

Migration and migration policies in the Netherlands

Dutch SOPEMI-Report 2002

E. Snel
J. de Boom
G. Engbersen

Rotterdam Institute of Social Policy Research (Risbo)
Erasmus University Rotterdam
PO Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
The Netherlands

Info: deboom@risbo.eur.nl or snel@fsw.eur.nl
or www.risbo.nl

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**Secretariat RISBO
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Postbus 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
tel.: +31(0)10-4082124
fax: +31(0)10-4529734
www.risbo.nl**

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Preface

This is the second Dutch SOPEMI report compiled by a group of Rotterdam researchers associated with Ercomer-Rotterdam and the Rotterdam Institute for Social Policy Research (RISBO). This report was commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Justice and the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. In the Netherlands the Ministry of Justice is responsible for both migration policies and immigrant integration.

This report has a different structure from previous Dutch SOPEMI reports. In chapter I, it opens with some new developments in Dutch migration policies. Chapter II outlines the central trends in migration to and from the Netherlands. The following chapters deal with the different types of migration. In Chapter III we concentrate on family migration (family reunification and other family-related migration), in chapter IV on labour migration and in chapter V on asylum migration. All of these chapters focus on migration flows to and from the Netherlands. As in previous years there is a separate chapter, chapter VI, on the stock of foreign residents and immigrant residents living in the Netherlands (in the Netherlands, the latter are often referred to as 'allochtonous persons'). This chapter starts with a discussion about the different definitions of 'foreigners' (foreign nationals), 'immigrants' (foreign born) and the wider category of 'allochtonous persons' (persons who were either born outside the Netherlands with at least one foreign parent or who were born in the Netherlands from two foreign parents). We conclude the report with an extensive chapter on labour market integration of the immigrant population (first and second generation) in the Netherlands (Chapter VII).

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Rotterdam, November 2003

Erik Snel

Jan de Boom

Godfried Engbersen

The changing Dutch immigration regime

For some time now, the Dutch government has been trying to limit immigration to the Netherlands. This increased restrictiveness of the Dutch policy is particularly apparent in the policy with respect to asylum migration, but also for other forms of immigration (family migration and labour migration). The basis of the present Dutch immigration policy was enshrined in the Dutch Aliens Act, which was approved by the Dutch parliament in 2000 and became effective a year later (April 2001).¹ This chapter will briefly describe the most important basic principles and regulations of the Dutch immigration policy. As well as the Aliens Act of 2000 this will also cover the recently proposed changes in the area of immigration policy, which have been submitted by the new Dutch government (a coalition of the Christian Democrats and the Liberals). The following items will be covered: Dutch asylum policy (section 1.1), the policy with respect to family migration (section 1.2), the policy with respect to labour migration (section 1.3) and finally the integration policy (section 1.4).

1.1 Dutch asylum policy²

Just like all other Western countries, asylum policy continues to be a thorny political issue in the Netherlands. During the 1990s an increasing number of asylum seekers came to the Netherlands. As a consequence of this, the institutions dealing with asylum requests became overburdened, with the result that asylum procedures took increasingly longer and the reception facilities for asylum seekers became overcrowded. Despite earlier attempts to limit the number of asylum seekers and to accelerate the procedures, the asylum seekers problem seemed to be unmanageable. The Aliens Act was drawn up against this situation and under considerable political pressure. Its primary purpose was a more restrictive and efficient asylum policy. The Dutch

¹ In the Dutch SOPEMI report of 2000 the main points of the Aliens Act were described in the contribution from Eke Gerritsma (New Aliens Law 2000).

² Our description of the current asylum policy in the Netherlands is largely based on: WRR, Nederland als immigratiesamenleving [The Netherlands as an immigration society]. The Hague: 2001 (in particular pp. 62-74) (www.wrr.nl)

Aliens Act is also based on previously made European agreements concerning asylum policy. Two points from this draft European asylum policy are particularly relevant for the Dutch policy (see WRR, 2001: 63):

- The principle of 'safe countries of origin': according to this principle an asylum request is declared unfounded if the asylum seeker originates from a country that is considered to be safe by the country handling the request. The word 'safe' means that the political, civil and human rights in the land concerned are sufficiently guaranteed.
- The principle of 'third countries of reception': this principle, aimed at hindering 'asylum shopping', refers to the situation in which an asylum seeker has entered the country via a different country (whether or not in the EU) that can be considered safe. As that land is safe, the asylum seeker should have requested asylum there and the receiving country is entitled to send the asylum seeker back there. Within Europe, these are referred to as 'Dublin' cases.

One of the biggest pressure points in Dutch asylum policy before 2000 was the long length of the procedures. Cases where asylum seekers had to wait for many years for a final decision about the asylum application were not an exception. There were two important causes for these protracted procedures. Firstly, an objection or appeal was often lodged against (negative) decisions of the immigration authorities (IND). Secondly, many procedures took so long because asylum seekers continued the procedure so as to obtain a better status. The Aliens Act 2000 aimed to shorten the procedures in three ways: a) by the basic principle that an asylum decision has to be made within six months, b) by limiting the possibilities to lodge an objection and by limiting the scope of the appeal, and c) by implementing one single status for asylum.

Ad a) The asylum decision within six months

In principle the immigration authorities (IND) issue a decision about an asylum request within six months. This is not a strict requirement, but an effort requirement. Aiming for faster asylum decision is nothing new, but in practice this could not be realised due to the massive influx of asylum seekers to the Netherlands. The Dutch government has taken a large number of different measures in recent years with the aim of limiting the number of asylum seekers and simplifying and accelerating the asylum procedure. The first measure was setting up so called Registration Centres, which had to make a decision about the asylum request within a very short space of time

(initially 24 hours, later 48 hours). Asylum seekers who are rejected by the Registration Centres should leave the Netherlands immediately. Secondly, criteria were formulated about which countries could be considered safe. A country is considered to be safe if it is a signatory to the relevant human rights agreements and also abides by these in practice. Whether or not this is the case is established by the Minister of Immigration and Integration (upon the advice of the Minister of Foreign Affairs). Asylum seekers originating from countries, which are considered to be safe according to the formal criteria, are not immediately rejected. There is always an assessment of the individual case as well. A condition for this is that the asylum seeker can make a plausible case that his or her personal safety is at risk in the country concerned.

Ad b) Withdrawal of possibilities to lodge an objection

Under the Aliens Act 2000 the possibility to lodge an objection against a decision by the immigration authorities (IND) was withdrawn. Now, asylum seekers can make an appeal only to the Council of State (the highest Dutch legal body), which is required to make decision within six months. Whilst waiting for an appeal decision, the asylum seeker may in principle remain in the Netherlands. However, this does not apply to the decision about a further appeal. If the asylum request (in appeal) is rejected, the alien should leave the Netherlands. At that moment the asylum reception and all other facilities are ended. A separate appeal against the ending of the reception is not possible.

Ad c) Introduction of a single asylum status

However, the most important change in the Aliens Act 2000 concerns the different statuses for asylum. Previously, the Netherlands had different asylum statuses, dependent on the grounds for asylum, with different rights and privileges. Since 1 April 2001, every asylum seeker whose asylum is recognised receives the same temporary residence permit, independent of the basis upon which asylum is granted. Each asylum seeker admitted first of all receives a temporary residence status for a maximum of three years, which can be converted to a permanent residence status after three years. A uniform package of rights and facilities is attached to this single status. All asylum migrants admitted (status holders) have the same rights in the areas of work, social security, family reunification, study and study grants, refugee passport, etc.

During the asylum procedure, asylum seekers have the right to reception. This reception is in asylum centres and sometimes also in normal housing. However, the basic principle of asylum reception is that asylum seekers mainly remain outside of society. Also, asylum seekers only have a limited right to perform paid work and they have no access to the Dutch social security system. Instead of social security benefit, there are 'pocket money arrangements' in addition to the reception provided. The logic behind keeping asylum seekers outside of society and the dominant institutions is that eventually a proportion of them will not be allowed to stay in the Netherlands and will therefore be required to depart again. Too rapid integration in Dutch society would only hinder this.

An important change in the Aliens Act 2000 for asylum reception is that rejected asylum seekers can be removed from the reception facility much more quickly than in the past. When an asylum request is rejected, the alien is given 28 days to arrange his return, which in principle is his own responsibility. The Dutch government assumes that the asylum seeker made his own way to the Netherlands and can therefore also be responsible for his departure if he is not admitted. If the asylum seeker has not departed after 28 days and enforced return is not possible then the asylum seeker is, if necessary forcibly, removed from his or her house /reception facility by the police of the alien police. This direct eviction from the residence has become possible due to the introduction of the so-called multi-purpose order under the Aliens Act 2000. This means that in the COA (the Central Council for the Reception of Asylum-Seekers [Dutch acronym: COA) or municipality where the asylum seeker resides, an eviction order does not have to be granted by a judge in order to remove the asylum seeker from the reception, but that instead after the departure period of 28 days an eviction from the accommodation can be effected immediately.

The consequence of this policy, in combination with the fact that many asylum seekers do not depart from the Netherlands but instead remain, is that a number of rejected asylum seekers end up on the street. Meanwhile in many municipalities 'informal social safety nets' have been set up for these groups, often in cooperation with churches and other private organisations. However, the Dutch government maintains that these informal safety nets are not justified and that rejected asylum seekers should leave the country.

The final pillar of the immigration policy is an active deportation and return policy. The Dutch return policy is based on the assumption that the asylum seeker has his own responsibility in this respect. The underlying argument is that the asylum seeker came to the Netherlands under his own steam and must therefore return under his own steam as well. The rule is that rejected asylum seekers must have left the Netherlands within four weeks. Once this period has elapsed, an address check takes place. If the alien is no longer at the last known address then he is registered as 'administratively removed' (also often referred to as 'departure with unknown destination'). In the majority of cases rejected asylum seekers are only administratively removed, as a result of which it is not clear whether those concerned still remain in the Netherlands illegally. In some cases, 'deportation' or 'departure under supervision' takes place. The first means that the alien is escorted over the border under the supervision of the police or immigration authorities (IND). The second means that the travel documents of the alien are taken and retrieved at the border post where the person leaves the country.

In its last budget (autumn 2003) the Dutch government has proposed the following changes to the asylum policy³:

- in order to further limit the influx of asylum seekers, efforts will be made in discussion with the EU and the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to provide better reception and protection of refugees in the area of origin. The Netherlands wishes to set up a trial project of protection in the area of origin.
- An effective return policy is seen by the new government as a 'spearhead of cabinet policy'. To this end, the supervision of aliens and illegal aliens should be strengthened and harsher sanctions should be implemented against the employment of illegal persons. In addition to this the voluntary return of aliens will be stimulated. In the case of voluntary return, the preparation, the transport and the departure to the land of origin will be facilitated by the International organisation for Migration (IOM), which in turn will be supported by the Dutch government.

Finally, the cabinet intends to implement a one-off measure for 'deserving cases' until 31 December 2003. This one-off measure will still only permit the residence to an alien who can satisfy each of the following conditions:

³ Ministry of Justice, Budget 2004. See. Press release Ministry of Justice dated 16 September 2003 [in Dutch].

- The alien submitted an initial request in the Netherlands before or on 27 May 1998;
- On 27 May 2003, the alien was still awaiting a final decision on this first asylum request. This condition also includes the situation that the alien is awaiting a final decision concerning the prolongation, withdrawal or non-prolongation of a conditional residence permit within the framework of this asylum request;
- The alien has continuously resided in the Netherlands since the submission of the first asylum request until 27 May 2003.

A further condition is that the residence permit is granted if the alien withdraws all current legal procedures to obtain residence. The residence permit is also not granted if there are contraindications, as delinquency or false documents. It is expected that 2200 people who have been waiting for a decision about their asylum request for five years or longer will receive a residence permit. Many welfare organisations, including the Netherlands Association of Municipalities, the Council of Churches and alien organisations have, however, pleaded for a much broader regulation which would apply to more than 6000 people.

1.2 Family reunification and marital migration

In the eyes of the Dutch government, immigration with the intention of family reunification and family formation should also be limited. For various reasons, marital migration in particular is seen as a problem. Due to marital migration, new, often poorly-educated, immigrants are continually entering Dutch society where they have few chances on the labour market. According to the government this ongoing migration has an undermining influence. More generally, marital migration is often taken as evidence of the poor integration into Dutch society. The continual family formation with people from the land of origin or region of origin provides little evidence of an orientation to the Dutch society.

A number of measures were already provided in the Aliens Act 2000, which had to limit the family and marital migration. In particular, these concerned requirements which were made of the family member and/or the marriage partner, already resident in the Netherlands. This person must already have lived in the Netherlands for a certain period of time (this only applies to

young people who themselves came to the Netherlands at a young age within the framework of family reunification) and furthermore have a certain income. According to the Aliens Act 2000 the partner already resident in the Netherlands had to have ongoing paid work and an income at least equal to the level of the minimum wage (this is also the subsistence level for families). The intention of this income requirement was, that the Dutch government wished to prevent taxpayer's money from being used to financially support partners of other family members coming to the Netherlands. The person already resident in the Netherlands – the referee – literally functions as the guarantor for the family and the partner. The newcomer can only receive his own independent residence permit after three years. This last measure is partly aimed at preventing sham marriages. The WRR (2001: 75) notes, however, that there is a tension between this dependence of family and marital migrants on the family member already resident in the Netherlands on the one hand and the equal strived for target that newcomers should independently participate in Dutch society on the other hand.

The present government has committed itself to further tightening the conditions for migration with the intention of family reunification and family formation, this – as it is formally stated – to “.. prevent problems in the integration of spouses, partners and children from third countries as much as possible and to ensure that the integration process runs as smoothly as possible”.⁴ The following measures are proposed:

- the minimum age for marital migration will be increased from 18 to 21 years (also partly to prevent forced marriages);
- the income requirement will be increased from 100% to 120% of the legal minimum wage;
- just as other newcomers, family reunification migrants and marital migrants will be required to follow Dutch language lessons in the country of origin: "Family unification migrants and marital migrants must learn the Dutch language at a basic level and acquire knowledge about the Dutch society in the country of origin. This knowledge and these skills will be tested as a condition for entry".⁵

⁴ Ministry of Justice, Budget 2004, p. 163

⁵ Ministry of Justice, Press release 16 September 2003). (See also section. 1.4 about developments in the Dutch integration policy).

1.3 Policy with respect to labour migration

The Netherlands also has a restrictive policy with respect to labour migration. In the opinion of the Dutch government there is – in view of the number of unemployed and benefit claimants in the Netherlands – no need for labour migrants to solve possible discrepancies on the labour market. Only in exceptional cases will mismatches between supply and demand on the labour market be solved by temporary migration. A known example of this is the recruitment of nursing personnel from countries such as the Philippines and South Africa. The recruitment of temporary personnel is possible under the Dutch Aliens Employment Act (Dutch acronym: WAV). The purpose of this Act is to “.. selectively allow the entry of labour migrants within the framework of labour market policy and to control the employment of illegal persons” (WRR, 2001: 80). However, the Dutch SOPEMI report 2001 revealed that over the past few years there has been a considerable increase in the number of temporary employees from abroad via de WAV. In 2002, the number of temporary employees from abroad increased even further, despite the current economic crisis in the Netherlands and the fact that unemployment is once again rising. Temporary workers from abroad are not just employed in the higher-educated professions but also in the low-skilled work that Dutch unemployed persons do not wish to do. Examples of such sectors are the meat processing industry, horticulture and the hotel and catering industry (see chapter four of this report).

In particular, the number of temporary employees in the horticultural sector has risen explosively in recent years. Previously, much of the work in horticulture was performed by illegal foreign workers. For example, anti-fraud checks carried out in 2001 in the Westland area (a well-known horticultural area in the Netherlands) revealed that illegal workers were employed by one in four of the horticultural businesses checked (cited: WRR, 2001: 81). For many years agricultural and horticultural organisations have asked for more supple regulations to make it possible to legally employ Polish workers for seasonal work. In response to this, in 2001 the Dutch government concluded a covenant with the relevant agricultural and horticultural organisations that formally makes it possible to recruit Polish seasonal workers. However, not all agricultural and horticultural businesses are prepared to adopt legal recruitment (now mainly of Bulgarians) unless the wages demanded are lower. Nowadays, Polish seasonal workers often demand normal wages.

In 2001, the cabinet issued a standpoint about the desirability of increased labour migration. The reason for this was a European Commission Notice about a Community-wide Immigration Policy dated November 2000.⁶ The commission pleaded in this announcement for increased possibilities for labour migration in the European Union for a number of reasons. The admission of so-called 'third country citizens' onto the labour market of the Union could combat structural shortages on the market, which occur in many member states and were partly due to the ageing of the population. In addition to this undesirable problems such as illegal immigration and human smuggling and human trade would be discouraged due to the regulation of labour migration. Furthermore, regulating labour migration fitted within the framework of the more intensive corporation with the countries of origin in the area of asylum and immigration, which the Union is keen to promote.

In its memorandum of October 2001, the Dutch government indicated that it was neither in favour of increased possibilities for labour migration nor increased regulation from 'Brussels'. With this the cabinet largely followed the arguments from the WRR as briefly described above.⁷ According to the memorandum, the WAV was generally 'satisfactory'. However, the cabinet could investigate the possibilities for a more efficient implementation of that WAV. In addition to this the admission procedures could be accelerated by letting the various procedures of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs run in parallel. Initially this would apply to foreign workers who contributed to the Dutch knowledge economy.

The Dutch government has therefore adopted a conservative position since the autumn of 2001 with respect to broadening the possibilities for labour migration. However, efforts to relax and accelerate procedures of a limited category of labour migrants, namely the so-called 'knowledge migrants' are being made. In addition to this, the government is in principle open to arrangements aimed at solving bottlenecks in the labour market by means of temporary labour migration. To this end the WAV is available as a regulating instrument. The government plays a role in the creation of covenants in sectors where there is a shortage of workers, whether or not this is temporary, for example healthcare, horticulture and Chinese restaurants. The

⁶ COM (2002) 757, 22 November 2000.

⁷ The WRR report cited was published in the same month as the cabinet's viewpoint. Therefore the cabinet memorandum does not refer to the report.

recent proposal to amend the WAV must provide a legal basis for these covenants.

1.4 Compulsory language course ('inburgering')

At the start of the 1990's the Dutch government devoted more attention to the relatively poor position of immigrants and ethnic minorities within the Dutch education system and on the labour market. The main reason for this continued far poorer performance of ethnic minorities was, it was argued, their insufficient labour market qualifications – especially deficient mastery of the Dutch language. This observation led to the start of compulsory language courses for all newcomers living from a social security benefit – in practice this mostly concerned approved asylum migrants – in 1996. Two years later, in 1998, the Dutch Integration of Newcomers ACT (Dutch acronym WIN) came into force. According to this act all new immigrants in the Netherlands have to follow a compulsory language course and introduction program. In Dutch this course is called 'inburgeren'. Literally this means 'settling down' but it also has the connotation on 'becoming a citizen' (burger = citizen). This compulsory language course has now been in place for five years and has been copied by several other countries. For example, Denmark has similar compulsory language and introduction courses for immigrants and in Germany a comparable policy has been announced in the still controversial new Immigration Act (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*). In the German case, however, language courses are only compulsory for asylum migrants.

In the Netherlands, this integration programme contains three parts. The first part is the *integration assessment*. Every new immigrant in the Netherlands is called up for an interview with a civil servant of the municipality where they reside, within four months of arriving. In this interview it is ascertained whether the immigrant must follow a programme. In certain cases, particularly in the case of highly-educated newcomers and people who already have a job, an exception is granted. The second part is an *educational programme* of 600 teaching hours: 500 hours to learn Dutch and 100 hours of orientation to Dutch society. Upon completing the lesson programme the participants sit a test to establish their command of the Dutch language. If that is good, the participant is then able to follow a subsequent course or to find a job. The third part of the integration process is

a number of *individual interviews* ('individual programme supervision') which must result in newcomers being able to find a subsequent course or a job, if that is what they want.

The municipalities are responsible for implementing the integration policy. However, they outsource concrete tasks in the area of education and finding employment to educational organisations and employment agencies. However, the municipalities manage the policy and ensure that everything proceeds as intended. Meanwhile, integration has developed into a fully-fledged industry. After a somewhat difficult start (insufficient places and qualified teachers for all newcomers) tens of thousands of language courses have now been started. The integration programme is now no longer limited to newly arrived immigrants. Immigrants who have already resided in the Netherlands for a longer period of time but who still do not or do not have a sufficient command of the Dutch language are, in certain cases, obliged to follow an language course (especially in the case of unemployment and benefit dependency). However, here we are only concerned about the integration of newcomers. Further it should be noted that since a year ago there has been a special integration programme for 'spiritual leaders' from abroad, especially for imams from the Arab world.

The purpose of the compulsory language courses is, in the words of the current Minister of Integration, *equipping* newcomers and minorities: "Equipping means that a person possesses the necessary skills to build up an independent existence". The 'minimum requirements' stated for this are that a person "... speaks the Dutch language [and] has a certain competitive strength on the different markets, in particular on the labour market..". "Integration programmes provide newcomers a first step on the way to further integration into society. On the basis of the WIN, newcomers are obliged to follow an integration programme with the objective of professional, educational or social minimal competence".⁸

However, in practice the integration does not always proceed without problems. An evaluation study⁹ revealed that in practice three problems play a role in the integration process: the education provided has little

⁸ Quote from the most recent budget 2004 from the Minister for Immigration and Integration, p. 178, 179 and 181.

⁹ M. Brink et al. (2002), *Verscheidenheid in integratie. Evaluatie van de effectiviteit van de WIN. Eindrapport [Diversity in integration. Evaluation of the effectiveness of the WIN]*. Amsterdam: Regioplan.

differentiation, high premature drop-out of participants and doubts about the end level of integration achieved. The first problem is that the content of the *education is insufficiently differentiated*. The education is targeted at newcomers with (very) little cultural baggage, as a result of which there is too little to offer higher-educated immigrants (including many highly-qualified refugees). A second problem is that many participants do not complete the course but *prematurely drop out*. At least one in five newcomers prematurely drops out of the course. In some municipalities this figure is even higher still.¹⁰ Although the compulsory integration programme does have sanctions (for example the imposition of fines or reductions in possible welfare benefits), in practice these are scarcely or never applied.

A third and perhaps the most important problem with the education is the *end level realised*. The purpose of the integration is that newcomers can adequately cope in Dutch society and in the work situation, which implies that they command a certain level of Dutch. For this certain minimum standards are distinguished. The level of 'social minimal competence' means that the new immigrants command sufficient Dutch to be able to cope in daily life. The level of 'professional minimum competence' means that new immigrants command sufficient Dutch to be able to follow a subsequent course or perform paid work. However, in practice only a small minority of participants on integration courses manage to achieve this level of 'professional minimal competence'. An evaluation study revealed that only 40 percent of participants achieve the level 'social minimal competence' and that the level 'professional minimum competence is only achieved by 10 percent of all participants (that is of those who completed the course) (Brink et al, 2002, p. 95). It can be concluded that 500 hours of Dutch lessons is clearly not sufficient to obtain the language level desired.

In its last budget, the Dutch government proposed drastic measures to improve the effectiveness of this integration programme. The basic principle is that on the one hand the quality of education must be improved and on the other the newcomer must demonstrate more responsibility for his own integration. 'Own responsibility' is very much the new magic word in present Dutch government policy. The government wants to improve the quality of the education by paying providers of the education for the level of

¹⁰ In Rotterdam for example, a drop-out of 31 percent is reported. See: Gemeente Rotterdam (2002), *Samen leven in Rotterdam. Deltaplan inburgering: op weg naar effectief burgerschap* [Rotterdam City Council (2002). Living together in Rotterdam. Deltaplan integration: towards effective citizenship] (p. 27).

performance achieved. Newcomers will be reminded of their own responsibility with the implementation of certain legal and financial stimulants.¹¹ These basic principles lead to the following tangible policy proposals:

- Newcomers should already have learnt the Dutch language and acquired knowledge of Dutch society in the land of origin. " The acquisition of a certain language level in the country of origin is a precondition for admission to the Netherlands", according to the Minister for Immigration and Integration in her last budget.¹²
- Initially, newcomers must pay for the costs of the integration projects (estimated at EUR 6000) themselves. Only those who successfully complete the 'integration exams' will be reimbursed part of the costs by the Dutch government.
- The 'market for integration' will be liberalised. At present only certain educational parties are allowed to provide integration courses but in the future a range of bodies will be allowed to provide such education. The newcomer/student will be free to choose the course followed.
- Municipalities will continue to be responsible for the success of the integration of newcomers. The government will completely switch to 'complete output financing' of the integration (read: municipalities will only be paid if the students successfully complete the course).
Municipalities see an important stumbling block with respect to this last matter. On the one hand the newcomers can choose which course they follow yet on the other hand the municipalities are presented with the bill if this choice goes wrong and the course is not successfully completed.

¹¹ Minister for Immigration and Integration, Rapportage Integratiebeleid Etnische Minderheden 2003 [Report on Integration of Ethnic Minorities Policy 2003], p. 20.

¹² Minister for Immigration and Integration, Budget 2004, pp. 182 onwards.

Migration to and from the Netherlands

2.1 The Netherlands as an immigration country

For many years, the Netherlands has been a 'reluctant country of immigration'. Since the early 1960s the Netherlands has had a positive immigration surplus. However, successive Dutch governments never acknowledged the country to be an immigration country. Only in 1998 did the then (social-liberal) government officially state that it is 'an unmistakable fact that the Netherlands has become an immigration country' (Nota 'Kansen krijgen, kansen nemen' [Report 'Getting changes, taking changes'])). Although this statement was merely intended as a statement of fact, it caused a considerable debate in the Dutch parliament. Since 2000 the political voices opposed to further immigration have become louder in the Netherlands. The populist political leader Pim Fortuyn, who was later assassinated, stated quite simply that 'the Netherlands is full'. Recent public opinion polls, held shortly after the assassination of Pim Fortuyn, made it clear that not less than two-thirds of the Dutch population agreed with or strongly agreed with the statement: 'There are too many immigrants ['allochtonous'] in the Netherlands' (SCP, 2003: 370). Due to this change in the political climate current Dutch migration policies have become quite restrictive.


Against this background of serious political debates on migration, this chapter sketches a more factual picture of migrations flows to and from the Netherlands. What are the central trends in the field of immigration and emigration? Who are the immigrants and why do they come to the Netherlands? After the Second World War the Netherlands was still a country of emigration. Under the official encouragement of the Dutch government, many Dutch citizens emigrated to countries like the United States, Canada or Australia. This situation only changed in the early 1960s with the arrival of so-called 'guest workers' from the Mediterranean countries to the Netherlands. The expectation was - as the word 'guest worker' implies - that these labour migrants would only reside temporarily in the Netherlands and

would return to their home countries once they had completed their work. This 'myth of migrants returning' dominated the official Dutch thinking about immigration and immigrant integration for many years. Only when the guest workers brought their families to the Netherlands instead of leaving did it become clear that the immigrants were here to stay. This became even clearer still in the early 1980s when major flows of postcolonial immigrants from the Caribbean area (Suriname, Netherlands Antilles) started to come to the Netherlands.

Since the mid-1980s immigration¹³ to the Netherlands has not only grown in terms of numbers, but also in terms of diversity. The growth in immigration since the mid-1980s is shown in figure 2.1 and table 2.1. The increasing heterogeneity of the immigrant population in the Netherlands is described in the next section. Figure 2.1 shows development of the migration surplus to the Netherlands between 1980 and 2002. The immigration surplus of non-nationals grew from a level of about 20,000 per year in the early 1980s to around 70,000 per year in 2001. However, in 2002 there was a decline in the immigration surplus for the first time in many years. The main reason for this was the decline in immigration of non-nationals (from 94,000 in 2001 to 86,000 one year later, table 2.1) which was probably due to the sharp decrease in the number of asylum seekers coming to the Netherlands. The immigration surplus of Dutch nationals has varied over the years, but is frequently negative. In the last few years (2001, 2002) the immigration surplus of Dutch nationals has been negative because less Dutch nationals have arrived in the Netherlands from abroad and more Dutch nationals have left the country.

¹³ It has to be emphasised that in principle, Dutch migration statistics only refer to so-called long-term migration flows. The standard Dutch migration statistics are derived from municipal population registers. However, registration is only obligatory when people enter or leave the Netherlands for a certain period of time. For immigrants registration is only obligatory if they reside in the country for at least four months following registration. People leaving the country are obliged to notify the authorities if they intend to live outside of the Netherlands for at least eight months in the first year following this notification. All this means that the so-called short-term migration flows are not included in the standard Dutch migration statistics. Indeed, little is known about temporary residence in the Netherlands (for more information see section 1.3 of this chapter). Furthermore, standard Dutch migration statistics may be incomplete since (even without paying attention to undocumented immigrants) we can assume that not every (temporary) immigrant and in particular emigrant will register according to the formal rules.

Figure 2.1: The Netherlands: surplus of Dutch and non-Dutch nationals, 1980-2002



Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline

Table 2.1: Immigration and emigration of Dutch nationals and foreign nationals in the Netherlands (1980-2002)

Year	Immigration			Emigration			Surplus		
	Dutch nationals	Foreign nationals	Total	Dutch nationals	Foreign nationals	Total	Dutch nationals	Foreign nationals	Total
1980	32,684	79,820	112,504	35,837	23,633	59,470	-3153	56,187	53,034
1981	29,767	50,416	80,183	38,216	24,979	63,195	-8449	25,437	16,988
1982	29,810	40,930	70,740	39,413	28,094	67,507	-9603	12,836	3,233
1983	30,321	36,441	66,762	32,810	27,974	60,784	-2489	8467	5978
1984	29,616	37,291	66,907	31,824	27,030	58,854	-2208	10,261	8053
1985	33,196	46,166	79,362	31,009	24,206	55,215	2187	21,960	24,147
1986	34,585	52,802	87,387	31,155	23,563	54,718	3430	29,239	32,669
1987	35,080	60,855	95,935	31,139	20,872	52,011	3941	39,983	43,924
1988	32,976	58,262	91,238	34,403	21,388	55,791	-1427	36,874	35,447
1989	33,529	65,385	98,914	38,218	21,489	59,707	-4689	43,896	39,207
1990	36,086	81,264	117,350	36,749	20,595	57,344	-663	60,669	60,006
1991	35,912	84,337	120,249	35,998	21,330	57,328	-86	63,007	62,921
1992	33,904	83,022	116,926	36,101	22,733	58,834	-2197	60,289	58,092
1993	31,581	87,573	119,154	37,019	22,203	59,222	-5438	65,370	59,932
1994	30,887	68,424	99,311	39,409	22,746	62,155	-8522	45,678	37,156
1995	29,127	66,972	96,099	41,648	21,673	63,321	-12,521	45,299	32,778
1996	31,572	77,177	108,749	42,921	22,404	65,325	-11,349	54,773	43,424
1997	33,124	76,736	109,860	40,278	21,940	62,218	-7154	54,796	47,642
1998	40,706	81,701	122,407	39,175	21,266	60,441	1531	60,435	61,966
1999	40,786	78,365	119,151	38,358	20,665	59,023	2428	57,700	60,128
2000	41,467	91,383	132,850	40,474	20,727	61,201	993	70,656	71,649
2001	38,897	94,507	133,404	42,921	20,397	63,318	-4024	74,110	70,086
2002	34,631	86,619	121,250	45,571	21,157	66,728	-10,940	65,462	54,522

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline


2.2 Immigration to the Netherlands

Since 1989 immigration to the Netherlands has been considerably higher than in the period prior to this. In the previous period more than 100,000 immigrants came to the Netherlands in 1980. This earlier immigration peak coincided with the independence of Suriname. When the inhabitants of this former Dutch colony could choose between Surinamese or Dutch citizenship

many of them choose the latter and consequently came to the Netherlands. During the 1980s the number of immigrants coming to the Netherlands varied from about 67,000 (in 1983 and 1984) to about 96,000 (in 1987). After 1990 more than 100,000 immigrants came to the Netherlands during most years (with the exception of 1994 and 1995). The peak of immigration was in 2000 and 2001, when more than 130,000 immigrants arrived in the Netherlands. However, in 2002 the number of immigrants declined to a little more than 120,000 (table 2.1).

Who are these 120,000 immigrants who came to the Netherlands in 2002? From what kind of countries did they come to the Netherlands and for what reason? About 30 percent of all immigrants are Dutch nationals coming or returning to the Netherlands (more than 34,000 people, table 2.1). The table also shows that the number of Dutch nationals immigrating to the Netherlands was particularly high in the years 1998-2000. Figure 2.2 gives a more precise picture of where these Dutch immigrants to the Netherlands came from.

Figure 2.2: Immigration of Dutch nationals (selected categories) 1995-2002



Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline

It is clear that a relatively large proportion of immigrants with Dutch citizenship are persons coming from the Dutch Caribbean islands, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. Inhabitants of these islands have Dutch citizenship and more or less free access to the Netherlands. In the period

1998 to 2001 more than 10,000 Antilleans came to the Netherlands each year, due to the poor economic situation on these islands. In 2002 the number of Antillean immigrants declined to about 8000 (almost one-quarter of all Dutch nationals immigrating to the Netherlands). Of the remaining 26,000 immigrants with Dutch citizenship, half of them came from other EU countries and the other half from other countries which are unspecified.

Table 2.2: Immigration of foreign nationals by country of origin and gender, 2002

	Male		Female		Total	
		in %		in %		in %
Total	62,073	100	59,177	100	121,250	100
Dutch nationals	18,468	29.8	16,163	27.3	34,631	28.6
<i>of whom from</i>						
Dutch Ant. & Aruba	4046	6.5	4168	7.0	8214	6.8
Non-Dutch nationals	43,605	70.2	43,014	72.7	86,619	71.4
Western countries	19,352	31.2	20,202	34.1	39,554	32.6
<i>of whom from</i>						
14 EU countries	11,182	18.0	9624	16.3	20,806	17.2
<i>of whom from</i>						
Belgium	889	1.4	1073	1.8	1962	1.6
Germany	2464	4.0	2519	4.3	4983	4.1
United Kingdom	2850	4.6	1924	3.3	4774	3.9
Eastern Europe	3993	6.4	5773	9.8	9766	8.1
<i>of whom from</i>						
Yugoslavia (former)	783	1.3	874	1.5	1657	1.4
Soviet Union (former)	1883	3.0	2637	4.5	4520	3.7
Poland	754	1.2	1333	2.3	2087	1.7
other Western countries	4177	6.7	4805	8.1	8982	7.4
<i>of whom from</i>						
United States	1655	2.7	1615	2.7	3270	2.7
Canada	260	0.4	322	0.5	582	0.5
Australia	442	0.7	430	0.7	872	0.7
Indonesia	581	0.9	989	1.7	1570	1.3
Japan	603	1.0	581	1.0	1184	1.0
Non-Western countries	23,915	38.5	22,466	38.0	46,381	38.3
<i>of whom from</i>						
Turkey	3214	5.2	2685	4.5	5899	4.9
Angola	2177	3.5	1252	2.1	3429	2.8
Guinea	801	1.3	223	0.4	1024	0.8
Morocco	2167	3.5	2620	4.4	4787	3.9
Sierra Leone	1484	2.4	383	0.6	1867	1.5
Sudan	526	0.8	256	0.4	782	0.6
Somalia	329	0.5	343	0.6	672	0.6
South Africa	297	0.5	490	0.8	787	0.6
Suriname	869	1.4	1333	2.3	2202	1.8
Afghanistan	1393	2.2	1023	1.7	2416	2.0
China	1548	2.5	2241	3.8	3789	3.1
Iraq	670	1.1	599	1.0	1269	1.0
Iran	683	1.1	633	1.1	1316	1.1
Syria	367	0.6	285	0.5	652	0.5
Thailand	204	0.3	802	1.4	1006	0.8
Centre for asylum seekers	338	0.5	346	0.6	684	0.6

Source: Statistics Netherlands

Table 2.2 indicates where the 120,000 immigrants who arrived in the Netherlands in 2002 came from. The data in the table refer to the nationality of the immigrants and their country of origin. First a distinction is made

between Dutch nationals (including immigrants from the Netherlands Antilles) and non-Dutch nationals. For the latter category the country of origin is mentioned. However, the country of origin is not necessarily the country of birth, but rather the country immigrants declared as being the country they arrived from.

As previously mentioned, in 2002 about 34,600 immigrants were Dutch nationals coming or returning to the Netherlands, which included 6800 Antilleans. In 2003, the proportion of Dutch nationals in the total immigrant population was almost 30 percent. Of the non-Dutch immigrants coming to the Netherlands, a little more than 20,000 came from other EU countries and another 9000 came from other Western countries such as the United States, Canada, Japan or Australia. Taking these three categories together we can state that more than 64,000 of the 120,000 immigrants in 2002 were Dutch nationals or came from other EU or other Western countries (excluding the countries in Middle and Eastern Europe). This means that in 2002, 53 percent of all immigrants were either Dutch nationals or came from other Western countries inside or outside of Europe. Even if we exclude the immigrants from the Netherlands Antilles we can say that almost half of all immigrants (46 percent) were either Dutch nationals or came from other Western countries.


In the current political debate about immigration, immigrants are often associated with persons coming from non-Western countries with a different cultural background who lack the personal skills necessary to make a living in the Netherlands. It is all too easily forgotten that about half of the immigrant population consists of either Dutch citizens or immigrants from other Western countries taking up residence in the Netherlands on a temporary or permanent basis for a variety of reasons.

The other half of the immigrant population in 2002 can roughly be divided in two main categories: immigrants from countries in Middle and Eastern Europe on the one hand and immigrants from the so-called non-Western countries on the other. Over the last few decades, one dominant trend in international migration within Europe has been the growing migration from the east to the west of the continent. In 2002 almost 10,000 non-Dutch immigrants (8 percent of the total immigrant population) arrived from the countries in Middle and Eastern Europe. In the 1990s the largest immigrant group from Middle and Eastern Europe were persons from the former Yugoslavia who fled the war in

their country. The peak in immigration from former Yugoslavia to the Netherlands was in 1993 when 8912 (Muus, 1993) persons from the various post-Yugoslav republics entered the Netherlands. In 2002, however, only 1700 non-Dutch immigrants from former Yugoslavia arrived in the Netherlands. Almost 5000 non-Dutch immigrants came from the former Soviet Union which was 4 percent of the total immigrant population in 2002. As is the case with other Eastern European countries, more female than male immigrants from the former Soviet Union arrived in the Netherlands.

Around 40 percent of all immigrants in 2002 come from non-Western countries.¹⁴ The largest subcategories among the 46,000 or so non-Western immigrants in 2002 were: Turks (5900 persons), Moroccans (4800 persons), Chinese (3800 persons), Angolans (3400 persons), Afghans (2400 persons) and Surinamese (2200 persons). From these figures it is interesting to note the more or less traditional immigrant groups in the Netherlands (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans) still constitute a large proportion of the non-Western immigrants, but that relatively new immigrant groups in the Netherlands such as the Chinese, Angolans and Afghans are relatively large as well. A characteristic of these new immigrant groups is that they mainly consist of asylum seekers. These figures clarify the previously mentioned trend of a growing differentiation in the flows of immigrants coming to the Netherlands. Figure 2.3 shows this trend in a historical perspective.

¹⁴ Statistics Netherlands distinguishes between Western and non-Western countries. Western countries are considered to be: all European countries (including the countries in Middle and Eastern Europe) except Turkey, North American countries, some Asian countries (Japan and Indonesia) and the countries in Oceania (Australia, New Zealand). Turkey and all other countries in Latin and South America, Africa and Asia are considered to be Non-western.

Figure 2.3: Migration surplus of non-Dutch immigrants by country of origin, 1980-2002

Source: Statistics Netherlands

In the early 1980s more than half of all non-Dutch immigrants arriving in the Netherlands came from just three countries: Turkey, Morocco and Suriname. During the 1980s and early 1990s the proportion of these three immigrant groups steadily declined to around 30 percent of the total immigrant population in 1993. After that the share of these more or less traditional immigrant groups in the Netherlands remained on a much lower level (between 15 and 20 percent). The proportion of immigrants from other EU countries in the total immigrant population in the Netherlands remains rather steady at a level of 15 to 20 percent. This all means that the proportion of immigrants from all other countries increased from less than 30 percent in the early 1980s to 70 percent or more in the late 1990s. All these figures show an increasing heterogeneity of the immigrant population in the Netherlands.

Which are the fastest growing immigrant groups in the Netherlands over the last few years? Table 2.3 shows the pattern in the number of immigrants from selected countries between 1995 and 2002. Here immigrants are defined as 'foreign-born': persons born outside of the Netherlands regardless of their nationality. The countries of origin are divided into Western and non-

Western countries. The number of foreign-born immigrants in the Netherlands showed an overall increase of almost one-third (from almost 75,000 in 1995 to 100,000 in 2002). However, in the years 2000 and 2001 the total number of foreign-born immigrants was considerably higher (some 110,000 each year) than in 2002. The number of immigrants from other Western countries also increased, but by less than the overall average (an increase of 20 percent between 1995 and 2002). In the same period the number of immigrants coming from non-Western countries increased by almost 50 percent.

Table 2.3: Immigration of foreign-born to the Netherlands by country of origin (1995-2002)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total	74,703	86,183	87,145	96,423	94,177	109,033	110,254	99,808
<i>of whom from</i>								
Western countries	36,517	38,042	37,467	40,311	42,609	49,478	48,340	43,434
<i>of whom from</i>								
EU countries	18,261	21,476	22,600	23,660	23,642	25,087	24,844	23,354
<i>of whom from</i>								
Belgium	2087	2461	2809	3036	2882	2718	2609	2459
Germany	6470	6362	6374	6261	5892	5939	5826	5625
United Kingdom	3629	4643	4669	4791	5276	6226	6226	5357
Eastern Europe	11,531	8379	6595	7440	9581	14,531	13,571	10,572
<i>of whom from</i>								
Yugoslavia (former)	7352	3387	1591	1463	3910	4629	3082	1713
Soviet Union (former)	2098	2297	2061	2539	2906	5923	5965	4553
Poland	1158	1410	1430	1562	1090	1762	2067	2155
other Western countries	6725	8187	8272	9211	9386	9860	9925	9508
<i>of whom from</i>								
United States	2781	3571	3558	3920	3991	4051	3777	3811
Canada	489	679	649	681	731	770	862	702
Australia	495	605	591	766	849	911	1048	1003
Indonesia	757	941	949	1477	1313	1533	1674	1641
Japan	1212	1275	1221	1129	1209	1211	1240	1208
Non-Western countries	38,160	48,048	49,671	56,112	51,568	59,555	61,914	56,374
<i>of whom from</i>								
Turkey	4803	6274	6488	5765	4917	5363	5904	6103
Angola	673	493	281	269	609	1161	1819	3428
Guinea	57	67	88	186	252	517	889	1021
Morocco	3017	4219	4510	5079	4398	4170	4927	4849
Sierra Leone	95	185	174	214	410	768	1518	1863
Sudan	211	287	571	928	785	1469	1337	783
Somalia	2691	3105	1397	1087	1360	1820	1397	742
South Africa	561	881	1047	1687	1307	1256	1334	1030
Suriname	2419	3338	3229	4231	2777	3113	3134	3098
Argentina	98	108	109	126	102	147	231	283
Brazil	515	688	734	766	687	745	765	819
Afghanistan	1367	2637	3279	3449	4913	4244	4061	2410
China	1340	1324	1668	1900	1845	2636	3643	3901
Iraq	2412	4135	5544	6742	2925	4024	2807	1273
Iran	2526	2713	1581	1051	1072	1596	2068	1344
India	540	607	730	874	742	666	693	607
Thailand	404	549	523	660	636	862	1045	1069
Vietnam	187	214	244	290	285	388	563	706

Source: Statistics Netherlands

A remarkable feature is the declining immigration from Eastern European countries to the Netherlands. This is contrary the expectation of a growing Eastern European immigration due to the changed political situation in

Europe during the 1990s. However, this declining Eastern European immigration can be explained by the sharp fall in immigration from the former Yugoslavia. In 1995, during the height of the Yugoslav wars, the number of immigrants from the former Yugoslavia (mainly refugees) reached its peak. The number of immigrants from all other Eastern European countries has increased rapidly since 1995. In many cases the number of immigrants coming to the Netherlands from other Eastern European countries has more than doubled since the mid 1990s.

Table 2.4: Countries with the fastest growing number of immigrants (1995-2002)

	Increase since 1995 (1995=100)	Number of immigrants in 2002	% of all immigrants in 2002
Soviet Union (former)	217	4553	4.6
China	291	3901	3.9
Angola	509	3428	3.4
Sierra Leone	1961	1863	1.9
Indonesia	217	1641	1.6
Portugal	264	1434	1.4
Thailand	265	1069	1.1
Guinea	1791	1021	1.0
Australia	203	1003	1.0

Source: SN (processed by RISBO)


Table 2.4 summarises table 2.3 and shows countries for which the number of immigrants has significantly increased since 1995 (at least doubled) and which have contributed a significant proportion of all foreign-born immigrants coming to the Netherlands (at least 1 percent of the total immigrant population). Nine countries satisfy both criteria. The former Soviet Union, China and Angola are countries with rapidly growing immigrant populations. These countries can be regarded as the upcoming immigrant countries for the Netherlands. Together these three countries formed 12 percent of the total immigrant population in 2002. Another remarkable feature in the table is that some countries that are considered to be Western (Indonesia, Portugal, Australia) belong to these upcoming immigrant countries.

2.2.1 Migration motives

Another important aspect of immigration statistics deals with the motives of immigrants coming to the Netherlands. When immigrants enter the country they have to indicate their reason for wanting to stay in the Netherlands. This information is registered in the so-called Central Register of Aliens of the Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service (Dutch acronym: IND). Statistics Netherlands publishes these data on an annual basis. Figure 2.4 provides a first overview of immigration motives of Non-Dutch immigrants since the mid 1990s.

During the second half of the 1990s the Netherlands experienced a period of positive economic growth that resulted in increasing shortages on the Dutch labour market. In particular, there was a need for high-skilled workers, but also for low-skilled workers in certain industries (for instance agriculture). These labour market shortages are reflected in the growing number of immigrants who came to the Netherlands for employment reasons (from 10,000 in 1995 (15 percent of all immigrants) to almost 20,000 in 2001 (21 percent of all immigrants)). In 2002 the number of immigrants coming for employment reasons had again declined to around 17,000, due to the worsening economic situation in the Netherlands. However, as the total number of immigrants fell, the proportion of immigrants coming to the Netherlands for employment reasons remained steady (21 percent of all immigrants in both 2001 and 2002). Chapter 4 of this report examines labour migration to the Netherlands in greater detail.

Figure 2.4: Migration motives of foreign nationals, 1995-2002



Source: Statistics Netherlands

Another striking feature in figure 2.4 is the sharp decline in the number of asylum seekers coming to the Netherlands. This decline had already started in 2001, when 1000 less immigrants came to the Netherlands to apply for asylum than was the case in 2000. In 2002 the number of immigrants who came here to seek asylum further declined by more than 7000 persons.

Chapter 5 of this report examines developments in the field of asylum migration in greater detail.

A third important category among the immigrants coming to the Netherlands is persons who come here for family reasons. The number of immigrants coming here for family reasons rose steadily from 29,000 in 1995 to more than 35,000 in 2002. Migration for family reasons also forms a substantial proportion of the total immigration (in 2002 at least 40 percent). Migration for family reasons can be subdivided into 'family reunification' and 'marital migration'. Family reunification means that a family already existed before the migration and that one or more family members (partner, children) join the immigrant who came to the Netherlands earlier. Marital migration (or 'family formative migration') means that someone settles in the Netherlands because they are considering a marriage or cohabitation with somebody already living in the Netherlands. Both phenomena are typical examples of so-called chain migration. Marital migration has become a hot item on the Dutch political agenda. Chapter 3 examines this issue in greater detail.

We conclude this section with a breakdown of the data on immigration motives per country of birth (table 2.5). Obviously, there are considerable differences in the dominant migration motives between different categories of the immigrant population. For immigrants from other EU countries, employment is clearly the dominant motive for coming to the Netherlands, although there also is a considerable immigration from other EU countries for family reasons (around one fourth of the total immigration from these countries). Family reasons are somewhat surprisingly the dominant immigration motive for immigrants from other Western countries - especially from the USA. Less than 30 percent of the immigrants from other Western countries come to the Netherlands for employment (with the exception of Japan from which 40 percent of the immigrants came for employment reasons). Family reasons are also the dominant migration motive for immigrants coming from the Eastern European countries, although other motives are also important for these immigrant categories. Almost half of the immigrants coming from former Yugoslavia or the former Soviet Union (as previously stated the most important upcoming country of immigration) come here to seek asylum. A considerable number of immigrants from Poland come for employment reasons.

For immigrants coming from non-Western countries, family reasons and asylum are quite clearly the dominant migration motives. This is especially true for immigrants coming from the more traditional migration countries for the Netherlands: Turkey, Morocco and Suriname. More than 80 percent of all immigrants from these countries come here for family reasons. Chapter 3 of this report examines this family migration from these traditional migration countries in greater detail. Most immigrants coming from most African and Asian countries come here seeking asylum. There are, however, a few important exceptions to this general pattern. For immigrants from non-Western countries (notably India, Argentina, South Africa) employment is also a very important - if not the dominant - migration motive.

Table 2.5: Immigration of foreign nationals by country of birth and migration motive, 2002

	Employment	Asylum	Family	Study	Other
absolute numbers	17,963	19,078	35,358	9273	4946
in %	20.7	22.0	40.9	10,7	5.7
<i>of which</i>					
Western countries	38.7	8.3	34.6	10.6	7.9
<i>of which</i>					
EU countries	57.2	0.0	28.1	7.7	7.1
<i>of which</i>					
Belgium	48.0	0.0	24.5	3.5	24.1
Germany	51.2	0.0	24.0	13.4	11.5
United Kingdom	68.9	0.0	27.1	1.5	2.5
Eastern Europe (1)	15	29	38.3	11.4	6.1
<i>of which</i>					
Yugoslavia (former)	4.1	45.1	40.8	5.8	4.3
Soviet Union (former)	7.9	47.9	31.9	7.7	4.4
Poland	31.7	0.3	44.1	13.9	10
other Western countries	26.3	0.3	45.2	16.3	11.9
<i>of which</i>					
United States	29	0.0	52.9	11.4	6.7
Canada	28.5	0.0	42.8	11.9	16.4
Australia	28.8	0.0	37.4	2.9	30.7
Indonesia	4.2	0.3	42.0	38.0	15.6
Japan	39.8	0.0	46.6	10.4	3.0
Non-Western countries	6.5	32.9	45.7	10.8	4.0
<i>of which</i>					
Turkey	6.5	7.1	82.3	2.3	1.7
Angola	3.2	93.3	2.9	0.1	0.3
Guinea	8	85.5	5.6	0.1	0.6
Morocco	2.9	1.3	90.9	4.0	0.9
Sierra Leone	0.3	97.2	1.7	0.7	0.2
Sudan	0.5	81	15.2	2.2	1.0
Somalia	1.7	73.3	23.7	0.0	1.3
South Africa	22.9	0.4	37.9	9.9	29.2
Suriname	2.5	1.2	86.4	6.7	3.0
Argentina	30.5	0	48.8	15.8	4.9
Brazil	12.3	0.5	70.4	10.2	6.6
Afghanistan	0.1	68.1	31.2	0.0	0.4
China	5.6	10.4	16.9	53.4	13.8
Iraq	0.5	64.9	33.2	0.1	1.2
Iran	2.9	62.6	25.2	7.8	1.3
India	34.3	2.1	40.1	16.9	6.6
Thailand	1.3	0.8	87.8	4.5	5.5
Vietnam	2.9	5.9	36.0	53.6	1.4

Source: Statistics Netherlands

¹⁾ Albania, not included (missing data)

2.3 Short-term immigration

Up to now we have only described the so-called long-term immigration flows to the Netherlands. The figures presented are derived from municipal population registers and only refer to immigrants who stay in the Netherlands long enough to be obliged to register. In fact, very little is known about short-term immigration flows to the Netherlands. Short-term immigration flows are defined as a temporary stay of up to six months in the country. Since border crossings are not registered in the Netherlands and citizens from many countries can enter the country temporarily without the need for an entry

visa, there are few registrations of foreign persons who stay in the Netherlands for less than six months. The only exception is foreigners who apply for a visa for temporary residence in the Netherlands. The official name for this visa is 'Machtiging Voorlopig Verblijf' (MVV).

A MVV is a visa for a stay in the Netherlands of longer than three months. Since 1998 having a MVV is a condition for obtaining a normal residence permit. Before immigrants can leave for to the Netherlands to apply for a normal residence permit, they have to possess a MVV which is issued by the Dutch diplomatic authorities in the country of origin. However, this rule does not apply for residents from other EU countries and from Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United States or Switzerland.

In this section we will describe the trend in the number of applications for MVV permits since 1998. The number of MVV applications has increased from 36,287 in 1998 to 49,477 in 2001. More recent data on the number of MVV applications are not available. More detailed data about the characteristics of MVV applicants are only available for the year 2000.

If we examine the nationality of foreigners applying for a MVV we can see that Turks and Moroccans make the most applications. More than one-quarter of all MVV applications are made by Turkish or Moroccan nationals. Other important nationalities for MVV requests are Surinamese, Chinese and Polish nationals (see table 2.6).

Table 2.6: MVV applications in 2002 according to the applicant's nationality

	Number of MVV applications	In %
Moroccan	5895	13
Turks	5651	13
Surinamese	2760	6
Chinese	2510	6
Polish	1988	5
Indonesian	1727	4
Russian	1240	3
South African	1134	3
Indian	1058	2
Thai	993	2
All other nationalities	18,930	43
Total	43,886	100

Source: IND, Trendrapportage reguliere instroom 1998-2001

Data about the goals of residence of MVV applicants are also available. These goals of residence are more or less the same as those already stated for immigrants in general. Half of all MVV applicants want to come to the Netherlands for family reasons (either family reunification or marital migration). The proportion of MVV applicants coming here for family reasons

has not increased over the past few years. About 10 percent of all MVV applicants belong to the somewhat diffuse category 'other dependent residence' (meaning that the individual concerned is dependent on the partner or other Dutch or foreign nationals), 13 percent of them came to the Netherlands because of employment and another 26 percent because of other, unspecified reasons.

Table 2.7: Goals of residence for MVV applications (2002)

	Number of applications		As %	
	1998	1999	2000	2000
Family reunification	11,970	12,898	10,223	23
Family formation	5740	9698	11,788	27
Other dependent residence	3234	3371	4941	11
Employment	3716	5683	5668	13
Other reasons	11,627	11,750	11,266	26
Total number of applications	36,287	43,400	43,886	100

Source: IND, Trendrapportage reguliere instroom 1998-2001

However, the goals of residence of MVV applicants vary considerably between the different nationalities. Moroccan, Turkish and Surinamese MVV applicants most frequently come to the Netherlands because of family reasons (either family reunification, marital migration or other dependent residence). Table 2.8 shows the ten nationalities of MVV applicants that most frequently come to the Netherlands because of either employment or study. MVV applications for employment purposes are most frequently made by Poles, South Africans, Indians and Russians. MVV applications to study in the Netherlands are most frequently made by Chinese and Polish citizens.

Table 2.8: Ten nationalities with the greatest number of MVV applications where employment or study was the goal of residence

Employment			Study		
	Number	As %		Number	As %
Polish	739	13	Chinese	908	12
South African	597	11	Indonesian	654	9
Indian	366	6	Polish	406	5
Russian	320	6	Moroccan	388	5
Chinese	319	6	Hungarian	286	4
Hungarian	303	5	Surinamese	266	4
Turkish	278	5	Russian	246	3
Romanian	261	5	Mexican	211	3
Philippine	213	4	Romanian	175	2
Slovakian	213	4	Indian	172	2
Other nationalities	2059	64	Other nationalities	3723	50
Total	5668	100	Total	7435	100

Source: IND, Trendrapportage reguliere instroom 1998-2001

2.4 Emigration from the Netherlands

The counterpart of immigration is emigration. Earlier in this chapter, Table 2.1 gave an overview of the emigration of Dutch nationals and foreign nationals since 1980. The total emigration from the Netherlands has remained quite

stable since the early 1980s and fluctuated between 52,000 in 1987 and almost 67,000 in 2002. Indeed, the number of emigrants in 2002 was the highest since decades. Only in 1982 was the number of emigrants slightly higher. A closer comparison of these two years with high emigrant numbers reveals that the number of foreign nationals leaving the Netherlands was much higher in 1982 than in 2002. However, the number of Dutch nationals leaving the Netherlands was higher in 2002 than in 1982.

Table 2.9 shows the countries of destination for Dutch nationals and foreign nationals leaving the Netherlands in 2002. Dutch nationals constituted two-thirds of all emigrants in 2002 and foreign nationals one-third. For both Dutch and foreign nationals, the proportion of male emigrants is slightly higher than the proportion of female emigrants. Dutch nationals mostly emigrate to other Western countries and in particular to other EU countries. The only exception to this was the Netherlands Antilles that also attracted a relatively large proportion of the Dutch emigrants in 2002. Sixty percent of all Dutch nationals leaving the Netherlands in 2002 went to other EU countries. Two-thirds of all Dutch emigrants of 2002 went to just seven different countries, namely Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom, Netherlands Antilles, the United States, France and Spain.

The countries of destination for foreign nationals leaving the Netherlands in 2002 were slightly more diverse. Half of all foreign nationals leaving the Netherlands in 2002 went to other EU countries and three-quarters of them go to another Western country (including Japan). Exactly half of the non-Dutch emigrant population went to only six different countries: namely Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Japan and France. Emigration from the Netherlands to non-Western countries is remarkably low. Only one in five of all foreign nationals leaving the Netherlands in 2002 went to a non-Western country. The most popular non-Western countries of destination for foreign nationals leaving the Netherlands are Turkey, China and Indonesia. The contingents of emigrants leaving for these non-Western countries, however, amount to no more than a few hundred persons (400 at the most) - in a total of 20,000 emigrants. Some Eastern European countries (former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union and Poland) attract contingents of emigrants of a comparable size.

Finally if we combine the Dutch and foreign nationals leaving the Netherlands in 2002 we can again see that just seven countries attracted 60 percent of all

emigrants leaving the Netherlands in 2002. With the exception of the Netherlands Antilles, these were all Western countries: Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom and the United States, France and Spain. The first two countries (Germany and Belgium) are by far most important for emigrants from the Netherlands. Thirty percent of all emigrants from the Netherlands went to these two countries. Only 25 percent of all Dutch and non-Dutch emigrants leaving the Netherlands in 2002 went to either non-Western countries or to Eastern European countries.

Table 2.9: Emigration of Dutch and non-Dutch nationals by country of destination and gender, 2002

	Dutch			non-Dutch			total		
	male	female	total	male	female	total	male	female	total
2002	24,660	20,911	45,571	10,899	10,258	21,157	35,559	31,169	66,728
<i>In %</i>	37.0	31.3	68.3	16.3	15.4	31.7	53.3	46.7	100.0
<i>of whom to</i>									
Western countries	18,743	15,692	34,435	8794	8373	17,167	27,537	24,065	51,602
<i>of whom to</i>									
EU countries	14,764	12,384	27,148	5496	5114	10,610	20,260	17,498	37,758
<i>of whom to</i>									
Belgium	4262	3737	7999	647	624	1271	4909	4361	9270
Denmark	191	145	336	94	110	204	285	255	540
Germany	4431	3222	7653	1567	1602	3169	5998	4824	10,822
France	1233	1185	2418	492	521	1013	1725	1706	3431
Italy	286	321	607	343	252	595	629	573	1202
Portugal	223	186	409	184	117	301	407	303	710
Spain	1263	976	2239	454	450	904	1717	1426	3143
United Kingdom	2084	1976	4060	1122	868	1990	3206	2844	6050
Sweden	203	145	348	146	165	311	349	310	659
Eastern Europe	414	287	701	804	755	1559	1218	1042	2260
<i>of whom to</i>									
Yugoslavia (former)	95	112	207	223	175	398	318	287	605
Soviet Union (former)	92	44	136	161	175	336	253	219	472
Czechoslovakia (former)	66	36	102	115	90	205	181	126	307
Poland	72	41	113	178	201	379	250	242	492
Other Western countries	3565	3021	6586	2494	2504	4998	6059	5525	11,584
<i>of whom to</i>									
Norway	160	131	291	89	131	220	249	262	511
Switzerland	390	358	748	137	120	257	527	478	1005
United States	1464	1217	2681	1.029	962	1.991	2493	2179	4.672
Canada	509	445	954	187	201	388	696	646	1.342
Indonesia	162	121	283	151	206	357	313	327	640
Japan	54	42	96	559	485	1044	613	527	1140
Australia	488	424	912	239	257	496	727	681	1408
New Zealand	224	208	432	55	64	119	279	272	551
Non-Western countries	5917	5219	11,136	2105	1885	3990	8022	7104	15,126
<i>of whom to</i>									
Turkey	220	239	459	245	179	424	465	418	883
Egypt	80	68	148	27	27	54	107	95	202
Morocco	159	145	304	193	121	314	352	266	618
South Africa	198	180	378	98	215	313	296	395	691
Netherlands Antilles	1896	1963	3859	9	17	26	1905	1980	3885
Aruba	561	525	1086	1	2	3	562	527	1089
Suriname	510	333	843	60	69	129	570	402	972
Brazil	134	87	221	80	108	188	214	195	409
China	167	134	301	204	178	382	371	312	683
India	40	44	84	105	52	157	145	96	241
Israel	87	82	169	26	21	47	113	103	216
Singapore	88	77	165	39	41	80	127	118	245
Thailand	172	86	258	30	73	103	202	159	361

Source: Statistics Netherlands

2.4.1 Return migration¹⁵

Of course an interesting question is what proportion of the newly arrived immigrants in the Netherlands will stay in the country or will return to their country of origin. As previously mentioned, in the past the Dutch government

¹⁵ This section is completely based on: M. Alders & H. Nicolaas, (2003) Een derde van de immigranten binnen zes jaar weer vertrokken. In: CBS, *Bevolkingstrends*, 1^{ste} kwartaal (www.cbs.nl).

used to erroneously assume that most labour migrants would return to their home countries. This raises the question as to the extent of return migration nowadays. This is examined by Statistics Netherlands in a so-called cohort analysis (Alders and Nicolaas, 2003). The study, the results of which are presented here in an abbreviated form, covered the period 1995-2001. The data were taken from the municipal population registers [Gemeentelijk Basisadministratie (GBA)] in which every legal resident of the Netherlands is registered. In addition to characteristics such as age, sex and so forth, for migrants born outside of the Netherlands, the length of stay is also recorded (the period which somebody has spent in the Netherlands since the last occasion on which they lived here). With the help of this information it is possible to distinguish between migrants who are here temporarily and those who are resident in the Netherlands on a more or less permanent basis. The most important result of this analysis is that the majority of the immigrants remain in the Netherlands but that a significant proportion also depart again within a fairly short period of time.

Table 2.10: Emigration of foreign born immigrants by year of residence in the Netherlands

Settled down:	Total	Of which % left in :							Total
		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	
	x 1000	%							
1995	74.7	3.1	9.5	7.4	5.4	3.6	2.9	2.5	34,4
1996	86.2		3.6	10.2	7.9	4.7	3.6	3.0	33,0
1997	87.1			4.0	10.6	7.6	5.1	3.6	30,8
1998	96.4				3.8	10.2	7.1	5.2	26,2
1999	94.2					3.7	9.5	7.2	20,4
2000	109.0						3.4	8.7	12,1
2001	110.3							3.5	3,5

Source: Alders and Nicolaas, Statistics Netherlands, 2003


Table 2.10 contains seven cohorts (each of 1 year) which indicate the proportion of migrants who arrived in that year that departed again in subsequent years. From this it is clear that of the migrants who arrived in 1995 (that was almost 75,000) more than one-third had departed again by 2001. The same is true to immigrants who arrived in 1996. In the following years the number of immigrants who have departed again from the Netherlands is of course gradually less. However, it can be assumed that a proportion of these immigrants will still leave the Netherlands in the years following the period investigated. In the period 1995-2001 a total of more than 650,000 migrants came to the Netherlands. Of this group almost 22% had departed again by 2001.

Although the pattern for Western and non-Western migrants is similar, there are considerable differences in the level of the departure percentages. For example, of the 35,000 Western immigrants who came to the Netherlands in

1995, almost half had departed again within six years. Of the 40,000 non-Western immigrants who came in that year a quarter had departed again from the Netherlands within six years. For the immigration cohort from 1997, these differences are even greater still. For this cohort almost half of the Western immigrants have also departed, but now within four years. This means that Western immigrants who came to the Netherlands in 1997 departed even more quickly than their predecessors. For the non-Western immigrants this proportion is 20%, which is comparable to the immigration cohort of 1995.

We saw that Western immigrants, in particular immigrants from the European Union, mostly come to the Netherlands for employment reasons (table 2.5). The departure percentages of Western immigrants from a number of specific employment migration countries (Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States) are therefore higher than the average for Western immigrants. Figure of 2.5 shows that within six years almost three-quarters of the Americans and 80 percent of the Japanese have departed from the Netherlands. These proportions are 30 to 40 percent higher than the average for all Western immigrants. Conversely, Western immigrants from Poland and the former Yugoslavia are, however, more likely than average to remain in the Netherlands.

Figure 2.5: Percentage of immigrants that arrived in 1995 and emigrated within 6 years



Source: Alders and Nicolaas, Statistics Netherlands, 2003

A far greater proportion of non-Western immigrants than Western immigrants remain in the Netherlands. Many non-Western immigrants arrived in the Netherlands as asylum seekers, for example from Afghanistan, Iran and Somalia. These immigrants will not be inclined to return to their land of origin before the situation for them there has clearly improved, which in practice mostly means a long or permanent residence in the Netherlands. However, other groups of non-Western immigrants have higher departure percentages than the total group of non-Western immigrants. Examples of this are migrants from China, India, the Netherlands Antilles/Aruba and South Africa. A proportion of these groups are also employment migrants.

Appendices for chapter 2

Table A2.1: Development of external migration of Dutch nationals and Foreigners, 1980-2002

Year	Dutch nationals			Foreigners			Total			Net. Admin. Correct.	Corrected Surplus
	Immi-gration	Emi-gration	Surplus	Immi-gration	Emi-gration	Surplus	Immi-gration	Emi-gration	Surplus		
1980	32684	35837	-3153	79820	23633	56187	112504	59470	53034	-	53034
1981	29767	38216	-8449	50416	24979	25437	80183	63195	16988	-	16988
1982	29810	39413	-9603	40930	28094	12836	70740	67507	3233	-	3233
1983	30321	32810	-2489	36441	27974	8467	66762	60784	5978	-3647	2331
1984	29616	31824	-2208	37291	27030	10261	66907	58854	8053	-2920	5133
1985	33196	31009	2187	46166	24206	21960	79362	55215	24147	-4260	19887
1986	34585	31155	3430	52802	23563	29239	87387	54718	32669	-5889	26780
1987	35080	31139	3941	60855	20872	39983	95935	52011	43924	-8833	35091
1988	32976	34403	-1427	58262	21388	36874	91238	55791	35447	-8205	27242
1989	33529	38218	-4689	65385	21489	43896	98914	59707	39207	-12356	26851
1990	36086	36749	-663	81264	20595	60669	117350	57344	60006	-11595	48411
1991	35912	35998	-86	84337	21330	63007	120249	57328	62921	-13311	49610
1992	33904	36101	-2197	83022	22733	60289	116926	58834	58092	-14974	43118
1993	31581	37019	-5438	87573	22203	65370	119154	59222	59932	-15566	44366
1994	30887	39409	-8522	68424	22746	45678	99311	62155	37156	-17073	20083
1995	29127	41648	-12521	66972	21673	45299	96099	63321	32778	-18874	13904
1996	31572	42921	-11349	77177	22404	54773	108749	65325	43424	-26620	16804
1997	33124	40278	-7154	76736	21940	54796	109860	62218	47642	-19755	27887
1998	40706	39175	1531	81701	21266	60435	122407	60441	61966	-18848	43118
1999	40786	38358	2428	78365	20665	57700	119151	59023	60128	-19756	40372
2000	41467	40474	993	91383	20727	70656	132850	61201	71649	-17776	53873
2001	38897	42921	-4024	94507	20397	74110	133404	63318	70086	-19248	50838
2002	34631	45571	-10940	86619	21157	65462	121250	66728	54522	-30190	24332

Source: Statistics Netherlands, statline

Administrative corrections: Administrative corrections consist of inclusions in and withdrawals from the municipal population registers for other reasons than birth, death, migration or redefinition of municipal borders. Most of these administrative corrections refer to people for whom it has been demonstrated that they have left the municipality, often to live abroad. Entries often concern people who reappear in the same or in a different municipality and are then included in the population register.

Net administrative corrections

Migration figures in the Netherlands need to be corrected by the number of 'net administrative corrections', a figure that is particularly influenced by the unreported emigration of foreigners. If the net administrative corrections are deducted from the registered migration surplus, the result is a lower 'corrected' migration surplus.

Statistics Netherlands [Dutch acronym: CBS] presents the registered migration statistics as well as the 'net administrative corrections'. The corrected migration surplus (1980-2001) as stated in the appendix should be regarded as an unofficial figure.

3.1 Political debate about family migration

In the previous chapter we saw that a relatively large proportion of the migration was due to what we have summarised up until now as 'family reasons'. Migration for 'family reasons' is a typical example of chain migration: the phenomenon that immigrants are often followed by new immigrants from their immediate social environment. In the classical form, chain migration refers to the gradual movement of the inhabitants of a village or area to a different country. The first immigrant (the pioneer) makes inhabitants from his area so enthusiastic about his new country or work that they follow him. The second phase in the process of chain migration arises when the pioneers invite their spouses and children to join them or when the children of migrants marry partners from the country of origin. This chapter focuses on this second phase in the chain migration process.

In the previous chapter the Netherlands were referred to as a 'reluctant country of immigration'. However, in the 1960s and 1970s the Netherlands welcomed many labour migrants under the assumption that these people would only remain temporarily. Instead of this, the original guest workers invited their families who had remained in their country of origin to come to the Netherlands. This 'phase of family reunification' (in the 1970s and 1980s) signified a quite unexpected immigration for the Netherlands. A similar phenomenon was repeated more recently with the children from the first generation of labour migrants who had grown up in the Netherlands. Again it unexpectedly transpired that many Turkish and Moroccan young people sought their life partner in the land of origin and not in the Netherlands. Their reasons for doing this will be explained later in this chapter.

Furthermore, migration due to 'family reasons' (both family reunification and 'marital migration') is not a phenomenon limited to just the former guest worker communities. For example, recognised asylum migrants also have a

formal right to family reunification and many native Dutch residents seek their life partner outside of the Netherlands. However, the political debate about marital migration is predominantly concerned with Turkish and Moroccan young people who seek their partner in their country of origin. Generally speaking, the Dutch government views marital migration as an undesirable phenomenon that must be curtailed whenever possible. The argument behind this standpoint is, that marital migration is at odds with the desired integration of the allochthonous population. On the one hand the Netherlands tries to teach migrants and their children the Dutch language and to provide them with a good education so as to improve their chances on the employment market, yet on the other hand, as a result of family migration, there is a continual stream of new migrants for whom this entire integration process must more or less be restarted.

In this chapter we will first of all present some general figures about the extent of family migration to the Netherlands. Then we will take a closer look at the Turkish and Moroccan young people who invite their marriage partner from their country of origin and their reasons for doing this.

3.2 Extent of family migration to the Netherlands

In the Dutch statistics about family migration, a distinction is drawn between three types of family migration: family reunification, marital migration and migration of other family members. Family reunification means that a family already existed before the migration and that one or more family members (partner, children) have joined the immigrant who came to the Netherlands earlier. Marital migration (or 'family formative migration') means that someone settles in the Netherlands for the purpose of marrying or cohabitating with someone already resident in the Netherlands. Therefore, family reunification concerns an *existing* couple or family that are reunited in the Netherlands, and marital migration concerns a *new* couple or family that is formed by a resident of the Netherlands and a partner from outside of the Netherlands. Finally, it is possible that other family members also come to the Netherlands; this is the 'migration of other family members'. Together these three categories constitute the total family migration.

In 2002 more than 35.000 migrants came to the Netherlands for family reasons. More than half of this group (about 20,000 persons) were marital

migrants that is: people who came to the Netherlands to form a new of family or couple here (married or otherwise). One-third of the family migrants came under the umbrella of family reunification. The remaining 2500 people fell under the category of 'migration of other family members'. The significance of this family migration phenomenon is apparent from the last column (table 3.1). In 2002 more than 40 percent of the total immigration to Netherlands was family migration.

In table 3.1 the figures about family migration are detailed according to the country of origin and in table 3.2 according to sex and age category as well. In 2002, almost one in three family migrants came from another Western country (including Eastern Europe). More than 5000 family migrants came from other EU countries, in particular the United Kingdom and Germany. More than 4000 family migrants came from various Eastern European countries, in particular from the former Soviet Union, Poland and the former Yugoslavia. As the data in table 3.1 do not provide any information about the Dutch partner of the family migrant, we do not know whether this is native Dutch persons bringing back the partner from Eastern Europe or Eastern European immigrants (for example asylum seekers) who previously came to the Netherlands and have now invited their partner across from Eastern Europe. However, we do know that the Eastern European family migrants are generally women (table 3.2). In 2002, just under 4000 family migrants came from other Western countries, including a notably large number from the United States (1500 persons).

In total more than 22,000 family migrants from non-Western countries came to the Netherlands in 2002. The majority of these were women. More than 40 percent of all non-Western family migrants come from just two countries: Turkey (4800 persons) and Morocco (nearly 4500 persons). From the last column of table 3.1 it can also be seen how important the phenomenon of family migration is for the total migration from Turkey and Morocco to the Netherlands: 80 to 90 percent of all immigrants from both countries are family migrants. Within this group of Turkish and Moroccan family migrants, the vast majority of cases concern marital migrants. It is also worth noting that in the case of Turkish and Moroccan family migrants there are considerably fewer women, as unlike family migrants from other countries, there are equal numbers of men and women among the Turkish and Moroccan family migrants (table 3.2).

Finally, there is a striking difference between family migrants from Western and non- Western countries (table 3.2). Almost 40 percent of family migrants from Western countries are minors, and in the case of family migrants from other EU countries this figure is over 50 percent. We assume that this mainly concerns the children of persons who have come to the Netherlands for other reasons, for example, work. In contrast to this, three-quarters of the family migrants from non-Western countries are adults who come to the Netherlands due to family reasons.

Table 3.1: Immigration of foreign nationals for family reasons by country of birth, 2002

	Family reunification	Family members	Marital migration	total	as part of total migration (%)
2002	12,096	2479	20,765	35,340	40.8
<i>of which</i>					
Western countries	5160	1837	6242	13,239	34.6
<i>of which</i>					
EU countries	3409	983	1014	5406	28.0
<i>of which</i>					
United Kingdom	697	239	188	1124	27.2
Germany	566	139	339	1044	24.0
France	246	85	95	426	26.6
Belgium	259	85	63	407	24.5
Portugal	212	59	29	300	26.0
Spain	133	22	75	230	18.3
Eastern Europe (1)	1000	198	2956	4154	38.3
<i>of which</i>					
Soviet Union (former)	473	59	994	1526	32.0
Poland	245	83	666	994	44.1
Yugoslavia (former)	150	20	535	705	40.8
Romania	40	7	267	314	49.2
Czechoslovakia (former)	31	8	197	236	43.6
Bulgaria	41	11	171	223	49.1
other Western countries	751	656	2272	3679	45.2
<i>of which</i>					
United States	316	336	839	1491	53.0
Canada	52	35	158	245	42.8
Indonesia	103	18	546	667	42.0
Japan	89	180	339	608	46.7
Australia	86	45	180	311	37.4
Non-Western countries	6936	642	14,523	22,101	45.7
<i>of which</i>					
Turkey	1174	43	3590	4807	82.3
Morocco	1403	27	3059	4489	90.9
South Africa	78	55	178	311	37.8
Ghana	73	2	161	236	49.7
Somalia	133	2	62	197	23.8
Suriname	633	11	1257	1901	86.4
Brazil	129	31	365	525	70.4
Colombia	173	8	180	361	69.0
Afghanistan	613	10	253	876	31.2
Thailand	199	4	650	853	87.8
China	207	10	427	644	16.8
Iraq	337	7	144	488	33.1
Philippines	93	4	275	372	58.4
Iran	150	7	187	344	25.2
India	52	22	200	274	40.2

Source: Statistics Netherlands

1) Albania, not included (missing data)

Family migration

Table 3.2: Immigration of foreign nationals for family reasons by country of birth, gender and age category, 2002

	total	male	female	<13	13-17	18-29	30-39	40+
2002	35,340	36.2	63.8	21.3	7.9	38.0	21.7	11.1
<i>of which</i>								
Western countries	13,239	30.7	69.3	31.3	6.4	27.6	20.5	14.1
<i>of which</i>								
EU countries	5406	37.7	62.3	48.4	7.6	17.6	14.7	11.8
<i>of which</i>								
The Netherlands	1161	49.9	50.1	79.2	5.3	12.3	1.1	2.2
United Kingdom	1124	31.2	68.8	39.7	7.8	12.6	20.9	19.0
Germany	1044	33.3	66.7	34.9	7.4	24.9	19.7	13.1
France	426	37.1	62.9	44.6	6.6	19.2	15.7	13.8
Belgium	407	38.8	61.2	47.7	8.4	22.6	11.1	10.3
Portugal	300	39.3	60.7	54.0	14.3	15.3	9.0	7.3
Spain	230	31.3	68.7	36.1	7.4	20.9	23.0	12.6
Eastern Europe (1)	4154	22.1	77.9	13.0	6.0	45.2	22.3	13.6
<i>of which</i>								
Soviet Union (former)	1526	20.2	79.8	15.8	8.4	35.0	25.5	15.3
Poland	994	22.2	77.8	16.0	5.2	44.8	17.6	16.4
Yugoslavia (former)	705	32.5	67.5	7.4	4.1	54.0	22.3	12.2
Romania	314	16.9	83.1	8.0	3.5	50.6	25.8	12.1
Czechoslovakia (former)	236	16.9	83.1	7.2	3.4	67.4	16.5	5.5
Bulgaria	223	19.7	80.3	12.1	7.2	43.9	26.5	10.3
other Western countries	3679	30.0	70.0	26.9	5.3	22.6	27.2	18.0
<i>of which</i>								
United States	1491	36.8	63.2	32.6	5.7	18.9	21.9	20.9
Canada	245	38.8	61.2	22.4	4.5	24.9	24.1	24.1
Indonesia	667	15.6	84.4	9.4	4.3	36.9	33.6	15.7
Japan	608	19.2	80.8	35.4	5.9	9.5	33.1	16.1
Australia	311	34.1	65.9	29.3	4.2	24.4	30.2	11.9
Non-Western countries	22,101	39.5	60.5	15.3	8.8	44.1	22.5	9.4
<i>of which</i>								
Turkey	4807	50.4	49.6	9.7	7.9	61.3	14.4	6.7
Morocco	4489	43.4	56.6	10.2	9.4	52.1	19.9	8.3
South Africa	311	33.4	66.6	23.2	8.0	26.0	25.4	17.4
Ghana	236	45.3	54.7	6.8	11.9	27.1	37.3	16.9
Somalia	197	40.6	59.4	19.8	12.7	39.1	18.3	10.2
Suriname	1901	39.1	60.9	16.0	10.7	33.6	26.0	13.7
Brazil	525	21.3	78.7	17.0	6.5	34.5	29.9	12.2
Colombia	361	32.4	67.6	27.7	10.8	26.9	22.2	12.5
Afghanistan	876	39.6	60.4	36.4	16.8	24.2	14.7	7.9
Thailand	853	14.7	85.3	15.1	5.6	37.0	34.0	8.2
China	644	34.2	65.8	15.7	11.3	28.7	30.3	14.0
Iraq	488	35.9	64.1	26.8	13.3	35.2	15.2	9.4
Philippines	372	17.2	82.8	12.9	5.4	39.2	31.7	10.8
Iran	344	28.2	71.8	14.5	9.3	43.9	18.9	13.4
India	274	30.7	69.3	14.2	4.0	46.7	28.1	6.9

Source: Statistics Netherlands

3.3 Marital migration from Turkey and Morocco¹⁶

In this section we will consider marital migration from Turkey and Morocco to the Netherlands in greater detail. This section is based on a doctoral thesis about this question (Hooghiemstra, 2002). We have already seen that this involves a considerable group of immigrants (in 2002 more than 9000 persons). Taking this figure, Hooghiemstra calculated that three-quarters of all Turks and Moroccans marrying in the Netherlands found their partner in their country of origin. Hooghiemstra refers to this as cross-border marriage. It is still a widely occurring phenomenon, even among Turkish and Moroccan men who were born in the Netherlands and have lived here for most of their lives.

Table 3.3 Turkish and Moroccan men and women married in the Netherlands in 2000, classified according to choice of partner (in percent)

	Turkish male	Moroccan male	Turkish female	Moroccan female	Total
Partner from the Netherlands					
Of which with					
Dutch origin	4.1	5.2	2.8	2.8	3.9
Same origin	13.5	17.8	20.1	26.0	18.3
Other non-Dutch origin	0.7	1.0	0.7	1.5	0.9
Partner not from the Netherlands					
Of which with					
Same country of origin	79.7	74.6	75.3	68.1	75.4
Other country of origin	1.7	1.0	1.0	1.4	1.3
Total (= 100%)	28,211	20,351	18,872	14,030	81.64

Source: E. Hooghiemstra, *Trouwen over de grens*. Den Haag_ SCP 2002, pp. 23

Of all the 81,000 persons of Turkish or Moroccan descent who married in the Netherlands in the year 2000, no fewer than three-quarters found their partner in their country of origin. And when Turkish and Moroccan persons marry someone already living in the Netherlands then in the vast majority of cases this person has the same ethnic origin. The number of Turks or Moroccans marrying someone of Dutch origin is very small (varying from 2.8 percent for Turkish or Moroccan female to 4 to 5 percent for Turkish or Moroccan male). Hooghiemstra also compared the marriages concluded by the first and second-generation immigrants from both countries and found that there is a gradual reduction in the interest in a partner from across the border. Yet between 56 percent and 71 percent of the second generation marriages are still with a partner from the country of origin.

¹⁶ This section is completely based on: E. Hooghiemstra, *Trouwen over de grens. Achtergronden van partnerkeuze van Turken en Marokkanen in Nederland. [Marriage across the border. Backgrounds of partner choice of Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands]*. Den Haag: Social and Cultural Planning Office (2000).

Hooghiemstra also found that both men and women from Turkey and Morocco marry across the border, but for different reasons. There are several reasons why so many Turkish and Moroccan persons still marry a partner from outside the Netherlands: a) the continuing high migration pressure from the sending countries, b) the maintenance of transnational ties, and c) the increasing qualitative imbalance between the sexes within the Turkish and Moroccan ethnic groups in the Netherlands. This last aspect is a result of the fact that the integration of second-generation Turkish and Moroccan boys and girls in Dutch society is taking place at different rates and in different directions.

Hooghiemstra denies that marrying across the border is solely a result of the bad economic conditions in the sending countries. Young second-generation immigrants in the Netherlands do not want to function as a 'flying passport' for compatriots to come to the Netherlands. A marriage is only accomplished when there are good and intense relations between the families in both countries. According to Hooghiemstra, the main reason for marrying across the border is that for various reasons young men and women of Turkish and Moroccan origin are unable to find a partner in the Netherlands. For all of these groups someone of Dutch origin does not come into the equation. However, young Turkish and Moroccan men and women do not seem to be destined for each other. This is the result of their different ways of integrating in Dutch society.

Hooghiemstra signals a gap between the sexes in both communities. Turkish and Moroccan boys and girls spend their time differently. Boys are predominantly outside their home where they are not strongly bound by behavioural rules. Girls, however, spend much more time inside the home and are expected to conform to all the customs and rules in public. Turkish and Moroccan girls are also much more oriented towards a school career than their male counterparts. As a result both groups develop separately from each other and when the time comes to choose a partner they have little in common to find each other interesting. When these young people are asked about the criteria for choosing a future partner their answers show some remarkable differences. Girls are more interested in the relational aspects of the future relationship, whereas boys emphasise characteristics which (in their eyes) are favourable for the role of their future wife as a mother and as a daughter-in-law. The girl's reputation is crucial for the boys. The boys assume that Turkish and Moroccan girls who have grown up in the

Netherlands are seeking more modern partners than they themselves are or wish to be. Girls on the other hand find that the boys do not have enough confidence in their qualities as carers and wrongly cast doubt on their good names.

As a result of these different expectations Turkish and Moroccan boys look for more traditionally-oriented wives in their countries of origin while Turkish and Moroccan girls look for more modern-oriented future husbands. Many girls, especially those with a higher education, develop a preference for a partner relationship that is based on equality and consultation. Some girls also wish to continue working after marriage, as a reflection of all the efforts they have made to complete their education. At the same time, the girls say that most of the males from their ethnic group in the Netherlands permit themselves all manner of freedoms, but assume their traditional roles after marriage. The boys are not really against the idea that their future wife may be working, but are also not exactly thrilled by the prospect. The fear about the ability to realise their future ideals with a partner from their own group in the Netherlands combined with the hope that a partner who is able to migrate to the Netherlands because of marriage will be more likely to meet their wishes, are important reasons why both boys and girls embrace the idea of marital migration.

3.4 Asylum migrants and family reunification¹⁷

The previous section was mainly concerned with the follow-on migration of earlier guest workers and their descendants. However, the asylum migrants who have arrived in the Netherlands more recently also have a right to family reunification subject to certain conditions. An asylum seeker has no right to family reunification until the asylum procedure has been successfully completed. However, as soon as asylum migrants are formally admitted to the Netherlands and have a temporary or permanent residence permit, they can also bring their partners and/or children to the Netherlands under certain conditions. After obtaining a residence permit asylum seekers also have the right, just as residents of the Netherlands, to bring a future partner to the

¹⁷ This section is completely based on: Nicolaas, H., A. Sprangers en H. Wiltvliet, 2003. Ontwikkelingen in de volgmigratie van asielmigranten. In: CBS, Bevolkingstrends, 2de kwartaal (www.cbs.nl).

Family migration

Netherlands with the intention of marriage or cohabitation (= family forming migration), subject to certain conditions.

Table 3.4 shows how frequently asylum seekers arriving in the Netherlands in the 1990s made use of this right. The table shows that between 1995 and 2000 more than 126,000 asylum seekers settled in the Netherlands via the asylum procedure. Between 1996 and 2001, these 126,000 were followed by almost 40,000 'following migrants', persons who came to the Netherlands under the arrangements for family reunification and family formation. This means that every asylum seeker who came to the Netherlands in this period was followed by 0.3 following migrants. Two-thirds of these following migrants were partners and children who came across from the country of origin (family reunification) and one-third were new partners of the former asylum migrants who came from the country of origin (marital migration).

Table 3.4 Following migrants from asylum migrants by country of birth

	Number of asylum migrants 1995-2000	Following migrants 1996-2001			Total family migration	Following migrants per asylum migrant
		Family reunion of partners	Family reunion of children	Marital migration		
	<i>x 1000</i>					
Eastern Europe	27.1	1.2	1.8	1.8	4.8	0.2
<i>of whom from</i>						
Former Yugoslavia	17.6	0.8	0.9	1.2	2.8	0.2
Former Soviet Union	8.7	0.3	0.7	0.3	1.3	0.1
Asia	63.3	5.2	10.2	5.6	21.0	0.3
<i>of whom from</i>						
Afghanistan	19.3	0.8	1.8	0.2	2.9	0.2
China	3.3	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.8	0.2
Iraq	22.2	2.1	3.8	0.4	6.2	0.3
Iran	8.2	0.4	0.7	0.5	1.6	0.2
Syria	2.0	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.8	0.4
Turkey	3.3	1.0	2.3	2.3	5.6	1.7
Africa	31.4	2.1	5.9	4.0	12.0	0.4
<i>of whom from</i>						
Angola	3.1	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.1
Sierra Leone	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Sudan	4.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.1
Somalia	10.7	0.5	0.8	0.3	1.6	0.1
Other countries	4.7	0.3	0.5	1.3	2.1	0.5
Total	126.4	8.8	18.4	12.7	39.9	0.3

Source: Nicolaas, Spranger and Witvliet (2003)

Labour migration


The desirability of labour migration is a much-discussed topic within Europe. Recently both the European Commission and some European governments have argued that labour migration in EU countries is an indispensable solution for existing and future tensions on the European labour markets. Proponents of further labour migration argue that the influx of labour migrants is necessary to compensate for the decreasing birth rates in most European countries and to restore the balance between the number of economically active and inactive citizens in the ageing European populations.

In response to these discussions the Dutch government has stated that labour migration is not opportune in the Netherlands at this point in time. Despite the profitable economic development and job growth in the Netherlands in the second half of the 1990s there is still an unacceptably large number of job seekers and labour market drop-outs (especially people in disability schemes). According to the Dutch government, large-scale labour migration in the Netherlands will only become an option once Dutch job seekers have been reintegrated in the labour market. This standpoint that has been confirmed by the Dutch labour unions is even more relevant now that the economic situation in the Netherlands has worsened and the unemployment figures are rising. Yet this line of reasoning ignores the specific need for certain workers on the Dutch labour market. On the one hand there is a need for qualified and well-educated workers (nurses, doctors, teachers, ICT specialists, etcetera) in specific economic sectors (health, education, personal and commercial services, ICT). Dutch job seekers are often not qualified for these jobs. On the other hand there is also a need for low-qualified workers in specific economic sectors in which Dutch job seekers are often not willing to work (especially in horticulture and to a lesser extent in the hotel and catering industry). Illegal foreign immigrants often find employment in these sectors.

Despite the formal Dutch denial of the need for labour migration, Dutch employers are increasingly looking for qualified employees abroad. A well-known example of this was the arrival of nurses from the Philippines and South Africa. At present Dutch hospitals are trying to contract South African

doctors on quite a large-scale. This paradox on the Dutch labour market (persistent economic inactivity on the one hand and labour shortages on the other) has also become apparent with the continual growth in the number of temporary work permits issued during the second half of the 1990s. Since 1 September 1995 the employment of non-EU foreigners has been regulated under the Dutch Foreign Nationals Labour Act (Wet Arbeid Vreemdelingen or WAV). The WAV was described in detail in the SOPEMI-Netherlands report of 1995. A temporary work permit on the grounds of the WAV can be seen as an incidental solution for mismatches on the labour market. One of the conditions for a temporary work permit on grounds of the WAV is that individual employers and employees agree on the employment of foreign labourers. Figure 4.1 shows that the number of temporary work permits has increased significantly in recent years.

Figure 4.1: The number of temporary work permits and 'declarations' issued on the ground of the Dutch Foreign Nationals Labour Act (WAV) in the period 1990-2002



Source: WRR 2001, unpublished data by CWI

This chapter gives a more factual picture of the number of foreign temporary workers coming to the Netherlands.

From 1990 to 1997 the number of temporary work permits was fairly stable. In 1997 the number of temporary work permits exceeded 10,000 per year for the first time. In the following four years the number of temporary work permits tripled to reach 30,000 in 2001. In 2002 this increase in the number

of temporary work permits continued, despite of the current economic recession. In 2002, a total of 35,000 temporary work permits were issued.

Table 4.1 shows the countries of origin for labour migrants who came to the Netherlands with a temporary work permit. More than two-thirds of the temporary labour migrants came from Western countries (including Eastern European countries) and one-third came from non-Western countries. In particular, the number of temporary labour migrants from Eastern European countries has increased sharply over the last few years. In 1999 about 6400 temporary workers from several Eastern European countries came to the Netherlands. Four years later, in 2003, their number had more than doubled to almost 15,000. This means that 43 percent of all temporary labour migrants who came to the Netherlands in 2002, came from Eastern European countries, whereas in 1999 this was only 31 percent. Moreover, the number of temporary workers from Poland has risen sharply due to the covenant the Dutch government concluded with agricultural and horticultural organisations that made formal recruitment of Polish seasonal workers possible (see chapter 1). In 2001, the highest number most labour of labour migrants still came from the United States. In 2002 the five countries with the highest number of temporary labour migrants in the Netherlands were: Poland, the former Soviet Union, the United States, the former Czechoslovakian Republic and the People's Republic of China.

Table 4.1: Number of temporary work permits (WAV) by nationality (1996-2002)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total	9173	11,062	15,181	20,816	27,678	30,153	34,558
Western countries	-	-	-	11,994	16,234	17,633	20,184
Eastern Europe	-	-	-	6437	10,047	11,653	14,867
<i>of whom from</i>							
Poland	735	928	1184	1501	2497	2831	6575
Soviet Union (former)	-	-	-	2121	3572	3784	3562
Czechoslovakia (former)	174	256	282	606	1058	1673	1487
Yugoslavia (former)	-	-	-	746	1146	1098	1016
Hungary	275	349	502	662	718	1063	999
Romania	287	193	299	458	643	741	858
Bulgaria	-	-	-	317	387	427	326
other Western countries	-	-	-	5556	6186	5980	5316
<i>of whom from</i>							
United States	1945	2275	2603	2822	3133	2918	2594
Canada	286	412	439	604	628	504	407
Indonesia	146	148	211	482	547	799	795
Japan	949	893	871	890	945	909	1008
Australia	240	263	312	444	505	515	376
Non-Western countries	-	-	-	8695	11,229	12,245	14,044
<i>of whom from</i>							
Turkey	467	442	661	710	1007	931	1109
Sierra Leone	-	-	-	31	81	222	1047
Angola	-	-	-	31	110	268	589
Sudan	7	6	70	322	488	524	569
South Africa	197	223	588	479	566	646	376
Guinea	-	-	-	11	60	110	324
Somalia	-	-	-	158	273	321	241
Cameroon	-	-	-	45	92	144	222
Morocco	-	-	-	198	230	198	211
Suriname	-	-	-	261	364	445	387
China	578	489	512	701	980	1161	1743
Afghanistan	8	15	238	651	580	699	979
Iraq	12	30	964	1520	1627	1176	793
India	390	519	830	901	1006	974	778
Iran	-	-	-	160	300	448	545
Syria	-	-	-	95	188	196	285

Source: CWI

Table 4.2 shows the types of jobs for which temporary work permits were issued. Contrary to the popular idea that temporary work permits are primarily issued for better-qualified professions, the data reveal that the highest number of work permits are issued for work in the agricultural and horticultural sectors. In 2001 more than one-quarter of all temporary work permits were issued for agricultural and horticultural work and in 2002 this was one-third. The sudden increase in the number of Polish temporary labour migrants in 2002 seems to be related to the growing need for agricultural and horticultural workers in the Netherlands. The increasing number of foreign agricultural and horticultural workers is striking, since the idea that Dutch unemployed persons can be employed in this sector is frequently discussed. Other lower-qualified professions that attract a relatively large number of

labour migrants are various industrial production jobs, chauffeurs and personnel for the hotel and catering industry.

In addition to these lower-qualified professions, labour migrants are also attracted to certain more highly qualified jobs. A relatively large proportion of temporary work permits are issued for the artistic professions such singers, musicians and dancers. Three different more highly qualified professions with a relatively large number of labour migrants are scientists, computer and information specialists and other executive professions.

Table 4.2: Number of temporary work permits (WAV) by type of profession (1999-2002)

	absolute				in percentages			
	1999	2000	2001	2002	1999	2000	2001	2002
Agriculture / horticulture	5040	7694	8046	11,749	24.2	27.8	26.7	34.0
Artistic professions	3616	4324	4408	3971	17.4	15.6	14.6	11.5
Production work	1132	1996	2828	4127	5.4	7.2	9.4	11.9
Science	2377	2851	2715	2576	11.4	10.3	9.0	7.5
Computer specialists	1725	2209	2291	1193	8.3	8.0	7.6	3.5
Executive professions	1525	1889	1972	1712	7.3	6.8	6.5	5.0
Advisors	1962	1919	1749	1443	9.4	6.9	5.8	4.2
Chauffeurs	898	1088	1358	1396	4.3	3.9	4.5	4.0
Hotel and catering industry	410	672	1019	1543	2.0	2.4	3.4	4.5
Other services	1311	2032	2192	3240	6.3	7.3	7.3	9.4
Construction	139	278	615	294	0.7	1.0	2.0	0.9
Health care	182	291	429	605	0.9	1.1	1.4	1.8
Sports	261	256	210	199	1.3	0.9	0.7	0.6
Unskilled labour	44	43	111	310	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.9
Mechanics	55	59	91	125	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4
Other professions	71	76	119	75	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.2
Unknown	68	1	0	0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
All professions	20,816	27,678	30,153	34,558	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: CWI

Table 4.3: Temporary work permits (WAV) by type of profession and region 2002 (in percent)

	Total (N)	Western countries				Non-Western countries			
		Eastern Europe	Northern-America	Japan / Indonesia	Oceania	Turkey	Africa	Other America	Other Asia
Agriculture / horticulture	11,542	48.7	0.7	1.9	0.8	15.2	42.5	4.2	27.4
Artistic professions	3967	14.2	30.7	3.8	12.6	3.0	4.8	22.5	4.2
Production work	4062	9.7	6.5	5.2	6.5	13.3	20.4	6.3	15.4
Science	2562	5.7	8.9	11.5	12.8	5.6	4.0	15.8	11.0
Computer specialists	1190	1.6	6.2	3.3	15.7	3.0	1.5	3.9	7.2
Executive professions	1710	0.8	19.1	23.1	16.1	8.5	1.3	4.8	4.6
Advisors	1438	1.6	13.4	11.0	21.2	5.8	1.9	7.4	3.9
Chauffeurs	1396	7.1	0.1		1.0	26.8	0.5	0.2	0.1
Hotel /catering	1522	3.5	0.4	14.8	1.7	3.1	2.5	4.6	7.6
Other services	3205	3.7	8.1	12.0	7.8	11.3	15.6	23.0	14.5
Construction	294	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.2	3.1	0.2	0.1	0.2
Health care	604	0.9	1.4	11.8	0.2	0.2	1.3	2.9	1.7
Sports	199	0.2	3.6	0.3	3.1	0.0	0.3	1.4	0.1
Unskilled labour	304	0.4	0.1	0.8	0.0	0.5	2.4	2.1	1.1
Mechanics	122	0.3	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.4
Other professions	75	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.8	0.4
Total	34,192	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(n)		(14,867)	(3001)	(1803)	(477)	(1109)	(5202)	(1086)	(6647)

Source: CWI

Table 4.3 shows the types of jobs in which temporary workers from different countries are employed. Hardly surprisingly, there are clear differences between temporary workers from the more developed Western countries on the one hand and temporary workers from Eastern Europe and developing countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia on the other. Temporary workers from the developed Western countries (USA, Canada, Japan, Oceania, including Australia and New Zealand) predominantly work in high-skilled jobs such as executive professions and advisors. American temporary workers are also frequently employed in the artistic professions. Temporary workers from Eastern European countries, in particular Poland, and from African countries predominantly work in the agricultural and horticultural sectors. Eastern European and Latin American temporary workers also frequently work in the artistic professions. African and Asian temporary workers frequently work in production jobs. African, Latin American and Asian temporary workers are also frequently employed in the so-called 'other services' such as cleaning jobs.

Developments in asylum migration

5.1 Introduction

This chapter briefly describes recent developments with respect to the influx of asylum seekers and asylum policy. The most striking aspect is the sharp decrease in the number of asylum seekers over the past five years. The new Dutch Aliens Act, which came into effect in 2000, is held responsible for this decrease. In this chapter we will mainly focus on the influx of asylum seekers to the Netherlands and changes in the composition of this category. Finally, we will examine the concluding part of the asylum policy, the return policy.

5.2 Admission Policy

In Chapter 1 we have discussed recent changes in Dutch legislation with regard to asylum seekers. Apart from this new legislation, we can witness a stricter selection in the centres where asylum seekers have to report. An increasing number of cases are rejected in the 'accelerated asylum procedure'. In 2001, 22 percent of all asylum applications were rejected in the accelerated procedure. In 2002 this figure rose to 45 percent. The central criterion for dealing with cases in the accelerated procedure is whether they can be rejected within 48 processing hours without time-consuming investigations (including manifestly unfounded cases and cases where a claim can be lodged with a third country). In principle this procedure takes 48 hours, not including the night hours. In practice the asylum seeker has to wait for four to five days in a registration centre.

The accelerated procedure and the rising percentage in asylum centre rejections have attracted criticism. Due to the speed of the procedures problems could arise in establishing the facts. Many asylum seekers are not given sufficient opportunity to present their case for asylum. In the asylum centres there is too little time to collect the documents. Traumatized, ill, old or minor asylum seekers generally need more time than the 48 processing

hours to present their case for asylum. There is too little time for legal assistance. All of these problems could mean that the facts on which the Minister bases his decision about the asylum request are incorrect or incomplete. The incomplete collection of the facts also has consequences for a possible review of a negative decision. The (marginal) judicial review is of course limited. The judge must chiefly base his decision on the facts collected by the IND. This criticism was pointedly made in a report by Human Rights Watch, "*Fleeting Refuge: The Triumph of Efficiency over Protection in Dutch Asylum Policy*", was rejected by the Dutch government. The government has consistently challenged this criticism, in part by arguing that the judge aims to uphold more than 90 percent of the asylum centre decisions and that the accelerated procedure makes it clear to those abroad that non-serious asylum seekers have no chance of receiving long-term asylum reception. However, these arguments from the government are not undisputed. Many still argue that the lengthening of the decision process will improve its quality.

The stricter Dutch policy is also apparent from the changes which have occurred with respect to the categorical protection policy. In 2002 the categorical protection policy for both Afghanistan and Sierra Leone was terminated.

5.3 Asylum requests

The Dutch government's restrictive asylum policy is probably the most important reason for the decrease in the number of asylum applications (especially the high percentage of rejections in the accelerated procedure and the strict policy for unaccompanied minors). The number of asylum requests decreased from more than 32,000 in 2001 to some 19,000 in 2002 (see table 5.1). In table 5.1 we can see the large monthly differences between the years 2001 and 2002 and in figure 5.1 we can see the trends over a period of more than 10 years.


Developments in asylum migration

Tabel 5.1: Total number of individual asylum seekers who arrived, with monthly breakdown and percentage variation between years:

Month	2001	2002	Variation +/- (%)
January	3697	2377	-35.7
February	2805	1972	-29.7
March	3086	1950	-36.8
April	2781	1767	-36.5
May	2549	1590	-37.6
June	2219	1479	-33.3
July	2475	1419	-42.7
August	2462	1350	-45.2
September	2551	1432	-43.9
October	3401	1374	-59.6
November	2399	1037	-56.8
December	2154	920	-57.3
Total	32,579	18,667	-42.7

Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service

Figure 5.1: Asylum requests by country of nationality, 1991-2002



Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline

In 2002, almost all countries of origin exhibited a large absolute decrease in asylum influx in comparison to previous years (see table 5.2).

Table 5.2: Asylum requests by country of nationality, 1997-2002 (top ten countries 2002)

Country of nationality	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Angola	370	610	1580	2200	4111	1891
Soviet Union (former)	1960	3230	5520	4200	3235	1891
Sierra Leone	390	480	1280	2030	2405	1620
Afghanistan	5920	7120	4400	5050	3614	1077
Iraq	9640	8300	3710	2780	1329	1022
Yugoslavia (former)	3790	8330	8520	5700	2184	847
Iran	1250	1680	1530	2550	1519	665
Turkey	1140	1220	1500	2270	1400	638
Nigeria	300	390	240	290	401	556
China	1160	920	1240	1400	703	541
Other nationalities	8520	12940	13210	15420	11678	7919
Total	34440	45220	42730	43890	32579	18667

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline, Ministry of Justice

A closer examination of the figures from the former Soviet Union countries reveals that most of the asylum applications come from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia and the Ukraine (see table 5.3).

Table 5.3: Asylum applications from Former Soviet Union countries in The Netherlands

Country of origin	1999	2000	2001	2002
Armenia	1249	812	529	427
Azerbaijan	2449	1163	634	335
Belarus	40	113	115	131
Estonia	0	2	3	3
Georgia	321	291	298	219
Kazakhstan	102	180	133	43
Kyrgyzstan	6	119	71	55
Latvia	10	9	9	10
Lithuania	12	11	12	9
Moldova	31	28	20	31
Russia	960	1016	911	420
Tajikistan	21	42	56	12
Turkmenistan	0	1	1	0
Ukraine	306	218	191	156
Uzbekistan	13	197	252	40
Total	5520	4202	3235	1891
Totals	1999	2000	2001	2002
Applications from Former S.U.	5520	4202	3235	1891
Total applications in The Netherlands	39299	43895	32579	18667
Percentage Former S.U.	14%	10%	10%	10%

Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service

The proportion of asylum applications from (former) countries where a residence permit is granted on the basis of a categorical protection policy (former Provisional Residence Permit Policy) decreased from 56 percent of the total issued in the Netherlands in 1998 to just 34 percent in 2002. The number of asylum seekers from, for example, Angola (-54 percent), Sierra Leone (-33 percent) and Afghanistan (-70 percent) decreased dramatically in 2002. The decreases for Afghanistan and Sierra Leone were due to the general protection policies for these countries being terminated in the summer of 2002 (see table 5.4).

Table 5.4: Asylum applications from nationalities with current or former categorial protection policy in The Netherlands

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Afghanistan	5920	7118	4400	5055	3614	1077
Bosnia-Herz.	1968	3769	1169	1652	1026	221
Burundi	64	147	204	335	427	452
D.R. Congo	592	411	252	539	500	522
Iraq	9641	8300	3703	2773	1329	1022
Liberia	471	193	175	240	167	292
Rwanda	192	415	422	334	222	118
Sierra Leone	390	482	1280	2023	2405	1620
Somalia	1280	2775	2697	2110	1098	538
Sudan	678	1875	1744	1426	869	513
Total	21196	25485	16046	16487	11657	6375
Totals	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Applications cat. prot.	21196	25485	16046	16487	11657	6375
Total applications in The Netherlands	34443	45217	39299	43895	32579	18667
Percentage cat. prot.	62%	56%	41%	38%	36%	34%

Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service

The influx of indicated unaccompanied minor asylum seekers in the Netherlands decreased from 5009 in 1999 to 3232 in 2002. However, the figure of unaccompanied minors as a percentage of the total influx of asylum seekers remains rather high and stable (17 percent). In 2002, the main countries of origin were still Angola, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Afghanistan.

Table 5.5: Influx of indicated unaccompanied minor asylum seekers in The Netherlands

Country of origin	INDIS			
	1999	2000	2001	2002*
Angola	756	1059	1991	854
Iraq	335	261	117	56
Sierra Leone	529	757	728	392
Ivory Coast	2	48	37	46
Guinea	380	819	668	199
Somalia	496	410	248	87
Nigeria	24	31	43	70
D.R. Congo	77	123	116	101
Afghanistan	215	303	228	141
Ethiopia	60	78	73	46
Other	2135	2816	1702	1240
Total UMA	5009	6705	5951	3232
* Data on 2002 and 2003 are provisional				
	INDIS			
	1999	2000	2001	2002*
UMA	5009	6705	5951	3232
Total	37921	43895	32579	18667
Percentage UMA	13%	15%	18%	17%

Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service

5.4 Asylum requests in Europe

The decrease in the number of asylum seekers in the Netherlands is also clear if we compare the Dutch data with data from 13 other European countries with respect to the influx of asylum requests under consideration. Table 5.6 presents the influx in asylum requests under consideration during

the first nine months of 2002 compared with the same period in 2001. In the months January to September 2002 more than 300,000 asylum applications were submitted in the countries stated, a rise of 3 percent with respect to the same period in 2001. There were particularly strong increases in the United Kingdom, Sweden and Austria.

Table 5.6: Asylum requests in Europe compared; 2002 with 2001 period January-September

	Jan-Sep 2001	Jan-Sep 2002	Mutation	Mutation in %
United Kingdom	64024	79405	15381	24%
Germany	66017	54272	-11745	-18%
France	34443	37270	2827	8%
Austria	22382	27733	5351	24%
Sweden	15831	23978	8147	51%
Switzerland	15013	19246	4233	28%
The Netherlands	24625	15336	-9289	-38%
Belgium	18855	14008	-4847	-26%
Norway	10143	13286	3143	31%
Ireland	7569	8412	843	11%
Spain	6538	4806	-1732	-26%
Denmark	9514	4579	-4935	-52%
Finland	1266	2440	1174	93%
Total	296220	304771	8551	3%

Source: Inter-Governmental Consultations (IGC)

5.5 Granted asylum requests

The submission of an asylum request is the first step in a process. Only some of the asylum requests are actually approved. Table 5.8 shows the number of asylum requests approved per year for ten different groups. The number of asylum requests approved has shown a marked decrease. In 1997 almost 17,000 requests were approved, whereas in 2002 less than 30 percent of this number were approved. The majority of requests approved were for asylum seekers from Sierra Leone.

Table 5.7: Asylum requests granted by country of nationality, 1997-2002 (top ten countries 2001)

Country of nationality	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Sierra Leone	50	130	160	280	1410	1190
Iraq	4340	5990	550	510	660	420
Soviet Union (former)	650	530	510	480	410	360
Burundi	30	70	50	170	300	300
Angola	200	140	200	580	230	300
Somalia	1180	880	1030	920	440	270
Iran	1100	600	530	350	210	270
Afghanistan	4240	3990	4380	3410	2440	230
Sudan	530	820	300	420	380	230
Yugoslavia (former)	2260	350	420	730	600	150
Other nationalities	2410	1600	1360	1880	1160	1080
Total	16990	15100	9490	9730	8240	4800

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline, numbers rounded in units of five

Table 5.8 provides additional information about the type of status awarded. From the data presented it is clear that there has been a strong decrease in the number of 'A statuses' awarded during the period 1997-2000, whereas

the granting of residence permits with a humanitarian status has decreased much less. The figures for 2002 concern statuses awarded under the new Aliens Act and they therefore cannot be simply compared with the situation in 2000. Table A5.2 in the appendix provides an overview of the statuses granted from 1988 onwards.

Table 5.8: Refugees admitted and the humanitarian or refugee status granted 1997-2002

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
<i>Before new Aliens Act 2000</i>						
Refugees						
Individual requests 'A status' granted	6630	2356	1507	1808	444	
Humanitarian status						
Granted (VtV)	5176	3591	3471	4791	1567	
Provisional status temporary protection (VVtV)	5182	9152	8512	3127	806	
<i>After new Aliens Law 2000 (april 2001)</i>						
VV asylum fixed term					4906	4076
VV asylum indefinite term					508	721
VV asylum fixed term (not granted)						26807
VV asylum indefinite term (not granted)						54
Refused (old and new Aliens Law)	28318	28173	41367	57418	51317	26381

Source : Ministry of Justice

The figures presented in the previous tables concern the decision taken during the year in question (approved or rejected), irrespective of the year in which the asylum request was submitted. Therefore the figures presented about approvals cannot be directly compared with the figures presented in table 5.2 about the asylum requests submitted and thus do not provide any insight into the percentage approved. In order to delineate the percentage approved cohort studies are needed. In the 2001-Sopemi Study we have presented the results of a cohort study conducted by Van der Erf (2002). On the basis of material made available by the IND concerning the completion of asylum procedures according to the year of submission (1994-2000), Van der Erf concluded that the percentage of asylum requests approved in the Netherlands has significantly decreased. For asylum seekers who submitted their request in 1997, the approval percentage was 47 percent. For those who submitted their request in 2000 the figure was probably not be higher than 17 percent. The results of recent cohort studies show that the approval percentage is still decreasing. For 2001 the approval percentage was 13 percent.

5.6 Return policy and the expulsion of asylum seekers

The majority of aliens who request asylum in the Netherlands do not receive a residence permit and therefore there is a constant stream of aliens leaving the Netherlands. Most of these aliens depart of their own volition and a small number need to be forcibly expelled. The return of legally removable asylum seekers is one of the most unmanageable parts of the alien policy. There are three basic assumptions in the Dutch return policy.

A first basic principle is that in the asylum procedure, the responsibility for self-reliant return rests on the asylum seeker. The idea behind this is that the asylum seeker managed to get to the Netherlands on his own initiative and must therefore return on his own initiative as well. After every negative decision in the procedure the asylum seeker will be reminded of his responsibility and encouraged to make preparations for his return.

A second basic principle is that the government's primary responsibility is to terminate the refuge provisions. If the asylum seeker does not leave of his own accord then enforced departure can be effected.

Finally there is a high level of cooperation between the various authorities involved such as the Aliens Police, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service, the Central Council for the Reception of Asylum-Seekers [Dutch acronym: COA) and the Royal Netherlands Military Police. In the case of voluntary return the asylum seeker can request support from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).

The main stages in the return process are:

For each negative decision in the asylum procedure of an asylum seeker the IND informs the COA of this by sending a copy of the judicial order or judgement.

- After it has received each copy of the judicial order of judgement, the COA invites the asylum seeker to an interview. In this interview the asylum seeker is informed of the possibility that in the end he will not be allowed to remain in the Netherlands and in that case the reception facilities will be terminated after 28 days. The asylum seeker is advised not to wait until after the 28 days have elapsed and to prepare for a possible departure during this 28-day period. In this he is reminded of his own

responsibility. For help and advice in these preparations for an independent return he is referred to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). For legal information and support he is referred to the Dutch Refugee Council and his own lawyer. Before the asylum seeker can finally be expelled legally, the COA holds a final interview. In this interview (complimentary to the aforementioned information) the asylum seeker is informed that he must leave the reception facility within 28 days. If he does not do that voluntarily the accommodation will be cleared by the police or alien police.

- 28 days after the alien has been informed that he or she must leave the country, a check is performed to establish whether this has actually happened. The Aliens Department then carries out an *address check* at the last known address of the alien. The alien is considered to be "administratively removed" if he is not encountered at the address and it can be assumed that he has departed. In the majority of cases this implies "departure with unknown destination".
- If the alien is found at the last known address after 28 days and forced return as possible then the person is taken into custody before being *deported or leaving under supervision*.

The rejected asylum seeker can receive various forms of supervision for his return. For example, there are country specific projects in which the Dutch government cooperates with the countries of origin and a range of organisations who are active in the field of migration. Furthermore, there is supervision from the return office of the IOM which assists rejected asylum seekers in their return. In 2002, the number of people who returned to the country of origin or migrated further and in so doing were assisted by the IOM increased by 25 percent compared to 2001 (this mostly concerned rejected asylum seekers). In 2002, 2194 persons departed with help from the IOM.

The number of people that voluntarily departed with help from the IOM is relatively small compared to the total number of 'expelled asylum seekers' in 2002, namely 21,255. From the table below it can be seen that the number of expelled asylum seekers rose considerably compared to 2001 (almost 25 percent). In particular, asylum seekers from Iraq, (former) Yugoslavia, (former) Soviet Union and Somalia were expelled on a large-scale (see table 5.9). However, we do not know the extent to which these groups also actually


left the Netherlands. In figure 5.2 the removals for the period 1992-2001 are detailed according to the type of removal.

Table 5.9: Expelled asylum seekers by country of nationality, 1997-2002 (top ten countries 2002)

Country of nationality	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Iraq	1040	1190	1940	1310	1780	2421
Yugoslavia (former)	2910	3280	6210	4140	2180	2300
Soviet Union (former)	1360	960	950	1420	1350	1880
Somalia	1120	680	850	890	940	1526
Turkey	790	820	660	880	1250	1047
Iran	1070	440	460	730	770	1012
Afghanistan	480	670	980	650	1090	882
Sierra Leone	160	150	190	290	490	801
Angola	430	180	110	170	250	760
Congo	630	350	130	170	200	750
Other nationalities	8880	5620	5860	5970	5720	7876
Total	18870	14340	18340	16620	16020	21255

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline, Ministry of Justice

Figure 5.2: Expelled asylum seekers by type of expulsion, 1992-2002



Source: Statistics Netherlands

The chart shows that the proportion of compulsory removals (Controlled departure and Expulsion) has strongly decreased during the past three years. In 1999, more than one-third of all removals occurred in this manner, whereas in 2001 only 20 percent of the rejected asylum seekers were forcibly expelled from the country. Also in absolute terms the number of expulsions and the number of cases in which controlled departure takes place is decreasing. By far the greatest numbers of rejected asylum seekers are therefore removed by means of checking the address. Although this is in accordance with the policy's objectives, the asylum seeker bearing

responsibility for his return, it is not clear whether these persons actually leave the country or continue to remain in the Netherlands as illegal immigrants. There are clear indications that a significant proportion will continue to remain in the Netherlands on an illegal basis (Engbersen et al, 2001). Figures about detained illegal aliens in the period 1997-2000 reveal, for example, that substantial numbers of illegal aliens from 'asylum countries' such as Iraq, (former) Yugoslavia, (former) Soviet Union and Somalia were detained (Engbersen et al, 2002).

Due to the problems in returning, two tendencies are visible. Firstly, more use has been made of enforced return by means of building special centres. Secondly, use has also been made of the expertise of local organisations that offer help to rejected asylum seekers. An example of the latter is the cooperative project between the IOM and the Pauluskerk in Rotterdam, which has a considerable reputation with respect to receiving and helping marginal groups such as drug addicts, rejected asylum seekers and illegal aliens. In 2002 a cooperative project was set up, financed by the European Refugee Fund, within the framework of the 'Return and Emigration of Aliens from the Netherlands (REAN)' programme. In this project, efforts are made to provide specific assistance to groups of illegal aliens and asylum seekers from the former Soviet Union. Within the framework of this project almost 190 people returned to the States of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus with help from the IOM and the Pauluskerk. In the majority of cases, however, this concerned illegal aliens and not rejected asylum seekers.

Appendix for chapter 5

Table A5.1: Admitted refugees and humanitarian or refugee status granted 1997-2002

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
<i>Before new Aliens Law 2000</i>															
Refugees															
Invited refugees	782	596	701	589	643	659	554	605	615	187	502	11	*	*	
Individual requests A-status granted	589	1032	694	775	4923	10338	6654	7980	8806	6630	2356	1507	1808	444	
Total refugees	1371	1628	1395	1364	5566	10997	7208	8585	9421	6817	2858	1518	1808	444	
Humanitarian status															
Granted (VtV)	915	1076	857	1920	6891	4674	9235	6203	7384	5176	3591	3471	4791	1567	
Provisional status temporary protection (VVtV)							3456	4318	7400	5182	9152	8512	3127	806	
<i>After new Aliens Law 2000 (april 2001)</i>															
VV asylum fixed term														4906	4076
VV asylum indefinite term														508	721
VV asylum fixed term (not granted)															26807
VV asylum indefinite term (not granted)															54
Refused (old and new Aliens Law)	7337	9674	8999	14544	20304	15759	32146	32297	51686	28318	28173	41367	57418	51317	26381

Source : Ministry of Justice, uit Muus 2001 aangevuld met gegevens over 2000

Stock of foreign nationals and immigrant population in the Netherlands

6.1 Introduction

The previous four chapters have described the immigration flows to and from the Netherlands. In this chapter we describe the stock of foreign nationals and the immigrant population living in the Netherlands. Before we provide any concrete figures on this, we first of all need to address the problem of definitions. Which persons are considered to be an 'immigrant' or a 'foreigner' in the Dutch statistics? International statistics on the subject contain a variety of information about two types of 'foreigner', namely 'foreign nationals' (that is, residents in a country with a different nationality) and 'foreign born' (that is, residents from a country who - independent of their nationality - were born outside of the country). However, in the Netherlands a third, more complicated, definition of 'non-Dutch' is in use. Whether somebody is considered to be 'non-Dutch' (in official language 'allochtonous'), is determined by the *ethnic origin* of the person concerned and this in turn is determined by the country of birth of both the person concerned and his or her parents. The Dutch statistical authorities (Statistics Netherlands) have chosen this non-standard definition of 'non-Dutch' because they consider the usual definitions based on the nationality of the country of birth of the person concerned to be too limited. First of all we will discuss why the usual definitions of 'foreigners' are found to be too limited for the Netherlands and then the alternative definition which is used in the Dutch statistics.

Someone who wishes to know how many immigrants live in a country, must first of all establish exactly who belongs to this category. The most obvious means of doing this is to count the number of people with a different *nationality* (*foreign nationals*). However, in the case of the Netherlands in particular, there are a variety of good reasons as to why the number of

people with a non-Dutch nationality provides a very incomplete picture of the total immigrant population. First of all, as a former colonial power, the Netherlands has a relatively high number of immigrants from the former colonies. However, a significant proportion of these postcolonial migrants (originating from Suriname or the Netherlands Antilles) have the Dutch nationality. If we were to examine just the number of non-Dutch nationals in the Netherlands then this group of immigrants would not be considered. Secondly, the same is true for immigrants who have meanwhile acquired the Dutch nationality - this is relatively easy in the Netherlands and therefore occurs quite frequently. And finally, according to the present regulations, all children born in the Netherlands with at least one Dutch parent (including naturalised immigrants) automatically have the Dutch nationality. For all of these reasons the number of people with a non-Dutch nationality provides a very limited picture as to the size of the total immigrant population in the Netherlands.

A second means of establishing the number of immigrants in the country is to take the country of birth of those concerned. Persons born outside of the country (foreign born) are then included in the immigrant population. Although this definition is often used internationally, it nonetheless has limitations. The first problem is that if only the country of birth of those concerned is considered, children born outside of the Netherlands but to Dutch parents are then counted as immigrants. A second problem of this approach is that it excludes the children of immigrants born in the Netherlands (so-called second-generation). After all they were born in the Netherlands and are therefore not 'foreign born'. However, the Dutch authorities also want to keep track of this second generation of migrant children and one of the main reasons for this is the considerable number of socially disadvantaged persons in this group.

As a result of these limitations the Dutch government has decided to adopt a third approach for determining the immigrant population. This is based on the ethnic origin of persons, which is based on the country of birth of the person concerned as well as that of his or her parents. Officially, the Dutch language terms such persons with a foreign ethnic origin 'allochtonous' and persons with a Dutch origin 'autochtonous'. Under the 'allochtonous' a distinction is made between the first and second generation. Somebody is considered to be allochtonous if they and at least one of the parents were born outside of the Netherlands or if they were born in the Netherlands but both parents were

born outside of Netherlands. Therefore, a child born *outside* of the Netherlands but with two Dutch parents is not considered to be allochtonous, but a child born outside of the Netherlands with one foreign parent is. A child born *in* the Netherlands with one Dutch and one foreign parent is not considered to be allochtonous, but a child born in the Netherlands with two foreign parents is.

Finally, in the official statistics a distinction is still frequently made between Western and non-Western allochtonous. 'Western allochtonous people' originate from the rich, industrialised countries: Europe (both EU countries as well as the countries in Middle and Eastern Europe), the United States and Canada, but in addition to this also Japan and Oceania (in particular Australia and New Zealand). In the official Dutch statistics Indonesia is also considered to be a Western country (probably for historical reasons). 'Non-Western allochtonous people' are therefore persons originating from all other countries in Central and South America (including Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles), Africa and Asia. Finally, it must be stated that Turkey is the only European country which is considered to be one of the ' non-Western countries'.

We first of all describe the stock of foreign nationals and the immigrant population in the Netherlands according to different definitions. In so doing we will see that the different definitions and approaches result in a variety of figures (section 6.2). We will then describe the various demographic characteristics of the allochtonous population in the Netherlands (section 6.3), the trend in the number of naturalisations (section 6.4) and the few data about money transfers by immigrants living in the Netherlands to their respective countries of origin (section 6.4).

6.2 Numbers of non-Dutch residents and immigrants in the Netherlands

From table 6.1 it is clear that the definition of the non-Dutch population used makes a considerable difference. Based on the number of foreign nationals, the number of non-Dutch residents is 700,000 persons. Based on ethnic origin, the number of non-Dutch residents ('allochtonous') is however almost four times as high (almost 3 million persons). If just persons with a non-Dutch nationality are included, 4.3 percent of the total Dutch population belongs to

this category. If one takes all of the allochthonous population (both first and second generation, originating from both Western and non-Western countries) then in 2002, one in five Dutch residents (19 percent) belonged to this category. Slightly less than half of the allochthonous population originates from other Western countries (including the countries in Middle and Eastern Europe): 1.4 million persons or 9 percent of the total population in the Netherlands. Slightly more than half of the allochthonous population originates from Non-Western countries: 1.6 million persons or 10 percent of the total Dutch population.

Therefore for the Netherlands, the formal nationality of immigrants is a far from satisfactory manner for gaining insights into the total size of the non-Dutch population. The same is also true for other countries where it is relatively simple to acquire the new nationality. The last column of table 6.1 shows what proportion of a certain population category (based on the ethnic origin, therefore first and second generation) still has the nationality of the country of origin. This makes it clear that a relatively large number of immigrants and their descendants in the Netherlands have the Dutch nationality. Surprisingly enough this is not only the case for migrant groups who have freely settled such as Indonesians, Surinamese and Cape Verdians, but also for migrant groups who have arrived fairly recently in the Netherlands, many of whom came to the Netherlands as asylum migrants (Somalians, Syrians, Angolans, Iranians, Iraqis, Ethiopians and Afghans). For each of these migrant groups less than one in eight people (12 percent) still possesses the nationality of the country of origin.

Stock of foreign nationals and immigrant population in the Netherlands

Table 6.1: Stock of non-Dutch or allochtonous population in the Netherlands 2002 (= 1-1-2003)

	(I) Nationality	(II) Country of birth	(III) Ethnic origin	III as % of the entire Dutch population	% with nationality of their country of origin
Total	16,192,572	16,192,572	16,192,572	100.0	
Dutch/autochtonous	15,492,618	14,478,417	13,153,814	81.2	
non-Dutch/allochtonous	699,954	1,714,155	3,038,758	18.8	23.0
<i>of which</i>					
Western countries	291,423	662,438	1,416,156	8.7	20.6
<i>of which</i>					
14 EU countries	210,549	312,784	749,561	4.6	28.1
<i>of which</i>					
Germany	56,060	120,573	393,207	2.4	14.3
United Kingdom	44,052	48,502	76,078	0.5	57.9
Belgium	26,306	46,847	113,239	0.7	23.2
Eastern Europe	36,505	126,988	182,722	1.1	20.0
<i>of which</i>					
Yugoslavia (former)	11,754	56,157	76,007	0.5	15.5
Soviet Union (former)	9533	30,791	39,375	0.2	24.2
Poland	6912	20,095	34,051	0.2	20.3
Czechoslovakia (former)	2374	5707	9596	0.1	24.7
Hungary	1832	5628	12,530	0.1	14.6
other Western countries	44,369	222,666	483,873	3.0	9.2
<i>of which</i>				0.0	
United States	15,412	22,543	29,859	0.2	51.6
Canada	3435	8817	12,487	0.1	27.5
Australia	3352	10,141	13,960	0.1	24.0
Indonesia	10786	161,443	400,622	2.5	2.7
Japan	5747	6035	7116	0.0	80.8
Non-Western countries	292,962	1,051,705	1,622,602	10.0	18.1
<i>of which</i>					
Turkey	100,286	190,488	341,400	2.1	29.4
Morocco	97,843	163,422	295,332	1.8	33.1
Somalia	2116	19,560	27,567	0.2	7.7
South Africa	3330	12,264	14,914	0.1	22.3
Ghana	3630	11,798	17,974	0.1	20.2
Cape Verde	1289	11,340	19,353	0.1	6.7
Egypt	2440	10,381	17,026	0.1	14.3
Ethiopia	1166	8059	10,120	0.1	11.5
Angola	1009	9804	11,710	0.1	8.6
Sudan	1089	6533	7629	0.0	14.3
Congo	1310	5950	8312	0.1	15.8
Suriname	8573	189,007	320,658	2.0	2.7
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba	-	91,646	129,312	0.8	--
Colombia	1743	10,820	8798	0.1	19.8
Brazil	2994	9258	10,900	0.1	27.5
Dominican Republic	1165	6819	9200	0.1	12.7
Iraq	4771	35,793	41,959	0.3	11.4
Afghanistan	3997	30,959	34,249	0.2	11.7
China	11,223	28,686	38,815	0.2	28.9
Iran	2513	24,154	28,043	0.2	9.0
India	3416	11,616	12,971	0.1	26.3
Vietnam	2274	11,656	16,865	0.1	13.5
Pakistan	2605	11,096	17,749	0.1	14.7
Hong Kong		10,458	17,923	0.1	0.0
Sri Lanka	1604	10,418	9606	0.1	16.7
Philippines	2597	7959	11,755	0.1	22.1
Thailand	3783	8329	10,497	0.1	36.0
Syria	670	6490	8466	0.1	7.9
South Korea	1421	5675	3072	0.0	46.3
Unknown/stateless	115,569				

Source: Statistics Netherlands

Tables A6.2 and A6.3 (in the appendix to this chapter) provide insights into the trends in the number of residents in the Netherlands with a non-Dutch background. In table A6.2 this background is based on the nationality (foreign nationals) and in table A6.3 on the ethnic origin. If we examine the number of foreign nationals in the Netherlands then surprisingly their numbers have decreased since 1995, despite the fact that there were strong increases in immigration surpluses in the second half of the 1990s (see chapter 2). The number of foreign nationals originating from other Western countries has increased somewhat, but we can see a considerable decrease in the number of foreign nationals from the various Eastern European countries (from almost 50,000 in 1995 to 36,000 in 2002) and in particular from the non-Western countries (from almost 440,000 in 1995 to less than 300,000 in 2002). The number of foreign nationals originating from traditional immigration countries such as Turkey and Morocco decreased by about one third in this period. In view of the ongoing immigration from non-Western countries this decrease in the number of foreign nationals from these countries can only be explained by an apparently very high number of naturalisations. This will be further examined in section 5.4.

Table A6.3 shows the trends in the number of allochtonous persons in the Netherlands between 1995 and 2002. The number of allochtonous persons in the Netherlands is increasing rapidly, from scarcely 2.5 million in 1995 to more than 3 million in 2002. This means that in just seven years the number of allochtonous persons in the Netherlands has increased by more than 20 percent, whereas the total Dutch population in this period only grew slightly (about 5 percent). The strong growth in the number of allochtonous persons in the Netherlands can mainly be put down to the number of allochtonous persons originating from the various Eastern European countries and from the non-Western countries. The number of Eastern European allochtonous persons increased by more than 50 percent between 1995 and 2002 (from 119,000 to 180,000). The number of allochtonous persons originating from the former Soviet Union almost tripled in this period. We have already seen that immigrants from the former Soviet Union are the most rapidly growing immigrant group in the Netherlands. However, the number of allochtonous persons originating from non-Western countries also grew rapidly in this period: from almost 1.2 million in 1995 to more than 1.6 million in 2002, in other words a growth of almost 40 percent in a period of 7 years.

Finally, table A6.3 distinguishes between allochtonous persons from the first and second generation in the year 2002. These groups seemed to be the same size: of the more than 3 million allochtonous persons in the Netherlands in 2002, 52 percent belonged to the first generation (born outside of the Netherlands to at least one foreign parent) and 48 percent to the second generation (born in the Netherlands to two foreign parents). The proportion of second-generation allochtonous persons is particularly high amongst the various Western migrant groups such as the Germans (73 percent), Belgians (68 percent), Indonesians (66 percent), Canadians and Australians (both 65 percent). The non-Western allochtonous group with the greatest proportion of second-generation individuals are the Moroccans (45 percent of all Moroccans living in the Netherlands - measured on the basis of ethnic origin - were born in the Netherlands). Allochtonous groups with the highest proportion of first-generation migrants are citizens of the former Soviet Union, Japanese, Angolans, Iraqis, Iranians, Sudanese and Afghans. For each of these groups, 80 percent of the total population was born outside of the Netherlands.

6.3 Some demographic characteristics of the immigrant population

In this section we will discuss some demographic characteristics of the allochtonous population in the Netherlands. We will examine the distribution according to age and sex, the regional distribution of the allochtonous population and finally available predictions concerning the trends in the allochtonous population in the coming decennia.

Table 5.4 shows the distribution of the Dutch and allochtonous population according to age and sex. With this the allochtonous population is split into those originating from Western and those originating from non-Western countries. With respect to the distribution according to sex (gender) we see few or no differences between the population groups. For both the Dutch population and the non-Western allochtonous population the proportion of men in the total population is slightly more than half (51 and 51.5 percent respectively). This is striking in so far as it might be expected that for a typical immigrant population such as the non-Western allochtonous group, the proportion of men would possibly be higher than the proportion of women. Yet this is not the case.


However, there are large differences in the age structure of the various population groups (see figure 6.1). The non-Western allochtonous population is predominantly a young population group. Almost half (49 percent) of the Non-Western allochtonous population in the Netherlands are younger than 20 years. For the native Dutch population about one in three persons are in the age category up to 20 years. Conversely the proportion of elderly in the native Dutch population is much higher than that in the non-Western allochtonous population. In the non-Western allochtonous population only 2.5 percent of the total population belongs to the age-group 65 years and older. The advanced elderly (75 years or older) scarcely occur yet in the non-Western allochtonous population. However, in the native Dutch population 18 percent of the total population is 65 years or older. It can be concluded that the tendency towards an ageing population in the Netherlands, is at present only occurring amongst the native Dutch population. The relatively young age structure of the non-Western allochtonous population forms a welcome counterweight to the threatened ageing of the native Dutch population.

Table 6.4: Dutch and allochtonous population to gender and age category in % (2002)

Age	Dutch			Allochtonous (Western)			Allochtonous (non-Western)		
	male	female	total	male	Female	total	male	female	total
0 to 5 years	7.1	7.0	7.1	5.5	5.0	5.2	10.6	10.8	10.7
5 to 10 years	6.9	6.8	6.9	5.4	5.0	5.2	9.7	9.8	9.7
10 to 15 years	7.1	7.0	7.0	5.6	5.3	5.5	9.7	9.7	9.7
15 to 20 years	6.7	6.6	6.6	5.7	5.3	5.5	9.8	9.4	9.6
20 to 25 years	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.7	7.0	6.9	9.4	10.0	9.7
25 to 30 years	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.9	8.6	8.2	9.0	10.0	9.5
30 to 35 years	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.9	10.3	10.1	10.3	10.4	10.4
35 to 40 years	9.4	9.4	9.4	10.1	10.4	10.3	9.7	8.7	9.2
40 to 45 years	9.3	9.4	9.3	9.2	9.6	9.4	7.7	7.3	7.5
45 to 50 years	8.7	8.7	8.7	8.8	9.2	9.0	5.2	5.5	5.3
50 to 55 years	8.5	8.5	8.5	9.6	9.5	9.6	3.7	3.9	3.8
55 to 60 years	8.0	8.1	8.0	8.3	7.9	8.1	2.8	2.6	2.7
60 to 65 years	5.7	6.0	5.8	7.2	6.9	7.0	2.4	1.9	2.2
65 or older	14.6	21.1	17.8	12.9	18.9	16.0	2.3	2.7	2.5
Total (= 100%)	5,674,132	5,493,450	11,167,582	603,252	618,053	1,221,305	814,845	768,384	1,583,229

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline

Figure 6.1: Age distribution of Dutch and allochtonous populations (2002)



Another much-discussed theme is the regional distribution of the immigrant population in the Netherlands. Despite all of the public debate about the subject, the Netherlands can scarcely be termed a multicultural society. We have already seen that only one in ten Dutch residents are an immigrant or a child of an immigrant from a non-Western culture. However, the Netherlands does have a number of multicultural cities. In the four main cities of the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) the proportion of migrants and their descendants ('allochtonous') from non-Western countries is increasing much more rapidly. A total of more than 2 million people live in these four cities. About 640,000 of them (about one in three) can be placed in the category non-Western allochtonous. Meanwhile In 2002 one in three residents of Amsterdam and Rotterdam belonged to the category non-Western allochtonous. In The Hague the proportion of non-Western allochtonous persons is slightly lower (30 percent) and in Utrecht much lower (20 percent). In all other medium-sized cities in the Netherlands the proportion of non-Western allochtonous persons as a percentage of the total population is significantly lower.

For each ethnic category, Table 6.5 also shows what proportion of the total population is resident in one of the four main cities. Living in one of the large cities is not particularly popular amongst the native Dutch population. Only one in eight of the native Dutch live in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague or Utrecht. Western allochtonous persons are apparently slightly more oriented to the city environment than the native Dutch population. About one in six of

the Western allochtonous population lives in one of the four cities mentioned. The non-Western allochtonous population, however, are much more strongly oriented to the main cities. Almost 40 percent of all non-Western allochtonous population live in one of the four main cities in the Netherlands. This orientation to one of the four main cities is strongest amongst the Surinamese (more than half of the total Surinamese population lives in one of the four main cities), and the weakest amongst the Antilleans and Turks.

Table 6.5. Regional distribution of allochtonous population (Western and non-Western) (2002)

	Total	of which		of which from			
		Western allochtonous	non-Western allochtonous	Turkey	Morocco	Suriname	Neth. Antill.
Netherlands	16,192,572	1,416,156	1,622,602	341,400	295,332	320,658	129,312
<i>of which</i>							
Amsterdam	736,562	100,985	246,512	36,614	60,835	71,537	11,714
The Hague	463,826	57,541	140,796	29,301	22,280	44,285	10,380
Rotterdam	599,651	59,108	203,048	43,327	34,158	52,148	20,039
Utrecht	265,151	26,241	53,255	11,885	22,540	6871	2152
<i>as % of the total population</i>							
Netherlands	100.0	8.7	10.0	2.1	1.8	2.0	0.8
<i>of which</i>							
Amsterdam	100.0	13.7	33.5	5.0	8.3	9.7	1.6
The Hague	100.0	12.4	30.4	6.3	4.8	9.5	2.2
Rotterdam	100.0	9.9	33.9	7.2	5.7	8.7	3.3
Utrecht	100.0	9.9	20.1	4.5	8.5	2.6	0.8
% total population living in 4 cities	12.8	17.2	39.7	35.5	47.3	54.5	34.2

Source: Statistics Netherlands

A last subject that we wish to discuss here is population forecast of Western and non-Western allochtonous populations (first and second generation) in the Netherlands (table 6.6). The number of allochtonous persons originating from other Western countries is not expected to increase significantly in the coming years (from 1.4 million persons in 2002 to 1.5 million in 2010 to 1.9 million in 2030; this last figure is not in the table). However, the number of allochtonous persons in the Netherlands originating from non-Western countries is expected to rise much more quickly, albeit somewhat less than in the 1990s. Between 1990 and 2002 the number of non-Western allochtonous persons in the Netherlands almost doubled (from more than 800,000 to 1.6 million). According to the predictions from Statistics Netherlands the number of non-Western allochtonous persons in the Netherlands will continue to grow in the coming years to almost 2 million in 2010 and almost 2.5 million in 2020. This means that the proportion of non-Western allochtonous persons (as a percentage of the total population in the Netherlands) will slowly but gradually increase from precisely 10 percent in 2002 to 12 percent in 2010 to 14 percent in 2020.

Table 6.6 Population forecast: number of Western and non-Western allochtonous population (1990-2020)

	1990	2002*	2010	2020
	x1000			
Western	-	1416	1502	-
Non-Western	831	1623	1974	2425
<i>of which from</i>				
Turkey	203	341	394	452
Morocco	164	295	359	432
Suriname	224	321	349	375
Dutch Ant. and Aruba	69	129	153	189
other Non-Western	171	537	719	978
Non-Western as % from the total population	8.3	10.0	11.8	14.1

*2002= 1 January 2003

Source: SCP, Report on minorities 2003, pp. 17

Table 6.6 also shows that the 'classic' ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans) will also grow a lot more in the future. However, the greatest increase will be in the category 'other non-Western allochtonous'. In 1990 persons originating from these other non-Western countries only formed one-fifth of the total non-Western allochtonous population in the Netherlands. In 2020 this proportion will increase to about 40 percent. This development confirms the previously signalled tendency of the increasing heterogeneity of the allochtonous population living in the Netherlands. If this trend continues than by 2050 only half of the non-Western allochtonous persons living in the Netherlands will belong to the classic ethnic minority groups (Alders, 2003).

For the number of allochtonous persons originating from Western countries, it is the number of allochtonous persons from the Middle and Eastern European countries that will increase considerably in the coming years. It is expected that in the coming years some 20,000 people a year will come to the Netherlands from these countries, partly as a consequence of the intended expansion of the EU.


Table 6.6 does not distinguish between first and second-generation migrants, in other words between new migrants who come to Netherlands and the children of migrants born in the Netherlands. However, if we do make this distinction (extended data in the appendix to this chapter, table A6.6) we can see that both the first and second-generation non-Western allochtonous populations will quickly increase in size over the coming years. The first generation is growing due to continuous immigration: the number of first-generation migrants originating from non-Western countries is expected to increase by more than 160,000 between 2002 and 2010. This is a consequence of an estimated annual migration surplus of 20,000 persons. Due to the growing number of first generation migrants in the Netherlands,

the second generation (children of migrants) will also increase in size, and even more so as the number of women from the first generation of childbearing age increases. In the coming years it is expected that about 30,000 children a year from a non-Western mother or father will be born in the Netherlands. This means that until 2010 the non-Western second generation will grow by more than 250,000 persons to 838,000 persons. In 2010 more than 42 percent of all non-Western allochtonous persons will belong to the second-generation, whereas in 2002 that was just 38 percent. The second generation is therefore growing much quicker than the first generation. However, over the course of time the growth rate of the second generation will gradually decrease again. On the one hand this will be because the first generation will gradually become older and will therefore no longer be of childbearing age and on the other because it is expected that non-Western women will also gradually have less children.

6.4 Naturalisation

We have already seen that the majority of the non-Western allochtonous persons have Dutch nationality (possibly in addition to the nationality of the land of origin). Amongst the Surinamese and Antilleans (originating from the former Dutch colonies) the vast majority have always had the Dutch nationality. This is also the case for about two-thirds of the 'classic' ethnic minorities such as the Turks and Moroccans. However, it is striking that also among the so-called 'new migrants groups' such as Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians and Somalians a clear majority have meanwhile acquired the Dutch nationality. In the period 1995-2002 a total of 477,000 non-Dutch residents were awarded Dutch citizenship. The peak in the number of naturalisations was however in 1996, when almost 83,000 non-Dutch residents obtained Dutch nationality. After this the number of naturalisations decreased each year. In 2002 more than 45,000 non-Dutch residents acquired the Dutch nationality.

Figure 6.2: Non-Dutch residents obtaining Dutch nationality other than by birth by year.



Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline

The trend in the number of naturalisations is strongly correlated to changes in the Dutch policy with respect to this point. The peak in the number of naturalisations in the Netherlands in 1996 was the result both of the growing number of non-Dutch immigrants during the early 1990s and changes to the policies concerning aliens in 1992. Between 1 January 1992 and 1 October 1997, non-Dutch residents who obtained Dutch nationality were allowed to keep their original nationality. On 1 October 1997 this possibility to hold dual nationality was replaced by a more restrictive policy. Dual nationality is now only possible in a number of exceptional cases. Most of these concern nationals from countries that by law do not recognise or allow their citizens to give up their nationality. Another exception is made for those people for whom it would be 'unreasonable' if they had to give up their original nationality (Muus, 2001). As a consequence of this change in policy the number of naturalisations fell sharply from 83,000 in 1996 to 60,000 in 1997. In particular, the number of naturalisations among Turkish nationals decreased sharply in 1997. The policy changes hardly affected Moroccan citizens since according to Moroccan law they are not allowed to relinquish their nationality. After this marked decrease, the number of naturalisations during the period 1997-1999 stabilised at about 60,000 and then further decreased to a level of 45,000 in 2002.

6.5 Money transfers by immigrants

Immigrants have always left for other countries, not only to obtain better living conditions but also to financially and materially support those staying behind (immediate family, wider family, fellow villagers and compatriots from the area. Therefore migrants often maintain a strong financial link with the country of origin. According to recent estimates the total size of the flow of money from all migrants in the world to the land of origin is at least 100 billion dollars. This is greater than the amount given worldwide in development aid.

Table 6.7: Private transfers of money to selected countries 1992-2001 (in million euros)

<i>million euros</i>	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
former labour recruitment countries											
Morocco	85	88	100	101	106	117	124	151	169	180	191
Turkey	124	132	141	146	151	168	175	216	227	250	249
Portugal	18	17	19	20	22	23	25	28	36	39	28
Spain	57	56	61	23	29	42	43	68	75	94	48
Former Yugoslavia	1	5	5	11	17	22	20	31	48	37	
Greece	4	3	7	7	7	7	7	8	11	12	11
Refugee countries											
Iraq	1	0	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Iran	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Afghanistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sri Lanka	6	5	5	8	5	7	5	5	7	9	9
Vietnam	0	1	1	5	9	9	9	9	11	13	12
China	0	0	2	4	9	7	9	10	12	11	12
Somalia	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zaire	3	1	3	4	4	3	1	0	0	0	0
Congo-Kinshasa	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0

Source: The Dutch Central Bank, department statistical information

In the Netherlands Turks in particular and to a lesser extent Moroccans transfer a lot of money to the country of origin. Further research amongst Turkish and Moroccan migrants indicates that the size of the financial support depends on both the characteristics of the receiving households as well as those of the givers.¹⁸ Households in the country of origin who are in a more dependent position (because, for example, a woman is the head of the household and there are juvenile children in the household) receive more money than households with a male head. In the majority of cases it concerns a man who has come to the Netherlands as a guest worker, whilst his wife and children remained in the country of origin. Research has also revealed that that more affluent migrants transfer more money to the country of origin than less affluent migrants. Migrants with a paid job send at least four times as much money to the country of origin than those receiving

¹⁸ See T. Fokkema en G. Groenewold, De migrant als suikerroom [The migrant as rich uncle. In: Demos June/July 2003 (www.nidi.nl/public/demos)

social security benefits. The research finally investigated whether the financial transfers would give rise to follow on migration. Generally speaking this was the case. Turks and Moroccans from households (in Turkey and Morocco) who had received money from abroad, speak significantly more often about the intention of emigrating than those who have received little or no money.

Appendices for chapter 6

Table A6.2: Stock of the population by nationality 1996-2002 (2002 = 1-1-2003)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total	15,493,889	15,567,107	15,654,192	15,760,225	15,863,950	15,987,075	16,105,285	16,192,572
Dutch nationals	14,768,468	14,887,238	14,976,115	15,097,853	15,212,418	15,319,273	15,414,892	15,492,618
non-Dutch nationals	725,421	679,869	678,077	662,372	651,532	667,802	690,393	699,954
<i>of which</i>								
Western countries	275,372	271,663	271,112	269,671	268,345	275,265	285,645	291,423
<i>of which</i>								
14 EU countries	191,074	188,316	190,192	192,151	195,886	201,574	207,858	210,549
<i>of which</i>								
Germany	53,922	53,525	53,914	54,113	54,272	54,811	55,572	56,060
United Kingdom	41,146	39,300	39,153	38,829	39,466	41,404	43,604	44,052
Belgium	24,111	24,021	24,443	24,826	25,382	25,860	26,148	26,306
Eastern Europe	48,964	48,455	45,240	40,649	33,763	32,748	34,519	36,505
<i>of which</i>								
Yugoslavia (former)	33,513	32,810	28,417	22,348	15,565	12,904	12,122	11,754
Soviet Union (former)	5011	5824	6534	7135	7120	7575	8543	9533
Poland	5910	5642	5680	5906	5645	5944	6312	6912
Czechoslovakia (former)	891	1021	1210	1493	1593	1893	2297	2374
Hungary	1133	1164	1272	1404	1385	1538	1719	1832
other Western countries	35,334	34,892	35,680	36,871	38,696	40,943	43,268	44,369
<i>of which</i>								
United States	12,769	12,640	12,980	13,389	14,074	14,751	15,217	15,412
Canada	2574	2604	2702	2743	2892	3130	3398	3435
Australia	2013	1970	2031	2244	2522	2802	3201	3352
Indonesia	8159	7945	7970	8377	8717	9338	10,127	10,786
Japan	5347	5336	5369	5460	5507	5626	5771	5747
Non-Western countries	435,387	383,648	368,637	340,544	316,819	305,493	297,749	292,962
<i>of which</i>								
Turkey	154,310	127,032	114,696	102,003	100,688	100,782	100,309	100,286
Morocco	149,841	138,677	135,721	128,584	119,726	111,396	104,262	97,843
Somalia	17,223	15,385	13,648	8904	5296	3567	2654	2116
South Africa	1444	1530	1769	2301	2512	2864	3230	3330
Ghana	5150	4131	4375	3975	3887	3877	3756	3630
Cape Verde	2111	1847	1786	1794	1567	1404	1352	1289
Egypt	4084	3105	3101	2933	2771	2588	2425	2440
Ethiopia	3653	2146	1870	1538	1280	1203	1161	1166
Angola	1633	1661	1679	1609	1184	982	946	1009
Sudan	676	704	868	1093	1113	1212	1114	1089
Congo	3213	2909	2765	2430	1887	1622	1437	1310
Suriname	15,174	12,015	11,760	10,497	8665	8469	8491	8573
Colombia	1569	1584	1718	1848	1790	1636	1668	1743
Brazil	2145	2194	2380	2525	2597	2728	2841	2994
Dominican Republic	1453	1304	1312	1283	1204	1164	1158	1165
Iraq	9694	11,355	13,008	12,747	10,025	8639	6919	4771
Afghanistan	3913	4579	5275	5364	4395	4203	4259	3997
China	7912	7322	7260	7480	7473	7997	9395	11,223
Iran	10,150	8634	7831	6196	3892	2833	2520	2513
India	2748	2523	2803	3082	3234	3361	3417	3416
Vietnam	3765	2637	2032	1697	1546	1613	1885	2274
Pakistan	3724	3219	3199	2967	2882	2880	2737	2605
Sri Lanka	3186	2639	2395	1924	1549	1531	1591	1604
Philippines	2363	2318	2428	2398	2351	2417	2427	2597
Thailand	1985	2017	2162	2385	2520	2920	3288	3783
Syria	2031	1096	857	659	543	560	628	670
South Korea	722	829	910	964	1079	1193	1280	1421
unknown/stateless	14,662	24,558	38328	52,157	66,368	87,044	106,999	115,569

Source: Statistics Netherlands

Stock of foreign nationals and immigrant population in the Netherlands

Table A6.3: Stock of the population by ethnic origin 1995-2002 (2002 = 1-1-2003)

	1995	1997	1999	2000	2001	2002	In 2002 of which	
							First generation	Second generation
Total	15,493,889	15,654,192	15,863,950	15,987,075	16,105,285	16,192,572		
Autochthonous	12,995,175	13,033,792	13,088,648	13,116,851	13,140,336	13,153,814		
Allochthonous	2,498,714	2,620,400	2,775,302	2,870,224	2,964,949	3,038,758	1,585,927	1,452,831
<i>of which</i>								
Western countries	1,327,601	1,341,947	1,366,535	1,387,036	1,406,596	1,416,156	581,361	834,795
<i>of which</i>								
14 EU countries	731,929	733,059	739,309	744,219	748,930	749,561	275,921	473,640
<i>of which</i>								
Germany	411,503	405,991	401,119	398,776	396,316	393,207	104,522	288,685
United Kingdom	65,663	66,781	69,263	71,904	74,869	76,078	45,533	30,545
Belgium	111,228	111,537	112,604	113,066	113,239	113,239	36,004	77,235
Eastern Europe	119,296	131,753	147,008	160,665	173,646	182,722	126,023	56,699
<i>of which</i>								
Yugoslavia (former)	56,220	60,959	66,947	71,438	74,640	76,007	56,043	19,964
Soviet Union (former)	13,485	17,334	22,625	28,694	34,903	39,375	30,724	8651
Poland	25,125	27,315	29,180	30,600	32,210	34,051	19,716	14,335
Czechoslovakia (former)	7106	7616	8274	8860	9456	9596	5629	3967
Hungary	11,454	11,742	11,917	12,104	12,359	12,530	5518	7012
other Western countries	476,376	477,135	480,218	482,152	484,020	483,873	179,417	304,456
<i>of which</i>								
United States	22,730	24,479	26,808	28,080	29,093	29,859	18,777	11,082
Canada	9519	10,370	11,217	11,697	12,199	12,487	4439	8048
Australia	10,355	11,076	12,230	12,805	13,493	13,960	4969	8991
Indonesia	411,622	407,885	405,155	403,894	402,663	400,622	135,561	265,061
Japan	6355	6475	6674	6859	7078	7116	5855	1261
Non-Western countries	1,171,113	1,278,453	1,408,767	1,483,188	1,558,353	1,622,602	1,004,566	618,036
<i>of which</i>								
Turkey	271,514	289,777	308,890	319,600	330,709	341,400	190,219	151,181
Morocco	225,088	241,982	262,221	272,752	284,124	295,332	163,280	132,052
Somalia	20,060	25,842	28,780	29,631	28,979	27,567	19,546	8021
South Africa	9629	10,737	12,524	13,459	14,378	14,914	8129	6785
Ghana	12,480	13,973	15,609	16,429	17,232	17,974	11,597	6377
Cape Verde	16,662	17,478	18,242	18,558	19,012	19,353	11,335	8018
Egypt	11,598	12,738	14,398	15,165	16,108	17,026	10,280	6746
Ethiopia	7978	8460	8997	9392	9783	10,120	7286	2834
Angola	2594	3352	4477	5852	7962	11,710	9777	1933
Sudan	943	1936	3919	5497	6935	7629	6513	1116
Congo	4546	5147	6115	6828	7657	8312	5729	2583
Suriname	280,615	290,467	302,514	308,824	315,177	320,658	187,279	133,379
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba	86,824	92,105	107,197	117,089	124,870	129,312	84,395	44,917
Colombia	4937	6002	7025	7484	8122	8798	6033	2765
Brazil	6589	7639	8913	9562	10,237	10,900	6685	4215
Dominican Republic	5321	6174	7341	8035	8676	9200	6737	2463
Iraq	11,278	22,295	33,449	38,191	41,323	41,959	35,732	6227
Afghanistan	4916	11,551	21,468	26,394	31,167	34,249	30,936	3313
China	23,471	26,191	29,759	32,280	35,691	38,815	27,144	11,671
Iran	16,478	20,685	22,893	24,642	26,789	28,043	23,908	4135
India	9476	10,302	11,516	12,032	12,589	12,971	8695	4276
Vietnam	12,937	13,801	14,717	15,302	16,012	16,865	11,551	5314
Pakistan	14,127	15,135	16,149	16,787	17,325	17,749	10,921	6828
Hong Kong	17,147	17,304	17,510	17,635	17,789	17,923	10,169	7754
Sri Lanka	5636	6463	7685	8384	9053	9606	7144	2462
Philippines	7738	8868	9857	10,449	11,100	11,755	7621	4134
Thailand	5576	6503	7701	8553	9450	10,497	7625	2872
Syria	3604	4324	5397	6488	7736	8466	6462	2004
South Korea	1492	1819	2245	2503	2764	3072	2038	1034

Source: Statistics Netherlands

Table A6.6: Number of Western and non-Western allochthonous (extended)

		2002 x1000	2010	2030	2050
Non-Western	1st generation	972	1136	1448	1606
	2nd generation	587	838	1381	1852
	Total	1558	1974	2829	3458
Western	1st generation	575	636	915	1065
	2nd generation	831	866	998	1155
	Total	1407	1502	1914	2220
Turkey	1st generation	186	204	230	229
	2nd generation	145	191	265	318
	Total	331	394	495	547
Morocco	1st generation	160	178	209	217
	2nd generation	125	181	271	320
	Total	284	359	481	537
Suriname	1st generation	186	192	191	160
	2nd generation	129	158	197	220
	Total	315	349	387	380
Neth Ant. and Aruba	1st generation	82	93	120	136
	2nd generation	43	60	105	151
	Total	125	153	225	288
Africa	1st generation	120	140	178	216
	2nd generation	58	95	178	253
	Total	178	235	356	469
Asia	1st generation	201	276	425	526
	2nd generation	67	121	288	458
	Total	268	397	713	984
Latin America	1st generation	37	54	95	122
	2nd generation	21	33	77	132
	Total	58	87	172	254
Indonesia	1st generation	137	121	85	65
	2nd generation	265	266	256	196
	Total	403	387	341	261
EER	1st generation	278	290	367	404
	2nd generation	476	474	462	496
	Total	754	765	829	901
Other European	1st generation	124	188	396	522
	2nd generation	59	89	213	361
	Total	184	276	608	883
Other non-European	1st generation	35	37	69	74
	2nd generation	31	38	67	102
	Total	67	74	135	176

Source: Alders, M, Statistics Netherlands, 2003

Stock of foreign nationals and immigrant population in the Netherlands

Table A6.7: Naturalization of foreign nationals by country of former nationality 1996-2002

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total	82,687	59,831	59,173	62,093	49,968	46,667	45,321
<i>of which</i>							
Western countries	9764	11,257	11,927	13,746	8569	6214	5501
<i>of which</i>							
EU countries	3520	2904	2419	2127	1848	1884	2049
<i>of which</i>							
Germany	776	567	558	580	508	573	608
United Kingdom	1174	912	578	453	374	356	394
Belgium	287	183	200	189	164	189	223
Eastern Europe	4950	7362	8634	10,769	5948	3572	2678
<i>of which</i>							
Yugoslavia (former)	2283	5412	6668	7993	3809	1647	938
Soviet Union (former)	591	586	826	1510	1103	879	758
Poland	1129	827	677	688	587	597	530
other Western countries	1294	991	874	850	773	758	774
<i>of which</i>							
United States	489	410	261	161	160	168	225
Canada	121	109	108	74	51	65	66
Indonesia	436	314	368	514	456	416	380
Non-Western countries	72,108	47,891	46,044	43,724	33,999	32,653	30,173
<i>of which</i>							
Turkey	30,704	21,189	13,484	5214	4708	5513	5391
Morocco	15,598	10,478	11,252	14,217	13,471	12,721	12,033
Egypt	1077	551	393	496	443	528	437
Somalia	3002	2141	4918	3487	1634	873	378
Ghana	1208	737	502	432	348	360	357
Nigeria	268	166	98	153	143	196	214
Suriname	4445	3019	2991	3194	2008	2025	1957
Colombia	409	354	288	341	382	259	274
Brazil	319	279	227	257	231	290	249
Dominican Republic	387	207	217	235	200	206	143
Iraq	854	798	2721	3834	2403	2315	2367
Afghanistan	360	217	905	1847	945	803	1118
China	1394	975	800	977	1002	1111	908
Iran	2299	1285	1806	2560	1375	754	336
Thailand	319	253	235	275	277	355	289
Philippines	401	279	298	295	300	348	263
India	407	249	234	235	242	309	250
Pakistan	630	296	287	277	237	255	241
Stateless	815	683	1202	4623	7400	7800	9647

Source: Statistics Netherlands

Labour market integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the Netherlands

7.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the socio-economic position of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. Therefore, unlike the previous chapters, the emphasis is not on immigration but on the problems of integration, in this context interpreted as socio-economic integration. The decisive factor for the degree of socio-economic integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities is whether they have the opportunity to obtain an adequate position on the labour market. On the one hand this means whether or not they participate in the labour market and on the other whether or not they can obtain a position appropriate to the level of education they have received. This chapter does not present any data about the professional level achieved. Yet it does consider the following items: the problem of labour participation and unemployment among ethnic minorities (section 7.2), the dependency of ethnic minorities on social security benefits (section 7.3), a more theoretical discourse containing possible explanations as to the poor position of ethnic minorities on the labour market (section 7.4) and finally a short sketch of the policies implemented in the Netherlands to improve the labour market position of ethnic minorities and the effects of this in so far as these are known (section 7.5).

However, we start with a short explanation of the empirical data and definitions used in this chapter. The data used are mainly taken from the Labour Force Surveys (*Enquête Beroepsbevolking*) from Statistics Netherlands. This is an annual large-scale survey. Each year between 80,000 and 90,000 people from about 50,000 to 60,000 households are interviewed. This number of respondents is large enough to be able to make statements about the labour market position of the most important ethnic minorities. In the Netherlands, these are on the one hand the former guest workers and

their families and descendants from the Mediterranean areas (Turkey and Morocco) and on the other postcolonial migrants from Suriname, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. In addition to this the Labour Force Surveys distinguish a rapidly growing group of migrants from 'other non-Western countries'. This includes, for example, relatively recent immigrants who have come to the Netherlands via the asylum procedure.

The ethnic origin of respondents in the Labour Force Surveys is established according to the standard definition of Statistics Netherlands.¹⁹ As previously explained in chapter three, with this definition a person's origin is established using the country of birth of the person in question and that of the person's parents. A person is categorised as allochtonous if they and at least one of both parents were born outside of the Netherlands *or* if the person was born in the Netherlands but both parents were born outside of the Netherlands. 'Allochtonous persons' therefore include both first and second-generation migrants (but second generation migrants only if both parents were born outside of the Netherlands). A distinction is then drawn between 'allochtonous persons' originating from Western countries and those originating from non-Western countries. Western countries are the other EU countries, Eastern European countries and the other Western countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, but also Japan. Non-Western countries are all of the other countries in Asia, Africa and South America. In this chapter we do not use the term 'non-Western allochtonous', but the more internationally used term 'ethnic minorities'. However, this represents the migrants and their descendants who originate from a range of non-Western countries, including the former Dutch colonies, who have come to the Netherlands.

7.2 Employment and unemployment of immigrants and ethnic minorities

During the second half of the 1990s in particular, the Netherlands experienced a very favourable period of economic growth, which is also referred to as the 'Dutch miracle' in international literature (cf. Visser & Hemerijck, 1997; Schmid, 1999). It was a combination of a restrictive

¹⁹ This is new. In previous editions of the Dutch SOPEMI report the data taken from the Labour Force Surveys were predominantly concerned with the first-generation migrants (foreign born).

financial economic policy, a political climate of wage restraint and a restructuring of the social security system. This period was characterised by continuous economic growth and in particular a growth in the number of jobs. Therefore the number of employed persons in the Netherlands (that is the number of people who perform paid work for at least 12 hours per week, including part-time work) rose from scarcely 6 million in 1994 to more than 7 million in 2002. In other words the number of people in employment rose by more than 20 percent within a period of eight years (see table 6.2). The central question in this section is whether ethnic minorities could utilise these favourable developments in the Dutch economy during the 1990s and if so to what extent? However, since then the economic climate in the Netherlands has also become less favourable. Since 2000 the Netherlands has experienced a renewed economic recession and increasing unemployment. The extent to which this recent development has negatively affected the labour market position of ethnic minorities and whether this has annulled any possible progress made by these groups in the 1990s will be determined.


Baseline situation at the start of the 1990s

If we want to establish whether ethnic minorities and migrants from non-Western countries profited from the favourable economic developments and the considerable job growth in the 1990s then we must first of all determine their baseline position at the start of that decennium. This baseline position was nothing short of miserable, particularly amongst Turks and Moroccans. If we describe the Netherlands as a 'welfare state without work' (Esping-Andersen, 1996), then this was particularly applicable to these two groups and at that time. Amongst the Turks and Moroccans in particular there was a disastrous combination of a very low labour market participation and high unemployment amongst those who participated in the employment market. The overall effect of these two factors was that in 1994, for example, less than one in three Turks and Moroccans of working age were in formal paid employment. Furthermore, the unemployment amongst Turks and Moroccans was very high (30 percent of the total working population for these groups). The Caribbean ethnic minorities (postcolonial migrants from Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles) have always held an intermediate position between the Mediterranean groups on the one hand and the native Dutch population on the other. Amongst the Surinamese and Antilleans the proportion of employed persons at the start of the 1990s was already higher than among Turks and Moroccans (between 40 and 50 percent) and the unemployment was lower (about 20 percent).

Labour market position of ethnic minorities and the native Dutch population (1994-2002)

The development of the labour market position of ethnic minorities and the native Dutch population can be described with three key indicators: the gross labour market participation, the net labour market participation and the unemployment figure. Figure 7.1 provides an overview of these three key indicators and the tables on which these are based can be found in the appendices to this report. In these tables a distinction is always made between men and women per population category.

Figure 7.1: Labour market participation and unemployment of ethnic minorities and the native Dutch population (1994-2002)



Source: Statistics Netherlands, Labour Surveys (EBB) 1994 to 2002 (processed by Risbo)

The first indicator is the *gross labour market participation*. This figure reveals the proportion of the population group between the ages of 15 and 64 years that is working or seeks work and is therefore part of the total working population. Differences between ethnic minorities in the degree of labour market participation can be caused by: the proportion of non-participating women, the age structure of different population groups (if a group has many school-age children then the labour market participation is correspondingly low) and the extent of 'labour market drop-out' (for example because the population group contains a relatively large number of individuals declared unfit to work). Figure 7.1 shows that the labour market participation rose for all of the population groups between 1994 and 2002. Despite this, there are still clear differences between the native Dutch population and the ethnic minorities. Amongst the native Dutch population the labour market participation continuously rose between 1994 and 2002, from 63 to 70 percent. Amongst the Surinamese and Antilleans the labour market participation was somewhat lower. For the Surinamese it rose from 59 percent in 1994 to 67 percent in 2002 and for the Antilleans it rose from 55 percent in 1994 to 63 percent in 2002. For Turks, Moroccans and other non-Western ethnic minorities the labour market participation in 2002 was still only about 50 percent.

Although the labour market participation of Turks and Moroccans has increased considerably since the start of the 1990s, it is still significantly lower than the Dutch national average. There are various reasons for the low labour market participation amongst these groups (see SCP 2003, pp. 205-8). Firstly, few Turkish and Moroccan women actively participate in the labour market. Only one in three Turkish and Moroccan women between the ages of 15 and 65 years belong to the working population (figure 7.2). Secondly, the Turkish and Moroccan population groups are relatively young, as they contain a relatively large number of school-age children who have not yet entered the labour market. Thirdly, a relatively large number of Turkish and Moroccan persons have been declared unfit for work and a relatively large number of unemployed Turkish and Moroccan persons do not or scarcely actively seek work. These labour market drop-outs do not fall under the working population. A fourth, and perhaps the most important, reason for the low labour market participation by Turks and Moroccans is the low level of education. For all population categories, irrespective of the ethnic origin, the lower educated are much less frequently active in the labour market than the higher educated. As number of very low-educated persons within the Turkish

and Moroccan groups is particularly high (especially among the older first generation guest workers) it is hardly surprising that the labour market participation is low.

Table 7.1: Gross labour market participation according to ethnic origin and level of education (2002)

	Turks	Moroccans	Surinamese	Antilleans	Native Dutch
No education	24	24	41	*	*
Primary Education	44	51	63	53	43
Basic Secondary Education	70	69	75	73	57
Further education or higher	76	80	91	86	80
Total	51	49	71	66	70


*number of respondents in survey too low or category not distinguished in the group concerned
Source: SCP, Report on minorities 2003, p. 207 (based on SVPA-02 and EBB-02)

The data in table 7.1 show that the labour market participation of lowly-qualified persons from both the ethnic minorities and the native Dutch population is very low. The category 'no education' is rarely found in the native Dutch population. Yet this is the case amongst Turks and Moroccans. This concerns first-generation poorly-educated guest workers and their wives whose labour market participation is now very low. These completely uneducated Turks and Moroccans strongly reduce the average labour market participation of these population groups. For the other low-education categories (only primary education, or basic secondary education) it is striking that the labour market participation of the various ethnic minorities is slightly higher than that of the native Dutch population with a similar low-education.

For the Surinamese and Antilleans the gross labour market participation is considerably higher than among Turks and Moroccans. In particular, the labour market participation of the Surinamese group is almost the same as that of the native Dutch populations. This is mainly due to the large-scale participation of Surinamese women in the labour market (figure 7.2). More generally it can be stated that the strong growth in the number of employed persons in the Netherlands during the 1990s was due to the particularly strong increase in the labour market participation of women. This was due to their continuing emancipation, the increased employment opportunities for women in the expanding services sector and perhaps the increasingly strong demand for part-time work in the Netherlands in particular. In the population groups with the highest labour market participation (native Dutch population but also Surinamese and Antilleans) the labour market participation of women showed a strong increase during the 1990s. The labour market participation of men from these groups also rose but to a much smaller extent. An important cause of the much lower labour market participation of

Turks, Moroccans and other non-Western minorities is the continued low labour market participation of women from these groups. Although the labour market participation of Turkish, Moroccan and other non-Western women rose during the 1990s, it is still at a very low level (about 35 percent for Turkish and Moroccan women and about 40 percent for women from other non-Western countries).

Figure 7.2: Gross labour market participation according to ethnic origin and sex (2002)



Source: Statistics Netherlands, Labour Surveys (EBB) 1994 to 2002 (processed by Risbo)

A second indicator is the *net labour market participation*. This figure indicates the proportion of the population group between 15 and 64 years who are in paid employment for 12 hours per week or longer. The figures are shown in figure 7.1 and are provided in greater detail in the appendix to this chapter. In general, the patterns we can see here are the same as those for the gross labour market participation. For all of the population groups, there was a strong increase in the number of employed persons during the 1990s. Yet here we also see a clear difference between a leading group made up of groups with a high labour market participation (native Dutch, Surinamese and Antilleans) and groups where the proportion of employed persons is significantly lower (Turks, Moroccans and other non-Western ethnic minorities). Although since 1994 there has been a strong increase in the proportion of Turks and Moroccans in employment, relatively speaking this proportion was still very low in 2002 (46 and 45 percent respectively). In concrete terms this means that less than half of all Turks and Moroccans of working age are actually in paid employment. The reasons for this are mostly the same as those previously stated: the very low proportion of working women amongst these groups (due to cultural reasons and less progress in

the emancipation of women), the young age structure and the large labour market drop-out, for example, due to employment disability.

In figure 7.1 the number of employed persons is expressed as a percentage of the potential working population. However, it is also interesting to examine the absolute number of employed persons per ethnic group and how this developed during the 1990s (table 7.2).

Table 7.2: Number of employed persons (12 hours per week or longer) according to ethnic origin (1994-2002)

	1994 <i>x 1000</i>	1996	1998	2000 <i>1994=100</i>	2002	2002
Native Dutch	5223	5442	5756	5833	5960	114
Non-Western ethnic minorities (total)	262	282	333	459	536	205
Of which						
Turks	51	53	57	91	103	202
Moroccans	34	35	46	59	84	247
Surinamese	106	110	123	135	138	130
Antilleans/Arubans	21	23	24	42	52	248
Other non-Western ethnic minorities	50	63	83	132	159	318
Total	5916	6184	6609	6916	7141	121

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Labour Surveys (EBB) 1994 to 2002

As previously stated, the number of employed persons in the Netherlands rose by more than 20 percent in a short period of time between 1994 and 2002. The growth in the number of employed persons was significantly lower amongst the native Dutch population than amongst the various ethnic minorities. Amongst the Turks, Moroccans, Antilleans and the other non-Western ethnic minorities there was even more than a doubling in the number of employed persons within the space of eight years. A further examination of the figures reveals that this particularly strong growth in the number of employed persons in these groups mostly occurred during the second half of the period studied (after 1998). However, unlike the net labour market participation, it is not possible to ascertain from these figures whether this strong growth in the number of employed persons arose due to the growth of the total population group (which will certainly be case for the other non-Western ethnic minorities, which includes many asylum migrants) or due to an increase in the *extent* of employment opportunities (that is, percentage of the total group).

A third important indicator of the labour market position of ethnic minorities is the *percentage of unemployment*.²⁰ Figure 7.1 clearly shows that the favourable economic tide in the Netherlands during the 1990s led to a

²⁰ Our discussion about the pattern in unemployment trends amongst ethnic minorities and the native Dutch population is largely taken from: SCP, *Rapportage minderheden 2003*, pp. 209-211.

considerable (according to some observers even a spectacular) decrease in the unemployment among various ethnic minorities. In 1994, unemployment amongst the Turks and Moroccans as well as Surinamese and Antilleans was still very high (about 30 and 20 percent respectively). In 2001 and 2002, the unemployment amongst all ethnic minorities decreased to a level of less than 10 percent. It should be noted that in this period, the unemployment amongst native Dutch persons also exhibited a strong decrease (to less than 3 percent in 2001 and 2 percent in 2002). It could therefore be stated that there has been no decrease in the relative unemployment gap between the ethnic minorities and the native Dutch population (the unemployment amongst ethnic minorities has nearly always been two to three times higher than amongst the native Dutch population). However, experts agree that the unemployment amongst ethnic minorities reached an 'acceptable level' at the turn of the millennium. By putting too great an emphasis on the ongoing higher unemployment of the ethnic minorities, one fails to recognise the enormous decrease in unemployment amongst these groups (Dagevos, 2001 and 2002; Veenman, 2003a).

Now the crucial question is whether the unfavourable economic circumstances in the Netherlands since 2001 have led to a renewed increase in the unemployment amongst ethnic minorities and whether they have suffered more or less under the present economic crisis than the native Dutch population. Table 7.3, taken from the *Report on minorities 2003* from the Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP), presents the current developments in greater detail. According to the report, the recent changes in the labour market position of ethnic minorities are characterised by a strong increase in their labour market participation and a strong increase in their unemployment (SCP 2003, pp. 211). The current shrinking labour market is not capable of fully absorbing the considerable increase in employable persons from ethnic minorities (table 7.2). The consequence of this is that the unemployment among ethnic minorities is increasing and more strongly than the national average. In table 7.3, this can mainly be seen in the development of the absolute number of unemployed persons in the various population groups. On average, the number of unemployed persons in the Netherlands rose by 22 percent in 2002 compared to the previous year. Amongst the non-Western ethnic minorities, however, this increase in unemployment was even greater still, namely 29 percent.

However, there are striking differences between the various ethnic minorities. The data reveal that the recent development in unemployment is on this occasion relatively favourable for the Turks and Moroccans, the ethnic minorities with relatively speaking the most unfavourable labour market position. Unemployment amongst the Turks and Moroccans did increase but less than the average in the Netherlands (and also less than amongst the native Dutch population and other ethnic minorities). The researchers from the SCP do not have a good explanation for this phenomenon. However, the figures indicate that the recent increase in unemployment has mainly been among the more highly qualified and as most Turks and Moroccans are lowly qualified they have been less affected.

Table 7.3 Number and percentage of unemployed according to ethnic origin (2001-2002)

	Number of unemployed		Difference 2001-2002	Unemployment rate	
	2001	2002		2001	2002
Total	248	302	+22	3.4	4.1
Dutch population	168	205	+22	2.8	3.3
Non-Western minorities (total)	49	63	+29	8.7	10.5
Of which					
Turks	9	10	+11	8	9
Moroccans	8	9	+13	10	10
Surinamese	9	12	+33	6	8
Antilleans/Arubans	4	6	+50	8	10
Other Non-Western minorities	19	26	+37	11	14

Source: SCP, Report on minorities 2003, pp. 211 (based on Labour Surveys)

Finally, we wish to note that although the unemployment figures in the Netherlands are increasing (average of 3.5 percent in 2001 to more than 4 percent in 2002), by international standards they are still very low. In principle, the same is true for the unemployment percentages among the 'non-Western ethnic minorities'. An unemployment figure of 10.5 percent in 2002 is for the time being not disturbingly high and nothing like as high as it was in the mid-1990s. Furthermore, the unemployment among ethnic minorities in the Netherlands is lower than in other countries. All things being considered, the situation is relatively favourable although it must be stated that the figures used here are only up to the end of 2002 and that since then the economic situation in the Netherlands has further worsened.

Explaining unemployment amongst ethnic minorities²¹

The last remaining question in the study into the labour market position of ethnic minorities is the extent to which the weaker position of the groups is a result of the lower educational level and if other factors play a role in this. In the *Report on minorities 2003* from the SCP this question was researched as

²¹ This section is completely taken from: SCP, *Report on minorities 2003*, pp. 219-221.

follows. First of all regression techniques applied to the available survey data calculated the extent to which the chance of unemployment among the native Dutch population could be clarified by general factors such as age, sex and the level of education received. The coefficients obtained using the regression techniques expressed the average chance of a native Dutch person with a specific characteristic becoming unemployed. Then the characteristics of ethnic minorities were entered into the regression comparisons for native Dutch persons. By attributing the coefficients of native Dutch persons to the ethnic minorities, it was assumed that ethnic minorities with certain characteristics have the same chance of unemployment as native Dutch persons with these characteristics. This provided an unemployment percentage for the ethnic minority group that would apply if the characteristics were calculated in the same manner as for native Dutch persons. This fictitious unemployment percentage for each of the ethnic minorities was then compared with the actual unemployment percentages.

If the actual unemployment of ethnic minorities is the same as the fictitious figure then the differences in the characteristics (level of education, age, sex) are responsible for the difference in unemployment between the ethnic minorities and the native Dutch population. If the actual unemployment is higher than the fictitious figure then this implies that there are also other factors which determine the higher unemployment amongst ethnic minorities. The nature of these other factors cannot be deduced from the analysis. It could be discrimination, but also a less effective searching strategy on the labour market, less functional social networks or less of a focus on paid employment.

Table 7.4 Actual (a) and expected (e) unemployment percentages to ethnic minorities (2002)

	Turks		Moroccans		Surinamese		Antilleans	
	actual	estimate	actual	estimate	actual	estimate	actual	estimate
Total	14	5	14	6	10	5	12	5
Female	18	8	14	9	12	7	16	7
Young people (15-24 years)	18	10	17	11	30	11	27	11
Education in the Netherlands	9	5	11	5	6	4	7	4
Adequate command of Dutch	9	4	10	5	6	4	9	4
Higher educated (First degree+)	10	3	10	3	4	3	4	3

Source: SCP, Report on minorities 2003, pp. 211 (based on several surveys)

The data in the table clearly show that the actual unemployment amongst ethnic minorities is much higher than would be the case if the native Dutch population and ethnic minorities had the same background characteristics and the same chance of becoming unemployed. The differences between the actual and expected unemployment figures amongst ethnic minorities do,

however, differ per ethnic category. This difference is least amongst the Surinamese group and the greatest among the Turkish group. In concrete terms this means that even with the same level of education, the ethnic minorities have a higher chance of being unemployed than the native Dutch population. In other words, ethnic minorities obtain less benefit from the human capital they have acquired than the native Dutch population. This is strongest among the Turkish group and the least strong amongst the Surinamese group. Further, in the table we can see that women and young people are much more frequently unemployed than one would expect on the basis of the characteristics they offer.

These differences between the native Dutch population and ethnic minorities can mainly be attributed to the fact that ethnic minorities have enjoyed their highest level of education in the country of origin and are less competent in the Dutch language. The differences between the actual and the expected unemployment show a marked decrease when only minority group members with Dutch educational qualifications and a good command of the Dutch language are included in the analysis. However, even then we still see that the Turkish and Moroccan groups have a higher actual unemployment than would be expected on the basis of background characteristics such as age, sex and educational level. This is also the case if there are favourable characteristics offered, whether these are Dutch diplomas, a good command of the Dutch language or a higher educational level. Even then the unemployment amongst Turks and Moroccans is considerably higher than that amongst the native Dutch population *with the same characteristics*.

However, amongst Surinamese with favourable characteristics the differences are only slight, particularly among the higher qualified. According to the SCP this is a clear indication for the strong improvement in the labour market position of the Surinamese group in recent years. Surinamese who speak good Dutch, have obtained Dutch qualifications and are highly qualified have almost the same chance of finding work as native Dutch persons with these characteristics. Generally speaking the same is true for the Antillean group. However, there is one exception to these favourable outcomes for the Surinamese and Antilleans. The equal chances of unemployment with respect to native Dutch persons with equivalent characteristics does not apply to the young people from both groups. In view of the background characteristics of Surinamese and Antillean young people, the unemployment among these groups should be about 10 percent. In reality this figure is much higher.

Summary

It can be concluded that the labour market position of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands during the 1990s – a period in which the Netherlands experienced favourable economic growth and a strong increase in jobs – improved considerably. This is revealed in the increased labour market participation of the ethnic minorities as well as (and in particular) the strong reduction in unemployment. It is fair to state that during the 1990s the labour market participation of the ethnic minorities compared to the native Dutch population showed considerable improvement (SCP, 2003). However, two qualifications need to be made with respect to these favourable outcomes. Although the relative position of the ethnic minorities on the labour market improved during the 1990s, it still lags behind that of the native Dutch population. It is disturbing that just 50 percent of all non-Western ethnic minorities of working age are in paid employment, and amongst Turks and Moroccans this figure is even lower still. Secondly we can state that this positive improvement among the ethnic minorities only took place relatively late in the 1990s. Up until 1998 the ethnic minorities did not or scarcely profited from the favourable developments in the Dutch economy. Clearly potential employees from the ethnic minority population only became attractive to employers when there was a considerable scarcity of persons on the labour market (many vacancies, few or no jobseekers).

A second conclusion concerns the difference between the various ethnic minorities. However one examines the labour market position of ethnic minorities, a difference remains between Turks, Moroccans and other non-Western ethnic minorities on the one hand and Surinamese and Antilleans on the other. The ongoing and fairly weak labour market position of Turks and Moroccans, despite the improvements noted, is largely due to the very poor baseline position of the older generation of former guest workers (little or no education, very high labour market drop-out). In other words, the relatively weak labour market position of Turks and Moroccans is partly a problem of the past that will partly disappear with a change of cohorts (entry of younger, better educated Turks and Moroccans onto the labour market). However, this is not true for the so-called other non-Western ethnic minorities, which includes many of the asylum migrants who have recently come to the Netherlands. At present little statistical data is available from this category. However, it seems that a weak labour market position not only occurs among the 'classic ethnic minorities' (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans), but also, and perhaps to a large extent, amongst new migrant groups who

have settled in the Netherlands as refugees or asylum seekers (see Snel & De Boom, 2000).

A third conclusion concerns the consequences of the recent turnaround on the labour market for the ethnic minorities. For the first time in many years, the Netherlands is once again experiencing rising unemployment. We often think that employed persons in ethnic minorities will be affected by the increasing unemployment, on the basis of 'last in, first out'. However, this is not the case. Up until 2002 (more recent figures are not available) employed persons from the Turkish and Moroccan groups were relatively unaffected by the increasing unemployment. A possible explanation for this is that many jobs disappeared among the more highly qualified professions (for example, ICT), whereas many Turkish and Moroccan employed persons carry out low-qualified work. Whatever the reason, unemployment among native Dutch persons, but also among the Surinamese and Antilleans group, clearly rose more quickly in 2002 than was the case for Turks and Moroccans. In particular the rapidly increasing youth unemployment among the Surinamese and Antilleans is seen as a non-existent problem. The Netherlands has scarcely known youth unemployment in recent years. Another pressing problem is the worsening labour market position of the category other non-Western ethnic minorities, which includes many accepted asylum migrants.

7.3 Ethnic minorities and social security


Another way of describing the labour market position of ethnic minorities is the extent to which these categories depend on social security benefits. The picture provided by this analysis does not completely agree with the previously sketched picture of the unemployment and labour market participation of ethnic minorities. For example, unemployment concerns persons who are still formally seeking work but cannot find it. If we look at people who are receiving social security benefits then this also concerns people who have left the labour market and – frequently for a very long period – are living on unemployment benefit or employment disability benefits ('labour market drop-outs'). This phenomenon has a high relative prevalence amongst ethnic minorities. A second difference with the previous analysis is that instead of survey data (which can always include a certain bias) administrative data about persons entitled to social security benefits are used. By linking the administrative data from social security offices to

municipal population registers the ethnic origin of persons entitled to social security benefits could be established (Just as in the previous section ethnic minorities are considered to be migrants born outside of the Netherlands as well as their descendants, in other words first and second generation).

At the end of 2001, almost 1.5 million people in the Netherlands claimed social security benefits. This extremely high number of persons entitled to social security benefits (for an employed working population of about 7 million people) is sometimes called 'the dark side of the Dutch miracle'. In view of the high degree of inactivity it is hardly surprising that the ethnic minorities are strongly overrepresented under the persons entitled to social security benefits. One in eight native Dutch persons aged between 14 and 65 years received social security benefits (12 percent). Amongst ethnic minorities the proportion of persons entitled to social security benefit was almost twice as high. At the end of 2001, almost one-quarter (23 percent) of the total ethnic minority population received social security benefits (see figure 7.3).

Amongst the ethnic minorities the proportion of persons entitled to social benefits is highest amongst the Turks and Moroccans. At the end of 2001, 28 percent of Turks and 20 percent of Moroccans received a social security benefit. At the end of 1999, the proportion of these ethnic minorities entitled to social security benefits was slightly higher still. For the Surinamese, Antilleans and other non-Western ethnic minorities the proportion entitled to social security benefits is lower than for the Turks and Moroccans but still considerably higher than for the native Dutch population. At the end of 2001, about one in five Surinamese and Antilleans received a social security benefit. For these two groups, and in particular for the Antilleans, the proportion entitled to social security benefits two years previously was much higher.

Figure 7.3 Persons with a social security benefit to ethnic origin, 1999-2001



Source: A. Boerdam, Veel uitkeringen onder niet-westerse allochtonen [Many non-Western ethnic minority members claim social security benefits]. In: Statistics Netherlands, Bevolkingstrends [Population trends], 1st quarter 2003 (processed by Risbo)

For all of the population categories, older people more frequently receive a social security benefit than young people. For example, at the end of 2001 the proportion of young members of ethnic minorities (15-24 years) entitled to social security benefits was just 7 percent. For the oldest age category (55-64 years) the proportion entitled to social security benefits was nine times as high (namely 59 percent). The proportion of persons entitled to social security benefits in the oldest age category is particularly high amongst the Turkish and Moroccan group. In 2001, 85 percent of Turkish men between the ages of 55 and 64 years received social security benefits. For Moroccan men in the same age group this figure was 76 percent. In comparison, about one in three native Dutch men from the oldest age category (34 percent) received a social security benefit (data not in the figure).

Figure 7.3 also reveals the type of social security benefit involved. The large number of people receiving employment disability benefits is characteristic of the Netherlands. At present there are almost one million people in the Netherlands receiving an employment disability benefit with just 7 million in employment. Amongst the ethnic minorities, a particularly large number of Turks receive employment disability benefits and again this is particularly true for Turkish men from the oldest age category. Sixty-one percent of all Turkish men aged 55 to 64 years receive an employment disability benefit. For the oldest age category of Moroccan men the proportion receiving employment disability benefits is lower at 46 percent but is still much higher than that for older native Dutch men (27 percent). The large difference in the number of persons receiving employment disability benefit between Turkish and Moroccan men on the one hand and older native Dutch men on the other can be explained by a variety of factors: the very low educational level of the Turkish and Moroccan group (for unemployment and employment disability a low educational level is a strong risk factor), the heavy work that men have often performed over many years and the fact that many Turkish and Moroccan guest workers were offered the relatively favourable employment disability benefit instead of redundancy during the process of industrial restructuring.

The overrepresentation of Turks (and to a lesser extent of Moroccans) receiving employment disability benefits is, however, not limited to the category of older men, but also occurs among young people and in particular women. Recently, this was once again confirmed by a study in 2000 into new employment disability benefits under the Dutch Employment Disability Act (WAO). The WAO is by far the most important employment disability benefit in the Netherlands. This study revealed that in that year, 4.7 percent of all working Turks had entered the WAO scheme from the labour market as opposed to 1.4 percent of all native Dutch workers. For Turkish women the influx into the WAO scheme was significantly higher than for Turkish men. During the year investigated no less than 8 percent of all working Turkish women ended up in the WAO, against 3 percent of working Turkish men (figures from Statistics Netherlands, 2003). A multiplicity of factors probably play a role in the high employment disability risk for Turkish women: they are mainly employed in low-qualified and unpleasant jobs with few opportunities for self-development, that neither the employers nor the benefit offices do much to promote reintegration, the fact that the family often insists that these women stay at home after they have had children, the stress of the

migrants daily existence, etc. For the employees in such a vulnerable position an employment disability benefit sometimes functions as a refuge in which they can temporarily seek shelter to escape the pressure (Snel et al., 2002).

As well as many people on employment disability benefits, the Moroccan group also contains a relatively large number of people on welfare benefits: 17 percent of all Moroccans between the ages of 15 and 64 years (among women 19 percent) live on welfare benefit. In comparison, the figures for the native Dutch population are 2 percent of men and 3 percent of women. However, the percentage of Surinamese and Antillean women on welfare benefit is also very high. One in seven Surinamese women live from the welfare benefit and for Antillean women the figure is one in four. It can be assumed that many of these cases are single mothers on welfare benefit, a fairly common phenomenon in these two population groups. The high number of Surinamese and Antillean women claiming welfare benefit is in stark contrast with what has previously been stated about the generally favourable labour market position of these two groups. This shows that data about the benefit dependency of ethnic minorities provides additional information and in particular about those who are not active or no longer active on the labour market and appear to permanently live on benefits.

7.4 Explaining the weaker labour market position

On the basis of the information provided up until now it can be concluded that during the 1990s, ethnic minorities managed to improve their weak position on the labour market. However, relatively speaking the ethnic minorities still exhibit low labour market participation, high unemployment and a high dependency on social security benefits. This continued weak position is particularly strong amongst the Mediterranean groups (the former guest workers and their descendants) and is present to a much lesser extent amongst the postcolonial migrants from Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles. Although the majority of available research about these groups concentrates on describing these developments, some research has also attempted to explain this weak position of the ethnic minorities (see Veenman, 1997; Dagevos, 1998; Dagevos et al., 1999; Odé, 2002). A brief summary of the findings from this research now follows.

The most important finding is that there is no one single factor which can explain the continued poor position of the ethnic minorities with respect to labour market participation and unemployment; a combination of factors is involved. The most important factor is probably a lack of *individual labour market qualifications* (level of education, work experience, command of the Dutch language). For example, we have already seen that the increased chance of unemployment of ethnic minorities compared to the native Dutch population can to a large extent, although not completely, be explained by the lower educational level and other supply characteristics of ethnic minorities. Generally speaking this is also the reason why ethnic minorities are overrepresented in the lower-qualified professions compared to the native Dutch population. With a better education, a course completed in the Netherlands and a better command the Dutch language, some of the differences in the performance between ethnic minorities and the native Dutch population on the labour market would disappear. However, inadequate individual qualifications do not completely explain this difference. If we compare the ethnic minorities with the native Dutch population using comparable characteristics then we can state that both the chance of unemployment and the chance of a lower level of employment is higher among the ethnic minorities. In other words, they are less successful at benefiting from the human capital they have acquired. This is much more the case for Turks and Moroccans than for Surinamese and Antilleans.

A second factor which can explain the labour market position of ethnic minorities are *conjunctural circumstances*. We have already seen that the labour market participation and unemployment of ethnic minorities generally fluctuates with the economic climate. The same is also true of the native Dutch population but there is one important difference. We saw that during the 1990s, ethnic minorities benefited relatively late from the improving economic situation, whereas they have been the first to suffer from the current economic malaise. This temporal difference can be explained using the theory of 'labour queuing'. Ethnic minorities, and in particular Turks and Moroccans, stand so to speak at the back of the supply queue because in the eyes of the employers they are the least productive. During a period of economic growth, job seekers who are considered to be more productive are the first to receive a job. Only if this source of proffered workers has dried up can those at the back of the queue get a chance. During periods of recession the converse is true: the less attractive jobs disappear first and those at the back of the queue are the first to become unemployed.

In the third place *structural factors* play a role in explaining the weaker position of ethnic minorities on the labour market. Many of the current ethnic minorities originally came as guest workers to the Netherlands and found work in Dutch factories. However, this fact made this group exceptionally vulnerable for the process of industrial restructuring which the Netherlands became caught up in after 1980 in particular. With the closure of factories a large number of unqualified work in the Netherlands disappeared and migrant groups suffered high levels of unemployment. The growth in employment during the 1980s mostly took place in the services sector and mostly concerned better qualified jobs. Ethnic minorities with their low level of education were insufficiently qualified for such jobs ('labour market mismatch'). In addition to this there were an increasing number of low-qualified service professions – the Swedish sociologist Esping-Andersen (1993) mentions, for example, an upcoming 'services proletariat' in the advanced Western economies – but women have better access to these positions than men. The effect is that native Dutch, Surinamese and Antillean women are benefiting from the growth in employment in the low-qualified service professions, but that Turkish and Moroccan unemployed men are not. As we have previously seen, Turkish and Moroccan women participate little in the labour market anyway.

A fourth factor that can explain the weak position of ethnic minorities, concerns *cultural factors*. This factor is incredibly controversial, but it is logical, for example, that the sustained low labour market participation of Turkish and Moroccan is partly a consequence of cultural resistance amongst these groups to working women. More generally, the extent to which the unfavourable labour market position of ethnic minorities is a consequence of the fact that these groups are generally speaking less strongly oriented to Dutch society has been investigated (Odé, 2002). The study revealed that in addition to educational level and command of the language, the cultural orientation of ethnic minorities also affects the labour market participation and the professional level achieved. In this study the cultural orientation was the extent to which ethnic minorities supported typically modern values such as individualisation and emancipation. In addition to this it was found that the level of contact with the native Dutch population was important for employment chances as well as the professional level reached by the ethnic minorities. Having typically Western or modern views and maintaining

informal contact also affected the chance of employment and the professional level achieved.²²

A fifth possible explanation for the poor position of ethnic minorities on the labour market could be that they have *less effective social networks*. In the Netherlands many jobs are offered on an informal basis: not via the employment office or job advertisements but via informal social contacts. However, to be able to make use of this one needs to have informal contacts with persons who can provide such jobs and/or have information about these. These are, therefore, people who are actively involved in the employment process and who are more likely to be members of the native Dutch population than members of ethnic minorities. The research of Odé (2002) revealed that contact with native Dutch persons was important for the chance of a job and the professional level reached by ethnic minorities.

And last but not least significant explanation for the poor position of ethnic minorities is discrimination on the labour market (Veenman, 2003b). A last possible explanation of the poor position of ethnic minorities on the labour market is discrimination. Extensive research has been done to ascertain whether discrimination according to ethnic origin exists on the Dutch labour market (see for an overview: Veenman, 2003). Bovenkerk carried out a classic study into discrimination on the labour market. In an experimental study he sent Dutch and non-Dutch applicants, who otherwise had exactly the same characteristics, to employers for a job interview. He established that in 20 percent of the cases, a Surinamese or Spanish applicants did not receive the job, but a Dutch applicant with the same characteristics did. According to Bovenkerk this was indicative of discrimination. However, this conclusion has been contested. It is quite possible that employers had reasonable arguments to take on the Dutch person and reject the foreign applicant (for example, previous experiences with Surinamese employees or the consideration that clients prefer not to be assisted by a foreign member of staff).

²² Of course the nature of the contact can be considered. Do some ethnic minority members have modern views and informal contact with native Dutch persons *because* they work and are highly educated? Or is the converse relationship true, that they have work and are better educated *because* they have modern views and informal contacts with native Dutch persons. Only in the last case can cultural orientation and social contact be considered as a reason for the greater chance of a job and the higher level of education of some ethnic minority members. With a LISREL analysis of panel data Odé (2002) showed that this second scenario holds. Having modern views is a prior condition to following a course of study and having a job.

Another means of investigating possible discrimination, is the so-called decomposition method in which, for example, the risk of unemployment amongst Dutch persons is compared with that for migrants with similar individual characteristics (educational level). An example of this analysis is given in section 7.3 of this report. This type of research has been carried out on many occasions in the Netherlands and the outcome has always been that there is a higher risk of unemployment and/or a lower professional position amongst migrants, which can only partly be explained by an inadequate educational level. An 'unexplained remnant' still remains that is not associated with the low educational level of migrants. Initially, this 'unexplained remnant' was associated with discrimination, but this does not necessarily have to be the case. Apart from the educational level and discrimination, the greater risk of unemployment and/or the lower professional level of migrants could also be due to other factors (for example, language proficiency, searching behaviour of the job-seekers, communicative skills, and so forth).

Veenman (2003b) eventually concludes that research reveals that discrimination also occurs in the Netherlands and has a negative effect on the labour market position of migrants, although we do not precisely know the extent of this problem. However, he believes that there are indications that labour market discrimination in the Netherlands has decreased in recent years. This could also be a consequence of the favourable economic growth in the Netherlands and the shortages on the labour market arising from this. If employers are experiencing considerable difficulty in finding employees, they cannot afford to reject people on the basis of skin colour or ethnic origin. Therefore it remains to be seen whether discrimination will once again resurface during the present economic recession.

7.5 Government policy to improve the labour market position of immigrants

Since the start of the 1990s, the Dutch government has carried out an explicit policy to improve the social position of immigrant groups. This policy is known as the integration policy. The aim of this policy is to ensure the equal participation of newcomers and ethnic minorities in central social institutes and in particular education and the labour market. It is not possible within a short space to extensively describe all of the policy activities

developed in the previous decennia within the framework of this integration policy. We limit ourselves to two specific lines of policy in this area: the general labour market policy and in particular the policy of subsidised employment and the specific labour market policy for ethnic minorities. For the latter we will mainly elaborate on a highly successful project to stimulate the influx of ethnic minority members as employees in small and medium-size companies.

General labour market policy (subsidised employment)

In 1999 the previous Dutch government presented an Action Plan for the labour market policy with respect to ethnic minorities. The starting point was to reduce unemployment (then still quite high) among ethnic minorities and to stimulate labour participation among ethnic minorities by means of a combination of general and specific policy. Therefore, the policy to improve the labour market position of minorities and immigrants did not necessarily require a specific approach for these groups. In addition to this, the stated objective was that at the very least, ethnic minorities had to participate equally in the instruments of the general labour market policy. For many years, an important part of the general labour market policy in the Netherlands has been the policy of subsidised employment. With the help of government funds, many tens of thousands of jobs have been created for the long-term unemployed in both the public and private sectors. As minorities are strongly overrepresented amongst the long-term unemployed then it is clear that they should at least participate equally in subsidised employment. Recent figures reveal that this policy objective of the equal participation of ethnic minorities in subsidised employment has indeed been achieved (SCP, 2003: 264-269).

Since 1998 there have been three types of subsidised employment in the Netherlands. The first type of subsidised employment is meant for long-term unemployed persons who are expected to be able to find a regular job after some time. These so called 'ID-jobs' ("Instroom en doorstroom" meaning something like 'flow in' and 'flow out') are meant as temporary jobs for long-term unemployed people to learn and gain experience. The problem is, however, that this flow out subsidised employment into the regular labour market in practice never occurred. The second arrangement is the so-called Dutch Job-Seekers Employment Act (WIW). WIW-jobs are also meant for long-term unemployed people. However, for these group the perspective of returning to the regular labour market is much smaller or even absent. ID-

jobs and WIW-jobs can both be placed in either the public sector or in private enterprises. The jobs are for a large part financed from social security funds.

Here we are interested in the extent to which members of ethnic minority groups are able to make use of these arrangements. The objective was that ethnic minorities should make use of these arrangements at least proportionally and this was indeed the case.

Table 7.5 Persons with a subsidised job according to ethnic origin (end 2002) in absolute numbers and proportionately*

	ID-jobs		WIW-jobs		WIW-work experience	
	Total number	Proportional?	Total number	Proportional?	Total number	Proportional?
(Non-Western) minorities	15280	1.6	8800	1.5	1210	1.7
Native Dutch population	25650	0.8	15600	0.8	1810	0.8
Others (incl. unknown)	12060		3030		390	
Total	53000		27520		3410	

* Proportion of the group in the measure / proportion of the group in the unemployed population (2002)
Source: Social and Cultural Planning Office, Report on minorities 2003, p. 265)

The Social and Cultural Planning Office from whom we have taken the above-mentioned information, concluded that subsidised employment fulfils a very important function for ethnic minorities. At the end of 2002 there were about 80,000 subsidised jobs (divided into three categories). More than 25,000 people working in these jobs came from ethnic minorities. Upon converting this into their percentage of the total unemployed population, the researchers from the SCP established that ethnic minorities more than equally participate in the system of subsidised employment. It was also concluded that "... for ethnic minorities subsidised work is an important instrument for reducing the distance to the labour market and for moving on to other, sometimes regular work. The importance of subsidised work only increases during lesser favourable economic conditions. The chance that vulnerable categories amongst employable persons from the ethnic minorities can find a job in the normal labour market decreases with every passing day. Subsidised work is then an invaluable alternative as result of which the relationship with the labour market is maintained" (SCP, 2003: 269).

From the viewpoint of employment for ethnic minorities it is, therefore, highly regrettable that the new government in the Netherlands has decided to reduce the funds available for subsidised work and to drastically limit the number of subsidised jobs available.

7.5.1 Specific labour market policy

The Dutch government adopts the starting point that the labour market position of ethnic minorities must be primarily improved by means of general

policy but that if necessary specific measures can also be taken ('general policy where possible, specific policy if needed'). From this starting point, specific measures have been taken in recent years to stimulate the labour market participation of ethnic minorities and to reduce the unemployment amongst these groups. Some special projects were specifically targeted to young people or women from ethnic minorities and other projects were targeted at the entire ethnic minority population. One of the most successful projects (and also a good example of specific policy to help ethnic minorities) was the covenant that the then Minister of Social Affairs and Employment reached in April 2000 with the trade organisation for small and medium-size companies in the Netherlands (the so-called MKB covenant).

This covenant was concluded at a time that employers had great difficulty in filling vacancies due to the existing shortages on the labour market. At the same time there was also a disproportionately large amount of unemployment among the ethnic minorities. The purpose of the covenant was that within a period of one year the companies concerned would register 30,000 vacancies, which would preferably be filled by members of ethnic minorities. The government (that is Work provision) and private employment agencies would actively seek potential employees from ethnic minorities. The project was extended twice due to its success. Official figures reveal that during the entire project (from April 2000 to end of December 2002) no less than 60,000 job seekers from the ethnic minority population found a job as a result of this project. To put things in perspective: this is more than 10 percent of the total number of employed persons among the ethnic minorities in 2002 (see table 7.2).

Available evaluation research²³, that only covers the first year of the project (June 2000 to June 2001), reveals that in many cases this involved stable jobs. Six months after the original placing, two thirds of those involved had a permanent contract. About three-quarters of those still working after six months still had a permanent contract a year after being placed. Unfortunately, it is not known whether these persons are still employed now that the economic situation in the Netherlands is much worse.

²³ A. Berkhout e.a. (2002), *Minderheden aan het werk. Onderzoek naar de arbeidsmarktpositie van de in het kader van het MKB-minderhedenconvenant geplaatste kandidaten*. Eindrapport. [Ethnic minorities in employment. A study into the labour market position of candidates placed within the framework of the MKB minorities covenant. Final Report.] Amsterdam: Regioplan.

It can be concluded that it is possible - at least in times of the high economic growth and shortages on the labour market - to help large numbers of people from ethnic minorities to a job. In the recent *Report on minorities* from the SCP put the apparent success of this project into perspective. For example, it was stated that the official figures (about 60,000 placements in the space of two years) probably contained double counts. Further it was established that not only the long-term unemployed from the ethnic minorities benefited from the project but in all likelihood it also benefited people who previously had other work. However, the greatest problem is that the project was concluded at the end of 2002. All things being considered, the SCP concludes that although the minorities' covenant of the MKB has been favourable (not only was the improvement of the labour market position of ethnic minorities discussed but concrete action was also taken), there is also a cynical aspect. It is in effect a procyclic policy. The project arose during a period of high economic growth but was concluded as soon as the shortage on the labour market had ended and the unemployment among ethnic minorities was again increasing. And therefore such a policy was concluded at the very moment it was most needed (SCP, 2003: pp. 281-285).

Appendices for chapter 7

Table A7.6: Gross labour participation by ethnicity* 1994-2002

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total population									
Native Dutch	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	69	70
Allochtonous	55	57	57	59	59	59	60	61	61
Western	61	62	63	64	64	65	66	66	66
non-Western	49	51	51	52	53	53	54	55	56
Turkish	42	43	44	45	44	45	49	52	51
Moroccan	40	43	42	44	45	45	40	47	50
Surinamese	59	61	62	61	66	65	69	67	67
Antillean	55	57	58	57	57	61	60	59	63
other non-Western	50	49	48	52	49	49	52	53	53
Total	53	54	54	56	56	57	58	59	60
Male									
Native Dutch	77	78	78	79	80	80	81	81	81
Allochtonous	68	69	68	69	70	70	71	70	71
Western	74	74	73	74	76	76	77	75	77
non-Western	61	63	62	62	63	64	65	65	66
Turkish	58	59	59	62	59	61	66	67	66
Moroccan	53	59	57	58	62	61	54	61	65
Surinamese	67	70	70	66	72	71	77	72	72
Antillean	67	69	67	64	69	76	66	68	70
other non-Western	61	59	59	62	58	59	64	63	63
Total	65	67	66	66	68	69	69	69	70
Female									
Native Dutch	48	50	51	52	54	55	56	57	59
Allochtonous	42	45	46	48	48	49	48	51	50
Western	47	51	52	53	53	55	55	57	56
non-Western	36	38	39	41	42	41	41	44	45
Turkish	23	27	28	26	26	28	30	36	35
Moroccan	25	21	23	26	28	27	22	31	34
Surinamese	50	52	54	57	61	60	62	62	62
Antillean	44	47	49	51	47	49	55	51	57
other non-Western	35	36	36	40	38	37	39	41	41
Total	39	41	42	44	44	45	45	48	49

* first and second generation immigrants (=“allochtonous”)

Table A7.7: Net labour participation by ethnicity 1994-2002

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total population									
Native Dutch	58	60	61	62	64	66	67	67	68
Allochtonous	46	47	48	50	52	54	55	57	56
Western	54	55	56	58	60	62	63	63	63
non-Western	37	37	39	42	44	45	48	50	50
Turkish	29	30	33	35	36	40	44	48	46
Moroccan	29	29	30	35	36	37	34	42	45
Surinamese	47	49	52	53	58	58	63	62	61
Antillean	43	44	46	45	49	53	55	55	57
other non-Western	35	33	36	38	39	41	45	47	45
Total	42	43	45	46	49	51	53	55	55
Male									
Native Dutch	73	74	75	76	78	78	79	80	79
Allochtonous	56	57	58	60	63	65	67	66	66
Western	67	67	67	69	72	73	75	73	74
non-Western	45	46	48	49	53	55	59	60	59
Turkish	41	43	44	49	50	54	61	62	59
Moroccan	36	41	41	45	49	51	48	56	59
Surinamese	54	56	59	57	63	63	72	66	67
Antillean	53	56	54	51	60	67	61	62	64
other non-Western	42	41	43	44	46	50	55	56	54
Total	52	53	54	56	59	62	64	65	65
Female									
Native Dutch	43	45	46	48	50	52	54	55	56
Allochtonous	35	37	39	41	42	44	44	47	46
Western	40	44	46	47	48	51	51	54	53
non-Western	28	28	30	34	35	35	36	40	40
Turkish	16	17	21	19	21	24	26	33	32
Moroccan	20	14	15	22	22	21	19	26	30
Surinamese	40	44	45	49	54	53	55	59	56
Antillean	34	33	38	40	39	41	50	48	50
other non-Western	25	24	27	31	31	29	33	36	35
Total	31	32	34	37	38	39	41	44	44

* first and second generation immigrants (=“allochtonous”)

Table A7.8: unemployment rate by ethnicity 1994-2002

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total population									
Native Dutch	7	7	6	5	4	3	3	3	3
Allochtonous	17	17	15	14	11	9	8	6	8
Western	11	11	10	9	6	5	5	4	5
non-Western	25	26	22	20	16	14	11	9	10
Turkish	30	31	25	22	17	13	9	8	9
Moroccan	29	32	29	21	20	18	13	10	10
Surinamese	19	19	16	14	12	10	9	6	8
Antillean	22	23	21	21	15	13	8	8	10
other non-Western	31	32	26	27	20	17	14	11	14
Total	21	22	19	17	13	11	9	7	9
Male									
Native Dutch	5	5	4	3	3	2	2	2	3
Allochtonous	17	16	15	13	10	8	6	6	7
Western	9	9	9	8	5	4	3	3	4
non-Western	27	26	22	21	17	13	10	9	11
Turkish	30	28	25	21	16	12	8	8	10
Moroccan	33	31	28	23	20	17	12	8	10
Surinamese	19	20	15	13	13	10	7	8	7
Antillean	21	18	19	20	13	12	8	9	8
other non-Western	32	31	27	29	20	15	14	10	14
Total	21	20	18	17	13	10	8	7	8
Female									
Native Dutch	10	10	10	8	6	5	5	4	4
Allochtonous	18	19	16	14	12	10	9	7	8
Western	15	14	12	12	9	7	7	6	6
non-Western	23	27	22	19	16	15	12	9	10
Turkish	31	39	26	25	18	15	12	7	8
Moroccan	18	37	35	16	20	22	15	15	9
Surinamese	20	17	17	15	12	10	11	5	9
Antillean	23	29	23	21	18	15	9	7	11
other non-Western	27	33	25	23	20	21	14	12	13
Total	21	25	21	17	15	13	10	8	9

* first and second generation immigrants (=“allochtonous”)

Labour market integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the Netherlands

Table A7.9: Persons with a social security benefit, 1999

	social assistance		unemployment		disability		total	
	abs (x1000)	%	abs (x1000)	%	abs (x1000)	%	abs (x1000)	%
Total Population								
Total	420,3	3,9	205	1,9	891,8	8,3	1509,5	14
Native Dutch	223,3	2,5	160,6	1,8	737,7	8,4	1118,6	12,7
Western	48	4,8	22,9	2,3	86	8,6	156,1	15,6
non-Western	149	15,8	21,6	2,3	68,1	7,2	234,8	24,8
Turkish	28,8	14,1	6,9	3,4	26,2	12,8	60,6	29,8
Moroccan	29,6	17,6	3,8	2,3	15	8,9	47,7	28,4
Surinamese	27,3	12,8	4,7	2,2	17	8	48	22,4
Antillean	13,7	18,5	1,4	1,8	3	4	17,8	24,1
other non-Western	49,6	17,3	4,8	1,7	6,9	2,4	60,7	21,2
Male								
Total male	162,8	3	115,1	2,1	522,8	9,6	794,6	14,6
Native Dutch	79	1,8	89,3	2	432,4	9,7	598	13,4
Western	18,4	3,7	13	2,6	48,8	9,9	79,8	16,2
non-Western	65,4	13,3	12,8	2,6	41,6	8,5	116,7	23,7
Turkish	12,9	12	3,9	3,7	15,9	14,8	31,4	29,4
Moroccan	14,1	15,5	2,8	3,1	11,7	12,8	27,7	30,3
Surinamese	9,7	9,6	2,2	2,1	8,1	8	19,7	19,4
Antillean	5	13,6	0,7	1,9	1,5	4	7	19,3
other non-Western	23,7	15,3	3,2	2	4,4	2,8	30,9	19,9
Female								
Total female	257,5	4,9	89,9	1,7	369	7	714,8	13,5
Native Dutch	144,3	3,3	71,3	1,6	305,3	7	520,5	12
Western	29,6	5,8	9,8	1,9	37,2	7,4	76,3	15,1
non-Western	83,6	18,4	8,8	1,9	26,5	5,8	118	26
Turkish	15,9	16,4	3	3,1	10,3	10,6	29,2	30,2
Moroccan	15,5	20,2	1	1,3	3,3	4,3	20	26,2
Surinamese	17,6	15,7	2,5	2,3	8,9	7,9	28,2	25,2
Antillean	8,7	23,3	0,7	1,8	1,5	4,1	10,7	28,8
other non-Western	25,9	19,7	1,6	1,2	2,5	1,9	29,8	22,7

* first and second generation immigrants (= "allochthonous")

Table A7.10: Persons with a social security benefit, 2001

Herkomstgroepering	social assistance		unemployment		disability		total	
	abs (x1000)	%	abs (x1000)	%	abs (x1000)	%	abs (x1000)	%
Total Population								
Total	375,2	3,4	155,6	1,4	948,4	8,7	1469,7	13,5
Native Dutch	188,1	2,1	118,4	1,3	777,3	8,8	1080	12,2
Western	41,7	4,1	17,9	1,7	90	8,8	148,6	14,5
non-Western	145,4	13,8	19,3	1,8	81	7,7	241	22,8
Turkish	25,8	11,7	6,1	2,8	30,7	14	61,2	27,9
Moroccan	29,1	15,9	3,6	2	17,9	9,8	49,5	27,2
Surinamese	23,7	10,5	3,9	1,7	19,5	8,6	45,9	20,4
Antillean	14,2	16,3	1,2	1,4	3,7	4,3	18,9	21,7
other non-Western	52,7	15,4	4,5	1,3	9,2	2,7	65,6	19,1
Male								
Total male	140,8	2,5	88,8	1,6	529,8	9,6	753,5	13,6
Native Dutch	64,1	1,4	67,4	1,5	434,9	9,7	564,2	12,6
Western	15,4	3	10,3	2	48,6	9,6	73,8	14,6
non-Western	61,4	11,2	11,1	2	46,4	8,5	115,5	21,1
Turkish	10,9	9,5	3,2	2,8	17,2	15	30,1	26,2
Moroccan	13,3	13,6	2,6	2,6	13	13,3	27,7	28,4
Surinamese	8,2	7,7	1,8	1,7	8,8	8,2	18,4	17,2
Antillean	4,7	10,9	0,6	1,5	1,8	4,1	7	16,3
other non-Western	24,3	13,1	2,9	1,6	5,6	3	32,3	17,5
Female								
Total female	234,4	4,4	66,8	1,2	418,5	7,8	716,2	13,3
Native Dutch	124	2,9	50,9	1,2	342,5	7,9	515,8	11,9
Western	26,4	5,1	7,6	1,5	41,5	8	74,8	14,4
non-Western	84	16,5	8,2	1,6	34,6	6,8	125,6	24,7
Turkish	14,9	14,2	2,9	2,8	13,5	12,9	31,1	29,7
Moroccan	15,8	18,7	1	1,2	4,9	5,8	21,8	25,8
Surinamese	15,5	13,1	2,1	1,8	10,7	9	27,5	23,2
Antillean	9,5	21,6	0,6	1,4	2	4,4	11,9	27
other non-Western	28,3	18	1,6	1	3,6	2,3	33,2	21,1

* first and second generation immigrants (= "allochthonous")

**Appendix: Tables for the OECD
publication 'Trends in
International Migration'**

Table B.1.1. NETHERLANDS, inflows of foreign population by nationality

Thousands

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
United Kingdom	6,496	4,971	3,537	3,650	4,341	4,327	4,741	5,018	5,855	5,886	4,829
Germany	7,107	7,446	6,146	4,655	5,695	5,693	4,746	4,491	4,855	5,064	5,091
Turkey	9,146	7,757	4,280	4,757	6,399	6,522	5,120	4,215	4,517	4,804	5,434
Morocco	7,150	5,877	3,192	3,100	4,272	4,500	5,310	4,427	4,160	4,900	4,919
United States	2,910	2,606	2,209	2,202	3,145	3,112	3,274	3,343	3,365	3,118	3,042
France	1,795	1,549	1,433	..	1,719	2,052	2,059	2,022	2,166	2,158	2,037
Suriname	6,885	7,840	2,890	1,716	2,755	2,595	3,200	1,802	2,067	2,196	2,171
Belgium	2,248	1,987	1,699	1,309	1,949	2,213	1,933	1,995	1,953	1,834	1,800
China	..	1,098	1,024	..	1,305	1,643	1,388	1,273	1,824	2,816	3,428
Italy	0,970	1,013	0,870	..	1,153	1,244	1,381	1,503	1,525	1,524	1,447
Poland	1,426	1,310	0,758	..	1,385	1,397	1,464	0,891	1,316	1,437	1,593
Japan	..	1,011	1,103	..	1,253	1,206	1,220	1,317	1,291	1,302	1,310
Spain	1,011	1,264	1,157	1,182	1,286	1,362	1,394
Iran	1,576	0,290	0,307	0,392	0,466	0,381
Somalia	1,392	0,285	0,182	0,137	0,780	0,058
Former Yugoslavia	4,856	8,912	8,449	7,349	3,383	1,578	1,421	0,735	1,392	1,135	0,845
Other countries	32,033	34,196	30,834	38,234	37,412	34,422	42,712	43,662	53,282	54,427	46,840
Total	83,022	87,573	68,424	66,972	77,177	76,736	81,701	78,365	91,383	94,507	86,619
<i>Of which:</i> EU ¹	22,251	19,725	15,995	14,794	19,225	20,287	19,909	20,439	22,060	22,412	21,044

Source: Statistics Netherlands

1. European Union 15 for all years.

Table B.1.2. NETHERLANDS, outflows of foreign population by nationality

	Thousands											
	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Germany	2,738	2,880	2,998	3,185	2,858	3,530	3,060	3,047	2,995	3,219	2,956	3,081
United Kingdom	2,444	2,424	2,589	2,796	2,932	2,480	2,320	2,617	2,468	2,363	2,101	2,202
United States	1,690	1,879	1,913	1,832	1,527	1,940	2,201	1,789	1,836	1,747	1,667	1,782
Japan	0,865	0,920	..	1,098	1,081	0,997	1,113	1,067	1,054	1,234
Belgium	1,328	1,325	1,099	1,344	0,853	1,215	1,145	0,970	0,955	0,990	1,000	0,996
France	0,870	0,834	0,699	0,789	..	0,773	0,786	0,773	0,787	0,961	0,861	0,974
Turkey	1,700	1,814	1,744	1,630	1,581	1,472	1,130	0,930	0,686	0,627	0,522	0,445
Italy	0,545	0,502	0,433	0,498	..	0,503	0,520	0,550	0,612	0,640	0,644	0,682
Morocco	1,060	1,027	1,099	1,151	1,100	1,049	0,843	0,602	0,500	0,404	0,436	0,372
Poland	1,192	0,217	..	0,311	0,368	0,398	0,341	0,304	0,360	0,307
China	0,121	0,165	..	0,179	0,196	0,212	0,212	0,194	0,209	0,355
Suriname	0,584	0,661	0,625	0,520	0,392	0,327	0,317	0,255	0,172	0,167	0,109	0,126
Former Yugoslavia	..	0,306	0,332	0,322	..	0,350	0,359	0,387	0,143	0,354	0,306	0,301
Other countries	8,371	9,081	6,494	7,377	10,430	7,177	7,614	7,739	7,845	7,690	8,172	8,300
Total	21,330	22,733	22,203	22,746	21,673	22,404	21,940	21,266	20,665	20,727	20,397	21,157
<i>Of which:</i> EU ¹	9,614	10,017	10,497	10,444	10,034	10,659	10,023	10,286	10,126	10,810	10,154	10,645

Source: Statistics Netherlands

1. European Union 15 for all years.

Table B.1.3. NETHERLANDS, inflows of asylum seekers by nationality

	Thousands											
	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Angola	0,160	0,120	0,540	1,370	0,740	0,420	0,370	0,610	1,585	2,193	4,111	1,891
Afghanistan	0,297	0,352	1,503	2,527	1,912	3,019	5,920	7,118	4,400	5,050	3,614	1,077
Sierra Leone	..	0,030	0,100	0,080	0,390	0,250	0,390	0,480	1,280	2,023	2,405	1,620
Iran	1,726	1,298	2,610	6,075	2,698	1,521	1,253	1,679	1,527	2,550	1,519	0,665
Guinea	0,070	0,050	0,090	0,120	0,340	0,526	1,394	1,467	0,476
Turkey	0,914	0,721	0,635	0,618	0,700	0,692	1,135	1,222	1,490	2,270	1,400	0,638
Iraq	0,684	0,770	3,229	2,858	2,431	4,378	9,641	8,300	3,703	2,780	1,329	1,022
Somalia	1,710	4,246	4,330	5,393	3,977	1,461	1,280	2,775	2,731	2,110	1,098	0,538
Bosnia Herzegovina	..	0,810	4,940	8,640	4,220	0,980	1,970	3,770	1,170	1,652	1,026	0,221
Russian Federation	..	0,410	0,630	1,140	0,620	0,550	0,460	0,520	1,000	1,039	0,941	0,420
Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia	..	4,770	4,690	4,110	1,560	0,800	1,650	4,290	7,130	3,851	0,908	0,516
Sudan	..	0,094	0,160	0,258	0,604	0,658	0,678	1,875	1,694	1,420	0,869	0,513
China	1,310	0,230	0,896	0,874	0,477	0,468	1,158	0,917	1,246	1,400	0,706	0,541
Sri Lanka	1,821	1,034	1,902	1,811	1,315	1,483	1,497	1,049	0,856	0,970	0,676	0,298
Azerbaijan	..	0,010	0,020	0,100	0,130	0,190	0,320	1,270	2,450	1,163	0,634	0,335
Armenia	..	0,040	0,350	1,080	0,360	0,360	0,430	0,710	1,250	0,812	0,529	0,427
Syria	0,550	0,240	0,270	0,390	0,260	0,310	0,460	0,830	0,850	1,077	0,522	0,322
Dem. Rep. of Congo	0,300	0,480	1,305	2,180	0,771	0,435	0,592	0,411	0,25	0,530	0,500	0,522
Congo										..	0,492	0,339
Algeria	0,080	0,150	0,343	1,351	0,651	0,442	0,526	0,821	0,635	0,430	0,328	0,202
Slovak Republic	0,250	0,470	0,130	0,180	0,110	0,320	0,460	0,998	0,233	0,200
Romania	1,662	0,960	1,085	2,762	0,378	0,130	0,075	0,059	0,080	0,070	0,034	0,060
Former USSR	1,013	0,627	1,599	4,525	1,887	1,678	1,958	3,230	5,520	4,220	3,200	1,891
Former Yugoslavia	2,733	5,621	10,189	13,438	6,149	1,974	3,788	8,329	7,125	5,700	2,210	0,847
Liberia	0,335	0,342	0,702	0,411	0,343	0,635	0,471	0,193	0,175	0,240	0,170	0,292
Other countries	6,320	3,031	3,751	5,115	3,395	2,633	3,021	4,659	6,596	6,465	5,696	4,713
Total	21,615	20,346	35,399	52,576	29,258	22,857	34,443	45,217	42,729	43,890	32,579	18,667

Source: Statistics Netherlands

Table B.1.4. **NETHERLANDS, stock of foreign-born population by country of birth**

	Thousands									
	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Surinam	182,921	180,894	180,961	181,568	182,234	184,184	184,979	186,469	188,002	189,007
Turkey	165,960	165,977	167,498	169,284	172,662	175,476	178,027	181,865	186,204	190,488
Indonesia	183,651	180,426	177,668	174,762	172,134	170,327	168,011	165,781	163,853	161,443
Morocco	139,402	139,772	140,734	142,683	145,753	149,618	152,693	155,819	159,757	163,422
Germany	129,385	131,223	130,127	128,048	126,797	125,540	124,237	123,110	122,074	120,573
Former Yugoslavia	29,726	37,172	43,779	46,094	46,717	47,541	50,535	53,865	55,878	56,157
Belgium	44,038	43,216	43,252	43,329	43,954	44,600	45,343	46,003	46,473	46,847
United Kingdom	44,841	43,251	42,306	41,714	42,312	42,677	43,627	45,670	47,937	48,502
Iraq	4,753	7,426	10,206	14,446	20,356	27,297	29,892	33,748	35,981	35,793
Somalia	11,931	14,904	17,171	19,819	20,611	21,047	21,433	21,720	21,084	19,560
China	15,219	15,218	16,106	16,910	18,019	19,386	20,629	22,706	25,786	28,686
United States	16,955	17,120	17,443	17,923	18,618	19,464	20,349	21,356	22,051	22,543
Iran	10,840	12,657	14,879	17,264	18,488	19,267	20,082	21,469	23,246	24,154
Afghanistan	7,184	10,754	14,619	19,842	24,277	28,470	30,959
Spain	17,488	17,478	17,399	17,439	17,622	17,886	18,047	18,273	18,570	18,666
France	15,347	15,354	15,422	15,784	16,494	17,240	17,923	18,657	19,302	19,518
Italy	15,571	15,383	15,463	15,583	15,936	15,933	16,741	17,207	17,587	17,749
Poland	12,422	12,887	13,550	14,348	15,073	15,933	16,319	17,351	18,627	20,095
Former USSR	5,651	6,612	8,380	10,138	11,707	13,721	16,131	21,559	27,062	30,791
Cape verde	10,632	10,813	10,972	11,012	11,053	11,227	11,340
Ghana	10,206	9,685	9,617	9,783	10,204	10,637	10,880	11,201	11,484	11,798
India	9,477	9,165	9,318	9,483	9,878	10,405	10,735	11,074	11,421	11,616
Pakistan	9,552	9,620	9,791	9,987	10,154	10,268	10,512	10,827	10,991	11,096
Vietnam	9,935	9,578	9,671	9,830	9,984	10,216	10,389	10,646	11,098	11,656
Portugal	9,136	8,951	8,975	8,908	8,975	9,222	9,685	10,218	10,969	11,510
Sri Lanka	7,178	7,432	7,868	8,048	8,401	8,789	9,231	9,720	10,135	10,418
Australia	8,645	8,687	8,967	9,209	9,529	9,932	10,141
Egypt	7,779	7,607	7,824	8,003	8,331	8,807	9,156	9,459	9,908	10,381
Ethiopia	6,379	6,740	7,034	7,052	7,119	7,198	7,341	7,592	7,874	8,059
Greece	6,632	6,565	6,477	6,470	6,720	6,861	7,110	7,375	7,682	7,917
Philippines	4,997	5,115	5,462	5,836	6,182	6,492	6,726	7,117	7,522	7,959
Japan	5,309	5,457	5,515	5,520	5,584	5,678	5,734	5,879	6,038	6,035
Ireland	4,803	4,530	4,424	4,359	4,400	4,226	4,288	4,425	4,545	4,558
Other countries	237,877	239,965	242,766	226,725	237,362	253,423	269,489	292,357	315,811	334,718
Total	1 375,361	1 387,380	1 407,086	1 433,601	1 469,035	1 513,917	1 556,337	1 615,377	1 674,581	1 714,155
% of total population	9,0	9,0	9,1	9,2	9,4	9,6	9,8	10,1	10,4	10,6

Source: Statistics Netherlands

Table B.1.5. NETHERLANDS, stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2000-2002		
												2000	2001	2002
Morocco	165,138	164,567	158,653	149,800	138,700	135,700	128,600	119,700	111,396	104,262	97,843	53,089	50,204	47,507
Turkey	212,450	202,618	182,089	154,300	127,000	114,700	102,000	100,700	100,782	100,309	100,286	50,761	50,790	50,89
Germany	49,333	52,053	53,363	53,900	53,500	53,900	54,100	54,300	54,811	55,572	56,060	27,650	28,116	28,502
United Kingdom	44,117	44,672	43,008	41,100	39,300	39,200	38,800	39,500	41,404	43,604	44,052	16,532	17,234	17,465
Belgium	24,023	24,164	24,135	24,100	24,000	24,400	24,800	25,400	25,860	26,148	26,306	13,627	13,765	13,975
Italy	18,809	17,450	17,461	17,400	17,300	17,400	17,600	17,900	18,248	18,559	18,730	6,303	6,490	6,597
Spain	17,284	16,790	16,831	16,700	16,600	16,600	16,800	16,900	17,155	17,449	17,505	8,179	8,433	8,539
United States	13,002	13,382	12,761	12,800	12,600	13,000	13,389	14,074	14,751	15,217	15,412	7,236	7,470	7,632
Portugal	9,352	9,622	9,230	9,100	8,800	8,700	8,800	9,200	9,765	10,585	11,257	4,419	4,738	5,018
Greece	5,554	5,790	5,627	5,400	5,200	5,300	5,300	5,500	5,692	6,015	6,244	1,978	2,087	2,206
Tunisia	2,560	2,415	2,124	1,900	1,900	1,500	1,400	1,300	1,300	1,276	1,242	0,504	0,524	0,511
Former Yugoslavia	16,788	24,678	29,577	33,500	32,800	28,400	22,300	15,600	12,904	12,122	11,754	6,311	5,971	5,908
Other countries	195,786	226,319	231,856	238,900	235,000	247,700	250,811	245,500	253,734	279,275	293,263	126,387	138,345	146,471
Total	757,408	779,842	757,138	725,400	679,900	678,100	662,400	651,500	667,802	690,393	699,954	322,976	334,167	341,221
<i>Of which:</i> EU	189,035	193,913	193,100	191,100	188,300	190,200	192,200	195,900	201,574	207,858	210,549	93,834	96,636	98,324
Total women	343,744	356,939	348,305	335,396	318,800	320,800	316,200	313,900	322,976	334,167	341,221			

Source: Statistics Netherlands

1. Including Hong Kong.

2. European Union 15 for all years.

Table B.1.6. NETHERLANDS, acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Morocco	7 300	7 990	7 750	8 110	13 480	15 600	10 480	11 250	14 220	13 471	12 721	12033
Turkey	6 110	11 520	18 000	23 870	33 060	30 700	21 190	13 480	5 210	4 708	5 513	5391
Bosnia Herzegovina	127	2 056	3 873	5 416	2 646	883	..
Iraq	854	798	2 721	3 834	2 403	2 315	2367
Suriname	4 010	5 120	4 990	5 390	3 990	4 450	3 020	2 990	3 190	2 008	2 025	1957
Somalia	3 002	2 141	4 918	3 487	1 634	873	378
Iran	2 299	1 285	1 806	2 560	1 375	754	336
China	1 394	975	800	977	1 002	1 111	908
Afghanistan	360	217	905	1 847	945	803	1118
Poland	1 129	827	677	688	587	597	530
Germany	380	380	330	310	500	780	560	560	580	508	573	608
Egypt	30	30	350	540	810	1 080	550	390	500	443	528	437
Russian Federation	302	288	289	489	422	335	..
United Kingdom	900	670	490	460	820	1 170	690	580	450	374	356	394
Former Yugoslavia	520	1 060	2 090	1 880	1 700	2 240	2 830	6 670	7 990	3 809	1 647	938
Former Soviet Union	591	586	826	1 510	1 103	879	758
Stateless	360	210	180	170	610	820	680	120	4 620	7 400	7 800	9647
Others	9 500	9 260	8 890	8 720	16 470	15 802	10 657	6 315	4 522	5 130	6 954	7 521
Total	29 110	36 240	43 070	49 450	71 440	82 700	59 830	59 170	62 090	49 968	46 667	45 321

Source: Statistics Netherlands

Table III.22. Current figures on flows and stocks of total population and labour force in the Netherlands

Figures in thousands unless otherwise indicated

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002		1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	
Migration flows														
<i>Total population</i>														
Inflows	109,9	122,4	119,2	132,9	133,4	121,3	Refugees and asylum seekers							
Outflows (incl. Adm. Corrections)	82,0	79,3	78,8	79,0	82,6	96,9	New requests for asylum	34,5	45,2	42,7	43,9	32,6	18,7	
Net migration	47,6	62,0	60,1	71,6	70,1	54,5	Total requests for asylum heard	..	38,9	
Adjusted total net migration	27,9	43,1	40,4	53,9	50,8	24,3	Total grants of asylum	17,0	15,1	13,5	9,7	8,2	4,8	
<i>Persons born in the Netherlands</i>								Expulsions						
Inflows	22,7	26,0	25,0	23,8	23,2	21,4	Of which: asylum seekers	18,9	14,3	18,3	16,6	16,0	21,3	
Outflows (incl. Adm. Corrections)	37,8	35,8	35,8	37,4	39,4	43,6	Employment							
Adjusted total net migration	-15,1	-9,8	-10,8	-13,6	-16,2	-22,2	Total foreign employment	4	208	235	
<i>Foreign born</i>								Employment of Dutch nationals						
Inflows	87,1	96,4	94,2	109,0	110,3	99,8	born abroad and foreigners	5	543	579	
Outflows (incl. Adm. Corrections)	44,1	43,5	43,0	41,6	43,2	53,3	Total "allochtonous" employment	5	910	972	1 032	1 083	1 152	
Adjusted total net migration	43,0	52,9	51,2	67,5	67,1	46,5	(new definition)	6	910	972	1 032	1 083	1 152	
Stock of population								Labour force indicators according to the new definition of "Autochtonous" and "Allochtonous" populations						
Total population	15 654,2	15 760,2	15 863,9	15 987,1	16 105,3	16 192,6	Total							
Total foreign population	678,1	662,4	651,5	667,8	690,4	699,5	Total labour force (thousands)	6 838	6 957	7 097	7 187	7 311	7 444	
<i>Of which:</i>								Activity rate	65	66	67	67	68	68
Morocco	135,7	128,6	119,7	111,4	104,3	97,8	Unemployment rate	6	5	4	4	3	4	
Turkey	114,7	102,0	100,7	100,8	100,3	100,3	Autochtonous							
Germany	53,9	54,1	54,3	54,8	55,6	56,1	Total labour force (thousands)	5 767	5 852	5 943	6 013	6 079	6 166	
United Kingdom	39,2	38,8	39,5	41,4	43,6	44,1	Activity rate	66	67	68	69	69	70	
Belgium	24,4	24,8	25,4	25,9	26,1	26,3	Unemployment rate	5	4	3	3	3	3	
Total foreign-born population	1 469,0	1 513,9	1 556,3	1 615,4	1 674,6	1 714,2	Allochtonous							
<i>Of which:</i>								Total labour force (thousands)	1 055	1 086	1 130	1 173	1 232	1 278
Surinam	182,2	184,2	185,0	186,5	188,0	189,0	Activity rate	59	59	59	60	61	61	
Turkey	172,7	175,5	178,0	181,9	186,2	190,5	Unemployment rate	7	14	11	9	8	8	
Indonesia	172,1	170,3	168,0	165,8	163,9	161,4	Surinam							
Morocco	145,8	149,6	152,7	155,8	159,8	163,4	Total labour force (thousands)	122	135	135	148	147	151	
Germany	126,8	125,5	124,2	123,1	122,1	120,6	Activity rate	61	66	65	69	67	67	
Naturalisations	59,8	59,2	62,1	50,0	46,7	45,3	Unemployment rate	7	14	12	10	9	6	8
<i>Of which:</i>								Turkey						
Morocco	10,5	11,3	14,2	13,5	12,7	12,0	Total labour force (thousands)	83	84	90	101	112	113	
Turkey	21,2	13,5	5,2	4,7	5,5	5,4	Activity rate	45	44	45	49	52	51	
Bosnia Herzegovina	2,1	3,9	5,4	2,6	0,9	-	Unemployment rate	7	22	17	13	9	8	9
Iraq	0,8	2,7	3,8	2,4	2,3	2,4	Morocco							
Suriname	3,0	3,0	3,2	2,0	2,0	2,0	Total labour force (thousands)	65	71	74	67	83	93	
Naturalisation rate (%)	8,8	8,7	9,4	7,7			Activity rate	44	45	45	40	47	50	
							Unemployment rate	7	21	20	18	13	10	10
							Antilles/Aruba							
							Total labour force (thousands)	35	37	43	46	49	57	
							Activity rate	57	57	61	60	59	63	
							Unemployment rate	7	21	8	8	10

1. Data are taken from population registers, which include some asylum seekers.

2. The administrative corrections account for unreported entries and departures on the population register.

3. Data are from population registers and refer to the population on 31 December of the years indicated. Figures include administrative corrections.

4. Estimates are for 31 March and include cross-border workers, but exclude the self-employed and family workers.

Sources: Statistics Netherlands; Ministry of Justice; Labour Force Survey.

5. "Allochtonous" refers to persons who have at least one parent

6. Autochtonous refers to persons who have both parents who

7. Persons who have at least one parent who is born in the men

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