	63	63	61	64
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>78</b>
<b>Female</b>											
Native Dutch	48	50	51	53	54	55	56	57	59	60	60
Of foreign descent	42	45	46	47	47	48	49	51	50	52	53
Western	47	51	52	53	53	55	56	58	56	58	59
non-Western	36	38	38	40	41	40	41	44	45	46	46
Turkish	23	27	29	27	27	30	30	36	35	36	40
Moroccan	25	21	22	27	29	27	22	31	34	34	34
Surinames	50	52	54	56	61	61	62	62	61	62	66
Antillean	44	47	50	53	48	49	54	51	57	57	55
other non-Western	35	36	38	40	38	36	39	41	40	43	40
<b>Total</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>59</b>

\*First and second generation immigrants

**Table A6.3 Net Labour Participation by Ethnic Descent\* and gender 1994-2004**

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
<b>Total population</b>											
Native Dutch	58	60	61	63	64	66	67	67	68	67	67
Of foreign descent	46	47	49	50	53	54	55	57	56	56	55
Western	54	55	56	58	60	62	63	63	63	63	62
non-Western	37	37	40	41	44	46	48	50	50	49	48
Turkish	29	30	34	35	37	40	44	48	46	46	46
Moroccan	29	29	31	35	38	39	34	42	46	41	37
Surinamese	47	49	53	52	59	59	63	62	61	61	62
Antillean	43	44	46	45	50	53	55	54	57	54	52
other non-Western	35	33	38	39	41	42	45	47	45	44	43
<b>Total</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>Male</b>											
Native Dutch	73	74	75	77	78	79	79	80	79	78	76
Of foreign descent	56	57	59	60	63	64	66	66	66	65	63
Western	67	67	67	69	72	72	74	73	74	73	71
non-Western	45	46	49	49	53	56	58	59	59	57	55
Turkish	41	43	46	49	51	53	61	61	59	61	59
Moroccan	36	41	44	45	51	53	47	56	59	53	45
Surinamese	54	56	62	57	63	63	71	66	67	68	67
Antillean	53	56	53	50	60	66	60	61	64	57	57
other non-Western	42	41	46	47	49	53	55	56	54	50	51
<b>Total</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>74</b>
<b>Female</b>											
Native Dutch	43	45	46	48	50	52	54	55	56	57	56
Of foreign descent	35	37	39	40	42	43	44	47	46	47	46
Western	40	44	45	47	48	51	51	54	52	54	54
non-Western	28	28	30	32	34	34	36	40	40	40	39
Turkish	16	17	21	21	22	26	26	34	32	29	33
Moroccan	20	14	15	23	24	22	19	26	31	28	28
Surinamese	40	44	45	48	54	54	55	59	56	56	58
Antillean	34	33	39	41	39	42	50	48	50	51	46
other non-Western	25	24	28	30	31	28	34	36	35	38	34
<b>Total</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>54</b>

\*First and second generation immigrants

**Table A6.4 Number of working people by ethnic decent\* 1994-2004**

	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2002	2003	2004
	x1000						1994=100		
Native Dutch	5223	5318	5617	5831	5961	5879	114	114	113
Non-Western immigrant	262	318	384	460	523	519	200	194	198
Turks	51	62	72	92	100	103	196	192	202
Moroccans	34	44	60	58	82	69	241	218	203
Surinamese	106	103	119	134	137	144	129	131	136
Antilleans	21	27	31	42	49	46	233	224	219
Other non-Western immigrants	50	81	102	134	154	157	308	302	314
<b>Total</b>	<b>5747</b>	<b>5953</b>	<b>6385</b>	<b>6751</b>	<b>7006</b>	<b>6917</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>120</b>

\*First and second generation immigrants

**Table A6.5 Unemployment Rate by Ethnic Descent and gender 1994-2004**

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
<b>Total population</b>											
Native Dutch	7	7	6	5	4	3	3	3	3	4	5
Of foreign descent	17	17	15	14	10	9	8	7	8	10	12
Western	11	11	10	9	7	5	5	5	5	7	8
non-Western	25	26	22	21	16	14	11	9	11	14	16
Turkish	30	31	24	22	16	13	9	8	9	14	14
Moroccan	29	32	28	22	20	16	13	10	10	17	22
Surinames	19	19	15	14	12	10	9	6	8	10	12
Antillean	22	23	21	21	16	14	9	9	10	17	16
other non-Western	31	32	25	26	17	16	14	11	14	16	18
<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Male</b>											
Native Dutch	5	5	4	3	3	2	2	2	3	4	4
Of foreign descent	17	16	14	13	10	8	6	6	7	11	12
Western	9	9	8	8	5	4	3	3	4	7	7
non-Western	27	26	22	21	16	13	10	9	11	15	16
Turkish	30	28	23	21	15	12	8	8	10	12	12
Moroccan	33	31	26	24	20	16	12	8	10	17	24
Surinames	19	20	13	13	12	10	7	8	7	9	10
Antillean	21	18	20	20	14	13	8	10	8	21	16
other non-Western	32	31	25	27	17	14	13	11	14	18	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Female</b>											
Native Dutch	10	10	10	8	7	5	5	4	4	5	6
Of foreign descent	18	19	16	15	12	10	10	7	8	10	12
Western	15	14	12	11	9	7	8	6	7	7	10
non-Western	23	27	23	20	16	15	13	9	10	14	15
Turkish	31	39	27	24	18	14	13	7	8	20	18
Moroccan	18	37	34	17	19	17	16	15	9	18	19
Surinames	20	17	16	14	12	11	11	5	9	11	13
Antillean	23	29	22	23	18	14	9	7	11	11	15
other non-Western	27	33	25	25	18	21	14	12	13	13	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>

\*First and second generation immigrants

**Table A6.6: Youth unemployment by Ethnic Descent and gender 1996-2004. Native Dutch versus non-Western immigrants**

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
<b>Total population</b>									
Native Dutch	10	8	7	7	6	6	8	9	12
Of foreign descent	25	22	18	13	12	13	12	18	21
of which									
Western countries	16	14	11	7	9	10	8	14	17
non-Western countries	34	29	23	18	15	14	16	21	23
<b>Male</b>									
Native Dutch	9	7	6	6	5	6	8	9	11
Of foreign descent	27	24	19	12	10	13	15	20	22
of which									
Western countries	19	15	10	5	7	8	10	15	18
non-Western countries	34	32	27	17	13	16	19	24	24
<b>Female</b>									
Native Dutch	12	9	8	8	7	7	8	10	12
Of foreign descent	24	20	16	14	15	12	10	15	19
of which									
Western countries	13	13	12	9	11	13	6	13	17
non-Western countries	34	25	19	18	17	11	12	17	21




**Table A6.7 Net Labour Participation and unemployment Rate of native Dutch and new immigrant groups' (2003)**

	net labour participation			unemployment		
	male	female	total	male	female	total
native Dutch	76	56	67	4	6	5
Yugoslavia (former)	58	39	49	20	21	20
Iraq	35	15	28	40	31	39
Afghanistan	38	10	27	34	50	37
Iran	52	32	43	25	25	25
Somalia	40	9	26	34	44	36

Source: SCP, WODC, CBS, Jaarrapport integratie

**Figure A6.1 Unemployment rates of native Dutch population and non-Western immigrants (both total population and juveniles) (1996-2004)**



**Table A6.8: Net labour market participation table (data of 2004 not available)**

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
<b>Total population</b>										
Native Dutch	58	60	61	63	64	66	67	67	68	67
Of foreign descent	46	47	48	50	53	54	55	57	56	56
Western	54	55	56	58	60	62	63	63	63	63
non-Western	37	37	40	42	44	46	48	50	50	49
Turkish	29	30	34	35	37	40	44	48	46	46
Moroccan	9	29	31	35	38	39	34	42	46	41
Surinamese	47	49	53	52	59	59	63	62	61	61
Antillean	43	44	46	45	50	53	55	54	57	54
other non-Western	35	33	38	39	41	42	45	47	45	44
<b>Total</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>Male</b>										
Native Dutch	73	74	75	76	78	79	79	80	79	78
Of foreign descent	56	57	59	60	63	64	66	66	66	65
Western	67	67	67	69	72	72	74	73	74	73
non-Western	45	46	49	49	53	56	58	59	59	57
Turkish	41	43	46	49	51	53	61	61	59	61
Moroccan	36	41	44	45	51	53	47	56	59	53
Surinamese	54	56	62	57	63	63	71	66	67	68
Antillean	53	56	53	50	60	66	60	61	64	57
other non-Western	42	41	46	47	49	53	55	56	54	50
<b>Total</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>Female</b>										
Native Dutch	43	45	46	48	50	52	54	55	56	57
Of foreign descent	35	37	39	40	42	43	44	47	46	47
Western	40	44	45	47	48	51	51	54	52	54
non-Western	28	28	30	32	34	34	36	40	40	40
Turkish	16	17	21	21	22	26	26	34	32	29
Moroccan	20	14	15	23	24	22	19	26	31	28
Surinamese	40	44	45	48	54	54	55	59	56	56
Antillean	34	33	39	41	39	42	50	48	50	51
other non-Western	25	24	28	30	31	28	34	36	35	38
<b>Total</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>55</b>

\* first and second-generation immigrants = of foreign descent

**Table A6.9: Unemployment (data of 2004 not available)**

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
<b>Total population</b>										
Native Dutch	7	7	6	5	4	3	3	3	3	4
Of foreign descent	17	17	15	14	10	9	8	7	8	10
Western	11	11	10	9	7	5	5	5	5	7
non-Western	25	26	22	21	16	14	11	9	11	14
Turkish	30	31	24	22	16	13	9	8	9	14
Moroccan	29	32	28	22	20	16	13	10	10	17
Surinamese	19	19	15	14	12	10	9	6	8	10
Antillean	22	23	21	21	16	14	9	9	10	17
other non-Western	31	32	25	26	17	16	14	11	14	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Male</b>										
Native Dutch	5	5	4	3	3	2	2	2	3	4
Of foreign descent	17	16	14	13	10	8	6	6	7	11
Western	9	9	8	8	5	4	3	3	4	7
non-Western	27	26	22	21	16	13	10	9	11	15
Turkish	30	28	23	21	15	12	8	8	10	12
Moroccan	33	31	26	24	20	16	12	8	10	17
Surinamese	19	20	13	13	12	10	7	8	7	9
Antillean	21	18	20	20	14	13	8	10	8	21
other non-Western	32	31	25	27	17	14	13	11	14	18
<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Female</b>										
Native Dutch	10	10	10	8	7	5	5	4	4	5
Of foreign descent	18	19	16	15	12	10	10	7	8	10
Western	15	14	12	11	9	7	8	6	7	7
non-Western	23	27	23	20	16	15	13	9	10	14
Turkish	31	39	27	24	18	14	13	7	8	20
Moroccan	18	37	34	17	19	17	16	15	9	18
Surinamese	20	17	16	14	12	11	11	5	9	11
Antillean	23	29	22	23	18	14	9	7	11	11
other non-Western	27	33	25	25	18	21	14	12	13	13
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>

\* first and second-generation immigrants = of foreign descent

## Developments in asylum policy

Mariska Kromhout (Research and Documentation Centre, Ministry of Justice)

### 7.1 Introduction

In 2004, several developments took place in the field of Dutch asylum policy, of which we will discuss the following. First of all, the number of asylum requests in The Netherlands continued to decrease, which may be explained by global trends as well as specific aspects of Dutch asylum policy. Secondly, several sections of the Aliens Act 2000 and subordinate legislation were amended, partly in response to EU-regulations. The accelerated asylum procedure was altered in a few respects, in response to a number of critical reports. Furthermore, Dutch policies regarding the assessment of asylum claims from nationals of specific countries and regions were adapted. Finally, the so-called Project Return started in 2004, aimed at asylum seekers whose asylum applications were rejected under the former Aliens Act, but who were still staying in The Netherlands.

### 7.2 Continuing reduction in the number of asylum requests

After a period of relatively high numbers of asylum requests, the number of asylum applications lodged in The Netherlands started to fall at the end of the year 2000. From the end of 2001 the rate of this reduction accelerated (Grütters 2003). Since then the numbers have been falling every year. In 2004 the number of asylum requests dropped beneath 10,000 a year, the lowest number in more than a decade. This downward trend can also be observed in the figures regarding asylum requests of solitary underage minors, where it has become even more dramatic: in 2004 only 594 asylum applications were lodged by solitary underage asylum seekers, less than half the number of 2003 (see chapter 4 of this report, table 4.5). Several Dutch politicians have claimed the reduction in the number of asylum requests as a 'success' of the Aliens Act 2000 that came into effect on April 1, 2001. However, the decrease started several months before that date. Furthermore, it coincides with a trend that materialized in industrialized

nations across the world after 2001. Figures of the UNHCR show that in 2002 the number of asylum requests compared to that in 2001 dropped in the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, a development that continued in the following years. Since 2003 a clear decrease has also been visible in Europe as a whole (UNHCR 2005, see also table 4.6). According to the UNHCR, this reduction in the number of asylum requests in industrialized countries can be explained by developments in the receiving countries as well as the sending countries. In the period described, the strong reduction in the number of refugees leaving Afghanistan and Iraq is pointed out as a major factor (UNHCR 2005).

Notwithstanding these general trends, it is remarkable that the reduction in the number of asylum requests in The Netherlands already started at the end of the year 2000, before the same happened in other Western European countries. In 2001 The Netherlands ranked fourth among European countries receiving the highest numbers of asylum requests, while it ranked tenth halfway through 2004 (see reports to the Lower House of Parliament TK 19 637, no. 652 and 911; compare table 4.6 in chapter 4 of this report). Specific elements of Dutch asylum law and policy may have contributed to this.

First, the statutory effects of the rejection of asylum claims laid down in the Aliens Act 2000 may have made The Netherlands less 'attractive' for asylum seekers than before. These effects are that the provisions in the reception centres where asylum seekers were accommodated are terminated once their claim is rejected and former asylum seekers are obliged to leave The Netherlands within a standard time limit of 28 days, or else may be deported from The Netherlands (see chapter 1). The courts cannot assess these consequences separately from the decision on admission, as a result of which asylum seekers have fewer opportunities to prolong their stay in The Netherlands by lodging an appeal against the decisions of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (INS). In the field, the impression persists that this has led to a reduction in the number of proceedings, although some asylum seekers still go to court close to the ending of reception facilities or expulsion from The Netherlands (Kromhout, Kok, Munk, & Beenackers in press).

A second factor which may have influenced the number of asylum requests in The Netherlands is the more extensive use of the Accelerated procedure. Every asylum request (with a few exceptions) enters the asylum procedure in the so-called Application Centre (AC). There, the INS decides whether to assess the asylum claim in the accelerated procedure or the regular asylum procedure. If it is decided to assess a claim within the accelerated procedure, the assessment takes place within 48 'process-hours' (which takes a maximum of about five days). Until December 6, 2004 only negative

decisions could be made within this procedure, but since then positive decisions are also possible. The accelerated procedure already existed before the Aliens Act 2000. However, the percentage of asylum claims rejected within this procedure has risen strongly in the first years of the new Act, from almost 20 per cent in the last months before the introduction of the Act to 60 per cent in the last months of 2002. After that, the AC-percentage dropped to about 40 % in 2004 (TK 19 637 & 27 557, no. 599; TK 19 637, no. 731, 805, 911). Asylum seekers whose claims are rejected in the accelerated procedure are to leave The Netherlands immediately. They have no right to reception facilities, even if they go to court to lodge an appeal against the decision. The dramatic reduction in the number of asylum claims of solitary underage asylum seekers may partly be related to the pilot that was carried out from November 2002 until the end of 2004 of so-called campuses for solitary underage asylum seekers. In these centres, solitary underage asylum seekers whose asylum claims had been rejected were prepared for their return to their country of origin. They were separated as much as possible from Dutch society and the language of communication was English. Initially, a long and strict daily programme was followed leaving the minors very little leisure time. This treatment led to many protests from the minors themselves and a great number of minors disappeared from the campuses. This led to a change in regime, which solved the problems only partly. Another difficulty was the great number of conflicts among the youngsters themselves. Furthermore, the organizations involved did not succeed in making the minors return to their country of origin, which was one of the main goals of the campuses. In response to these negative outcomes the Minister of Immigration and Integration closed down the campuses and designed a new reception model for solitary underage asylum seekers that is still being implemented (Klaassen & De Prez 2004; TK 27 062, no. 29).

The reduction of the number of asylum requests had far-reaching consequences for the organisations operating in the field of asylum, because their financing by the Ministry of Justice depends largely on these numbers. The reduction was especially felt at the INS, the central body for asylum seekers accommodation, organizations for legal aid and support for refugees and the organization of interpreters. In 2003 en 2004 the INS shut down two of the four Application Centres and several assessment centres for the regular asylum procedure. The business hours in the Application Centres were shortened. The central body for asylum seekers accommodation was forced to close many reception centres, and legal aid and refugee support organizations faced a loss of personnel, too. In the near future similar effects are expected for the Aliens Courts and attorneys at the courts (Kromhout et al. in press).

### **7.3 Amendments to the Aliens Act 2000 and subordinate legislation**

With the introduction of the Aliens Act 2000, several important changes were made in Dutch legislation regarding asylum (See chapter 1 of this report). In the years following this introduction, the Act was amended several times, mostly regarding specific legal proceedings. In 2004 changes were made to the system of appeal in cases of detention of aliens, lengthening the period between actual detention and the assessment of its lawfulness by the courts, in cases in which aliens did not go to court on their own initiative. Furthermore, as of September 1, 2004, the temporary residence permit, which accepted asylum seekers received, was no longer valid for a maximum of three but of five years. After five years a permanent residence permit may be applied for.

In the last few years the Aliens Act 2000 and subordinate legislation were also amended a few times in response to Directives from the Council of the European Union. Among the most recent directives that were implemented in The Netherlands were: European Council Directive 2003/9, which specified minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, EC Directive 2003/86 on the right to family reunification, and EC Directive 2001/55 on 'minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof'. This last directive was incorporated in the Aliens Act by introducing extra grounds for imposing a moratorium on decisions and returns in cases of asylum seekers who have been granted temporary protection by the Council of the European Union (see also the next section). Under the Dutch Presidency of the European Union the European Council adopted the so-called 'The Hague Programme' in November 2004. In this programme further steps towards a common European asylum system were announced. Until 2005, however, 'Europe' has exerted little influence on Dutch asylum legislation, because the number of EU directives in the field of asylum has been limited.

Finally, a few changes in the accelerated asylum procedure are worth mentioning. From the start in 1994, this procedure has been criticized by Dutch NGO's and organisations for legal aid. It started as a 24-hour procedure and became a 48-hour procedure in 1999, intended for the processing of those asylum claims that were likely to have little chance of 'success'. In 2001 the selection criterion changed into a criterion based solely on the question whether an asylum application could be assessed 'without time-consuming investigation', that is to say, within 48 "process" hours

(Lodder 2003). In 2003 and 2004 reports from, among others, the UNHCR (2003), Human Rights Watch (2003), and the Dutch Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs (Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken 2004) criticized the accelerated procedure. Some of the main points of criticism pertained to the time-related selection criterion, the limited amount of time available for legal aid, the (im)possibilities for traumatized asylum seekers to tell their whole story within a few days after their arrival in The Netherlands, the hearings of young children in the accelerated procedure and the less elaborate way in which the courts assessed appeals against asylum decisions, as a result of case law of the department of Administrative Law of the Council of State. In reaction to these points of criticism, the Minister of Immigration and Integration argued that the accelerated procedure contained enough safeguards to ensure a careful examination of asylum claims, stressing that cases requiring more time to investigate were transferred to the regular asylum procedure and that appeals could be lodged against decisions of the INS, which in most cases were lost by asylum seekers. She did follow the recommendations to make positive decisions in the accelerated procedure possible and to stop assessing asylum claims of solitary underage asylum seekers under the age of twelve in the accelerated procedure (TK 19 637, no. 826).

#### **7.4 Policies regarding specific countries and regions of origin**

According to the Aliens Act 2000 specific policies can be designed aimed at asylum seekers from specific countries or regions of origin. First of all, under certain conditions a temporary moratorium can be imposed on decisions regarding asylum claims of people coming from specific countries or regions. Since the introduction of the new Act this has happened several times, in situations of expectedly short periods of uncertainty about the situation in the countries or regions of origin, because of which no accurate assessment of asylum claims of people from these areas was deemed possible. As a result of these moratoria, the period within which the INS should reach a decision about the asylum claims concerned was extended by one year.

Another possibility is to impose a moratorium on the obligation of asylum seekers from specific countries or regions to leave The Netherlands after their asylum claims have been rejected. This may happen when the situation in a country or region of origin changes in such a way that it is unclear whether a person can be sent back. As a result of the decision to impose such a moratorium on returns, rejected asylum seekers regain their rights to

facilities like housing in reception centres for the duration of the moratorium, which is a maximum of one year.

Thirdly, the Minister of Immigration and Integration can proclaim a policy by which asylum seekers from specific countries or regions are granted a residence permit on the ground of the 'general situation' there, usually a situation characterized by (civil) war or other violations of human rights.

In 2004 the following developments in these policies took place (Kromhout et al. in press; TK 19 637, no. 911):

- The then current moratoria on decisions and returns in cases of asylum seekers from Northern Iraq and Central Iraq were ended on February 1 and June 27, respectively,
- For asylum seekers from Central Iraq a policy to grant a residence permit was continued; it was decided to pursue no specific policy with regard to people from Northern Iraq,
- A moratorium on returns was imposed for specific categories of people from Somalia, as of June 18,
- The then current moratoria on decisions and returns in cases of asylum seekers from Liberia ended on June 27,
- Regarding cases of asylum seekers from the Ivory Coast, moratoria on decisions and returns were imposed as of November 26,
- In 2004, a policy to grant a residence permit was pursued for people from Burundi, non-Arabic Sudanese people from specific regions and Tutsi from the Democratic Republic of Congo.

## 7.5 Project Return

As a result of the reduction in the number of asylum applications, the focal point of Dutch politicians and policy makers continued to shift in 2004 from the issue of the influx of asylum seekers to that of the return of rejected asylum seekers to their countries of origin, or, rather, their departure from The Netherlands (Commissie Evaluatie Vreemdelingenwet 2000 2004). In 2004, the focus was on asylum seekers who were still staying in The Netherlands several years after the first rejection of their asylum claims by the INS.

In 2003 the Minister of Immigration and Integration had granted a residence permit to more than 2,000 asylum seekers who on May 27 of that year were still awaiting a final decision on their first asylum applications, lodged on or before May 27, 1998 (the so-called Once-off Arrangement) (see chapter 1 for other criteria which had to be met). Another 220 people had received a residence permit because they were acknowledged as 'distressing cases'



(TK 19 637 & 29 344, no. 793). In 2004 and 2005 several thousands of those who had not met the criteria for the specific amnesty yet received a residence permit after winning their case in court, or because they were admitted by the INS on the basis of their exceptionally distressing circumstances (press release of the Ministry of Justice, April 29, 2005).

In the meantime the so-called Project Return was started in order to facilitate the departure from The Netherlands of those who received a final negative decision on their asylum claims. These asylum seekers had all lodged their first claims under the former Aliens Act, but were not granted a residence permit on the basis of either the once-off arrangement, or the discretionary power of the Minister to make exceptions for 'distressing cases'. Most of them were living in reception centres, others stayed in houses provided by the municipalities.

People in the target group of Project Return (which is still being carried out) are provided with extra assistance by the INS, the Aliens Police, the central body for asylum seekers accommodation and the International Organization for Migration, in order to organize their departure or return to their country of origin. They are eligible for a sum of money to assist them with their reintegration in their country of origin. If this facilitation does not lead to departure from The Netherlands in the first phase, people are obliged to leave their residence. If expulsion is possible, they are detained in one of the 'Removal centres', if not, they are referred to one of the two 'Departure Centres' that are set up specifically for Project Return. The first of these Departure Centres was opened in July 2004. In these centres, departure or return is encouraged and facilitated for another eight weeks. After that, several possibilities exist: if it is 'objectively determined' that people can not return to their country of origin through no fault of their own, a residence permit is granted on that ground. If this is not the case, people for whom the legal requirements for alien detention are met, will be transferred to a Removal Centre awaiting enforced return. In other cases, people's residence in the Departure Centres is terminated and they are obliged to leave it (TK 19 637 & 29 344, no. 793; TK 19 637, no. 911). After that, according to the general principle of the Dutch return policy, it is their own responsibility to leave The Netherlands. The Minister of Immigration and Integration has asked the municipalities not to provide or subsidize shelter for these people, but not all municipalities who encounter former asylum seekers on the streets are willing to respect this request (see e.g. TK 29 344, no. 2). Until January 1, 2005 almost 7,500 former asylum seekers belonging to the target group of Project Return left the project. Almost 40 per cent of them received a residence permit, in a few hundred cases because of exceptionally distressing circumstances, but seldom because people could not return to

their country of origin through no fault of their own (no other details are available on the rest). More than one third of the total group was registered as 'administrative departed', which means that they have left their residence, with unknown destination. In almost a quarter of the cases actual departure from The Netherlands was established, enforced, under supervision or, as in most cases, return via the International Organization for Migration (TK 19 637, no. 911). However, most people who left did so without going to one of the Departure Centres: until January 1, 2005 only 67 former asylum seekers had actually stayed in one of these centres (TK 19 637, no. 911).

The Departure Centres of Project Return are separate from the New Reception Model for asylum seekers who have lodged their claim under the Aliens Act 2000, and have not been rejected in the accelerated procedure. This model has been in place since January 1, 2005. According to this model, asylum seekers waiting for a decision from the INS on their first asylum applications and those who have been granted a residence permit but are waiting for a house in one of the municipalities are housed in centres for orientation and integration. Those who have received a negative decision from the INS but are awaiting the verdict of the court on their appeal are accommodated in centres aimed at return (TK 19 637, nr. 885).

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# Appendices





Table B.1.1. NETHERLANDS, inflows of foreign population by nationality

	Thousands																	
	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	200
United Kingdom	4,4	4,5	4,0	4,200	5,378	5,967	6,496	4,971	3,537	3,650	4,341	4,327	4,741	5,018	5,855	5,886	4,829	4,07
Germany	4,3	4,1	4,4	4,600	5,648	6,839	7,107	7,446	6,146	4,655	5,695	5,693	4,746	4,491	4,855	5,064	5,091	4,81
Turkey	8,4	9,6	10,4	11,000	12,637	12,376	9,146	7,757	4,280	4,757	6,399	6,522	5,120	4,215	4,517	4,804	5,434	6,19
Morocco	6,6	7,0	8,2	8,400	9,431	8,895	7,150	5,877	3,192	3,100	4,272	4,500	5,310	4,427	4,160	4,900	4,919	4,49
United States	2,0	2,0	2,0	2,300	2,497	2,615	2,910	2,606	2,209	2,202	3,145	3,112	3,274	3,343	3,365	3,118	3,042	2,53
France	1,4	1,5	1,6	1,600	1,809	1,703	1,795	1,549	1,433	..	1,719	2,052	2,059	2,022	2,166	2,158	2,037	1,85
Suriname	3,7	4,3	2,9	4,400	6,800	6,700	6,885	7,840	2,890	1,716	2,755	2,595	3,200	1,802	2,067	2,196	2,171	2,39
Belgium	2,3	2,4	2,3	2,200	2,398	2,360	2,248	1,987	1,699	1,309	1,949	2,213	1,933	1,995	1,953	1,834	1,800	1,66
China	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,098	1,024	..	1,305	1,643	1,388	1,273	1,824	2,816	3,428	3,77
Italy	0,8	0,9	0,9	1,000	1,051	1,020	0,970	1,013	0,870	..	1,153	1,244	1,381	1,503	1,525	1,524	1,447	1,33
Poland	..	..	0,7	1,100	1,321	1,422	1,426	1,310	0,758	..	1,385	1,397	1,464	0,891	1,316	1,437	1,593	1,53
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,011	1,103	..	1,253	1,206	1,220	1,317	1,291	1,302	1,310	1,26
Spain	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,011	1,264	1,157	1,182	1,286	1,362	1,394	1,30
Iran	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,576	0,290	0,307	0,392	0,466	0,381	0,42
Somalia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,392	0,285	0,182	0,137	0,780	0,058	0,03
Former Yugoslavia	..	..	..	..	..	..	4,856	8,912	8,449	7,349	3,383	1,578	1,421	0,735	1,392	1,135	0,845	0,84
Indonesia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,443	1,563	1,585	1,38
Other countries	18,900	24,600	20,900	24,600	32,294	34,440	32,033	34,196	30,834	38,234	37,412	34,422	42,712	43,662	51,839	52,162	45,255	33,64
<b>Total</b>	<b>52,8</b>	<b>60,9</b>	<b>58,3</b>	<b>65,400</b>	<b>81,264</b>	<b>84,337</b>	<b>83,022</b>	<b>87,573</b>	<b>68,424</b>	<b>66,972</b>	<b>77,177</b>	<b>76,736</b>	<b>81,701</b>	<b>78,365</b>	<b>91,383</b>	<b>94,507</b>	<b>86,619</b>	<b>73,56</b>
<i>Of which: EU</i>	..	..	15,6	15,711	18,613	20,757	22,251	19,725	15,995	14,794	19,225	20,287	19,909	20,439	22,060	22,412	21,044	19,12

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the notes at the end of the Annex.

1. EU: European Union 15 for all years.

Year 2000/2003 Note Former Yugoslavia : contains immigrants with nationality of Bosnia, Croatia,FR Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Slovenia

Table B 1.2. NETHERLANDS, outflows of foreign population by nationality

	Thousands																		
	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Germany	2,300	2,400	2,300	2,500	2,300	2,738	2,880	2,998	3,185	2,858	3,530	3,060	3,047	2,995	3,219	2,956	3,081	2,811	3,006
United Kingdom	2,800	2,500	2,500	2,500	2,430	2,444	2,424	2,589	2,796	2,932	2,480	2,320	2,617	2,468	2,363	2,101	2,202	2,433	2,580
United States	1,900	1,600	1,700	1,500	1,691	1,690	1,879	1,913	1,832	1,527	1,940	2,201	1,789	1,836	1,747	1,667	1,782	1,687	1,523
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0,865	0,920	..	1,098	1,081	0,997	1,113	1,067	1,054	1,234	1,085	1,086
Belgium	1,000	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,181	1,328	1,325	1,099	1,344	0,853	1,215	1,145	0,970	0,955	0,990	1,000	0,996	1,046	1,070
France	0,700	0,700	0,700	0,800	0,793	0,870	0,834	0,699	0,789	..	0,773	0,786	0,773	0,787	0,961	0,861	0,974	1,058	0,995
Turkey	5,200	3,800	3,500	3,000	2,309	1,700	1,814	1,744	1,630	1,581	1,472	1,130	0,930	0,686	0,627	0,522	0,445	0,664	1,316
Italy	0,600	0,500	0,500	0,500	0,453	0,545	0,502	0,433	0,498	..	0,503	0,520	0,550	0,612	0,640	0,644	0,682	0,818	0,666
Morocco	1,700	1,300	1,500	1,300	1,036	1,060	1,027	1,099	1,151	1,100	1,049	0,843	0,602	0,500	0,404	0,436	0,372	0,379	0,479
Poland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,192	0,217	..	0,311	0,368	0,398	0,341	0,304	0,360	0,307	0,407	0,485
China	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0,121	0,165	..	0,179	0,196	0,212	0,212	0,194	0,209	0,355	0,452	0,550
Suriname	0,400	0,300	0,500	0,500	0,522	0,584	0,661	0,625	0,520	0,392	0,327	0,317	0,255	0,172	0,167	0,109	0,126	0,154	0,156
Former Yugoslavia	..	..	..	..	..	..	0,306	0,332	0,322	..	0,350	0,359	0,387	0,143	0,354	0,306	0,301	0,354	0,486
Indonesia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0,240	0,259	0,362	0,401	0,450
Other countries	7,000	6,600	7,000	7,700	7,880	8,371	9,081	6,494	7,377	10,430	7,177	7,614	7,739	7,845	7,450	7,913	7,938	8,121	8,701
<b>Total</b>	<b>23,600</b>	<b>20,900</b>	<b>21,400</b>	<b>21,500</b>	<b>20,595</b>	<b>21,330</b>	<b>22,733</b>	<b>22,203</b>	<b>22,746</b>	<b>21,673</b>	<b>22,404</b>	<b>21,940</b>	<b>21,266</b>	<b>20,665</b>	<b>20,727</b>	<b>20,397</b>	<b>21,157</b>	<b>21,870</b>	<b>23,549</b>
<i>Of which:</i> EU	..	..	9,137	9,699	8,908	9,614	10,017	10,497	10,444	10,034	10,659	10,023	10,286	10,126	10,810	10,154	10,645	10,830	11,235

Note: Data are from population registers. For details on definitions and sources, refer to the notes at the end of the Annex.

1. European Union 15 for all years.

Table B.1.4. NETHERLANDS, stock of foreign-born population by country of birth

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Turkey	149,473	..	..	165,960	165,977	167,498	169,284	172,662	175,476	178,027	181,865	186,204	190,488	194,615	195,937
Suriname	162,913	..	..	182,921	180,894	180,961	181,568	182,234	184,184	184,979	186,469	188,002	189,007	189,732	190,104
Morocco	122,933	..	..	139,402	139,772	140,734	142,683	145,753	149,618	152,693	155,819	159,757	163,422	166,607	168,528
Indonesia	186,063	..	..	183,651	180,426	177,668	174,762	172,134	170,327	168,011	165,781	163,853	161,443	158,804	155,953
Germany	128,656	..	..	129,385	131,223	130,127	128,048	126,797	125,540	124,237	123,110	122,074	120,573	119,002	117,697
Former Yugoslavia	15,173	..	..	29,726	37,172	43,779	46,094	46,717	47,541	50,535	53,865	55,878	56,157	55,497	54,493
United Kingdom	38,304	..	..	44,841	43,251	42,306	41,714	42,312	42,677	43,627	45,670	47,937	48,502	48,267	47,472
Belgium	42,195	..	..	44,038	43,216	43,252	43,329	43,954	44,600	45,343	46,003	46,473	46,847	47,052	47,075
Iraq	1,494	..	..	4,753	7,426	10,206	14,446	20,356	27,297	29,892	33,748	35,981	35,793	35,968	35,913
Afghanistan	..	..	..	..	..	..	7,184	10,754	14,619	19,842	24,277	28,470	30,959	32,143	32,409
Former USSR	2,878	..	..	5,651	6,612	8,380	10,138	11,707	13,721	16,131	21,559	27,062	30,791	32,802	34,454
China	11,832	..	..	15,219	15,218	16,106	16,910	18,019	19,386	20,629	22,706	25,786	28,686	31,455	33,459
Iran	6,305	..	..	10,840	12,657	14,879	17,264	18,488	19,267	20,082	21,469	23,246	24,154	24,171	24,072
United States	14,656	..	..	16,955	17,120	17,443	17,923	18,618	19,464	20,349	21,356	22,051	22,543	22,594	22,635
Poland	9,966	..	..	12,422	12,887	13,550	14,348	15,073	15,933	16,319	17,351	18,627	20,095	21,177	24,992
Somalia	3,592	..	..	11,931	14,904	17,171	19,819	20,611	21,047	21,433	21,720	21,084	19,560	17,381	15,093
France	13,675	..	..	15,347	15,354	15,422	15,784	16,494	17,240	17,923	18,657	19,302	19,518	19,570	19,472
Spain	17,284	..	..	17,488	17,478	17,399	17,439	17,622	17,886	18,047	18,273	18,570	18,666	18,624	18,395
Italy	14,343	..	..	15,571	15,383	15,463	15,583	15,936	15,933	16,741	17,207	17,587	17,749	17,666	17,589
South Africa	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	10,141	10,639	11,286	11,984	12,264	12,292	12,274
Ghana	7,248	..	..	10,206	9,685	9,617	9,783	10,204	10,637	10,880	11,201	11,484	11,798	12,105	12,179
Vietnam	7,647	..	..	9,935	9,578	9,671	9,830	9,984	10,216	10,389	10,646	11,098	11,656	12,006	12,199
India	8,042	..	..	9,477	9,165	9,318	9,483	9,878	10,405	10,735	11,074	11,421	11,616	11,829	12,011
Portugal	8,066	..	..	9,136	8,951	8,975	8,908	8,975	9,222	9,685	10,218	10,969	11,510	11,954	12,063
Cape verde	..	..	..	..	..	..	10,632	10,813	10,972	11,012	11,053	11,227	11,340	11,443	11,542
Pakistan	7,424	..	..	9,552	9,620	9,791	9,987	10,154	10,268	10,512	10,827	10,991	11,096	11,054	10,827
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8,584	8,956	9,588	10,215	10,820	11,312	11,698
Hong Kong (China)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	10,457	10,451	10,442	10,450	10,458	10,410	10,432
Sri Lanka	5,227	..	..	7,178	7,432	7,868	8,048	8,401	8,789	9,231	9,720	10,135	10,418	10,402	10,258
Egypt	6,126	..	..	7,779	7,607	7,824	8,003	8,331	8,807	9,156	9,459	9,908	10,381	10,814	11,091
Australia	..	..	..	..	..	..	8,645	8,687	8,967	9,209	9,529	9,932	10,141	10,203	10,122
Angola	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2,867	3,474	4,646	6,451	9,804	10,124	9,310
Brazil	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	7,400	7,833	8,301	8,800	9,258	9,783	10,196
Canada	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8,045	8,203	8,427	8,718	8,817	8,829	8,849
Thailand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	5,637	6,089	6,793	7,522	8,329	9,103	9,772
Ethiopia	4,787	..	..	6,379	6,740	7,034	7,052	7,119	7,198	7,341	7,592	7,874	8,059	8,050	8,011
Philippines	3,598	..	..	4,997	5,115	5,462	5,836	6,182	6,492	6,726	7,117	7,522	7,959	8,366	8,669
Greece	5,627	..	..	6,632	6,565	6,477	6,470	6,720	6,861	7,110	7,375	7,682	7,917	7,995	7,997
Dominican Republic	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	5,286	5,639	6,107	6,519	6,819	6,949	7,044
Austria	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6,798	6,797	6,746	6,755	6,683	6,615	6,521
Sudan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2,712	3,470	4,836	6,065	6,533	6,339	5,817
Syria	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3,556	4,094	4,961	5,979	6,490	6,650	6,691
Japan	4,600	..	..	5,309	5,457	5,515	5,520	5,584	5,678	5,734	5,879	6,038	6,035	6,111	6,144
Congo	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4,226	4,530	5,020	5,580	5,950	5,942	5,687
Switzerland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	5,394	5,664	5,792	5,858	5,883	5,918	5,961
Former CSFR	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4,568	4,730	5,172	5,661	5,707	5,794	6,283
Korea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4,924	5,098	5,305	5,479	5,675	5,779	5,933
Hungary	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	5,228	5,193	5,333	5,525	5,628	5,618	5,662
Romania	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3,794	4,070	4,554	5,093	5,510	5,992	6,320
Ireland	3,898	..	..	4,803	4,530	4,424	4,359	4,400	4,226	4,288	4,425	4,545	4,558	4,587	4,495
Other countries	203,044	..	..	237,877	239,965	242,766	226,725	237,362	153,806	164,559	179,048	193,157	204,090	208,293	208,307
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 217,069</b>	..	..	<b>1 375,361</b>	<b>1 387,380</b>	<b>1 407,086</b>	<b>1 433,601</b>	<b>1 469,035</b>	<b>1 513,917</b>	<b>1 556,337</b>	<b>1 615,377</b>	<b>1 674,581</b>	<b>1 714,155</b>	<b>1 731,788</b>	<b>1 736,107</b>
% of total population	8,1	..	..	9,0	9,0	9,1	9,2	9,4	9,6	9,8	10,1	10,4	10,6	10,7	10,6

Note: For details on sources, refer to the notes at the end of the Annex.

Table B.1.5. NETHERLANDS, stock of foreign population by nationality

Thousands

Of which: women

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2003	2004
Turkey	202,618	182,089	154,300	127,000	114,700	102,000	100,700	100,782	100,309	100,286	101,845	100,574	51,524	51,073
Morocco	164,567	158,653	149,800	138,700	135,700	128,600	119,700	111,396	104,262	97,843	94,380	91,558	46,254	45,082
Germany	52,053	53,363	53,900	53,500	53,900	54,100	54,300	54,811	55,572	56,060	56,466	57,141	28,949	29,552
United Kingdom	44,672	43,008	41,100	39,300	39,200	38,800	39,500	41,404	43,604	44,052	43,678	42,519	17,384	17,050
Belgium	24,164	24,135	24,100	24,000	24,400	24,800	25,400	25,860	26,148	26,306	26,223	26,105	14,016	13,983
Italy	17,450	17,461	17,400	17,300	17,400	17,600	17,900	18,248	18,559	18,730	18,503	18,377	6,514	6,535
Spain	16,790	16,831	16,700	16,600	16,600	16,800	16,900	17,155	17,449	17,505	17,418	17,124	8,557	8,473
United States	13,382	12,761	12,800	12,600	13,000	13,389	14,074	14,751	15,217	15,412	15,075	14,837	7,501	7,362
France	..	..	10,532	10,575	11,152	11,873	12,524	13,326	14,113	14,469	14,529	14,544	7,339	7,317
Portugal	9,622	9,230	9,100	8,800	8,700	8,800	9,200	9,765	10,585	11,257	11,844	12,026	5,331	5,479
China	..	..	7,912	7,322	7,260	7,480	7,473	7,997	9,395	11,223	13,330	14,662	7,484	8,408
Indonesia	..	..	8,159	7,945	7,970	8,377	8,717	9,338	10,127	10,786	11,185	11,427	7,374	7,615
Suriname	..	..	15,174	12,015	11,760	10,497	8,665	8,469	8,491	8,573	9,406	9,644	5,178	5,307
Poland	..	..	5,910	5,642	5,680	5,906	5,645	5,944	6,312	6,912	7,431	10,968	5,422	7,445
Serbia and Montenegro	..	..	16,868	14,519	11,523	8,889	7,173	6,822	6,645	6,425	6,277	5,845	3,073	2,880
Greece	5,790	5,627	5,400	5,200	5,300	5,300	5,500	5,692	6,015	6,244	6,314	6,367	2,254	2,289
Japan	..	..	5,347	5,336	5,369	5,460	5,507	5,626	5,771	5,747	5,813	5,811	3,074	3,118
Iraq	..	..	9,694	11,355	13,008	12,747	10,025	8,639	6,919	4,771	4,182	3,852	2,012	1,902
Russian Federation	..	..	1,898	2,318	2,578	2,840	3,070	3,348	3,791	4,052	4,450	4,689	3,002	3,212
Former USSR (other)	..	..	2,412	2,561	2,767	2,917	2,619	2,632	2,915	3,323	3,794	4,494	2,549	3,063
Bosnia-Herzegovina	..	..	14,436	15,974	14,616	11,165	6,146	3,745	3,006	2,777	2,683	2,540	1,402	1,322
Ukraine	..	..	0,701	0,945	1,189	1,378	1,431	1,595	1,837	2,158	2,414	2,605	1,715	1,878
Croatia	..	..	1,718	1,766	1,685	1,639	1,602	1,582	1,632	1,650	1,679	1,595	0,877	0,833
Tunisia	2,415	2,124	1,900	1,900	1,500	1,400	1,300	1,300	1,276	1,242	1,312	1,307	0,550	0,565
Former Yugoslavia (other)	..	..	0,491	0,551	0,593	0,655	0,644	0,755	0,839	0,902	0,947	1,122	0,528	0,639
Former Yugoslavia	24,678	29,577	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Stateless	..	..	14,662	24,558	38,328	52,157	66,368	87,044	106,999	115,569	110,980	103,715	44,651	42,433
Other countries	201,641	202,279	122,986	111,618	112,222	106,831	99,417	99,776	102,605	105,680	110,027	113,903	61,657	64,754
<b>Total</b>	<b>779,842</b>	<b>757,138</b>	<b>725,400</b>	<b>679,900</b>	<b>678,100</b>	<b>662,400</b>	<b>651,500</b>	<b>667,802</b>	<b>690,393</b>	<b>699,954</b>	<b>702,185</b>	<b>699,351</b>	<b>346,171</b>	<b>349,569</b>
<i>Of which:</i> EU	193,913	193,100	191,100	188,300	190,200	192,200	195,900	201,574	207,858	210,549	211,009	210,072	99,158	99,396
Total women	356,939	348,305	335,396	318,800	320,800	316,200	313,900	322,976	334,167	341,221	346,171	349,569		

Note: Data are from population registers and refer to the population on the 31 December of the years indicated. For details on definitions and sources, refer to the notes at the end of the Annex.

1. United Kingdom Including Hong Kong.

2. European Union 15 for all years.

Table B.1.6. NETHERLANDS, acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality (data 2004 not available)

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Morocco	7 300	7 990	7 750	8 110	13 480	15 600	10 480	11 250	14 220	13 471	12 721	12033	7 126	
Turkey	6 110	11 520	18 000	23 870	33 060	30 700	21 190	13 480	5 210	4 708	5 513	5391	3 726	
Iraq	..	..	..	..	..	854	798	2 721	3 834	2 403	2 315	2367	832	
Suriname	4 010	5 120	4 990	5 390	3 990	4 450	3 020	2 990	3 190	2 008	2 025	1957	1 242	
Afghanistan	..	..	..	..	..	360	217	905	1 847	945	803	1118	982	
China	..	..	..	..	..	1 394	975	800	977	1 002	1 111	908	722	
Germany	380	380	330	310	500	780	560	560	580	508	573	608	445	
Poland	..	..	..	..	..	1 129	827	677	688	587	597	530	318	
Egypt	30	30	350	540	810	1 080	550	390	500	443	528	437	190	
United Kingdom	900	670	490	460	820	1 170	690	580	450	374	356	394	294	
Somalia	..	..	..	..	..	3 002	2 141	4 918	3 487	1 634	873	378	180	
Iran	..	..	..	..	..	2 299	1 285	1 806	2 560	1 375	754	336	180	
Former USSR (other)	..	..	..	..	..	289	298	537	1 021	681	544	411	296	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	..	..	..	..	..	127	2 056	3 873	5 416	2 646	883	400	216	
Russian Federation	..	..	..	..	..	302	288	289	489	422	335	347	207	
Former Yugoslavia	520	1 060	2 090	1 880	1 700	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
Former Yugoslavia (other)	..	..	..	..	..	2 156	3 356	2 795	2 577	1 163	764	538	323	
Stateless	360	210	180	170	610	820	680	120	4 620	7 400	7 800	9647	6 624	
Other countries	9 500	9 260	8 890	8 720	16 470	16 188	10 419	10 479	10 424	8 198	8 172	7 521	4 896	
<b>Total</b>	<b>29 110</b>	<b>36 240</b>	<b>43 070</b>	<b>49 450</b>	<b>71 440</b>	<b>82 700</b>	<b>59 830</b>	<b>59 170</b>	<b>62 090</b>	<b>49 968</b>	<b>46 667</b>	<b>45 321</b>	<b>28 799</b>	

Note: For details on sources, refer to the notes at the end of the Annex.

Table B.2.1. **NETHERLANDS, inflows of foreign workers by nationality (temporary work permits)**

Thousands

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Poland	0,7	0,9	1,2	1,5	2,5	2,8	6,6	9,5	20,2
Former USSR (1)	..	..	..	2,1	3,6	3,8	3,6	2,9	2,2
United States	1,9	2,3	2,6	2,8	3,1	2,9	2,6	2,6	2,0
China	0,6	0,5	0,5	0,7	1,0	1,2	1,7	2,3	2,4
Former CSFR	0,2	0,3	0,3	0,6	1,1	1,7	1,5	1,6	2,7
Turkey	0,5	0,4	0,7	0,7	1,0	0,9	1,1	1,3	0,5
Sierra Leone	..	..	..	0,0	0,1	0,2	1,0	1,3	0,6
Former Yugoslavia (2)	..	..	..	0,7	1,1	1,1	1,0	0,7	0,5
Japan	0,9	0,9	0,9	0,9	0,9	0,9	1,0	1,2	0,8
Hungary	0,3	0,3	0,5	0,7	0,7	1,1	1,0	1,0	1,1
Afghanistan	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,7	0,6	0,7	1,0	1,0	0,6
Romania	0,3	0,2	0,3	0,5	0,6	0,7	0,9	1,1	1,3
Indonesia	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,5	0,5	0,8	0,8	0,9	0,6
Iraq	0,0	0,0	1,0	1,5	1,6	1,2	0,8	0,8	0,7
India	0,4	0,5	0,8	0,9	1,0	1,0	0,8	0,8	1,1
Angola	..	..	..	0,0	0,1	0,3	0,6	0,8	0,4
Sudan	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,3	0,5	0,5	0,6	0,5	0,2
Iran	..	..	..	0,2	0,3	0,4	0,5	0,5	0,3
Canada	0,3	0,4	0,4	0,6	0,6	0,5	0,4	0,4	0,4
Suriname	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,3	0,4	0,4	0,4	0,0	0,2
Australia	0,2	0,3	0,3	0,4	0,5	0,5	0,4	0,3	0,3
South Africa	0,2	0,2	0,6	0,5	0,6	0,6	0,4	0,4	0,4
Bulgaria	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,3	0,4	0,4	0,3	0,4	0,4
Guinea	..	..	..	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,3	0,4	0,2
Syria	..	..	..	0,1	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,2	0,1
Somalia	..	..	..	0,2	0,3	0,3	0,2	0,1	0,1
Cameroon	..	..	..	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,3	0,3
Morocco	..	..	..	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,1
Other countries	2,5	3,6	4,6	2,9	3,9	4,4	4,4	4,7	3,7
<b>Total</b>	<b>9,2</b>	<b>11,1</b>	<b>15,2</b>	<b>20,8</b>	<b>27,7</b>	<b>30,2</b>	<b>34,6</b>	<b>38,0</b>	<b>44,1</b>

*Note:* For details on sources, refer to the notes at the end of the Annex.

1) including baltic states

2) including slovenia

Table III.22. Current figures on flows and stocks of total population and labour force in the Netherlands

		Figures in thousands unless otherwise indicated																
		1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004									
<b>Migration flows</b>	<sup>1</sup>									<b>Refugees and asylum seekers</b>								
<i>Total population</i>										New requests for asylum	34,5	45,2	42,7	43,9	32,6	18,7	13,4	9,3
Inflows		109,9	122,4	119,2	132,9	133,4	121,3	104,5	94,0	Total requests for asylum heard	..	38,9	..	..	..	..	..	..
Outflows (incl. Adm. Corrections)		82,0	79,3	78,8	79,0	82,6	96,9	104,8	110,2	Total grants of asylum	17,0	15,1	13,5	9,7	8,2	8,6	7,8	10,1
Net migration		47,6	62,0	60,1	71,6	70,1	54,5	35,6	19,0	<b>Expulsions</b>	62,0	55,7	69,2	49,1	40,9	50,4	55,6	41,5
Adjusted total net migration	<sup>2</sup>	27,9	43,1	40,4	53,9	50,8	24,3	-0,3	-16,2	<i>Of which: asylum seekers</i>	18,9	14,3	18,3	16,6	16,0	21,3	21,9	14,5
<i>Persons born in the Netherlands</i>										<b>Employment</b>								
Inflows		22,7	26,0	25,0	23,8	23,2	21,4	19,8	19,4	Total foreign employment	<sup>4</sup>	208	235	..	..	..	..	..
Outflows (incl. Adm. Corrections)		37,8	35,8	35,8	37,4	39,4	43,6	45,9	47,4	Employment of Dutch nationals								
Adjusted total net migration		-15,1	-9,8	-10,8	-13,6	-16,2	-22,2	-26,1	-27,9	born abroad and foreigners	<sup>5</sup>	543	579	..	..	..	..	..
<i>Foreign born</i>										Total "allochtonous" employment								
Inflows		87,1	96,4	94,2	109,0	110,3	99,8	84,7	74,6	(new definition)		910	972	1 032	1 083	1 152	1164	1159
Outflows (incl. Adm. Corrections)		44,1	43,5	43,0	41,6	43,2	53,3	58,9	62,9	<b>Labour force indicators according to the new definition</b>								
Adjusted total net migration	<sup>3</sup>	43,0	52,9	51,2	67,5	67,1	46,5	25,8	11,7	<b>of "Autochtonous" and "Allochtonous" populations</b>								
<b>Stock of population</b>										Total								
Total population		15 654,2	15 760,2	15 863,9	15 987,1	16 105,3	16 192,6	16 258,0	16 305,5	Total labour force (thousands)	6 838	6 957	7 097	7 187	7 314	7427	7510	7516
Total foreign population		678,1	662,4	651,5	667,8	690,4	699,5	702,2	699,4	Activity rate	65	66	67	67	68	68	69	68,6
<i>Of which:</i>										Unemployment rate	6	5	4	4	3	4	5	6,4
Morocco		135,7	128,6	119,7	111,4	104,3	97,8	94,4	91,6	Autochtonous								
Turkey		114,7	102,0	100,7	100,8	100,3	100,3	101,8	100,6	Total labour force (thousands)	5 767	5 852	5 943	6 013	6 079	6167	6216	6201
Germany		53,9	54,1	54,3	54,8	55,6	56,1	56,5	57,1	Activity rate	66	67	68	69	69	70	70	70,2
United Kingdom		39,2	38,8	39,5	41,4	43,6	44,1	43,7	42,5	Unemployment rate	5	4	3	3	3	3	4	5,2
Belgium		24,4	24,8	25,4	25,9	26,1	26,3	26,2	26,1	Allochtonous								
Total foreign-born population		1 469,0	1 513,9	1 556,3	1 615,4	1 674,6	1 714,2	1 731,8	1 736,1	Total labour force (thousands)	1 055	1 086	1 130	1 173	1 232	1260	1293	1314
<i>Of which:</i>										Activity rate	59	59	59	60	61	61	62	61,8
Surinam		182,2	184,2	185,0	186,5	188,0	189,0	189,7	190,1	Unemployment rate	14	11	9	8	6	8	10	11,9
Turkey		172,7	175,5	178,0	181,9	186,2	190,5	194,6	195,9	Surinam								
Indonesia		172,1	170,3	168,0	165,8	163,9	161,4	158,8	156,0	Total labour force (thousands)	122	135	135	148	146	150	154	161
Morocco		145,8	149,6	152,7	155,8	159,8	163,4	166,6	168,5	Activity rate	61	66	65	69	67	67	68	70,2
Germany		126,8	125,5	124,2	123,1	122,1	120,6	119,0	117,7	Unemployment rate	14	12	10	9	6	8	10	11,5
<b>Naturalisations</b>		59,8	59,2	62,1	50,0	46,7	45,3	28,8	Turkey									
<i>Of which:</i>										Total labour force (thousands)	83	84	90	101	112	111	115	115
Morocco		10,5	11,3	14,2	13,5	12,7	12,0	7,1	Activity rate	45	44	45	49	52	51	54	53,7	
Turkey		21,2	13,5	5,2	4,7	5,5	5,4	3,7	Unemployment rate	22	17	13	9	8	9	14	13,7	
Bosnia Herzegovina		2,1	3,9	5,4	2,6	0,9	0,4	0,2	Morocco									
Iraq		0,8	2,7	3,8	2,4	2,3	2,4	0,8	Total labour force (thousands)	65	71	74	67	83	91	89	89	
Suriname		3,0	3,0	3,2	2,0	2,0	2,0	1,2	Activity rate	44	45	45	40	47	50	50	47,7	
Naturalisation rate (%)		8,8	8,7	9,4	7,7					Unemployment rate	21	20	18	13	10	10	17	22,3
										Antilles/Aruba								
										Total labour force (thousands)	35	37	43	46	49	54	56	55
										Activity rate	57	57	61	60	59	63	64	61
										Unemployment rate	21	..	..	8	8	10	17	15,6

1. Data are taken from population registers, which include some asylum seekers.

2. The administrative corrections account for unreported entries and departures on the population register.

3. Data are from population registers and refer to the population on 31 December of the years indicated. Figures include administrative corrections.

4. Estimates are for 31 March and include cross-border workers, but exclude the self-employed and family workers.

5. "Allochtonous" refers to persons who have at least one parent who is born abroad.

6. Autochtonous refers to persons who have both parents who are born in the Netherlands.

7. Persons who have at least one parent who is born in the mentioned country.

Sources: Statistics Netherlands; Ministry of Justice; Labour Force Survey.

